

The Mandate Assessment of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)



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Abstract

The AU established the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as the first regional peacekeeping mission to intervene in Somalia. On 31 March 2022, it was replaced by the African Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which was given a transitional mandate until December 2024. This reconfiguration necessitates a fresh look and reassessment of ATMIS's mandate.

This paper analyzes and examines the reconfiguration decisions and resolutions of the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The central issue is whether ATMIS, under its current mandate, can feasibly conclude its operations within the abbreviated timeframe, considering Somalia's ongoing security challenges. The study explores whether ATMIS's existing mandate adequately addresses these security challenges and proposes revising the handover process to better align with current situational demands and priorities, as necessary.

Keywords: African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, peace keeping mission, Somalia, African Union.

1. Introduction

On behalf of the international community, the AU provided peacekeeping troops to Somalia in response to the Somali Government's request a decade ago¹ to help the Somali government stand still and respond to the long-existing security problems in Somalia since the fall of the central government of Somalia in 1991. For that purpose, the AU established the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as the first regional peacekeeping to intervene in Somalia, which is being replaced by the African Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is defined as “a multidimensional mission (military, police and civilian), authorised by the African Union and mandated by the United Nations Security Council – AU Peace and Security Council Communique for 1068th Meeting and UN Security Council Resolution 2628 (2022). It replaces the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with a clear mandate to fully implement the Somali Transition Plan (STP). ATMIS became operational on 1 April 2022.² The UNSC's decision to change the name and mandate from AMISIOM to ATMIS came after the Somali Government, AU, and international partners agreed to reduce the footprints of AU troops in Somalia. Eighteen thousand five hundred eighty-six (18,586) military and one thousand forty (1,040) police uniform personnel operate in Somalia. ATMIS's role of engagement is to assist the Somali government since the Somali Government has some overwhelming security and state-building challenges. In line with UNSC resolution no. 2628, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is mandated to achieve several strategic objectives before its mandate concludes in December 2024. These objectives include reducing the threat posed by armed opposition groups, which Al-Shabaab is at the forefront, supporting the capacity building of the integrated Somali security and police forces, conducting a phased handover of security responsibilities to the Somali authorities, and supporting peace and reconciliation efforts within the country.³

Due to the reconfiguration of the mission, some academic and research deliberations focus on AMISOM, the previous version of ATMIS.⁴ International Humanitarian law aspects have also been discussed, concentrating on violations of human rights in AMISOM military operations and perpetrators to be held accountable.⁵

This study focuses on the ATMIS mission and discusses whether its mandate is commendable and forward-looking in addressing the current security challenges in Somalia. The endorsement of this mandate by the AU PSC and UN SC is likely influenced by Somalia's complex and difficult security situation over the past decades. The study examines various perspectives and adopts a legalistic approach by assessing the scope and role of ATMIS and its implementation within the current Somali context. This paper analyzes the AU PSC Communique and UN SC resolution dated March 3, 2022, and March 31, 2022, as well as other relevant academic and legal documents, synthesizing whether the ATMIS mandate is deliverable and achievable within the given time frame.

The study is significant as it helps the Somali Government and other relevant stakeholders to gain a thorough understanding of the terms of the ATMIS mandate and effectively address it. This contributes to the adoption of necessary policies, strategies, and decisions, particularly as the mandate's scheduled expiry date approaches.⁶ Additionally, it represents a valuable addition to the existing literature in this field.

2. African Union Mission in Somalia: From AMISOM to ATMIS

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), later reconfigured to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), represents a significant evolution in regional peacekeeping efforts, addressing complex security challenges and supporting Somalia's journey towards

stability and self-reliance. It was established to support governmental structures in ensuring stability and backing the state-building process.

