

ISSN 2414 – 6501 (Print)
2517 – 9810 (Online)

SOMALI STUDIES

A Peer-Reviewed Academic Journal for Somali Studies

VOLUME 2

2017



**INSTITUTE FOR SOMALI STUDIES
MOGADISHU UNIVERSITY
MOGADISHU, SOMALIA**

About This Journal

Somali Studies: A peer-reviewed academic journal for Somali studies is a broad scope multidisciplinary academic journal devoted to Somali studies; published annually by the Institute for Somali Studies in print and online forms. ***Somali Studies*** aims to promote a scholarly understanding of Somalia, the Horn of Africa and the Somali diaspora communities around the globe.

Somali Studies provides a forum for publication of academic articles in broad scope of areas and disciplines in Somali studies, particularly focused on the humanities and social science. ***Somali Studies*** appreciates papers exploring the historical background or navigating the contemporary issues; special consideration will be given to issues which are critical to the recovery and rebuilding of Somalia, a country emerging from a devastating civil war.

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Published by Institute for Somali Studies

Website: www.isos.so - Email: isos@mu.edu.so

Tel/Fax: +252 1 858118

Mogadishu, Somalia

Printed in Somalia

SOMALI STUDIES

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ISSN 2414-6501 (Print)

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Hodan District, Near Km4 Square

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Mogadishu, Somalia

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Cabdi Yuusuf Xasan, aka **Cabdi-Dhuux**, is a prominent Somali folklore dancer and songwriter, currently he is the director of Somali National Theatre in Mogadishu, Somalia.

Somali Studies:
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Volume Two

Editorial Note

We are delighted to welcome you to the second issue which presents a selection of articles from different disciplines of Somali studies. The second issue contains six research articles and three Somali poems. One of the articles is written in the Somali Language.

In the debate about the relationship between Somali kinship systems and socio-political identity, the first article revisits the challenging debate between two schools in Somali studies field: traditionalists and transformationists; and explores what is at stake in this debate in the state building project in Somalia. The second article examines the state building process of Turkish model in Somalia and highlights the critical role of civilian power approach in the process of state building in failed states.

The third article spotlights the historical developments of the Somali Region in Ethiopia from the colonial period to the recent period around 1995. Not far from history, the fourth article journeys the Somali Civil War through selected Somali Poetry. It reflects unforgettable painful moments and experiences, and how the hopes and aspirations of generations are muted by bullets!

In Somali dialectology, the fifth article compares the oblique marking system of the Common Somali and Karre Dialects. This study, and other similar studies, may help better understanding of the evolution of the Somali language.

The sixth article is anthroponymical study which discusses “*name and naming system*” in Somali society, and proposes practical recommendations to deal with growing problems in this regard.

The last section is intended to document unpublished works in the field of Somali literature. In this issue, we selected three Somali poems that revolve around the theme of the responsibilities of the ‘Somali man’ in the family and society in recent decades.

As we worked on our inaugural volume last year and our second volume this year, we have been impressed by the reaction of scholars around the globe and their contacts and contributions such as suggestions, recommendations and submission of articles. Thank you for your support.

As this journal is a platform for scholars, we welcome your submissions in different areas and disciplines, with particular focus on social science and humanities, about Somalia, Horn of Africa, and the Somali diaspora communities around the globe. So, your papers are much appreciated to make a substantial contribution to the literature of Somali studies.

In conclusion, I would like to thank all our Editorial Team and members of Advisory Board for their direction and collaborative work.

Mustafa Feiruz
Editor-in-Chief

The State and its Fragments: Debates on Kinship and the State in Somalia



Ahmed Sh. Ibrahim

Abstract

This article has two primary objectives: a) to introduce the debate about kinship systems and socio-political identity and organization in Somalia. I do this by reviewing an exchange at a British tribunal between two prominent academics in Somali studies: Abdi I. Samatar and I. M. Lewis; b) to reflect on what is at stake in this debate by pointing at some of the potential consequences of the current U.N.-led state-building project in Somalia, which has embraced one side of this debate.

Keywords: Somalia, kinship system, Somali political identity, clanism, state-building, genealogy, colonialism, and anthropology

Introduction

One of the central debates in Somali studies deals with the relationship between Somali kinship systems and socio-political identity and organization. On one side of the debate is what is referred to as the “traditionalist” position, whose main proponent is the well-known, at least within the small field of Somali studies, British social anthropologist I. M. Lewis. In his long career and many publications Lewis has maintained that the enduring principle determining Somali political identity and social organization is the segmentary lineage system based on patrilineal descent. He argues that through genealogical reckoning based on patrilineal descent such socio-political units as the “*diya*-paying group,” “sub-clan,” “clan,” and “clan-family” are established as the organizing social and political units throughout the Somali nation. Though in some of his early writings Lewis was open to the view that Somali genealogy was partly a social and historical construct, it appears that since the 1990s he has upheld a position that stresses the kinship system as the basic and enduring explanatory principle in Somali society.¹ It’s as if Lewis understood the Somali civil war as a validation of the enduring nature of the “clan.”

On the other side of this debate is what is referred to as the “transformationist” position, whose main proponents are geographer Abdi I. Samatar (1992) and American cultural anthropologist Catherine Besteman (1996). The transformationists’ position is that developments during the colonial and post-colonial periods have led to dramatic transformations in Somali society, including the nature of kinship relations, such that it’s impossible to invest any explanatory power with lineages or clans as analytical categories. The transformationists consider various historical developments, including the imposition of European colonial rule on the Somali people, Somalia’s immersion and peripheral position in a global economy, the country’s strategic geographical location which renders it a playground in a global geopolitical game, and

the emergence of an urban political elite as key to understanding Somalia's economic and political realities, including the disintegration of the state in 1991 and the ensuing civil war. The transformationists contend that to utilize lineages and clans as analytical categories is to blind oneself to these complex historical developments and to assume that Somali kinship-based identities exist outside of history.

Needless to say, this short summary doesn't do justice to the arguments of Lewis and Samatar.²

Part I: Debating Somali Identity before a British Court

Turning now to the Lewis-Samatar exchange; I chose to focus on the following exchange for a number of reasons. First, the exchange between Lewis and Samatar clearly demonstrates their respective positions with regards to the question of Somali socio-political identity and organization in a relatively short space. Second, and more significantly, this exchange between two leading academics on Somalia debating Somali kinship systems and political identity in front of a British court illustrates how this debate isn't simply an outdated academic debate, but practically impacts the lives of Somalis today. In short, this case illustrates most poignantly what is at stake in the debate, a point underlined by the fact that Somali identity is being debated at a British tribunal, the former colonial power, with much consequence for Somalis.

The exchanges between Lewis and Samatar are published in an article titled *Debating Somali Identity in a British Tribunal: The Case of the BBC Somali Service*.³ The exchanges took place as part of a British court case having to do with a discrimination lawsuit against the BBC Somali service, a discrimination that was said to have occurred in the process of streamlining the staff at the service in 2000. Out of 200 Somali applicants, 3 were selected for the three long term posts. Some of the

applicants accused the new head of the service, a Somali man, of favoritism because the three successful applicants were young journalists coming from the same genealogical group as the head of the service. Claiming discrimination, the unsuccessful candidates requested from the BBC authorities that the hiring process be investigated for nepotism and discrimination. The claimants argued that the Somali man leading the hiring process “had given undue advantage to the successful candidates by favoring his own genealogical group and that this had resulted in their unfair dismissal because of their clan identity. Further, they contended that this amounted to racial or ethnic discrimination on the basis of clan affiliation” (Abdi 2010: 47). Because the plaintiffs claimed an ethnic/racial motivated prejudice, the tribunal asked expert witnesses to testify whether the case could fall under the purview of the *British Race Relations Act of 1976* (hereafter the *Act*). The claimants called on I. M. Lewis to testify and confirm that Somali genealogical groups could be viewed as distinct ethnic/racial groups, while the defense called on Abdi I. Samatar to argue that Somali genealogical differences couldn’t be equated with ethnic/racial differences as the Act intended. Other than the introduction and conclusion by Samatar, the submissions to the court by the two respective witnesses are reproduced in the article, verbatim. Four submissions are reproduced in the article, two per witness.

The two expert witnesses were asked to testify whether genealogical differences within Somali society could qualify as ethnic/racial differences, thereby justifying the plaintiff’s accusation that the selection of three individuals from the same genealogical group amounted to ethnic/racial discrimination under the Act. As the article points out, according to the Act, a group could be considered to constitute an ethnic/racial group if it had the following characteristics: a common geographical origin and language, a common literature and religion that distinguishes it from neighboring groups, and a history of being an oppressed minority (Abdi 2010: 48-49).

We will begin with a summary of the submissions by Lewis who argues that Somali genealogical groups meet these requirements thereby constituting different ethnic/racial groups and, therefore, the claimants were justified in accusing the head of the BBC Somali service of discrimination. Lewis starts out by underlining his unique qualifications to answer this question as an anthropologist. He writes, genealogy is “a form of social and political organization on which, as a professional Social Anthropologist, I have been specializing for almost fifty years. . . . I find that I am generally regarded internationally as the leading academic authority on Somali issues, and frequently consulted by governments and the media on Somali matters” (2010: 50). Hence, no-one is better positioned to speak on this issue, Lewis implies.

As for Samatar, Lewis questions his qualifications, as a geographer, to speak on this issue: “in my fifty years of university research and teaching I have never encountered a geographer who was expert in the complexities of African systems of kinship and clanship which are, as it were, bread and butter to the professional Social Anthropologist. Having reviewed, either in manuscript or published versions, most of Professor Samatar’s Somali writings, I know of nothing to suggest that he has the technical expertise to master this highly specialized field” (2010: 59). Having thus dismissed Samatar’s professional qualifications as a geographer to speak on the matter of Somali systems of kinship, Lewis asserts that being a Somali also doesn’t qualify Abdi to speak on this issue, “it should perhaps be emphasized, here, that while being a Somali necessarily gives one, direct, personal experience of Somali kinship and clanship, this is not the same as an objective analytical understanding based on systematic anthropological (or sociological) research” (2010: 59-60). Additionally, he adds that being a “Westernized Somali,” Abdi is in any case, distanced from the Somali social reality. Having established that he, as an anthropologist, who has mastered the “highly specialized field” of “African systems of kinship and clanship” is uniquely qualified

to speak on Somali systems of kinship, while, at the same time, dismissing Samatar's credentials and objectivity, Lewis goes on to state his case.

He begins by claiming that Somali political identity is unchanging and fixed at birth, "Somalis receive their fundamental social and political identity at birth through membership of their father's clan" (2010: 50). This is a profound statement by someone who elsewhere defended himself against the charge that lineage political identity as he frames it is an essentializing and ahistorical concept. Regardless, he explains that at an early age a Somali child is taught to trace his/her genealogy exclusively through paternal ancestors up to the ancestors of the "clan-family." A clan-family is a term Lewis coined to refer to the largest genealogical groupings in Somalia. He points out that the Somali people are made up of 5 such clan-families: Dir, Issaq, Darod, Hawiye, and Digil and Rahanweyn. These large genealogical groups, he claims, are treated by Somalis "like species of genus distinctions in nature, and regard them in short as natural divisions with the biological bases expressed in their genealogies" (2010: 61). Furthermore, these genealogies operate as "a source of pride and all members of the clan have a lively sense of clan superiority and distinctiveness and potential hostility toward those who do not share their descent" (52). In addition, these clan-families have specific histories which separate them from other clan-families. Lastly, Lewis maintains that Somali genealogical groups are equivalents of distinct ethnic groups is proved by "the presumption which Somalis manifestly hold, that those who share the same genealogy and belong to the same 'clan' (or 'sub-clan') should support each other at all times, and resort to nepotism utilizing every possible connection for the benefit of their own clansmen, at the expense of members of other clans, in on par with racism and ethnicity elsewhere" (2010: 60).

In sum, according to Lewis, a Somali individual is said to be absorbed in unchanging genealogical loyalty which commits the individual to identify

with a clan-family often constituting of over millions of members spread throughout the Horn of Africa, and in diasporic Somali communities around the world. These clan loyalties played out, Lewis contends, when the Somali Republic fell apart along clan lines. This clanism or politics of genealogy played out despite the assertions of the Somali military socialist regime, Somali nationalists, and Westernized elites that clanism was a thing of the past, he adds. Given his claim that Somali people are separated into genealogical groups with distinct feelings, characteristics, and histories, his conclusion is therefore “any organization which aspires to representative credibility must patiently display a balance of clan-family members which roughly corresponds to that of its public” (53). The violation of this all-important principle should be seen by the tribunal as tantamount to ethnic/racial discrimination, he concludes.

We now turn to Samatar’s two submissions. To begin with, Samatar highlights that his academic credentials as a geographer, and his firsthand knowledge as a native of the country, as well as his mastery of the Somali language and poetry qualify him to speak expertly on the issue of Somali identity. Responding to Lewis’s disparaging remarks about his qualifications, Samatar writes “It is not the first time that Professor Lewis has resorted to name-calling rather than engaging scholars who disagree with his ideas” (2010: 62). He points out that Lewis’s claim that a geographer can’t possibly be expected to be an expert on Somali systems of kinship and genealogy demonstrates that Lewis’s understanding of genealogy is “mechanically deterministic and permits little leeway for human agency and social change.” A position which “implies that one does not need to study the dynamics of a society and its larger context to better understand the shifting nature of politics. For Lewis, genealogy alone is enough” (2010: 63). It’s only under the influence of an old anthropological assumption that Somali political identity and social organization is primarily determined by genealogical reckoning that one can maintain the topic of Somali political identity is outside a

geographer's area of expertise, Samatar notes. Regarding Lewis's assertion that Samatar is a Westernized Somali and by implication removed from the Somali world, Samatar asks the obvious question, "given the fact that Professor Lewis hails from the Western world, would it not also be appropriate to say that his perspective is 'Westernized'" (2010: 64). Having thus defended himself against the charge that he is unqualified to speak on Somali kinship issues, Samatar turns to the issue in front of the tribunal: Do differences within Somali genealogical groups fit the Act's definition of ethnicity/race?

Samatar begins by noting that "genealogical 'groups' (clans) range in size from an extended family to a collection of such groups at the regional and national levels. Thus, the numbers of genealogical groups and sub-groups are contingently defined and not determined a priori" (2010: 55). The existence of genealogical groups, however, doesn't necessarily entail differences along genealogical lines, "the vast majority of the people in the country have same fundamental social, cultural and religious values that defined the nature of traditional Somali identity: Islam, Somali language, genealogy, oral and poetic literature, *xeer* (customary law), and sharing material risks. Collectively, these traits bounded Somali identity" (2010: 55). In fact, genealogical groupings and the cognizance of genealogy has traditionally been one of the unifying features of Somali society and a defining characteristic of Somali culture. Samatar argues that a distinction needs to be made between 'traditional' Somali genealogy and contemporary clanism, "Somali genealogies embedded in that old tradition, which was grounded in inclusive shared values, must not be conflated with the instrumentally induced recent political practice and concept – clanism. This practice was invented by competing elite factions in their struggle to illegitimately privatize public resources, including political power. Clanism is therefore bereft of tradition" (2010: 56). Additionally, and in contradiction to the Act's definition of ethnic/racial groups and Lewis's claim, Somali genealogical groups "do

not have a distinct history that distinguishes it from other Somalis,” and that “each Somali genealogical family lacks its unique cultural tradition, customs, manners, etc.” (2010: 56). In summary, Samatar contends that Somali genealogical groups aren’t equivalents of ethnic/race distinctions as defined by the Act, and the attempt to render them equal dovetails well with the agenda of “sectarian entrepreneurs that profit from un-civic manipulations of normal but benign human differences” (57).

After weighing the testimonies of the two experts and the arguments of the lawyers “the tribunal concluded that Somali clans do not meet the requirements of the RRA” (76). The court, therefore, agreed with Samatar and ruled against the plaintiffs.

Before we get to the significance of this case, let’s take a look at one of the arguments of Lewis: his assertion that African systems of kinship are a highly specialized field which he, as an anthropologist, is uniquely qualified to speak to. This claim that the Somali system of kinship is a highly complex and almost mysterious phenomenon whose workings is completely understood by very few is a claim Lewis has made on other occasions. Particularly when his emphasis on the segmentary lineage system or clan as the defining feature of Somali social organization and political identity was questioned. In the well-known debate⁴ between Lewis and Catherine Besteman, Lewis also questioned Besteman’s understanding of the segmentary lineage system. He wrote, Besteman “follows my terminology but does not fully understand its implications” (1998: 101). What lies behind Lewis’s claim that the segmentary lineage system is a highly complex phenomenon that only few specially trained anthropologists can fully comprehend?

The answer, I submit, is partly due to anthropologists’ aspiration to be the bearer of mysterious and exotic knowledge about non-Western i.e. “primitive” or “simple” societies to which he/she could then expertly

explain and sell to a Western audience. It is the disciplinary market niche of early anthropology to fashion itself as the decipherer of the mysterious and exotic beliefs and practices of the other. It is what one anthropologist referred to as the “savage slot,”⁵ which was anthropology’s object of study in the Western knowledge production division of labor, and whose disappearance due to global transformations provoked existential anxiety among anthropologists. One such transformation was brought about by the process of decolonization in the 1960s, which gave political power and the ability to speak on and about their own histories and society to the previously colonized, particularly the supposedly “primitive” Africans. This essentially meant the disappearance of anthropology’s object of study, the “primitive” or “simple” societies of Africa. To assert that in order to understand Somali social organizations and political identities one need not resort to uncovering the ‘mysterious’ workings of segmentary lineage and ancient blood ties is to rob the old anthropologist of his disciplinary market niche. Perhaps this explains Lewis’s claim that segmentary lineage system is a complex phenomenon which few understand, and his stubborn insistence that it’s *the* key to understanding everything Somali.

One of the arguments which Lewis has refused to accept is that his own emphasis on genealogy and clans as *the* key to understanding Somali society was self-fulfilling in that it was part of a discourse which helped to establish “the clan” as a social reality. Ironically, this case in front of a British court demonstrates that Lewis’s emphasis on kinship doesn’t happen in a vacuum and has consequences, often negative, for Somalis. What was the significance of the court’s decision? What was at stake in this debate? Samatar highlights four potential consequences for Somalis had the tribunal accepted Lewis’s argument. First, it “would have reinforced the notion, present in much of the literature, that genealogy is politics and that a Somali’s political identity is fixed from the day of his or her birth” (2010: 79). Second, an acceptance of Lewis’s argument would have established that Somalis consist of distinct ethnic/racial

groups, which would “have enhanced the credibility of sectarian assertions that Somalia should be divided into clan fiefdoms” institutionalizing lineage identity-based politics (2010: 80).⁶ Third, an outcome in favor of the plaintiffs “would have established clan representation as the foundation criterion for allocating employment opportunities in the Somali world” (2010: 80). This would potentially relegate considerations of merit to a secondary status with negative consequences for public life. Fourth, a ruling in favor of Lewis’s argument “would have sanctioned the notion that Somalis cannot assess one another professionally, even in British institutions such as the BBC, and will always favor individuals from their own genealogical group even when they are unqualified” (2010: 80). This would mean that only non-Somalis are “able to evaluate Somalis’ qualifications, and ‘native’ Somalis would never be able to overcome their ingrained malady” (2010: 81). It’s worth taking a moment to reflect on what it says that a ruling by a British tribunal would have led to such important consequences for the Somali people.

This court case proves that Lewis’s emphasis on clan as the key to understanding Somali society has had a lasting impact because as a member of the colonizing society his categorization had the power to influence the daily practices of the “natives” thereby becoming a self-fulfilling prophesy. Lidwien Kapteijns makes this point when she writes “the Lewisian paradigm with its overemphasis on clanship not only has a history of which its unaware but, because of that history, has also contributed to the clan discourse that continues to dominate thinking about Somalia today” (Kapteijns 2004-2011: 3). The potential consequences that Samatar highlighted, had the court agreed with Lewis’s position, testify to the power Lewis’s emphasis on clan exercised and still exercises. With his qualifications as an expert, who, as he pointed out, was constantly consulted by governments, NGOs, IGOs, and media organization, his concepts and framework had the potential to exercise real and far-reaching influence. That Lewis’s act of defining Somali

identity at a British court case could have such a drastic and lasting impact on Somali lives is a testament to the continuing domination of the Somali people by British/European countries long after the end of formal colonial relations. It is also a clear validation, if one was needed, of the argument that, immersed as s/he is in a world of unequal relations, the anthropologist's conceptual framework is both a reflection and an extension of the actual relations of power between the anthropologist's society and the one he/she studies. This leads us to a consideration of a slightly different kind than that which has been the hallmark of academic debate about clan and clanism in Somali studies.

Part II: Historicizing the “Clan”

One of the central critiques of anthropology during the colonial era dealt with anthropology's assumption that the “simple” societies which anthropologists studied were ahistorical and isolated from the rest of the world. This was a convenient assumption for the anthropologist for two reasons. First, the British school of functionalist anthropology, which dominated African anthropology until the 1960s and which influenced Lewis's studies of the Somali people,⁷ was based on the premise that a society constituted a holistic structure with clear boundaries separating it from other societies. The anthropologist could then study the interlinking functional parts that created the whole social structure. A historical approach that problematized the existence of clear boundaries between different social groupings would have seriously questioned structural functionalism as a school of thought. Second, since the so-called simple societies the anthropologist was studying were often colonized by the very society to which the anthropologist belonged, a historical approach would have undermined the “objective” and “scientific” stance which the anthropologist assumed. In fact, it was very often the existence of the colonial system that made the anthropological undertaking feasible thus

framing the anthropologist's inquiry and analytical categories. Anthropology's assumption that the society being studied was isolated and timeless was, therefore, convenient because it enabled the anthropologist to ignore the colonial system in her/his analysis. And by ignoring the colonial system the anthropologist ignored how his/her study was made possible by the conditions created by the colonial system and how the anthropologist's conceptual apparatus were entangled with that colonial system.

This critique of anthropology, which emerged in the 1970s,⁸ wasn't simply accusing anthropology of being the handmaiden of colonialism because many anthropologists from that era were quite critical of the colonial system and sympathetic to the colonized. The critique took anthropology to task for not thinking more theoretically and reflectively about the discipline's emergence in the encounter between a colonizing Europe and the colonized. Particularly, how the emergence of the discipline is conditioned by the unequal relations between Europe and its colonized African and Asiatic societies, and how this impacts anthropological theories. For instance, much of anthropology's theory about the social organization of "simple" or "primitive" societies was partial and biased because of the anthropologist's refusal to include in his/her analysis the colonizing society. To include the colonial apparatus in the analysis of the colonized would have led the anthropologist to critically reflect on her/his positionality, to analyze her/his conceptual categories, categories which the anthropologist often shared with the colonial administrator. Hence, the anthropologist would have realized that the so-called "traditional" African society or African "customary law" or "tribe" or "clan" were categories that either came into existence or were drastically altered in the course of the formation of the colonial administrative system. In other words, the anthropologist would have incorporated the colonizing European society, including himself, in the making of the African scene which he was studying.

Let's take a look at how an approach that incorporates the colonizing European society differs from one that treats the African society in isolation. One of the anthropologists that led the critique of anthropology in the 1970s is the distinguished anthropologist Talal Asad. In a collection of essays put together in honor of Edward Evans-Pritchard titled *Essays in Sudan Ethnography, Presented to Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard*, is included an essay by Asad titled *Political Inequality in the Kababish Tribe*. In this essay Asad is interested in analyzing the type of political inequality the "tribe" constitutes as a structure of domination. To do this Asad undertakes an analysis of the historical formation of "the Kababish tribe" and the current reality of domination that the category of the "tribe" helps to maintain structurally and ideologically. Such a critical analysis of the concept of the tribe incorporated three targets that through mutual confirmation helped to establish and maintain the category of the "tribe:" the colonial administrator, the Kababish, and the anthropologist:

"For the first, 'the tribe' as an administrative convenience represented a unit of authentic interest, regulated but not shaped by the colonial government. For the second, 'the tribe' as an experience of structured inequality appeared as part of a just and natural world of rulers and ruled. For the third, 'the tribe' as a theoretical construct for approaching the problem of political domination was ultimately based on specific assumptions about the nature of man, assumptions which he shared with the colonial administrator to the extent that both participated in a common cultural tradition. The first helped to create, the second to maintain, and the third to validate the structural inequality which was the tribe" (1972: 128).

Prior to the establishment of British colonial administration in Sudan under the Anglo-Egyptian regime the Kababish "was the name of a loose confederation of tribes of diverse origin which occupied what is now the north-western region of the Sudan" (1972: 128). The Kababish didn't

have a clear boundary which marked them off or their territory from other groups, “groups appear to have joined and left the confederation at different periods, and migrated from one locality to another” (1972: 128). This fluid nature of tribal identity changed, however, with the imposition of a colonial administration. In establishing control over the Sudan the British created a system of governance known as Native Administration which arranged the Natives into “tribes,” each headed by a representative leader and assigned a specific area as its traditional home. A particular sheikh was recognized by the colonial administration as the leader of the “Kababish tribe” and northern Kordofan was recognized to be its traditional home. In establishing and recognizing the formal and legal authority of a particular sheikh the colonial administration enabled this sheikh to eliminate any alternative source of power. All the important executive and judicial posts were kept within the sheikh’s family, which eventually developed into a privileged lineage. The “Kababish tribe” which came into being through the policies of the colonial regime was thus “necessary to the colonial regime, as the colonial regime became necessary to the tribe” (1972: 130). The anthropologist, or any other academic for that matter, who in his/her analysis failed to examine the historical formation of the structural inequality, which the “tribe” represented, helped to validate a structure that was created by the colonial system.

How does this analysis of the formation of a “tribe” in Sudan help us regarding the debate about “clan” and “clanism” in Somalia? One of the things that is missing from the debate within Somali studies is a historical genealogy of the “clan” or “sub-clan” within Somali society.⁹ In particular, analyses of how developments and transformations during the colonial era changed the nature of kinship relations. The debate in Somali studies often seems to come down to whether or not lineage relations and clan is the defining and enduring feature of Somali socio-political organization. On one side of this debate is the contention that lineage reckoning through patrilineal descent is the basic principle determining

socio-political identity and the mechanism through which such categories as the “clan” and “sub-clan” are constituted. This side contends that the lineage principle has endured throughout Somali history. The argument on the other side is that societal transformations during the colonial and post-colonial periods altered the nature of the traditional clan system making possible the formation of the destructive force of “clanism,” where political entrepreneurs manipulate kinship ties in their competition for political office. The latter position is no doubt the correct one, but it has often been misinterpreted to mean that without the political manipulation of political elites “clan” or “sub-clan” affiliation would be absent at the local level among ordinary Somalis. And, consequently, evidence of the existence of lineage identity and affiliation at the local level has been interpreted as a validation of Lewis’s argument that lineage or clan identity is the enduring and timeless feature of Somali socio-political organization. To say that the category of the tribe or clan was enmeshed in colonial policies and used to categorize groups on the ground in such a way that they might be governed more easily, or that it was used as a convenient category by Western academics doesn’t ipso facto mean that it wasn’t an important local cultural construct. It’s to argue that its utilization by a powerful foreign administration dramatically influenced and altered the pre-colonial usage and significance of the term.

What the above analysis of “the Kababish tribe” by Asad does is to link the existence of “the Kababish tribe” as a natural identity among ordinary “Kababish” to the effects of the colonial elaboration of the Native Administration system which utilized the “tribe” as an administrative category by arranging the Natives into “tribes.” It thus doesn’t assume the existence of “the Kababish tribe” as an identity among ordinary people invalidates its historical formation or transformation in the colonial encounter. In fact, it takes it for granted that such an identity exists among ordinary “Kababish.” What is lacking in Somali studies is a similar analysis that brings together the historical formation of “clan” as a

political identity among the Somalis to its deployment as an administrative category representing a unit of authentic interest by the colonizing powers. There are hints in Lewis's study of the effects that the British use of the "clan" as an administrative category had on the structure of clan authority. For example, he writes that there was no hierarchy of leadership among Somali lineage groups, which British colonial officials could utilize to establish their preferred system of *indirect rule*. Indirect rule needed local or indigenous leaders who could be used as a cost-effective means of establishing and legitimating colonial rule. There were traditional elders and symbolic figure-heads such as *sultan* or *aqil* in northern Somalia, but decisions were collectively made in consultations that were open to all males of a certain age. Lewis, however, points out that British colonial administration found this situation untenable and, therefore, chose a particular person as the *chief* of each *diya*-paying group, thus instituting a hierarchical authority:

"Bewailing the absence of clearly defined local chiefs, and anything remotely resembling the famous West African 'golden stool', the British found it very difficult to introduce their favorite system of indirect rule (the most economical form of colonial management then known). They did, however, eventually (1950) develop the earlier system of salaried 'chiefs' and elders into 'local authorities' with powers to levy local market and slaughter taxes. In principle, each diya-paying group had one salaried local authority, and administration remained primarily in the hands of the expatriate District Commissioners, who also acted as magistrates" (1995: 5).

We can imagine the effect this had on the nature of authority and identity of the *diya*-paying groups. It's also interesting to note that both the British colonial officials and Lewis assumed the *diya*-paying group to be one of the few authentic and coherent units in Somali social organization. Since Lewis tells us that *diya*-paying groups didn't have a recognized leader

prior to the establishment of the position of the chief by the colonial administration, it's not unreasonable to assume that the *diya*-paying group was more fluid and less cohesive than Lewis presents it in his studies. Relatedly, it is reasonable to suspect that since the colonial authorities needed an aggregate unit with authentic interest to rationally administer the colonized, the creation of a hierarchical authority under the figure of the chief was part of a process which led to the establishment of the *diya*-paying group as such a unit. Because Lewis didn't involve the colonial administration in his analysis of Somali kinship systems and socio-political organizations, we don't have a fuller picture of how the administrative categories of the colonial authorities influenced kinship-based socio-political units. Such shortcoming is of course a reflection of the critique which was made of colonial era anthropology. That is, in failing to incorporate the colonial regime in their studies, anthropologists ignored a major feature of the colonized world which they studied.

This brings us to the situation in Somalia today. The "international community" led by the U.N. has undertaken a state-building project in Somalia over the past decade. Influenced perhaps by Lewis's contention that "clans are the most natural building blocks" (1995: 13) in establishing a state in Somalia, the U.N., along with various Somali players, have chosen the "clan" or "clan-family" as the basic unit upon which to establish a state. Not surprisingly, the institutionalization of the clan as the basic unit of political organization has reignited "clan" conflict in various regions of the country and created numerous clan fault-lines. One of the underlying assumptions informing the institutionalization of the clan as the basic building block for state formation is the idea that the previous Somali Republic was undone by clan competition over power at the state level. Thus it's assumed that an equal distribution of power between clans has to be achieved to anchor the new state-building project on a solid footing. How is it then that the institutionalization of the clan which was meant to prevent conflict is proving to be the source of

conflict? Why is the treatment exacerbating the very malady it was meant to heal? Perhaps the fault lies in the diagnosis.

The view that “clan” was the major cause of the previous Somali state’s disintegration, and that the “clan” should therefore be the basic building block in the new state-building project is premised on the fiction that there were and are clearly bounded and readily identifiable “clan” units with their specific interests. In factuality clan identities are much more fluid and interpenetrating. The notion that “clan” is the enduring and stable social unit existing outside of and prior to the contingent historical factors of the day, and therefore, *the* key to understanding and solving Somalia’s myriad problems has blinded many to the political and economic pathologies of Somalia. It’s a seductive over-simplification and reduction of a much more complex reality for purposes of administrative and analytical convenience. Unfortunately, the institutionalization of “clan” under the current state-building project means the institutionalization and politicization of such fiction. Leading, most likely, to the formation of rigid boundaries between politicized clans, where previously such identities either didn’t exist or were fluid. In this sense, the current international-led state-building project and its utilization of “clans” bears some similarities to the colonial project, in so far as both involve the governing of the Somali population through the category of “the clan.” The current situation, therefore, calls for and presents us with an opportunity to move forward the debate about lineages/clans and socio-political organization and identity in Somali society.