2.1 AMISOM Mission

AMISOM was established and deployed in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union.⁷ In February 2005, the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) authorized and mandated a peacekeeping mission to Somalia and requested the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to deploy a peace-support mission to Somalia. In March 2005, following the decision of the AU PSC, IGAD officially established the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) to address the deteriorating situation in Somalia, although the mission has never been deployed and has never become operational in the field.⁸

On June 15, 2006, Somalia's transitional federal parliament voted to deploy an African peacekeeping force to support the fragile Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) in its efforts to restore law and order and re-establish state institutions.⁹ In response to this decision and acting under Articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC approved the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on January 19, 2007.¹⁰ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1744 (2007) authorized the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping mission to Somalia with a mandate of six months.

The initial mandate of the AMISOM peacekeeping mission was to support a National Reconciliation Congress created by the TFG for reconciliation purposes. The original mandate did not include offensive military measures. In 2014, the mandate of AMISOM was broadened and extended to engage in offensive operations under UNSC Resolution 2182 (2014). AMISOM's mandate was extended with each review period until

it was replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) on April 1, 2022, with a two-year mandate lasting until December 2024.¹¹

2.2 Mission Reconfiguration – ATMIS

The reconfiguration of the mission came after the Somali government assessed the security progress made in recent years, leading to the decision to conclude the African Union mission in Somalia. In response to and to fulfill the Somali government's request, Somalia's security partners developed the Somali Transitional Plan (STP). This plan aimed to facilitate the reduction of AU troops in Somalia. Deliberations on the STP began in 2018 and involved successive meetings chaired by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), attended by representatives from AU troop-contributing countries, the UN, and international partners, and included field visits to five Federal Member States.¹²

After concluding these discussions, the Somali Government and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) endorsed the Transition Plan, which the UN Security Council subsequently supported.¹³ The STP focused on three priority areas—operational activities, institutional capacity building, and supporting activities—to facilitate a smooth transition of security responsibilities to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), aligned with the Somali National Architecture.¹⁴

In line with this, on December 29, 2021, the FGS and AMISOM issued a joint statement on the outcomes of the STP, which was submitted to the AU PSC for further deliberation and action.¹⁵ This statement formed the basis for AU PSC Communique 1068 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2628, endorsing the decision to reconfigure AMISOM into ATMIS, effective April 1, 2022.¹⁶

The new arrangement is structured into four consecutive phases to implement the ATMIS transition smoothly. The transition plan aims for a gradual drawdown of ATMIS troops over a two-year timeframe. The first phase, reducing personnel by 2,000, is expected to be completed by December 2022. Further reductions to 14,626 uniformed personnel by September 2023, 10,626 by June 2024, and complete withdrawal by December 2024 will follow.¹⁷ However, the process has started with some technical delays and, per national priorities, the withdrawal of ATMIS forces has been slowed down.¹⁸

Ultimately, the transition signals that the UN, AU, and other partners have reached the limits of their financial and personnel resources for the mission, empowering Somalis to assume full responsibility and prepare for this significant task. Somalia is now expected to take on security responsibilities and manage its own affairs.

3. ATMIS Mandate and Legal Framework

To understand the mandate of the ATMIS, we will analyze AU PSC communique 1068 and UNSC resolution 2628, which led to the reconfiguration of AMISOM and the creation of ATMIS.

a) Deliberations of PSC Communique on March 8, 2022

As discussed in the previous sections, the PSC, as the organ responsible for maintaining peace and security in the African continent, issued a reconfiguration decision to create AU's new military regime of ATMIS.¹⁹ The PSC reconfiguration decision binds all AU member states under Article 3 of its Protocol relating to the Establishment of Peace and Security Council of the African Union²⁰. The PSC communique listed activity mandates that ATMIS is supposed to deliver in line with the

Somalia Translational Plan jointly agreed by AU and the Somali Federal Government.