Conclusion

I am calling for an analysis of the kind of political and social life the category of the “clan” is being enshrined in this new environment. How is the politicization and institutionalization of kinship identity effecting communal relations and identities in myriad and unexpected ways? What

kind of structure of inequality and domination is being created through the politics of representation based on “clans?” Above all, how is the “international community’s” utilization of “clans” as a convenient administrative category creating a new “clan” reality on the ground in Somalia? As mentioned above, a glaring shortcoming of Lewis’s understanding of the “clan” as a stable principle existing outside of history is that he never finds it necessary to undertake an analysis of the complex historical genealogy and social life of this category. A historical genealogy of the category of the “clan” would no doubt have involved an analysis of its utilization as an administrative category by the colonial administrators, and as an analytical category by academics. A proper understanding of the social life of the category of the “clan” today must also include the U.N.-led state-building project, which views it as the most convenient and “natural” category in setting in place a political process encompassing the entire country. In this sense, the current environment provides an opportunity to undertake an analysis of kinship systems and socio-political identity and organization in Somalia that incorporates external efforts to manage the Somali territory and population. A correction to I. M. Lewis’s blind spot and an opportunity to move the debate about kinship systems and political identity forward.

My argument isn’t that “clans” should not be the basic building blocks of the state-building project (though this is a very logical position to hold for a variety of reasons), nor that the “clan” is simply a product of external governance projects. Rather, I am suggesting that this external governance project, which takes and institutionalizes the “clan” as the basic unit of political representation, is creating a new reality on the ground. One that can be analyzed to move forward the debate about Somali kinship systems and political identity.

Notes

¹ As an example of this, see Lewis, *Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society*. Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red sea Press, Inc., 1994.

² For more on the approaches of the respective authors, I direct the reader to these two books: Lewis, I. M. *A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961; Samatar, Abdi I. *The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.

³ Abdi I. Samatar, “Debating Somali Identity in a British Tribunal: The Case of the BBC Somali Service,” *Bildhaan: an International Journal of Somali Studies*, Vol. 10 (2010): 36-88.

⁴ There was an important exchange between C. Besteman (1996, 1998) and Lewis (1998) in the journal *Cultural Anthropology*. For another critique of Lewis’s emphasis on kinship, see Abdi I. Samatar (1992).

⁵ Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. *Global Transformations: Anthropology and the Modern World*. N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan. 2003.

⁶ The division of the country into clan-based federal regions, which today is well underway, was proposed in 1995 in an EU, EC Somali Unit, and UNDP office for Somalia sponsored document titled “*A Study of Decentralized Political Structures for Somalia: A Menu of Options*.” In this document Lewis writes, “The reality, here, is that traditional Somali society could not be more ‘decentralized’, and remote in terms of political organization from the modern ‘state’. The instability inherent in this uncentralized, segmentary system is reinforced today by the easy access to automatic weapons throughout the country. More generally, *state formation in such uncentralized conditions rarely takes place without some form of external intervention*” (Preface III, emphasis added).

⁷ Studies of African kinship systems, particularly the theory of segmentary lineage system, was the defining theoretical contribution of this school, the British school of functionalist anthropology. Lewis’s studies of Somali kinship was an application on the Somali peninsula of the segmentary lineage theory advanced by E. E. Evans-Pritchard and M. Fortes. See, E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer: a description of the modes of livelihood and political institutions of a Nilotic people*. London, Oxford University Press, 1940; M. Fortes, *the Dynamics of Clanship among the Tallensi*. London, Oxford University Press, 1945.

⁸ For an influential critique of anthropology from that period is Talal Asad's (ed.) *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*. Berkshire, UK: Ithaca Press, 1973.

⁹ For an interesting analysis of the formation of a Bantu identity, see Ken Menkhaus, "The Question of Ethnicity in Somali Studies: The Case of Somali Bantu." In *Peace and Milk, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics*, eds., Markus V. Hoehne and Virginia Lulling (New York, Columbia University Press, 2010).

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Turkish Model in Somalia: Civilian Power Approach in State Building Process



Salad Sheikh Yusuf Addow

Abstract

The international community's intervention in fragile or failed states mostly is welcomed. But on the other hand, the external intervention revolves around the interest, ideas, strategies and the policies of the intervener. This study explores Turkish model in Somalia's state building and argues that the engagement in civilian power with humanitarian and development assistance, is more effective than coercive military intervention. Turkey's civilian power approach has a positive impact on Somali state building process, such as peace building and political process, enhancing the capacity of state institutions and socioeconomic development of the country.

Keywords: State building, Civilian power, development, Somalia, Turkey

“No one can speak of peace, justice and civilization in the world if the outcry rising from Somalia is left unheard... This is why we have launched a comprehensive aid campaign for Somalia... We are making every effort to carry out infrastructure investments that will enable Somalia to stand on its feet. We are also working unrelentingly to help provide an environment of political stability and peace conducive to sustainable development”.

*Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the UN General Assembly,
22 September 2011*

1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War marked the evolution of fragile and failed states as a consequence of falling military regimes and losing legitimacy (Huria, 2009: 1). Chaos and civil wars erupted in some countries due to the collapse of state institutions. As these civil conflicts increased, the international support to help restore stability and rebuild the fragile states augmented as well.

After the independence of Somalia in 1960,¹ civilian democratic governments ruled the country and Somalia was viewed as a model of a successful democracy in Africa, as peaceful and successful elections had been held in the country. However, military coup d'etat ended the civilian rule, and the country came under a military dictatorship from 1969 to 1991. In the 1980s, armed rebellion opposed the government, and the country plunged into a civil war that ousted the regime in January 1991. After the collapse of the central government, the armed opposition groups failed to reach a national agreement, and that is led to a power struggle among the warring factions. The whole state institutions collapsed, and the country entered an era of political and administrative vacuum. Several

efforts to salvage the country have been made by the international community by working closely with the neighboring countries to restore peace and stability in the country. The first inception of the transitional government was formed in 2000, but, that did not become fully functional due to combined factors.

Somalia, as a case of this study, has been without a fully functioning government for over two decades, despite obvious efforts to restore peace and stability in the country. By examining the role of the international community in Somalia, concentrating merely on hard power as the main policy instrument to rebuild the state has been less effective and taken longer time than was expected, and in some ways has resulted in counterproductive outcomes. Instead of that Turkey's approach has been more effective within a short period. This study will scrutinize the strategies and means of Turkey to rebuild the Somali state. The study will exclusively examine the Turkey's role of state building in Somalia as a viable strategy for intervening fragile situations of post-conflict societies.

The study is structured into two main sections. The first section presents the international efforts to stabilize Somalia since 1991, while the second section examines the Turkey's civilian power approach in Somalia state building. This paper is extracted and developed from the master thesis by the author on "The Role of Turkish Civilian Power in Somalia State Building Process". Before going down to the analysis of the study, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of civilian power and its role in state building concepts.

2. The Concepts of Civilian Power and State Building

The concept of civilian power was first used by Francois Duchene in 1970s to describe the civilian power Europe as a distinctive role for Europe to emphasize mainly on low politics, non-state actors, ideational influence and international interdependence (Orbie, 2006: 124). Duchene

indicated the foreign policy of the European Community to be an exemplar of a new period in political civilization by increasing its international influence using civilian power means. Although the Duchene' concept had not obtained much popularity in his earlier suggestions, however, the concept has received considerable attention in academic literature in recent years. As the meaning of the concept gives laterally, civilian power is non-military actions such as economic, diplomatic and cultural policy instruments, which in turn is different from military power force, which refers to the use of armed forces (Smith, 2005: 1). Smith suggests that any civilian power need to meet the following four criteria: means, ends, use of persuasion, and civilian control over foreign (and defense) policy making (Smith, 2005: 2). In other words, civilian power promotes to engage in diplomacy rather than coercive instruments and focuses on mediation to resolve conflicting parties, uses economic solutions to political problems, and considers the importance of indigenous peoples to determine their own fate in resolving the international seizures (Hill, 1983 qtd. in William: 5).

The second concept which needs to be defined in this study is state building. A number of definitions have been given by scholars, which gave different meanings to the term of the state. In this study, we adopt a comprehensive definition which combines the institutional presence of the state, the capacity to provide service, and the state-society relations, all, as significant elements of the state. The international community supports fragile and failed states,² to rebuild the capacity of public institutions, and mediate between political rivalries.³

State building as a broad concept, it was defined as “an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions, and legitimacy of the state driven by state–society relations” (OECD, 2011: 20). As a broad concept, there are four significant aspects that the international community supports to increase the resilience of the state, namely: 1) political settlement and the

political process through which state and society are connected; 2) enhancing the capability and responsiveness of the state to fulfill its principal functions and provide key services effectively; 3) building social expectations and perceptions about what the state should do, what the terms of the state-society relationships should be, and the ability of society to articulate demands that are “heard”; and finally, 4) peace building which is commonly defined as activities by national or international actors to prevent violent conflict to institutionalize peace (OECD, 2011: 30).

Although Somalia -as our case study- is labeled ‘failed state’ since 1991, however, the country has shown signs of recovery and improvement in the last years. The state institutions are rebuilding, and the government capability has increased. Therefore, this study uses the term ‘fragile’ instead of ‘failed’ state, to describe the Somali state building process.

The civilian power actors’ actions to influence the state building process in fragile and post-conflict states have been discussed enormously in the academic literature in recent years. The international community agreed to develop a joint policy to deal with the challenges posed by fragile states, and adopted a new comprehensive program to deal with the fragile situations “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States”. This deal, which was supported by the donors and affected countries, aims at five state building goals which are (1) building legitimate politics, (2) enhancing security, (3) improving justice institutions (4) building economic foundations and (5) increasing revenues & services (Jörn Grävingholt, 2012: 1). Although this program was adopted, yet one country’s intervention into another country to support, always promotes the ideas and values of the intervening country’s foreign policy instruments (Yoo, 2011: 1). As many international actors step up to assist the state building of fragile states, the success to accomplish goals of the mission and the acceptance of the recipient would always be different from one actor to another on account of the strategies, priorities and the means employed by

the foreign policy of these actors to resolve a conflict. Civilian power actors, unlike military powers, support the state building of fragile states, as they concentrate on non-military, primarily economic means, to resolve conflicts (Smith, 2005: 1).

Many international efforts to support fragile states failed due to merely employing coercive methods and military actions against the conflicting parties (Yoo, 2011: 111). By engaging in diplomatic reconciliation rather than coercive instruments, employing humanitarian and development assistance mechanism to all warring parts, the centrality of mediation in conflict resolution, and the importance of economic solutions to political problems, (Christopher Hill, 1983: 310-11; Trott, 2010: 5), civilian powers support the state building in fragile situations, according to these central ideas. Various studies suggest that coherent and well communicated incentives by the external actors, unlike military actions, clearly indicate which actions provoke positive or negative sensations and thus enhance[s] the leverage of external actors' measures to support state building (Jörn Grävingholt, 2012: 34).

Since the early 2000s, the Turkish foreign policy to fragile states seems to adopt civilian power intervention, in most cases, to achieve its desired ambition to enhance its role as an international actor.⁴

3. Somalia State Building and International Community

Soon after state collapse in 1991, the international community stormed to help rebuilding of the Somali state. Despite the fact that the United Nations, the African Union and IGAD, and the Arab League attempted to restore stability in the country; however, none of these efforts have ever succeeded to achieve stability in Somalia. Since 1991, the international community has made several attempts to rebuild the Somali state but has failed to yield its desired result as they mainly concentrate on military power.

The first attempt was after the UN Security Council authorized an international intervention led by United Nation Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM1) which started on 24th April 1992, to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu;⁵ and protect UN humanitarian workers in Somalia, (UN, 2003). As the situation on the ground deteriorated, the mission was replaced by a US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF),⁶ also known as the 'Operation Restore Hope'. The mandate of the mission was to employ all the necessary means to protect the humanitarian convoys, humanitarian assistance centers, and other peace-enforcement operations, (UN, 2003).⁷

In March 1993, the UN Security Council decided under the resolution 814 (1993) a transition from UNITAF to a new United Nations peacekeeping operation -- UNOSOM II with 28,000 military and civilian personnel to extend the mission throughout the country (United Nations, 2003). The mandate of the new mission included: preventing further violence and taking appropriate action when it is necessary; maintaining control of heavy weapons, seizing the small arms, and securing seaports, airports and all lines of communications of the country to restore stability, law and order, (United Nations, 2003). The operation failed due to an intense battle with some factions of Somalia's warlords and resulted in the complete withdrawal of the United Nations forces from Somalia in early March 1995.

The Second attempt was the US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 when the Union of Islamic Courts seized control of Southern and Central Somalia.⁸ As part of its global counterterrorism war, the United States tacitly supported Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 in a bid to overthrow the Islamists from power (Lone, 2006).⁹ However, due to the historical hostility between Ethiopian and Somalis, the Ethiopian troops further deteriorated the situation and emboldened the radical elements of the Union of Islamic Courts. The Secretary General of the UN recognized that the political and security situation in Somalia is "further complicated by regional and international factors; including the proliferation of arms, the potential use of Somalia as a stage for a proxy war among neighbours..." (UN Security Council, 2008, para.22).

The third attempt was the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), under the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 19th January 2007, and authorized by the UN Security Council on 20th February 2007, with the mandate to support the Somalia Federal Government. The twenty-two thousand uniformed AMISOM personnel (both military and police), contributed by ten African countries, including Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe have been in Somalia since 2007, (AMISOM). The European Union and other international actors have been investing billions of dollars for more than a decade in which AMISOM has been active in Somalia. Although the mission of AMISOM has made some progress, it has not achieved the desired objectives as the security threats are still active. The mission's heavy reliance on military solution; its inclusion of the front line states, especially Ethiopia & Kenya; and the negligence to invest enough in the Somalia security services have all proved less effective.

Although the international community has made several efforts for the last twenty years and achieved relative progress in Somalia's state building, however, these actions have not yet yielded a stable Somalia. The country is still an example of a state failure.

4. Turkey's Civilian Approach to Somalia State Building Process

With the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, Turkey was among the first of international coalition to send troops to Somalia to restore stability in the country. Lieutenant General Çevik Bir, a Turkish military commander, was appointed as force commander of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II (International Crisis Group, 2012: 2), to lead 28,000 military and civilian police personnel from 34 countries¹⁰ between April 1993 - January 1994 (United Nations, 2003).

Although Turkey, along with the United Nations operation made attempts to employ a civilian approach to mediate between the political rivalries, the mission ultimately failed, and did not yield a lasting peace in Somalia, as it had merely relied on foreign troops to secure and build a lasting peace. Finally, Turkey along with the United Nations troops withdrew from the country in March 1995 as the situation worsened.

The second attempt of Turkey's involvement in Somalia was in 2011 when Turkey responded to the humanitarian crisis that hit the East African region generally and Somalia in particular.¹¹ Although this intervention was mainly motivated by humanitarian morality, Turkey's post-2011 strategy has undertaken a civilian power approach by adopting an impartial choice from the political rivalries and by using diplomacy to mediate, and provide humanitarian and development assistance to all parts of the country, as well as building the state through infrastructure and institutional development.

4.1 Humanitarian and Development Aid

Today Turkish efforts in Somalia range from humanitarian to development and peace building. The catastrophic drought that hit Somalia in 2011 as a result of the prolonged civil war became a catalyst for the Turkish involvement in Somalia. To draw the attention of the world to the precarious situation of Somalia, the then prime minister of Turkey, Erdoğan, along with a large delegation including his wife and daughter, then foreign minister and other ministers and executives, visited in August 2011 which drew world's attention to the tragic humanitarian crises (Mehmet Özkan 2014: 22).

Turkey has launched a variety of campaign and sent a significant amount of aid to Somalia to ease the humanitarian disaster in Somalia. Turkey's engagement in Somalia has been remarkably unique as government

organizations, the private sector and local municipalities working towards a common goal have involved in the humanitarian and development efforts (Mehmet Özkan 2014: 22). Unlike universally accepted humanitarian definition which is mainly saving lives and alleviating the suffering of crisis-affected populations, the Turkish understanding of the concept is much broader than that by including the sense of human sympathy to its humanitarian assistance (Binder & Erten, 2013: 7). This approach combines the development assistance as motivated by the concept of human compassion. (Binder & Erten, 2013: 7). This broader notion has assisted Somalia to recover slowly due to the massive investment projects coming in the name of humanity. For instance, while many international humanitarian organizations were involved in providing relief services in Somalia, the Turkish state institutions and NGOs were building roads, hospitals, schools and other development projects alongside the humanitarian operations as part of human sympathy.

Turkey has pumped millions of dollars of humanitarian and development aid in Somalia since 2011 as table 1 shows.¹²

Table 1: Turkish Aid to Somalia (2011 – 2015)

Year	Amount of aid In millions \$	Somalia in the rank of Turkey's aid recipient
2011	93.39	4 th
2012	86.61	5 th
2013	115.74	4 th
2014	74.40	4 th
2015	314.82	2 nd
Total	684.96	

Source: TIKa, 'Turkish Development Assistance Reports of 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011' http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/publication/list/turkish_development_assistance_reports-24, accessed 20 June 2017.

Years without functioning government, the Somali people, who are known for their exceptional entrepreneurship skills, have managed to revive the country's economy by creating domestic and international business links despite the security challenge. As the role of the state in the country's economy has been limited, the key economic infrastructure was left without development for an extended period. For that reason, the development aid that Turkey has been pumping into Somalia went mainly to infrastructure development. In fact, Turkey sent at least 50 construction machines and trucks to Mogadishu, (Anadolu Ajansi, 2012), to be used for infrastructure development.

The Turkish infrastructure development activities in Somalia include: first: Mogadishu Friendship Road. As promised by then Prime Minister, President Erdoğan during his visit to Mogadishu in 2011, TIKa has constructed a 23km long road with 20-30m in width, the dual way road connects the airport to the city center and the presidential palace as one of the most important roads in the city. Besides that, TIKa installed 736 new lighting posts in the newly constructed road, (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2013: 45).

Furthermore, in collaboration with the Turkish General Directorate of State Airports Authority, TIKa has reconstructed the buildings of the airport terminals, installed VOR devices and trained airport personnel, transforming it into a fully functioning airport (TIKA, 2012: 274). On the other hand, TIKa constructed Mogadishu Civil Aviation Training Center in 2015 which is significant to enhancing the capacity of the Somali civil aviation sector.

Turkey extended its development assistance to all regions as a sign of impartiality from political rivalries. TIKa, for instance, has implemented development and humanitarian projects, besides Mogadishu, in Hargeisa, Berbera, Galkayo, Baidoa, and Kismayo. Consequently, the footprint of the Turkish projects could be seen in different regions of the country.

4.2 Enhancing Access to Social Services

Another area that Turkey greatly contributes to the stability of Somalia is enhancing access to social services. Despite the fact that civil society organizations and the private sector have positively contributed there, the social services sector faces many challenges concerning access to and availability and quality of the required social services.

Regarding the education, the Turkish state institutions and NGOs work in close collaboration with the Somali Ministry of Education to improve the country's education system. New schools have been constructed, others have been repaired.¹³

To enhance the capacity of the higher education institutions in Somalia, TIKa has supported several universities and schools working in higher education with educational equipment and facilities.¹⁴ Turkey also implemented vocational centers in Somalia to train the young people and equip them with the necessary equipment.

In addition to the schools, several Turkish state institutions and NGOs have provided scholarships to Somalis students. In the first two years of Turkey's involvement in Somalia, nearly \$70 million has been allocated to 1,200 Somali students, (Harte, 2012) to study in Turkey with a full scholarship, while the number has been increasing for the last years. However, the most prominent institutions are the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), Diyanet, KIMSE YOK MU and NILE Organization.¹⁵ These institutions have provided scholarships in high schools and university levels. Beside the full scholarships provided to study in Turkey, there are semiannual and annual scholarship programs granted to the Somalis.

Regarding the health service, Turkey has done an enormous endeavor, as its assistance in Somalia is more visible in the health sector than any other field. New hospitals and a nursing school have been built, while others have been renovated. The hospitals built or renovated include, but not limited to, the 200-bed Erdoğan Research and Training Hospital, which is the most modern hospital in Somalia; the 100-bed Mother and Child Hospital; the 62-bed Shifa Hospital, and the 50-bed Deva International Training and Research Hospital which was later transformed as part of Erdoğan Research and Training Hospital. The other health facilities constructed or repaired include the Berbera Hospital, the Galkayo hospital and 40 classrooms of the School of Nursing in Mogadishu. There are also other field hospitals built by either Turkish NGOs or supported by Turkish state institutions. Besides the hospitals, several training programs have been conducted both in Somalia and Turkey. Likewise, significant numbers of Turkish doctors have visited Somalia to assist while Somali internship students have been brought to Turkey for medical training purposes.

4.3 Enhancing the Capacity of the State Institutions

As the state institutions collapsed during the civil war, the Somali government is facing the challenge of rebuilding almost all state institutions from scratch. Effective and functioning institutions are crucial for the country's good governance, stability, and recovery from the years of anarchy. In this regard, the international community has been working with the Somali government to reinstate the key institutions of the government. As part of these international efforts, Turkey has played a unique role in rebuilding Somalia's state institutions. Most of the key Turkish government institutions have partnered with their Somali counterparts to help them in rebuilding efforts and provide expertise where needed. Somalia has considerably benefited from this capacity building relationship of an institution to institution, such as ministry to ministry, parliament to parliament, municipality to municipality, and so on.

The state capacity building activities undertaken by Turkey in Somalia include a provision of training to the government personnel, equipping and rebuilding the infrastructure of the state institutions such as the government buildings, and direct financial support to the government.

While institution capacity building activities are largely involved by many international actors, the study takes three excellent examples of Turkey's involvement in that area.

4.3.1 Direct Budget Support to the Somali Government

Upon a request from President Hassan Sheikh, the Turkish foreign ministry started a direct cash support to the Somali government during June-December 2013. The \$ 4.5 million, as an aid package monthly payment, (Keydmedia, 2014) was given to Somalia. According to Turkish Official Development Assistance, Turkey delivered 15 million USD to the Somalia government in a direct budget support, (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2013: 12). At the end of 2013, there were rumors published by some media outlets that Turkey had cut the direct cash to Somalia. However, Turkish Ministry of foreign affairs reaffirmed in a press statement the intention to continue the budget support for the year of 2014, (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). In May 2016, the Turkish president signed a protocol to give 24 million budget supports to Somali government (Huriyet Daily New, 2016). The direct budget support has helped the Somali government to pay the salary of its public personnel on a regular basis and carry out its state building activities.

4.3.2 Enhancing Key Government Institutions

Turkish state institutions and NGOs have been working with the Somali government to deliver social services. For instance, the Istanbul Municipality and other Turkish institutions cooperate with the Mogadishu

Municipality in urban transformation and development, building key roads, and improving the sanitation of the city. Another institutional support is building Information Technology infrastructures for the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2013, the Somalia ministry of foreign affairs signed an agreement with its Turkish counterpart to help construct Information Technology infrastructures to create a secure channel of communication between the ministry and its embassies all over the world. Under the project, all kinds of hardware, software and training needs will be met by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As the agreement has been implemented, there have been a number of trainings for the ministry staff in Turkey (Radio Muqdisho, 2014).

4.3.3 Training the Government personnel

Turkey supports the Somalia government with the training of its civil servants. A number of trainings have been carried out both in Somalia and Turkey. Notably, employees from the Somalia Presidency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mogadishu Municipality and other key government institutions have been sent to Turkey for several times. For instance, a total of ten diplomats from Somalia were trained in Turkey, in March 23 - 29, 2014 in the Diplomacy Academy, (Diplomasi Akademisi, 2014b). Three officials from the Somali presidency office have been trained in 'protocol rules and practices' between September 30 – October 05, 2013, in Turkey, as they also had meetings with the Directorate of Protocol of Turkish Presidency and the Directorate of Protocol of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to observe the practice of protocol rules, (Diplomasi Akademisi, 2013). Similar protocol trainings were also organized in Mogadishu by the Academy between 9 and 13 February in 2015 for the protocol staff of the Presidency (Diplomasi Akademisi, 2014a). The above-mentioned trainings are merely notable examples of institutional capacity buildings.

4.4 Security and Peace Building Efforts

Security is the primary challenge facing the Somali government. Security is also critical for the international community's re-engagement and foreign investment in the country. Although the international community has spent billions of dollars to support AMISOM, it was criticized for not investing enough in the Somali security services and national army. Turkey, which has no ground troops in Somalia, attempts to improve the capacity of security institutions using civilian power. In this regard, Turkey and Somalia signed the first deal of military cooperation on May 22, 2010. According to the signed document, the cooperation includes military logistics, training, and peace support, (Today's Zaman, 2012).

Police and intelligence training has been conducted in Somalia and Turkey. The first batch of Somali police personnel was sent to Turkey for capacity building training between 29 June and 16 July 2012, (Meydanistanbul, 2012). A total of sixty police members comprising forty-eight men, five women, and seven administrators had undergone serious training at Arnavutköy police training center in Istanbul.

Regarding a long-term strategy of Somalia's stability, Turkey is assisting the Somali armed forces as another major security sector. The Somali government has been lobbying the international community to consider building a Somali army as its greatest strategy to achieve a full control of the security that leads to long-term stability for the country. While giving support to the African mission in Somalia, Turkey started to invest mainly in the Somali army. In 2013, the first batch of such groups from the Somalia army was transported to Turkey for a yearlong military training. A total of 110 Somali military officers, comprising 58 officers, and 52 noncommissioned Officers (NCOs), graduated in the summer of 2014 following ten months of intensive military training in Turkey, (Haberler, 2014). As that training was the first successful batch, another 103 Somali military officials are in Turkey to be trained for land, sea and air defense (Radio Muqdisho, 2015).

While these pieces of trainings contribute significantly to the quantity and the quality of the army, police and the intelligence services, it was realized that there was a need for a broader strategy to rebuild the infrastructures of the country's security institutions, which had collapsed during the civil war, to build a homegrown effective security services, to achieve long term stability. In this regard, Turkey has recently finalized the construction of a Turkish Military Base in Mogadishu which occupies 400 hectares and houses three military schools, dormitories, and depots. It has the capacity to train 500 soldiers at a time and will be used to train troops from Somalia and other African countries (Anadolu Agency, 13/10/2016).

Turkey also supports with direct cash to the African Union's Somalia Peacekeeping Force in the context of peace-building, (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2013: 138).

4.5 Mediation

Although Turkey recognizes and respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, it has enjoyed good relations with all actors of Somalia's political process, including Somaliland, a self-declared independent entity which has not been internationally recognized yet; where even Turkey managed to open a consulate in Hargeisa. On the other hand, Turkey hosted Somaliland and the Federal Government for talks several times.

April 13, 2013, Turkey organized a Somali Conference for Somali president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and Somaliland president Ahmed Mohamed 'Silanyo', in Ankara in an effort to reach a political settlement. After negotiations and diplomacy in separate as well as trilateral meetings with then Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, then Prime Minister Erdoğan and then President Gül, the two Somali leaders concluded and agreed on Ankara Communiqué on 13th April 2013 (Mehmet Özkan 2014: 22).¹⁶

4.6 Somali problem at International Stage

Despite the fact that Somalia, at the international stage, was regarded as a no-go zone due to the security risks, then Prime Minister Erdoğan of Turkey led a delegation comprised of more than 200 political, business and cultural elites to Somalia together with his family in August 2011. His visit responded not only to the humanitarian tragedy but also drew the international attention to Somalia. Mogadishu, which was once called by the international media ‘the most dangerous city’ in the world, experienced the biggest foreign delegation in more than two decades. Despite the incessant warnings from some of the Western countries to their citizens from traveling to Somalia, or parts of it, due to security threats in Mogadishu, Erdoğan upstaged the international community in daring to take a lead and bringing together, some of his family, the key Ministers of his cabinet, civil society and state institutions to Somalia. President Erdoğan visited Somalia again in January 2015 and June 2016, as another major boost for Somalia’s international profile.

Speaking at the United Nations on 22 September 2011, a month after his visit to Mogadishu, Erdoğan allocated half of his UN General Assembly speech to Somalia. Speaking passionately about the Somalia crisis, urging the world leaders the need for a collective international response to the Horn of African war-torn country to restore stability and rebuild the state.

In another major move to take the Somalia case to the international desk, the Turkish government hosted several high-level international conferences on Somalia in Istanbul, seeking a comprehensive international solution for the Somali problem. The first conference took place in Istanbul from 21-23 May 2010, with delegations representing over fifty states. The three-day conference, co-convened by the United Nations and Turkey was intended to promote the Somalia’s economic investment. A proposed Taskforce by the Islamic Development Bank to bring together all development partners and agencies to respond to Somalia's critical needs pending the stabilization of the country, was agreed to be chaired by the government of Turkey.

The second conference that Turkey hosted was the Islamic Cooperation Conference on Somalia. As the worst humanitarian crisis in three decades hit East Africa, Turkey called an emergency Ministerial-level meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Istanbul on 17th August 2011, in order to raise awareness of the Somalia's famine crisis and seek a collective response. The Participation of the then President Gul, then Prime Minister Erdoğan and then Foreign Minister, Davutoglu, showed the significance of Turkey's effort to boost the Somali case to the international level. Speaking at the conference, Erdoğan announced his intention to go to Somalia.

The third conference hosted by Turkey on Somalia took place in Istanbul from 31st May to 1st June 2012. The two-day conference, which was a follow-up to the one previously held in Istanbul on 2010, focused on building a long-term solution to the Somalia's chronic state failure. Under the theme of "Preparing Somalia's Future: Goals for 2015", Turkey invited the Somali government leadership, regional administrations, and civil society representatives, as well as the international community to discuss building a long-term multi-dimensional solution for Somalia's future. Attended by representatives from 57 countries and eleven international and regional organizations, the conference made another significant step toward Somalia's backing in the eyes of the international community for state building support. As a host of the conference and a major donor, Turkey proposed the establishment of a new 'Rebuilding and Restructuring Fund for the Somalia Security' in which the conference endorsed the initiative to proceed.

4.7 Main Features of Turkish Model in Somalia

Turkish approach has used multifaceted state building model tackling the Somali crisis from various angles, and its efforts range from humanitarian to development and peace building. This engagement has been effective as government organizations, the private sector and local municipalities involved in the state building process. Below there is analysis of Turkey's approach and engagement to state building in Somalia.

Table 2: Turkish Approach to State Building in Somalia

Feature	Approach	Outcome
Humanitarian, development and state building operations	Direct aid delivery through presence on the ground	Efficient, cost-effective, rapid; needs based; more visibility
Alignment with Somali government's Priorities	Coordinating and planning with national government and local counterparts	Increased Somali ownership
Interventionism and conditionality	Non-interference; no direct policy conditionalities	Empowering state institutions; little Accountability
Drivers of Engagement	Humanitarianism and solidarity, soft power ¹⁷	Focusing on mutual benefits & long terms
Focus of Cooperation	Humanitarian support, political engagement, infrastructure and development, and institution building	Emphasizing economic solutions to ease political and security pressures, enhanced local institutions
Coordination with other donors	Strong bilateralism and little coordination with other donors	Better promotion of Turkish visibility; closer relationship with host government
Modalities of financing and support	In-kind goods, public-private partnerships, direct budget support, grants, technical cooperation, support via NGOs	Support mobilized from a variety of public and private sources; increased potential for sustained financing

Source: Besharati, Neissan and others. South-South Peace building: Lessons and Insights from Turkey and South Africa's Support to Fragile States; with modifications by the author.

5. Conclusion

It is noteworthy to mention that Turkish civilian power could not be effective in Somalia without the presence of the military forces of AMISOM. Therefore, my argument here is not that civilian power is an alternative to a military intervention, but rather it is that merely military power cannot bring a solution for failed states without coupling with civilian power.

After decades of conflict and state failure, the international community should consider, and rethink past strategies and policies adopted toward state building in Somalia. While hard power and military policy instruments have already prioritized, the international community should look other ways such as a civilian approach and its appropriate role in the state-building process.