The mandate generally concentrated on five themes: The first theme is “*to degrade Al Shabab and other terrorist groups.*”²¹ This is the premier and most crucial mandate ATMIS must perform in this critical context. However, the communique wording suggests that the aim is to lower the country’s security threat but not to eliminate it. If ATMIS, with 18,568 military troops on the ground, is not legally mandated to pacify the security challenge in the country, will it be practical for the Somali security force to be ready to do the remaining? If the drafters intended to mandate ATMIS to pacify the country, clearer and more appropriate language would have been better. However, if the intention was solely to weaken adversaries and their military capabilities, as the communiqué suggests, the relevant Somali authorities should carefully review and assess its contents to ensure that the Somali forces meet the necessary capabilities before ATMIS departs. Therefore, some effort and preparation should be made for the heavy task ahead to benchmark and avoid any security vacuum that has yet to be prepared for.

Besides the term “other terrorist groups” was also used in this communique. What does it mean? Such a question could be relevant because employing ambiguous words could lead to blanket misinterpretation, misapplication of the mandate, and unintended consequences. As a result, there will be a possibility that ATMIS might target innocent civilians under the pretext of “other terrorist groups.” It would be better to use more defined language to avoid confusion and misunderstanding.

The second theme of the mandate is “*to provide security to population centers and open the main supply routes.*”²² This theme is commendable because the communique drafters considered the safety and security of

the public during mandate execution. According to this theme, ATMIS is responsible for preventing and protecting civilians from incidents of insecurity, especially in areas where national security service is inadequate or doesn't exist. Nevertheless, when ATMIS performs its mandate, a distinction must be made between civilian and military objects and targets in line with International Humanitarian Law.

The third theme is “*to develop the capacity of the Somali Security Forces to enable them to take over security responsibilities.*”²³ This mandate entails enhancing the capacity of the national security forces and enabling them to take over national security responsibilities. Therefore, ATMIS must empower and nurture national security forces within this mandate and give them the necessary mentoring and training as requested by respective Somali authorities and in line with the Somali Transitional Plan (STP). The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and its Federal Member States (FMS) should have a clear national plan to accommodate this exercise. Considering this limited framework, it could be high time for the Somali leadership to select and recruit capable security personnel to take advantage of ATMIS's expertise.

The fourth theme is “*to support peace and reconciliation efforts of the FGS.*”²⁴ In light of this theme, ATMIS is required to support peace and reconciliation initiatives and efforts if FGS so requests. One of the ways that ATMIS can enforce this mandate component is, for example, either to provide a good office for conflicting parties or secure places and venues for reconciliations in collaboration with national authorities. When implanting such a mandate, ATMIS must act neutral and avoid political engagements not in line with its mandate.

The fifth theme is “*to help develop the capacity of the local authority institutions of the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States.*”²⁵ Under this theme, ATMIS must enhance and enable

local authorities to perform their designated functions properly and independently to benefit local communities. Local institutions include law enforcement, justice, and other core institutions necessary for delivering security and justice services in the local communities.

b) Deliberations of UN Security Council Resolution 2628 (2022)

This resolution 2628, on March 31, 2022, endorsed the AU PSC reconfiguration decision on 8 March 2022 and gave ATMIS a mandate of an initial 12 months effective from April 2022. The Security Council issued resolution 2628 under chapter VI of the UN Charter and authorized ATMIS to take “all necessary measures,” which seems to be a holistic and robust approach to dealing with security problems in Somalia. Taking “all necessary measures” encompasses ATMIS to use force to implement its mandate, including “*to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order.*”²⁶ From this point of view, the ATMIS mandate is broad and not limited to carrying out military offenses but rather encompasses protecting civilians from the threat of insecurity, assisting national institutions to function, and helping the Somali government address security challenges.

Moreover, paragraph 22 of the resolution outlines some specific mandates for activities:

1) “*to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab.*”²⁷ The resolution directs ATMIS to reduce non-state military adversaries using all available mechanisms. In addition, the resolution forwards responsibility to the Somali authorities to complete the task of elimination of *Al-Shabab* after ATMIS withdrawal.