By coordinating its state and civil society institutions, Turkey adopted different multifaceted approach by investing huge humanitarian and development assistance and building the Somali state through infrastructure and institutional development. Turkey has played a distinctive role in rebuilding Somalia's state institutions in a way that contributes effectively to the stability and development of the country. Turkey also played a mediating role in Somalia while keeping its impartiality and its presence in Somalia. For this regard, unlike any other country, Turkey has received huge support and sympathy from the Somalis.

As Somalia is located in a strategic position in the Horn of Africa, the Turkey's growing role should be careful about the suspicion of regional and global actors. Therefore Turkey's involvement should avoid a geopolitical rivalry, which could hinder the effectiveness of its efforts in Somalia.

Finally, this study recommends further research on the lessons learned and experiences on state/peace building efforts in Somalia. Such lessons are significant not to repeat the past mistakes, and could, also, be of advantage for state/peace building cases in other fragile or post-conflict countries.

Notes

¹ Somalia gained independence in 1960 after amalgamation between the former British Somaliland Protectorate which became independent from the UK on June 26, 1960, and Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration, which became independent on July 1, 1960. Together they united and formed the Somali Republic on July 1, 1960.

² States fail or become fragile as they run out to perform and loose legitimacy. The state becomes fragile when it has weak capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a population and its territory.

³ For more discussion, refer to Addow, 2015, p.10.

⁴ For more details, refer to Addow, 2015: 14-19

⁵ The two main Somali factions in Mogadishu reached an agreement of ceasefire and cessation of hostilities under auspices of United Nations. In accordance with the agreements, the ceasefire was to be monitored by a group of fifty unarmed uniformed United Nations military observers.

⁶ In addition to the United States forces, UNITAF included military units from Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe

⁷ The first elements of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), spearheaded by the United States, were deployed in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992. In the following weeks UNITAF forces expanded their operations to major relief centers in Somalia. UNITAF's principal goal was to establish a secure environment for urgent humanitarian assistance. Once that was accomplished, the military command would then be turned over to the United Nations.

⁸ There is a great debate about the (il)legality and the purpose of Ethiopian intervention. For more discussion, please refer to Khayre, Ahmed Ali. (2014) *"Self-Defence Intervention by Invitation, or Proxy war? The Legality of the 2006 Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia"* African Journal of International and Comparative Law 22.2 (2014): 208–233. Edinburgh University Press, UK.

⁹ As part of its global counter terrorism war, the United States instigated a proxy war in Somalia by supporting first local warlords with funds and asking them to capture suspected terrorists (Mark Mazzetti, Efforts by C.I.A Fail in Somalia, Officials Charge, *New York Times*, June 2006, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/world/africa/08intel.html>); and then gave Ethiopian a greenlight to invade the country.

¹⁰ Contributors of Military and Civilian Police Personnel of UNOSOM II were Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

¹¹ The historical relations between Somalia and Turkey went through different periods, starting from the Ottoman time to the Somalia's modern ages of independence, to the state collapse and 2011 humanitarian crises in the horn of Africa. The revitalizing of the relations returns to 2007 after the meeting of then Prime Minister Erdoğan with the Somali President, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. The former president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Sharif Sheikh Ahmed visited Ankara on several occasions before Erdoğan's first visit to Somalia in August 2011 with large delegation; followed by another visit in January 2015 when Erdoğan announced projects that would consolidate relations between the two countries. His third time, he visited to Mogadishu on June 2016, to inaugurate Turkish Embassy's new building complex in Mogadishu, described it as "the number one complex in the world". In their period, both Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visited Turkey several times, while the current president, Mohamed Abdullahi 'Farmajo', made his first visit to Turkey on April 2017.

Noticeably, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (1934 –2012) was the president of Transitional Federal Government of Somalia from October 2004 – December 2008 where he resigned and succeeded by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (1966 -), who was the president of Transitional Federal Government of Somalia from January 2009 to August 2012. Sharif was succeeded by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (1955 -) who was the president of the Federal Republic of Somalia

from September 2012 to February 2017, and succeeded by Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed "Farmajo" who was elected on February 2017.

- ¹² By working inside, and massively investing in economic infrastructure, the Turkish presence in Somalia has received huge support and sympathy from the Somalis, unlike any other country.
- ¹³ The schools, which were built or renovated by the Turkish state institutions or NGOs include, but not limited: Turkish Maarif Foundation Schools (previously named Bedir Turkish Secondary School), Anadolu Educational Center, Sheikh Sufi Imam Hatip secondary school, Agriculture school, fishing school, among others.
- ¹⁴ In 2012, TIKa provided 400 computers, 100 printers, overhead projects and generators to Somalia universities. In 2013, the total number of donated computers reached 600 computers.
- ¹⁵ NILE and KIMSE YOK MU are currently prohibited by the Somali government to operate in the country due to its alleged involvement in 15 July failed coup in Turkey.
- ¹⁶ The first talks between Somalia and Somaliland took place in London, UK on 21 June 2012, where both parties agreed to continue the dialogue. After a week, they met in Dubai on a presidential level for further talks and signed Dubai statement. Following UK and Dubai's mediation, Turkey has taken the lead in hosting both parties in Ankara to continue the discussions.
- ¹⁷ Turkish engagement increases bilateral trade and business investment opportunities for Turkish institutions. Also, it may be understood that Somalia has becoming the Turkish pivot into Africa for expanding its sphere of influence in the context of growing regional and global rivalries. For more details, please refer to Antonopoulos, Paul and others. (July 2017) "*Somalia: Turkey's Pivot to Africa in the Context of Growing Inter-Imperialist Rivalries*"; Journal of Comparative Politics, Volume 10, Number 2, (July 2017): 4-18. available at: <http://www.jofcp.org/assets/jcp/JCP-July-2017.pdf>.

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Somali Region in Ethiopia: Historical Developments during the Period 1884-1995



Abdirahman A. Muhumed & Mohamed A. Siraj

Abstract

The history of Somali Region is scattered in the vast history of Somalia and Ethiopia. But this article explicitly examines the historical developments of the region from the colonial period to the recent past around 1995, and how the region gained the diverging ethnic and national identities, Somali and Ethiopian at the same time. The paper also aims at presenting the historical developments of Somali Region in short, and traditional narrative perspective.

Key words: Somali Region, Ogaden, Hawd, Somalia, Ethiopia, British Colonies.

1. Introduction

Today's Somali Region in Ethiopia was simply the Western Somali territory and/or Ogaden & Hawd of the then times, traditionally located in the approximate area of southeastern Ethiopia, bounded on the north by British Somaliland and on the east by Italian Somaliland. Through conquests and colonization, it has gained its present shape and geopolitics.¹

Most studies available on the region mainly examine the political aura of the region and the 1977-78 war between Ethiopia and Somali. There are other studies scattered in the histories of Somalia and Ethiopia. For example, Abdi Samatar's *Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism and Regional Autonomy: the Somali Test* (Samatar, 2008) is an informative study of the region's political history, and it covers only the period after 1991. Other works include Hagmann's studies on the political aura of the region. Markakis's sketchy paper on Somali in Ethiopia (1996) and his other paper on the ethnic Somalis in new political order of Ethiopia (1994) are other studies worth mentioning too. However, none of these studies attempted to spotlight the history of the region and how the double Ethiopian and Somali identity have been shaped all the way to the colonial period, in a short and precise manner.

This essay summarizes the historical developments of Somali Region in Ethiopia, from the colonial period to the recent past; and examines how the history shaped the double Ethiopian and Somali identity.

2. Developments in 1884-1960

Somali people inhabit in the Horn of Africa where various Sultanates and city states were established in the medieval Islamic and the

precolonial periods. Adal Sultanate was one of those Sultanates located in the heart of Zeila, the North Western part of Somali settled territories.

Evidently, there is no clear evidence showing the inclusion of Somali inhabited territory into Ethiopia before the expansion of Emperor Menelik II to South and South East in the late 19th century.² There are some historical records indicating that historically Ethiopia had an access to the port of Zeila, but the case of Ogaden was not included in historic Ethiopia (Asefa Fisha, 2013).

In 1884, the scramble for Africa took place, and European colonies agreed to divide and colonize Africa. A vast land of Somalia fell under three main colonial administrations, namely British, French and Italian administrations. British protectorate of Somaliland was established in 1884 through a number of Anglo-Somali Treaties of Protection (Sh. Abdirahman, 1990). In the same way, Italians made their direct claims of Italian Somalia and its coast in 1889. Then in 1891 Italian and British colonial powers reached an agreement on their colonial spheres of influence in the East Africa (Mainly Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eretria). In 1889 Italy and Ethiopia signed the treaty of Wuchale but interpreted in different manners.³ On May 5, 1894, Italy, acting as the protector of Ethiopia, as per their interpretation of treaty of Wuchale, demarcated the boundary between Ethiopia (under Italian colonial administration) and British Somaliland as follows:

The boundary of the spheres of influence of Great Britain and of Italy in the regions of the Gulf of Aden shall be constituted by a line which, starting from Gildessa [Jeldesa] and running toward the 8th degree of north latitude, skirts the north-east frontier of the territories of the Girrhi, Bertiti, and Rer Ali Tribes, leaving to the right the villages of Gildessa, Darmi, Gig

giga [Jijiga], and Milmil. On reaching the 8th degree of the north latitude the line follows that parallel as far as its intersection with the 48th degree of longitude east of Greenwich (BIR, 1978).

By ignoring the 1894 treaty between Italy and Britain, where Gadabursi tribe's land lied under British protectorate, Menelik attempted and entered into Somali territory in 1896 by building some grass huts at Alola, a spring located in the southeast of Biyo Kabobe. In addition, Menelik also hoisted his flag at Alola and mentioned that Gadabursi and Issa tribe's territories (What is now from Shiniile, Jigjiga to Awbare) belong to Abyssinia (Somali Peninsula, 1962).

In 1896, after the defeat of Italians at the battle of Adwa⁴, Addis Ababa peace treaty took place between Italy and Ethiopia to resolve the misinterpretation of Wuchale treaty and negotiate the boundaries of Ethiopia and Italy in the Eastern Africa. In this treaty, Italy was no more acting as a protector of Ethiopia, and Ethiopia in search of its independent sphere of influence similar to that of British, French and Italian colonial administrations joined the partition of Horn of Africa (Mukhtar, 2003). Emperor Menelik proposed the boundary of Ethiopia by extending to the Western Somali territories of Ogaden and submitted it to Italy on June 24, 1896, and one year later, Italy approved its boundaries, though informally by only telegraphing without any signed document accompanying it.

In the same year, 1897, Ethiopia, continuing its expansion territories of the South and South East where Somali people settled, reached an agreement with the British colonial administration to demarcate the border between Ethiopia and the British Somaliland, which excluded most of the Hawd in Ethiopia. In this Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty in 1897, British ceded Somali territory to the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik in

exchange for his help in the fight against Somali clans (D. Laitin, S. Samatar, 1987).

However, this treaty occurred only between Ethiopia and the British administration and Somali people were not consulted and informed. Moreover, the treaty violated the previous protection agreements between the British colonial administration and the Somali clans. In fact, this was one of the main reasons that Somali's denied the validity of the treaty. By 1891, boundaries that Emperor designed, which included Ogaden and some of the Hawd, was accepted by other colonial administrations. In 1906 Italy, France and Britain legally recognize Ethiopia's sovereignty and settle disputes about the territorial borders (BIR, 1978). Unfortunately, Somali people were not even aware of the Abyssinian expansion to their territories since they had protection agreements with Britain in 1884 and in 1886.

In 1907, Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement demarcated their boundary with the British East African Protectorate (Kenya). This agreement places Italian Somaliland in a triangular point where Dewa and Genale rivers meet. A year later, Ethiopia and Italy also agreed to create new Ethiopian-Italian Somaliland boundary between Dolo and Webi Shabelle in 1908 (BIR, 1978 P, 4).

The second Ethio-Italian war begun in December 1934 at Walwaal. This is the beginning of the Italian conquest and occupation of Ethiopia. The incident started at Walwaal, located in Dollo Zone of the Somali settled territory of Ethiopia and ended up with the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, including Addis Ababa. Italy proclaimed an Italian colonial empire in the Horn of Africa that includes Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia in 1936. As a result, the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Sellasie escaped to England for exile.⁵ Consequently, Italy had control over Ethiopia, Somali territories of the South, British Somaliland to Hawd and Ogaden (Today's Somali

region of Ethiopia) (Mukhtar, 2003; Sh. Abdirahman, 1993). This is how Italy promoted and initiated the idea of "Grande Somalia" (Greater Somalia), which included all Somali settled territories. By September 1940, Benito Mussolini claimed that he has created "Greater Somalia" inside his Italian Empire (Mukhtar, 2003).

In 1941, British administration reestablished its colonial administration and extended it to Italian Somaliland, Hawd and Ogaden; also, helped the king of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie to come back to Ethiopia, after years of exile, as its ruler. Hawd and Ogaden remained under British Military Administration (BMA) until 1944 when Ethiopia through the agreement with Britain reasserted its sovereignty in the Reserved Area. (Farah Mohamed, 1978; Mukhtar, 2003).

In May 1943, Somali Youth Club (SYC) (later renamed SYL) was established by thirteen young Somali nationalists and operated its field offices in the whole Somali territories including Jigjiga and the NFD of Kenya. The nationalist movement spread throughout Somali settled territories. In 1946, the British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, proposed to the Allied Council of Foreign Ministers a plan to place the Somali-inhabited territories under the British Military Administration. Unfortunately, "Bevin Plan" was rejected and USSR, USA, and France blatantly stood against that plan. (Farah Mohamed, 1978).

Evidence showed that in the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1897, Britain did not sufficiently explain about the cession of Somali territory to Ethiopia nor did she recognize Ethiopian rights to Somali territory. British colonial administration also reached protection agreement, not to handover them to Ethiopia, with the local elders of Ogaden and Hawd. Nevertheless, half a century later, Britain arrived with a new and different interpretation of the position and purported to recognize the

sovereignty of Ethiopia over Somali territory to which she had a previous title (Somali Peninsula, 1962).

In 1948, British colonial administration withdrew from Ogaden and, to the dismay of Somalis, implemented the hidden agenda of handing over Ogaden as well as part of Reserved Area to Ethiopia, with no consent and awareness of all Somali people. Since then 'Somali Region of Ethiopia' has become a part of Ethiopia. It was misery to all Somalis as they protested against the handover causing the death of 25 demonstrators at Jigjiga alone. It was this time that the flag of SYL was removed from Jigjiga though SYL did not give up and continue to organize protests. (Farah Mohamed, 1978, p 138).

In 1955, in line with the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, the BMA withdrew from the Hawd and the Reserved Area, and Ethiopia took over the administration of these territories. From that time on wards, Ogaden and Hawd have been a part of the Ethiopian administered territory, with no consent of Somali people. In March 1955 the National United Front (NUF) attempted to regain the Hawd and the Reserved Area and to get its independence with the Somaliland British Protectorate. This resulted in endless chaos and violent conflicts (Mohamed Omar, 2001).

In 1958 the UN Trusteeship Council appointed an arbitration tribunal to decide upon the disputed territories between Ethiopia and Somalia before the termination of the trusteeship period. However, all these efforts ended in vain. This was followed by Somalia's independence in 1960 and Somalia did not recognize Anglo-Ethiopian delimitation of 1897 and provided no legal recognition of Ethiopian borders. The border question, to this date, remains unresolved and there are no clear demarcations between the borders of the two states (BIR, 1978; Mukhtar, 2003).

In 1948 and 1954 discontent led to incessant attempts to liberate and reunite the ceded region with the other Somali territories in “Great Somalia”. Somalia plainly denied and rejected to find any room to accommodate and recognize the validity of the political boundaries drawn at the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897 and the relevance of treaties defining Somali-Ethiopian borders.

Somalia denied the Anglo Ethiopian treaty of 1897 for three specific reasons: the first being the fact that this agreement turns a blind eye to the protection agreements that British colonials made with the Somali people; secondly Somali people of everywhere had, by any means, no idea and were not informed of the existence of such treaties; and lastly, such treaties violated self-determination principle.

3. Developments in 1960-1995

After Somalia gained its independence in 1960, Somalia's successive governments waged a campaign which mainly focused diplomatic means on regaining what they called "lost territory" and raised the issue on regional and international platforms like United Nations and Organization of Islamic countries. Liberating the remaining Somali territories from the both white and black colonial powers remained one of Somalia's main missions to be accomplished. Consecutive Somali governments attempted to incorporate the remaining Somali territories into “The Somali Republic”, and to realize the dream of Greater Somalia, as the five pointed star in the flag stand for.

The denial of the border between Ethiopia and Somali by the newly born Somali Republic and its growing diplomatic and military relations with the world, as well as the status quo of the region and its people, frightened Ethiopia. The hostilities grew steadily, and there were some clashes between Somali pastoralists and Ethiopian police forces in the

region. The incidents changed into a low-level war between the Ethiopian and Somali armed forces and spread along the border. In February 1964, fierce fighting broke out along the Ethio-Somali border. Shortly after, the hostilities came to an end. In fact Sudan, representing Organization of African Unity, took the responsibility to mediate between the two nations. Ministers from both sides met in Khartoum and agreed cease fire with 15km military withdrawal from both sides (Mukhtar, 2003; Farah Mohamed, 1978)

In 1966 the Ethiopian regime stalled martial law in the Somali Region and the neighboring Oromo region, and this was accompanied by gruesome tactics that were applied to punish herders to force them to renounce their support for the fighters. Many of these were ranging from confiscating their property, arbitrary arrests, to controlling water points and destroying their livestock (HRW, 2008).

The first organized liberation movement in the Somali territory under Ethiopian jurisdiction, came into existence a few years after Somalia gained its independence in 1960. The Somali Republic's Constitution sanctioned liberation of Somali territories in Ethiopia, Kenya, and French Somaliland. This essentially embedded these liberation movements in inter-state relations and, more centrally, in Somali regime politics. The liberation movement in Somali Ethiopia reached its zenith in 1977–78.

In 1970s Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF)⁶ was established and began recruiting aggrieved inhabitants of the region. Somalia helped local militias like WSLF, SALF (Somali Abo Liberation Front) and OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) to weaken Ethiopian forces in the region structurally and to destabilize the country as well (B. Yihun, 2014; Markakis, 1996).

In 1977, a large scale war was waged by Somalia in order to regain Ogaden from Ethiopia. Somali National Army crossed the border into Ethiopia and carried out military operations in Degahbour, Kebridehar, Warder and Godey (Yihun, 2014) taking control of Jijiga and large pockets of western region in the first two weeks of the war. WSLF fought against Ethiopia and the Ethiopian Somalis supported the war despite their strong control by Ethiopia (Abdi Samatar, 2008). The Somali success did not last long and Ethiopia pleaded to its allies to stop the ongoing onslaught at the hand of its sworn enemy. The USSR and Cuba, formerly Somalia's ally, sided with Ethiopia and South Yemen rushed for help. Consequently, Somalia was pushed back and forced to retreat from the areas they occupied, and this led to the weakening of Somali Government, both militarily and politically, inside and outside the country. In the ensuing years, this defeat tremendously contributed to the downfall of the central government. In March 1978, Siyad Barre recalled his army from Ethiopia.

Africa Watch (the precursor to Human Rights Watch's Africa Division) analyzed Ethiopian counter-insurgency operations in that time and found that they followed a four-pronged approach:

- forced displacement of much of the civilian population into shelters and protected villages;
- military offensives against people and economic assets outside the shelters;
- sponsoring of insurgent groups against the WSLF and Somali government; and
- attempts to promote the repatriation of refugees.

In December 1979, a new Ethiopian military offensive, this time including Soviet advisors and Cuban troops, was more specifically directed against the population's means of survival, including poisoning

and bombing waterholes and machine gunning herds of cattle. Militarily, the counter-insurgency operations succeeded in significantly weakening the insurgents or driving them across the border into Somalia (HRW, 2008).

Soon after the 1977 war massive influx of refugees started from the region, with hundred thousand of people crossed to neighboring Somalia, where they lived in refugee camps in the succeeding years (Hagman & Kalif 2008).

During the interim period, 1978–91, the liberation movement lost its autonomy because the Somali military regime used the liberation movement for its own purposes, as many movement leaders became henchmen of the new order. Those who disagreed with the tactics of the regime were forced to flee the country; the unlucky individuals rotted in jail. This treatment caused the movement to lose its grassroots identity and become a sycophant of the military rulers. The collapse of the state and the subsequent fragmentation of Somali society into warlord territories, along with the rise of sectarian politics, had dire effects on Somali Ethiopian politics. Although Somalis contributed significantly to the weakening of the Mengistu regime, the liberation movement was politically and militarily a spent force in 1991 (Abdi Samatar, 2008).

Many Somali Ethiopians who had moved to Somalia since the early 1960s returned to Ethiopia after May 1991. Some of these were senior military leaders and political entrepreneurs and came back to the region and stepped into politics and become parts of the new polity formed by Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)⁷ (Abdi Samatar, 2008).

In mid 1990s, a new constitution of Ethiopia was drawn up which marked a new beginning for the Somali Region, in line with the other regions of Ethiopia.⁸

In May 1995 a new legislative body, the Council of People's Representatives, was elected with the majority of seats going to the EPRDF. In August the Constituent Assembly officially transferred power to the new legislature, and the country was renamed the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. A new constitution came into force in August 1995 providing ethnic based federalism for the first time in the country's history. The new constitution provides self-determination and nine ethnically based regions (Asnake K., 2009), where the Somali Regional State is one among the nine regional states provided by 1995 constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

4. Conclusion

This paper has attempted to put forth a glimpse of the history of the Somali Region in Ethiopia all the way from the colonial era to the present, in a traditional narrative model. The article described that the formation of Somali Region in Ethiopia goes back to the colonial legacy of Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1897 while the Somali Government denies it.

In the first section, the essay overrules the recent distorted claims that Ogaden local elders preferred Emperor Haile Selassie to British colonies. The paper finds no valid claim to this argument and sheds light on how Britain ceded the region, secretly, to Ethiopia in 1897 and handed Ogaden and Hawd in 1948 and 1954 respectively. The rest of the essay examines the situation of the region from the 1960 up to 1995.

The paper does not examine the very recent historical developments in the region (1995 and afterwards). Thus there is a need for further research to be conducted on the current historical developments, cultural changes (amalgamation) and political shifts that have taken place in the region during the past decade.

Notes

¹ Ogaden, and Hawd and Western Somali Territory are terminologies used by different people and entities for different political positions and purposes. It defines whole or part of the territory that falls in the eastern part of Ethiopia and is settled by ethnic Somalis.

² Emperor Menelik II, born Sahle Mariam (1844 –1913), was Negus [means king] of Shewa (1866–89), then Emperor of Ethiopia (1889-1913), in 1889 became Emperor Menelik II.

³ Treaty of Wuchale was a treaty signed by King Menelik with Italy on 2 May 1889 (corresponding to 25 Miazia 1881 of Ethiopian Calendar). The treaty is signed in the Town of Wuchale (also spelled Uccialle or Ucciali) in Amhara Region, Ethiopia.

⁴ The battle of Adwa took place in March 1896 between Ethiopian Empire and Kingdom of Italy at a place located within the close vicinity of Adwa, Tigray Region. The cause of the battle resulted from the interpretation of the treaty of Wuchale (1889). The Amharic and Italian translation of the document conveyed different meanings.

⁵ Haile Selassie I (1892 –1975), born Tafari Makonnen Woldemikael, was an Ethiopian Emperor from 1930 to 1974. He was the Regent of Ethiopia from 1916 to 1930 while Zewditu (1876 –1930), the daughter of Menelik II, was the Empress of Ethiopia. Emperor Haile Selassie I was in exile from 1936 until he was reinstated in 1941.

- ⁶ Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was a guerrilla organization based in Ethiopia seeking to free the Somali Region in Ethiopia or Western Somalia and unite it with Somalia.
- ⁷ Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) commonly known as "Ehadig" is the ruling political coalition in Ethiopia, initially formed by TPLF (Tigray people's liberation front) and EPDM (Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement) combined in to one in early 1989, later on others joined. For more details refer to Sarah Vaughan (2003) *"Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia"*, (University of Edinburgh: Ph.D. Thesis, 2003); Abdi Ismail Samatar (2008) *"Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism and Regional Autonomy; The Somali Test"*.
- ⁸ The constitution of 1995 is the fourth constitution of Ethiopia, there were three earlier previous constitutions of Ethiopia in 1931, 1955 and 1987.

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“Of Warlords and Wordsmiths”: Journeying the Somali Civil War Through Selected Poetry



Helmi Ben Meriem

Abstract

Since mid-1980s, Somalia has experienced a long period of instability and chaos characterized by a brutal civil war. This paper focuses on some literary representations of the Somali civil war, in selected Somali poets, which shed light on Somalis' experiences and struggles in the civil war era. These poems reflect on how contemporary Somali poets have attempted to better understand and counter the effects of war, and delve into the intricate and complex nature of the civil war including its effects on Somalis such as loss of relatives, exile and destruction. These works do not restrict the war to images of bloodshed but also provide images of Somalis who strive to confront the violence and look forward to a peaceful Somalia. As they historicize the war, these poems achieve a cathartic effect, by which writers and readers cleanse themselves from distress, pain and loss of hope.

Keywords: Somali Poetry, Civil War, Peace, Catharsis, Warlords, Wordsmith

"A novel [or a poem] is a mirror carried along a high road. At one moment it reflects to your vision the azure skies, at another the mire of the puddles at your feet."

*Marie-Henri Beyle (Stendhal),
The Red and the Black*

Introduction

This article is a parallel reading of the war violence as it is countered by Somali poets. In the very act of describing the effects of the civil war, poets manage to perform two functions: a historicizing function and a cathartic one. The phrase "Of Warlords and Wordsmiths" is taken from Abdulqawi Yusuf's article by the same title, in which he studies the effects of Keinan Abdi Warsame's hip-hop songs and how Warsame is "battling warlords with lyrics" (49).

This article aims to stress the crucial role of poetry in the ongoing struggle for better life - of course, in a figurative and symbolic manner. In other words, the poems to be studied counter violence through discrediting violence and challenge the power of the gun through words filled with hope and aspirations of a lost generation, one devastated by civil war.

The way that poetry, as a form of writing, reflects the situation will be examined in a selection of poems by Somali poets—three women poets and two men poets respectively: *Ilwaad Jaamac*, *Warsan Shire*, *Aamina Axmed Yuusuf*, *Gamuute A. Gamuute* and *Cali Jimcaale Axmed*. These poems chronicle different stages of the Somali experience: from hope to despair, from tyranny to warlordism, and from statehood to statelessness. They also give a complete image of Somalis as they travel alongside their

country when songs of hope and aspirations were sung only to be muted by bullets—bullets that eventually mute the very people who were singing.

From 1969 until 1991, Somalia was governed by Dictator Siad Barre.¹ When his regime was driven outside of the capital Mogadishu, Somalis looked forward to a bright future when Somalia would be run outside of the dictatorship. Parallel to the poets who celebrated Barre’s 1969 coup d’état and “came up with moral justifications . . . for Barre’s ascendancy to power [with] songs like ‘*Geeddiga wadaay*’ . . . ‘*Guulwade Siyaad, aabbihii garashada*’ . . . and ‘*Caynaanka hay*’”² (Ahmed, “Daybreak” 17), most of Somali intellectuals have taken to the pen to justify a revolution against all forms of power-corruption. Somalis aspired to fulfil in a true manner the goals stated in the “First Announcement SRC Act on Behalf of the People”—“social justice,” “rapid progress of the country,” “liquidation of all kinds of corruption, all forms of anarchy, the malicious system of tribalism,” “Somali national unity,” and the “preserv[ation] [of] the policy of peaceful coexistence between all people” (Barre IV-V). In fact, in 1991, Somalis perceived the fight against Barre as a new chance for building Somalia on democratic and peaceful ground.

“Premonition”

Somali acclaimed critic and poet Ali Jimale Ahmed³ (Cali Jimcaale Axmed) has evocatively expressed this anticipation shared by Somalis in his poem “Premonition”; this poem, which was written on Thursday 27 December 1990—precisely a month before the fall of Barre’s regime,⁴ is “dedicated to those who translated a premonition into reality” (Ahmed, “Premonition” 84)—that is, to Somalis effectively casting a shadow over Barre’s rule. To describe this poem, one can only call it an optimistic ode to the power of the Somali people and to their shared hope for a brighter

future; the poet⁵ eloquently describes the last days of Barre in Mogadishu as his powers were fading against the willpower of the Somalis:

Besieged by the gun singing lullabies
Of freedom yet to come
Pigeonholed to the far end of town
Where the ocean meets land (84)

The poem puts into opposition two elements: a dictator retreating and a people advancing; with each step taken by the people, Barre finds himself further cornered into an even smaller space. The guns used by the people are different from those used by the regime; the insurgents' guns are "singing lullabies," which are usually sung to babies to get them to sleep. Ahmed's association of these guns with lullabies effectively associates Barre with sleep—a form of inactivity, closure and end; in chanting hope songs, Somalis drive Barre to sleep, that is, to idleness and to passiveness—an inability to respond and to counteract. Indeed, Barre is forced into a symbolic death as the landmass, he controls, decreases until he is caught between "*freedom-fighters*" and the ocean. Barre, realizing that he has lost the battle, chooses to flee Mogadishu.

In fleeing Mogadishu, Barre "mourns the loss of his name [which is] shrinking" (84); as Ahmed explains in a footnote, "Siyaad in Somali means 'to increase or augment'" (84) and consequently the name has become antithetical to the person bearing it, for Barre's power is shrinking as the power of the Somali people is growing. Prophesying such an historical moment, Ahmed describes what he thinks Somalis would be doing the day Barre is ousted:

Too small to swell anyone
.....
While people were dancing

In rain by the Mandrake
Jubilant, a curse lifted
But never put to rest. (84)

With Barre out of the picture, Somali people take to the streets to celebrate the end of dictatorship, which they hope will bring with it the end of many other negative aspects of the autocratic rule; dancing under the rain presents us with a highly romanticized image of the Somali people akin to that of two lovers walking under the rain or a desert people celebrating the end of a drought. The image set by Ahmed is that of a people determined to plant the seeds of future and water them with the rain of hope. Ahmed's picture of the rain can be seen as a counter-image to an incident from Somali history: "Even the skies were generous to the coup makers: long awaited rains fell in abundance . . . [which] the ideologues of the new regime quickly interpreted it as a divinely symbolic act" (Ahmed, "Daybreak" 17). One can argue that the rain of 1991 is as divinely symbolic as that of 1969, different eras with same aspirations; this rain is also symbolically cleansing in that it washes away the traces of bloodshed and violence. In the course of cleansing, it has washed away the curse that has been cast over Somalia; Barre's defeat equals the death of dictatorship and lack of freedom. Nonetheless, Ahmed ends his poem with a rather sharp twist as he warns that the curse would not fully be destroyed with Barre's ousting; this is a strong call for Somalis not to be caught up in the moment of Barre's removal but instead to be watchful for what remains of the curse.

When "The Mayor of Mogadishu," as Barre used to be called (Diriye Abdullahi 39), was pushed out of Mogadishu, anarchy descended on Somalia, and various factions challenged each other about who should have power: "As soon as the detested centre collapsed, a new vicious jostling for individual and clanistic power commenced, exacerbated by revenge-seeking rage . . . an orgy of looting . . . anarchy and chaos in

most major urban centers” (Lyons 21). Somalis, who were hoping for peace and democracy, were shocked to realize that ridding themselves of Barre was but the start. This brings back the suggestion at the end of “Premonition” that the journey towards democracy would not end with Barre. Somalia was trapped within a political scene characterized by chaos, violence and deep political and social divisions.

In this environment, as pointed out by Somali novelist and scholar Maxamed D. Afrax, a new form of struggle emerged:

Painfully moved by the current disaster, many Somali poets, dramatists and creative writers have responded to the civil war by a wave of new literature, condemning clan hostilities and similar destructive practices, and advocating for peace and national rebuilding. (32)

As Afrax indicates, the new emerging literature was aimed against the present status-quo and was a preparation for the future; novels, short stories and poems were written demanding the end of anarchy and civil war and the creation of a stable path for a prosperous Somalia. The emerging literature was “amongst the non-violent instruments of resistance used by Somalis against these home-grown oppressors” (Yusuf 49): Nuruddin Farah’s *Blood in the Sun Trilogy*, Abdirazak Y. Osman’s novel *In the Name of Our Fathers*, and Samatar Sooyaan’s short story “A Foreign Language Is Such a Nuisance” illustrate the civil war and its effects on the Somali population including crimes, relative losses, famine, displacement and emigration.