2) “*to support the capacity building of the integrated Somali security and police.*”²⁸ ATMIS is mandated to build the capacity of “integrated” security and police. What is peculiar here is the term “integrated” used in the resolution. Does integration mean security personnel should be drowned down or represented from all FMS? What the drafters intended is unclear, and perhaps more clarification is needed.

3) “*to conduct a phased handover of security responsibilities to Somalia.*”²⁹ This mandate allows the Somali government to gradually take full ownership of its affairs before the ATMIS withdrawal is concluded. This mandate further indicates that security handover can be materialized after training and building the capacity of security and police personnel.

4) “*to support peace and reconciliation efforts in Somalia.*”³⁰ Under this mandate, ATMIS facilitates peace and reconciliation efforts in the country. What type of support is required from ATMIS has not been clarified, and it seems open to all kinds of possible support for peace and reconciliation. It could be financial, logistics, and security support. Facilitation of peace and reconciliation efforts by ATMIS might extend to the local, FMS, and FGS levels in collaboration with FGS and other relevant local and state administrations.

c) Legal Limitation of ATMIS Mandate

As discussed above, ATMIS, as a peacekeeping operation mission, is mandated to execute activities enshrined in both AU PSC and UN SC decisions, respectively. While implementing its mandate, ATMIS should comply with international humanitarian and human rights laws as an international law subject.³¹ Also, ATMIS should fully respect *Somalia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity.*³²

These limitations oblige ATMIS to avoid human rights violations and political interference in Somalia's domestic affairs.³³

4. Is ATMIS a Peacekeeping or Peacemaking Mission?

Today's peacekeeping missions have different names, and their mandate distinction may be confused. To address such confusion, the United Nations adopted principles and guidelines to draw a demarcation line between peacekeeping and peace-enforcing UN operations. The most pertinent work and reference the UN introduced to make a clear distinction is the "*United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*."³⁴ These principles and guidelines guide all mandated UN peacekeeping operations. Although these principles and guidelines touch on several issues about peacekeeping operations, the following three principles are relevant to ascertain the type of ATMIS mandate: "*Consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate*."³⁵

Consent to peacekeeping operations means an agreement by conflicting parties to deploy peacekeepers. "*In the absence of such consent, a United Nations peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict, being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its intrinsic role of keeping the peace*."³⁶ The consent of each conflicting party must be obtained before the deployment of any peacekeepers. Forgoing the consent of one side of the conflicting party will jeopardize the whole mission and might force peacekeepers to be part of the conflict or to end unsuccessfully. Often, peacekeeping operations with no or less offensive mandate are deployed under Chapter VI of the United Nations, such as the previous United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1).³⁷ By contrast, peace-enforcing operations have a robust offensive mandate authorized under Chapter VII of the UN to deter threats to international peace and security, as in the case of ATMIS. For example, ATMIS is mandated under Chapter VII through its resolution 2628(2022) to reduce

the risk of any insecurity that challenges state functionality. Only the host state's consent is required, as in the ATMIS case, and Somalia's consent to the AU military arrangement is fully addressed in the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) between TFG and AU, signed on March 6, 2007, in Addis Ababa, developed for AMISOM deployment. SOMA is the parent document that also applies ATMIS.³⁸

Impartiality is another principle that applies to peacekeeping, and they are required not to take side of the conflicting parties and remain neutral. Nevertheless, ATMIS, as a peace-enforcing Mission, is part of the conflict as they are authorized to carry out offensive military engagements alongside Somalia's security forces. Peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings because they are present due to the consent of legitimate conflicting parties and must execute their mandates "without favor or prejudice to any party." Peacekeeping operations cannot use force to execute their mandate except in the exceptional circumstances elaborated in Article 51 of the UN Charter, which is limited to Self-defense. On the other hand, the UN Security Council allows ATMIS as a peace-enforcing mission to defend its mandate and "to take all necessary measures."³⁹ and "to conduct jointly planned and targeted offensive operations with Somali security."⁴⁰