Reflections

In his poem “Condolence”⁶, Somali poet Gamuute Axmad Gamuute, the penname used by Faarax Axmad Cali,⁷ expresses, as the title suggests, his concern for and commiseration with the Somali people; this poem is

structured in a surprising and evocative manner, in which there is a parallelism between two actions—shedding tears and shouting—and between association and disassociation with certain elements of the war. In other words, the stanzas are at times cries “with” the victims and at other times cries “against” the victimizers—from being passive through tears to being active in voicing a desire to end violence; the poem starts with a stanza that calls for mourning over the fate of Somalia:

Cry, my pen, cry	Cry, my pen, cry
Shedding tears of blood, cry!	Shedding tears of blood, cry!
Cry, my pen, cry	Cry, my pen, cry
For the slaughtered peace, cry!	For the thousands butchered, cry! (25)

One can make several remarks concerning the style employed in this stanza, which in fact applies to all of the following stanzas; there is an emphasis on reiterating the phrase “Cry, my pen, cry,” which can be understood symbolically as the pen crying on behalf of the Somali people. In writing this poem, Gamuute weeps through the pen, metaphorically ‘bleeding’ on the white paper on which the poem is written; as Somalis lost their voices due to killings and violence, the only way to cry is through the pen. In fact, the pen is “shedding tears of blood,” which are as dark as the depressing present of Somalia; whereas the history of Somalia is written in red ink—that is, with Somalis’ blood—Gamute writes his tears with the black ink of the pen, which both highlights the dire present but also gives Gamute an outlet for his ever-growing frustration with reality. Within this new reality, peace—that is, the very notion of coexistence—is “slaughtered,” which associates the deaths of Somalis with the death of peace; with every new “butchered” Somali, peace dissolves and is swallowed into the widening and growing ocean of blood.

As the poem progresses, Gamute points to a new struggle that Somalis have to face; the problem is not ridding Somalia of Barre but of Barre-like

people: “Cry, my pen, cry//Against the locust that left//the larvae behind, cry” (25). Gamuute is referring to the Somali proverb “Ayax teg, eelna reeb (Don’t be fooled by the migration of the locusts. They leave their larvae behind)” (Ahmed, “Daybreak” 20); the locust is symbolic of tyranny, The larvae refer to anarchy and warlordism, the insurgents fought against agony of tyranny but replaced it with another agony; and thus Somalia will be trapped in a vicious circle/cycle of warlords and fissional factions, looting and burgling, devastating civil war, social fragmentation and inter-clan violence. In fact, in his poem “Why Are We not Blest?,” Ali Jimale Ahmed shares the same perception as Gamuute: “A new head, stronger// mushrooms in the place// of the decapitated” (104); Barre’s decapitated head—that is, his physical absence from power and presidency palace —does not terminate the suffering of the people. Both poets highlight the fact that “the onslaught// starts anew” (“Why Are We not Blest?” 104) because the agony and misery does not end with ousting a dictator but rather starts with him! Somalia has become a “mutilated homeland” (“Condolence” 25) where every warlord thinks himself to be fit to lead, and wants to possess the recently-emptied seat of power upon huge heaps of skulls! Somalia has been divided between different rivalling warlords, whose only interest is to control more land and more resources, resulting in a dysfunctional disintegrated nation!

As Somalia was being divided like a prize of war between warlords, more and more Somalis became either internally displaced people or refugees “thrown to the four winds” (Mohamed 90); those who did not manage to escape the raging war were reduced to a “human shield” (Gamuute 25) protecting one faction against another. Somalis, who “slept//in the same womb, two horns//of the same cow” (Ahmed, “Season of Rape” 72), moved away from their shared past, culture, and fate towards being self-destructive people. Thus, Somalis used other Somalis to kill more Somalis—a literal translation of the Arabic proverb: “I, against my

brothers. I and my brothers against my cousins. I and my brothers and my cousins against the world” (Lewis 114).

From a revolution to overthrow a dictator to a brutal civil war, Somalia witnessed a sharp and unexpected shift in its history as the revolution became a clan war—or as Hussein Mohamed puts it, “with every gain comes a loss, in every loss a gain” (qtd. in Farah, *Yesterday* 120); while faction leaders fought each other for power, Somalis were caught in the in-betweens of a chaotic space in search for an escape and a people in constant fear for their lives.

Tainted Memory

In her poem “First Kiss,” Warsan Shire⁸ tells how a love story turned sour when the war started; this story of a Somali mother is told to her son by one of the relatives. It starts with a commanding statement: “The first boy to kiss your mother later raped women// when the war broke out . . .” (16); there is a rather shocking juxtaposition between a highly romanticized memory and a horrifying image of the present status-quo. The same Somali man, who loved the mother, raped other women as the war took hold of Somalia; in fact, the mother herself was raped by the first man she ever kissed: “Your mother was sixteen when he first kissed her.// . . .//On waking she found her dress was wet and sticking// to her stomach, half-moons bitten into her thighs” (16). From romanticism to rape, the mother becomes symbolic of the nation and its history: “In poetry, they [women] serve as a metaphor central to the nation’s psyche, a poetic metaphor representing the integrity and honour of the land” (Farah, “Clichés” 6); the rape of this particular Somali woman is evocative of the larger motherland being politically raped as it is divided among warlords. In the fate of its women, Somalia can be read.

Warsan Shire's poem concludes with a stanza that rather foregrounds essential questions about the post-civil-war period, reminding the readers and Somalis at large that the present cannot be easily forgotten:

Last week, she saw him driving the number eighteen bus,
.....
.....You were with her, holding a bag
of dates to your chest, heard her let out a deep moan
when she saw how much you looked like him. (16)

The driver of the bus is the man who had previously raped the mother; upon seeing him, the mother is transported back to the moment when she was raped—a visual-mental association. But what is more important is that the mother saw in her child her rapist; she is constantly reminded that she has carried in her womb the outcome of the rape, and that her child's father raped her. The child can be seen as a catalyst for a history that is engrained into the lives, memory and lineage of Somalis. In other words, children born-out-of-rape are living documentations of the atrocity of the civil war and anarchy - where there is confusion between friend and enemy, and neighbor and attacker.

But if “children who witnessed their mothers killed or molested were traumatized,” (Haji Ingiriis “Mothers and Memory” 229) what can one argue about children who bear in their blood the mark of trauma itself? Furthermore, if “it is likely that many of the affected children emerged as militiamen in order to avenge their loved ones,” (Haji Ingiriis 229) how will the rape-children act and how will they treat their fathers? The answers to these questions can only be answered by the victims themselves—both women and children—whose memory is forever imprinted by a trauma that extends to the future of the nuclear Somali family and the nation at large; only by “healing mothers and children [by helping them . . .] escape the mental depression” and the stigma of

“reputation injury” (Haji Ingiriis 234-5, 229) can Somalia as a country start the repair process of its wounded national identity and history.

Lamenting

A great part of the healing process is to voice the atrocities that Somalis have undergone during the civil war as does Aamina Axmed Yuusuf⁹ in a two-stanza poem entitled “Can You Hear Me?”. Similar to Gamuute and Warsan Shire, Aamina Yuusuf details the “cry of pain” of Somalis, who witnessed the killing of mothers, the raping of sisters, and the burning of villages (24); throughout the poem, the same question is reiterated: “Can you hear me? Can I be heard?” (24), which is at times shouted at soldiers (24), representative of violence and brutality, and at other times at doctors who are reopening the very wounds they want to cure. But most importantly, Aamina Yuusuf expresses her agony in a statement directed towards the city of Mogadishu:

Can you hear me, dear city,
For I can hear you cry as your heart is ripped out of its inner frame
And as your big walls are brought down,
Exposing you nakedly under the harsh African sky! (24)

The city described in this stanza can be any other Somali city such as Hargeisa, Baidoa, and Kismayo; regardless of which city the stanza portrays, the city is given human qualifiers—depicted as having a heart, a body and a rib cage. The city cries as its heart is taken out of it, symbolizing the stopping of the propulsion of blood throughout the body of the country and thus synonymous of death; the bloodshed, which has taken over Somalia, is intensified by the image of the city itself losing life. Nonetheless, the devastation of the human-like city does not stop at the level of ripping of its heart but extends to exposing it to the eyes of the outside world; as the walls of buildings collapsed, the city found its

inner and private parts publicized as part of the ongoing discriminatory war—a war that perceives everyone and everything as a justifiable target.

As cities rich in history fell to the ground under the constant violence sponsored by warlords; the residents, including particularly children, found themselves caught in a war where their “short life” (24) was even more shortened. “scared” and “dying” (24), Somali children realized that “say[ing] ‘mother’ at the age of one,” “laugh[ing] at the age of two,” “sing[ing] at three,” and “at four danc[ing]” have “not come to mean anything on a large world scale” as they were “at five learn[ing] to die” (24). As much as the four years are filled with joy, love and excitement, they were terminated in the civil war by the fifth year; Somali children were not allowed to contribute positively to the history of their cities and nations reducing them to mere casualties of the war.

Eventually, as Somalia’s and Somalis’ voice, arms and legs weakened, and as “voices of death” approached, death itself became a comfort; death, which was initially feared and avoided at all cost, was welcomed because only then Somalis “may no longer be scared” (24). In a curious twist of symbolism, life becomes death while death becomes life; in other words, death, that is, the physical end of life, is perceived by Somalis as an end to their agony and thus it begins a new form of life. All the activities learned in the short four years will be reignited and lived again in the afterlife, in a hope based on religious belief, for a better, safe and peaceful environment as opposed to the one in war-ridden Somalia. In brief, although Somalia as a mother is dying, Somalis look above to the heavens, waiting “to sink into the deep embrace of [their] mother[s]//who will comfort [them] so that [Somalis] will never be scared again” (24).

“Who am I?”

Not only did Poetry chronicling the Somali civil war become “the factual mirror of social reality in which the Somali finds an intimate representation of himself/herself”(Afrax 32) but it also became a notable venue for Somalis to voice themselves—not only among each other but to foreigners as well. In her poem “Who Am I?”, written when she was a high school student in Ottawa, Somali Canadian poet Ilwaad Jaamac¹⁰ authentically voices Somali children. “Who Am I?” essentially a manifesto-like poem defending the non-violent Somalis’ inability to alter the Somali reality, starts with a question many Somalis face abroad:

I am a Somalian,
And people ask me why
I stand by
And watch my people die (23)

The image of Somalis depicted in mainstream media is one of refugees or of a starved population carrying AK-47 Kalashnikov rifles; those who were not engaged in violence were reduced to the image of a “passive population” (Binet 149). Somalis were perceived as mere voyeurs to the violence and bloodshed that inflicted Somalia. In this respect, non-Somalis demanded Somalis to justify their ‘apparent passivity’ and ‘lack of involvement’ in Somali politics and state building.

Ilwaad Jaamac does not accept the characterization of Somalis as passive but she rather describes them as “feel[ing] useless// sometimes hopeless// most of the times, however, [. . .] homeless” (23). She wonders about her true identity as Somali, that is, about what makes her a Somali; the use of three adjectives with the suffix ‘less’ stresses

not the passivity of Somalis but their inability to act. In other words, to be useless, hopeless, and homeless is not the result of a self-identification action in which Somalis decide to be an ineffective people and refugees; actually Somalis are instead made useless and homeless by warlords, who control the power dialectics in Somalia: “Power was invested in the long neck of the gun with which it was protected” (Farah, *Milk* 86)—only the warlords had guns and thus power was exclusively in their hands. Faced with violence, peaceful Somalis found themselves forced either to flee the country or to stay and face possible death. Ilwaad Jaamac argues that Somalis were defined by the power of the gun, which was supposed to protect all Somalis not one specific faction against another.

Ilwaad Jaamac further expresses her feelings about the situation in Somalia when she “wonder[s] why//Everything [she] ever held dear// Is no longer here” (23); life as it was known by Somalis “seems to disappear//In fact, it did disappear” (24). As more warlords join the war, more treasured objects of Somali culture, history and experience are lost; here, disappearance does not refer only to what Somalis used to have but also to what they could have had in the future. In other words, with every Somali killed, Ilwaad Jaamac does not only “weep” for what was but also for “what no longer is,//And will never be” (24) including the bright future Somali children could have had. Indeed, as more Somalis are lost to violence, Somalia loses its past and its future alike as those killed carry in them the history of Somalia—thus by dying, a fragment of the Somali past is forever gone.

Somalia, a “beautiful land that was filled with trees//And peaceful seas from west to east” (24), is currently a country whose population uses those very seas to escape the war; rather than being enjoyed for their aesthetic beauty, seas are now functional as they offer one of the safest paths out of Somalia. The “wise old man praying in peace// children

joyfully playing and laughing//their mothers proudly watching and cheering” (24) are all lost in the midst of war deepening the scars inflicted on the collective memory. What matters is that in the deaths of these men, children, and mothers, Somalia has moved from being a reality to a nostalgic thought in Somalis’ minds. Previously, Haji Ingiriis stressed the need to examine the future of children born as a result of “rape” or those who witnessed any form of violence; the same inquiry can be broadened to include all Somalis regardless of gender, age, and clan affiliation. In this respect, Ilwaad Jaamac offers her answer to the ongoing war:

Hatred is the very core,
The bitter soul,
Of any war
It’s a war that destroyed the whole
And will destroy more
And will destroy more and more (24)

The collective psyche of Somalia has been imprinted with recurrent images of deaths and bloodshed, which have become part and parcel of the Somali legacy; denying this fact does not change the truthfulness of Jaamac’s postulation that hatred has taken over the Somali experience. The civil war, which was ignited by Barre’s tyranny, was indeed a movement based on a deep-seated hatred of Barre; Somalis, who before had only one figure to channel their hatred towards, are now engulfed in a more complex and fragmented system of hatred, where most Somalis are both hated and hating. Unless this hatred is healed from within, that is, by Somalis uprooting the seeds of hatred, the destruction will continue to characterize Somalia; the warlords can be silenced only when the core of the war is destroyed as a final act of constructive destruction in Somalia.

From Swords to Words:

In brief, referring back to Ali Jimale Ahmed's "The Third Season of Rape," the "feud internecine" (72) has changed the socio-political Somali landscape by making Somalis enemies of themselves; nonetheless, the end of the civil war is located in the very germ that started it—that is, in "the same womb" where the feud was ignited (72). In his poem "Of Nations and Narratives," Ahmed makes it clear that the beginning and the end of the civil war is situated in the same place:

Happy endings are
Not concocted
Nor delivered in
A C-section (23)

The end of the civil war needs to be delivered in the same manner as an infant is traditionally born; the birth of peace cannot be brought with more scars to the body of Somalia as a mother-symbol. It rather needs to be begotten in the very womb where war started; the happy endings "must germinate in// the belly of the narratives" (23) that would weave "in the loom of the plot" (23) a new Somalia where warlords are silenced and wordsmiths are voiced.

Therefore, the birth of new Somalia is closely linked to the end of war, hatred, and feud, which were intertwined for many years; the new narrative of the nation should be essentially about muting bullets in favor of words—in other words, moving from swords to words whilst keeping Somalia at the foreground of Somalis' minds.

Notes

¹ Mohamed Siad Barre (Maxamed Siyaad Barre) (c.1919-1995), the president of Somalia from October 1969, when he took the power via a bloodless military coup, until January 1991, when he was overthrown in a bloody civil war.

² “*Guulwade Siyaad, aabbihii garashada*” “Siyad the victory-bearer, and the father of knowledge” is the most prominent Somali revolutionary song which is flattering Siyad Barre for creating heroic image for him. It was compulsory to recite loudly in schools and community gatherings and meetings. In 1970 this song was composed by Hassan Haji Mohamed aka “*Hassan Guulwade*” (1949-).