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

The paper focused on the role and mandate of ATMIS in Somalia, which became effective in April 2022, and is scheduled to conclude in December 2024. The nature of the mission is a peace-enforcing operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized to use "all necessary means" to carry out its mandate. As the scheduled withdrawal of ATMIS approaches in December 2024, the mission faces challenges in fulfilling its mandate despite persistent security threats. Efforts are ongoing to prepare Somali security forces to assume full responsibility for national security. There are concerns that armed groups may exploit the potential

security vacuum resulting from the planned withdrawal, potentially exceeding the current capabilities of Somali forces in the near future. Hence, it is expected that there will be a need for the continued presence of the AU Mission, which necessitates the design of a post-ATMIS phase.

Therefore, in light of Somalia's complex security situation over the past three decades and in alignment with the mandate's implementation and new bilateral agreements between the AU and the Federal Government of Somalia, the paper recommends the following:

1. Ensuring the readiness of Somali security forces. This includes continuing to equip them with the necessary training, skills, and knowledge and facilitating a smooth handover based on the Somali Transitional Plan and newly established bilateral agreements. This will instill confidence in the stakeholders about the transition process.
2. Addressing the potential challenge of a security vacuum through necessary adjustments, including potentially rescheduling of the mandate of the mission and withdrawal deadline if necessary.
3. Ensuring the Somali Federal Government's full preparedness for the handover is crucial for the successful transition and stability of the country. This involves taking necessary steps and prerequisites to assume full responsibility for the country's security. This will reassure the stakeholders about the smooth transition of security responsibilities.
4. Fostering mutual collaboration between ATMIS and the Federal Government. This is crucial in prioritizing the achievement of the mandated tasks for completing the mission and facilitating a smooth withdrawal process. This will foster optimism among the stakeholders about the successful transition.

In conclusion, as the ATMIS mission approaches its scheduled conclusion in December 2024, it is imperative for all stakeholders—ATMIS, the Federal Government of Somalia, and international partners—to collaborate closely and effectively. In this regard, Somalia can move towards a stable and secure future by prioritizing the readiness of Somali security forces, addressing potential security vacuums flexibly, and ensuring robust collaboration. The successful transition from ATMIS to full Somali ownership of security responsibilities will mark a significant milestone in Somalia's journey towards lasting peace and stability.

Notes:

¹ On June 15, 2006, Somalia's Transitional Federal Parliament voted to deploy an African peacekeeping force in the country to support the fragile Transitional federal government of Somalia (TFG) in its efforts to restore law and order and re-establish state institutions. <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-parliament-votes-favour-foreign-peacekeepers>. Accessed April 30, 2023.

² <https://atmis-au.org/about-atmis/> Accessed June 25, 2024.

³ In June 2024, just before this issue's release, discussions began on the post-ATMIS phase. The focus is on establishing a new African Union-led mission, with a UN-authorized mandate tailored to Somalia's needs, to ensure a smooth transition of security responsibilities to Somali forces.

⁴ Zwiefelhofer, Tomáš. "VOJENSKÁ INTERVENCE KENI V SOMÁLSKU: Deset let přeshraničních střetů a vzájemných bilaterálních vztahů." Univerzita Obrany. Ustav Strategických Studií. Obrana a Strategie 2022, no. 1 (2022): 21-34.

⁵ Mutuma Wyne, Dr, and Benson Waweru Thuo. "Somalia: The Scope of International Humanitarian Law in An Evolving History of Conflict." Benson, Somalia: The Scope of International Humanitarian Law in An Evolving History of Conflict (April 21, 2023) (2023).

⁶ This study was released in July 2024, while the mission is scheduled to end in December 2024.

- ⁷ <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-8> Accessed on 30 June 2024. Also, https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf/ Accessed on 4 June 2024.
- ⁸ Mays, T., 2009. The African Union's African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Why did it successfully deploy following the failure of the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM). *partial completion of the requirements of the certificate of Training United Nations Peace Operations, Peace Operations Training Institute*. Available at https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/1904_Transitioning-in-Somalia.pdf . Accessed on 19 June 2024; Pp. 2-4
- ⁹ <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-parliament-votes-favour-foreign-peacekeepers/> Accessed on 19 Se Sept 2020.
- ¹⁰ Adopted November 7,2000 <https://au.int/en/treaties/constitutive-act-african-union> <https://amisom-au.org/key-documents/au-statements-reports/> Accessed on 19 June 2024
- ¹¹ <https://atmis-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/atmis-adopted-res-e.pdf> Accessed on 30 June 2024
- ¹² Blyth, Fiona. "*Transitioning to National Forces in Somalia: More than an Exit for AMISOM* (International Peace Institute,2019), Page 9 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1904_Transitioning-in-Somalia.pdf (2019). P.9
- ¹³ <https://press.un.org/en/2018/sc13264.doc.htm>. Accessed June 6, 2024.
- ¹⁴ Blyth, Fiona. "Transitioning to National Forces in Somalia: More than an Exit for AMISOM,pp. 9-13
- ¹⁵ See <https://press.un.org/en/2018/sc13264.doc.htm>. Accessed June 10, 2024.
- ¹⁶ <https://amisom-au.org/topics/press-statements/>. Accessed June 25, 2024.
- ¹⁷ <https://atmis-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/atmis-adopted-res-e.pdf>. Accessed June 29, 2024
- ¹⁸ <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/somalia-defers-atmis-drawdown-plan-yet-again>. Accessed June 30 2024.

- ¹⁹ <https://atmis-au.org/communique-of-the-1068th-meeting-of-the-au-peace-and-security-council-on-atmis-mandate>. Accessed August 26, 2023.
- ²⁰ Somalia is a state party to the Establishing Protocol of PSC and ratified it on 24/12/2013 <https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-relating-establishment-peace-and-security-council-african-union>. Accessed August 26, 2022
- ²¹ See point 9(a) of the Communique <https://atmis-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/communique-for-the-1068th-meeting-on-atmis-mandate-8-march-2022.pdf>. Accessed August 27, 2023.
- ²² See point 9(b), *ibid*
- ²³ See point 9(c), *ibid*
- ²⁴ See point 9(d), *ibid*
- ²⁵ See point 9(e), *ibid*
- ²⁶ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping>. Accessed 28-August 2022.
- ²⁷ See para 22(a) of resolution 2628 (2022).
- ²⁸ See para 22(b) of resolution 2628 (2022).
- ²⁹ See para 22(c) of resolution 2628 (2022).
- ³⁰ See para 22(d) of resolution 2628 (2022)
- ³¹ See para 22 of resolution 2628 (2022).
- ³² *ibid*
- ³³ Some reports suggest that African Union forces have been accused of killing civilians during operations, with some members also facing allegations of rape and other human rights abuses. The ATMIS Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell stated that they have investigated these reports. Refer to ‘SOMALIA 2022 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT’ available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/415610_SOMALIA-2022-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf
- ³⁴ See United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, 2008, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/peacekeeping/en/capstone_eng.pdf, Accessed August 27, 2022

³⁵ *ibid*

³⁶ *ibid*

³⁷ See UN SC resolution 751(1992) <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosom1backgr2.html>. Accessed August 29, 2023.

³⁷ <https://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Status-of-Mission-Agreement-on-AMISOM.pdf>. Accessed August 29, 2023.

³⁸ <https://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Status-of-Mission-Agreement-on-AMISOM.pdf>. Accessed August 29, 2023.

³⁹ UN SC resolution 2628 (2022), para 22, *ibid*

⁴⁰ (UN SC resolution 2628 (2022), para 23(a), *ibid*.

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