“*Geeddiga wadaay*” “Lead the track” is a Somali nationalistic song composed in 1962 (Amin, 12-13). “*Caynaanka hay*” “May you hold onto the reins of power forever” is a Somali revolutionary song composed in 1971 (Amin, 42-43), and it praises President Siad Barre personally. Both songs were overplayed in radio stations in 1970s, and composed by the late popular famous songwriter Abdi Muhumed Amin (1935-2008).

³ *Cali Jimcaale Axmed (Ali Jimale Ahmed)*, a prolific Somali poet, short-story writer and literary critic. He holds a PhD from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). He is the author of three collections of poetry: *Fear is a Cow* (2002), *Diaspora Blues* (2005), and *When Donkeys Give Birth to Calves* (2012). He is also the author of *Daybreak Is Near: Literature, Clans, and the Nation-state in Somalia* (1996), the editor of *The Invention of Somalia* (1995) and the co-editor of *Silence is not Golden: A Critical Anthology of Ethiopian Literature* (1995), and *The Road less Traveled: Reflections on the Literatures of the Horn of Africa* (2008). Ahmed’s poems studied in this article are reproduced in his collections of poetry.

⁴ Insurgent movements against Siad Barre’s regime emerged in 1980s, and they fired the first bullet in Mogadishu on 30 December 1990. After 26 days of confrontation Siad Barre was ousted, and the armed oppositions took over the power without any national agreement among them and the country plunged into chaos and wide-scale civil war.

⁵ This article opts not to use the literary term ‘persona’ when referring to the speaking voice in the poem; this article share the belief that, in the case of these Somali poems, the immediacy of the experience and the personal nature of the poems make it unfeasible to separate the poet from the poem as they are entwined.

⁶ This poem was translated by Mohamed Mohamed-Abdi and published in a French collection of Somali poems entitled *Apocalypse: Poèmes Somalis*; the poems in this collection span from 1978 until 1994 and chronicle the misery that befell Somalia and Somalis.

⁷ *Gamuute A. Gamuute*, pen name of Farah Ahmed Ali, a writer, poet and literary scholar based in Canada. In 1977, he obtained a degree in Arts from Faculty of Education (*Lafoole*), Somali National University. During his years at the university, he was the editor of the Somali section of *Baraha: The Educator*, a periodical published by the University. In 1976, his short story entitled “*Caynba Cayn*” (“*Everyone According to His Eyes*”) won the first prize in a literary competition held at the University. He is the author of *Coming of Age: An Introduction to Somali Metrics* (2012).

⁸ *Warsan Shire*, a Somali-British poet, writer and activist. *Her collections of poetry are Teaching My Mother How to Give Birth* (2011), *Our Men Do Not Belong to Us* (2014), and *Her Blue Body* (2015). In 2013, she has been awarded *Brunel University’s first African Poetry Prize*.

⁹ *Aamina Axmed Yuusuf*, a Somali-British poet. *She holds a degree in political sciences from University of London*.

¹⁰ *Ilwaad Jaamac*, a Somali Canadian poet residing in Ottawa.

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Oblique Marking System in Somali Language: Comparison of the Common Somali and Karre Dialect



Abdirachid Mohamed Ismail

Abstract

In Somali dialectology, comparisons on oblique marking particles, usually focusing on the similarities or dissimilarities of surface structures (cf. Lamberti 1986, Tosco 1997), identify the existence of two systems of oblique markers: a system of three markers specific to dialects between the two rivers, and another of four markers which characterizes Common Somali and Benaadir dialect [Maxaa-tiri dialectal group, in general]. Such a comparison does not tell us unfortunately the intimate connection between these two systems.

By conducting a detailed morpho-syntactic comparison between Karre dialect and Common Somali, we are able to perceive the historical relationship between the two systems of oblique marking, as well as the direction of change. It is also an argument testifying that these dialects belong to the same language.

Keywords: Somali Language, Karre Dialect, Oblique Markers

1. Introduction

Karre¹ is a Somali dialect spoken by Karre clan, one of the Somali clans, inhabits in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. In Somalia, they live in the Lower *Shabeelle* Region of southern Somalia, and they all speak Karre dialect (or *Af-Garre*).² Another group of Karre lives in north-eastern of Kenya, and *Liibaan* Zone of the Somali Region of Ethiopia, and they also speak Karre dialect which is highly influenced by the Oromo dialect of Boran.

This study will focus on Karre spoken in Lower Shabeelle Region of Somalia,³ and more specifically on a comparison between this dialect and the Common Somali (CS). This comparison will be on particles very frequent in Somali phrase and that scholars call them by various names (such as prepositions by Bell, 1953, Andrzejewski, 1975, Appleyard, 1990, and Mansur, A. O & Puglielli, A., 1999 ; case-markers by Biber, 1984; adpositions by Saeed, 1999; preverbs by Tosco 1993 and Sasse, 2003; oblique markers by M. Ismail A. M. (2011).

Dialectal comparisons on this topic (see Lamberti 1986, Tosco 1997), always focusing on the similarities or dissimilarities of surface structures identify the existence of two systems of oblique markers: a system of three markers specific to dialects between the two rivers, and another of four markers which characterize Common Somali and Benadir dialects. Such a comparison does not tell us unfortunately the intimate connection between these two systems.

By conducting a detailed morpho-syntactic comparison between Karre and Common Somali⁴, we are able to perceive the historical relationship between the two systems of oblique marking, as well as the direction of change.

In this study we use Somali alphabet. Except for sounds which are not in this alphabet and for which we use IPA such as the velar [ŋ] and palatal [ɲ] nasals and the mid central vowel [ə].

2. Problem of Designation

All these names given to the particles have at least one downside. If the particles have semantically a preposition meaning, syntactically they are related to the verb phrase, as defined by Saeed (1999: 163), while prepositions may also appear in a non-verbal domain. Concerning Biber's designation, who calls them *case-markers*, he points it out their syntactical function, without specifying their position in the sentence. Moreover, the term "case" is often associated to nouns, especially in Somali linguistics where it traditionally refers to indicate the four functions of the name (i.e. *absolutive, nominative, genitive and vocative*).

As for the notion of "preverb", it specifies the particular position of these markers in the sentence, rather than their syntactic function. But we should note that they are not related to the verb as such but to the predicate as Banti (1987: 130-131) has shown it. It is why they can be placed not only before a verbal predicate, but also before a nonverbal predicate as in the following examples:

CS

- | | | | |
|----|------------|-------------|------------|
| 1. | waa | ka | run |
| | PRES | ø-ka | run |
| | COP | 3MS.OBJ-ABL | true |
- It is true (for them)*

Karre

- | | | | |
|----|------------|-----------|---------------|
| 2. | uur | kə | baala |
| | belly | LOC | divinity-have |

A soothsayer (Literally: Who can guess everything, knows everything).

Maay

3. **Galaŋ** **ki** **dhiigla**
 hand LOC blood-have

A murderer (Literally: « who has blood in one's hand»)

From all these considerations and some others found in Ismail, Abdirachid M. (2011:476-477), we prefer to call them «oblique markers » which highlights the syntactic function of the particles without introducing any ambiguity.

3. Oblique Markers in Somali Dialects

The form and number of these markers are sometimes different within the same dialect, according to the scholars. For example Lamberti (1986: 100) indicates that the allative and ablative markers in Tunni are one and the same form, while Tosco (1997: 7) gives two dissimilar forms.

It is possible that this difference is due to the fact that the researchers have not surveyed the same sub-varieties. But it seems that the main reason of it is related to Sandhi phenomenon which applies to the vowel markers. Indeed, as we will see in this presentation, the markers vowels can change depending on the nature of the initial vowel of the verb that follows them. Without a thorough comparison between the oblique marking systems of the dialects, it is difficult to explain the gaps between the dialects on this matter.

The table below shows the oblique markers of the major Somali dialects. It takes into account the Sandhi phenomenon mentioned above:

Table 1: Oblique Markers of Somali Dialects

	Allative- Benefactive <i>To, for, towards</i>	Instrumental <i>with</i>	Ablative <i>from</i>	Comitative <i>with</i>
CS Benaadir	u	ku	ka	la
Ashraaf	iŋ	kv ⁵	ka/kv	la
Karre	u	kv	ka/kv	la
Maay	iŋ	kv	kə	lə
Dabarre	iŋ u	kv	ka	lə
Tunni	i	kv	ku	il
Jiiddo	ha (?)	ha	xa, haa	il

Source: compiled by the author

Lamberti (1986) has synthetized, in the following table, the oblique markers of the Somali dialects based on a synchronic comparison:

Table 2: Oblique Markers of the Somali Dialects
(Synchronic Comparison)

Dialects	A= 4 Oblique Markers (<i>ku</i> & <i>ka</i> being different)	B=3 Oblique Markers (<i>ku</i> & <i>ka</i> being same)
Common Somali	A	-
Benaadir	A	-
Ashraaf	-	B
Interriverine	-	B

Source: Lamberti (1986)

Note: Interriverine dialects are the Somali dialects spoken in the area between Shabeelle and Jubba rivers in Southern Somalia.

These markers can appear a) in isolation and b) in combination with themselves or by suffixing some pronouns like object personal,

impersonal or reflexive pronouns. The oblique markers in isolation or in combination are always pre-posed to the verb:

4.1 Isolated Oblique Markers

CS

4. **Axmed biyo Baan la qaaday**
 Ahmed water ThP+1S COM take-1S.PAST
I've taken some water with Ahmed.

Karre

5. **inoo ka yibida**
 where ABL 3MS-come-3MS.PAST
From where did he come?

4.2 Combined Oblique Markers

The oblique markers can be combined together, while associating or not with personal object pronouns. The combination of these elements follows always the same order, namely Pr.OBJ/IMPERS/REFL-ALL/BEN-INST-ABL-COM, tables 3 & 4.⁶ The four oblique markers can never appear in the same sentence:

Table 3 : Combined Oblique Markers of Karre Dialect

Pr. Objet \ OM →		ALL u	INST/ABL kə	COM lə
(1S)	i	i	ii	il
(2S)	ku	ku	kaa	kul
(1Pl)	nu	nu	nuu	nul
(2Pl)	ad	ad	adoo	adal/adala

Source: compiled by the author

Table 4: Combined Oblique Markers of CS

Oblique Markers → (OM)		ALL/BEN <i>u</i>	INST-ALL <i>ku</i>	ABL <i>ka</i>	COM <i>la</i>
Object Pronoun		ii (i+u)	igu (i+ku)	iga (i + ka)	ila (i +la)
(1S)	i	ii i+ (i+u)	iigu (i+(i+ku))	iiga (i+(i+ka))	iila (i+(i+la))
(2S)	ku	kuu ku + (i+u)	kuugu (ku+(i+ku))	kaaga (ku+(i+ka))	kuula (ku+(i+la))
(1Pl)	na	noo na + (i+u)	noogu (na+(i+ku))	nooga (na+(i+ka))	noola (na+(i+la))
(2Pl)	idin	idiin idin+(i+u)	idiinku (idin+(i+ku))	idiinka (idin +(i+ka))	idiinla (idiin+(i+la))

Source: compiled by the author

4. Resemblances and Dissemblance between CS and Karre Oblique Markers

As it is shown above in Lamberti's table, CS dialect has four markers (*la*, *u*, *ku*, *ka*), whereas Karre has three (*lv*, *u*, *kv*). Here are the CS markers and the way they are used:

1) **la** (comitative – marks accompaniment) – *with*.

Cali buu la socdaa He is walking (coming, etc.) with Ali.

Caasha ayuu la qaadayaa He carries with Aisha.

2) **u** (allative-goal or benefactive) – *towards, to, for*.

Helsinki buu u sii socdaa He is going to Helsinki.

Cali buu u keenay He has brought it/him/her/them for Ali.

3) **ku** (instrumental and allative-goal) – *with, by, to, towards, etc*.

Qaaddo buu ku cunayaa He eats with a spoon

<i>Baabuur buu ku qaaday</i>	He took him/her/them by car
<i>Jabuuti baan ku soconnaa</i>	We are going to Djibouti
<i>Shaqada ayay ku degdegeysaa</i>	She hurries for work (<i>litt. She hurries to go to work</i>)

4) ka (Ablative/directional-source / privative-restrictive) – *from*.

<i>Magaalada buu ka yimid</i>	He came from the city.
<i>Paris bay ka soo hadleen</i>	They have called from Paris.
<i>Warsame buu buuggii ka qaaday</i>	He has taken the book from Warsame.
<i>Lacagtii buu ka gooyay</i>	He has deprived (from) him/her/them the money.

Karre dialect has only three markers because the Instrumental-Allative and the Ablative have the same form, as it is indicated in the table below:

Table 5: Markers of Karre Dialect

	Comitative	Allative-Source Benefactive	Instrumental Allative-Goal	Ablative
CS	la	u	ku	Ka
Karre (Tosco, 1994)	lv ⁷	u	kv ⁵	

Source: compiled by the author

The question is then: how *kv* marker in Karre matches with *ku* and *ka* in CS system? To answer to this question, we need to consider the oblique system of each dialect so that we could see the dynamic correspondence between the two systems. In fact, we will see that we have here an evolutionary system which passes from a system of three markers represented by Karre to a system of four markers represented by CS dialect, which has innovated its original system by creating two distinctive *k*- markers, allocating to each marker a fixed vowel, namely –*u* (**ku**) and –*a* (**ka**), as it is explained in the following paragraphs.

5.1 The Comitative Marker: *la* (CS), *lv* (Karre)

For this marker, also known as associative case marker; we have an exact correspondence between the two systems, except that the vowel of Karre marker tends to assimilate with the first vowel of the verb, especially if the verb begins with a vowel (see examples 9, 10, 11):

CS

6. **Axmed** **biyo** **baan** **la** **qaadey**
 Ahmed water ThP.1S COM bring. PAST.1S
 I have brought some water with Ahmed

CS

7. **way** **isla** **socdaan**
 ToP.3PL REFL.COM walked.PRES.3PL
 They walked together (they are together, they are coming together etc.).

Karre

8. **waa** **islə** **sodiin**
 ToP REFL.COM walk.PRES.3PL
 They walked together (they are together; they are coming together, etc.).

Karre

9. **hupura** **lu** **uŋ**
 Food.ART.M COM eat.IMP.2S
 Eat the food with him/her/ them!

10. **lə⁸ firi**
 COM see.IMP.2S,
 See with him/her/them!

11. **lu ub**
 COM.plug.IMP.2S,
 Plug with it!

5.2 The Allative-Benefactive Marker: *u*

This marker has the same form in both CS and in Karre. However it does not play exactly the same syntactic function in the two dialects. In the CS, the scholars have noticed two functions for it: an allative (ALL) function, which indicates the direction of a process, and a dative-benefactive function (BEN) which shows an action realized for the benefit of somebody or something. There is also another function for this marker, rarely noted by the scholars, which indicates the cause (CAUS)⁹. In Karre, this morpheme *u* introduces only allative and cause functions.

5.2.1 Allative function

This characteristic of *u*, that Sasse (2003: 123) describes as "location at which or onto which something moves or is moved" has a purely locative-directional meaning:

CS

12. **Xamar buu u socdaa**
Xamar baa+uu u socdaa
 Hamar ThP+3MS ALL go-3MS.PRES
He is going to Hamar [another name of Mogadishu].

CS

13. **Cali baan u tegeyaa**
Cali baa+aan u Tegeyaa
 Ali ThP+1S ALL go-1S.PRES
I'm going to visit Ali (Lit. I'm going to Ali).

Karre

14. **Hamaraa u sheedaa**
Hamar+aa u Sheedaa
 Hamar+ThP ALL go.PRES
I'm going to Hamar.

This allative function can be confused sometimes with the dative meaning of this marker like in constructions (14), (18) and (19):

CS

15. **aabbheed** **baan** **u** **wadaa**
 aabbo+ka+eed baa+aan u Wadaa
 Father+ART.M+GEN ThP+1S **DAT** take. Someone to-PRES.1S
 I'm taking her to her father.

Karre

16. **ay** **wutaa ?**
 INT take. Someone to -1S.PRES
 Who are you leading?

17. **elepoo** **wudaa**
 girl+ThP lead-1S.PRES
 I'm leading a girl.

18. **ay** **u** **wutaa ?**
 INT **DAT** lead-2S.PRES
 To whom are you leading her?

19. **oog-eed** **u** **wudaa**
 father+GEN.3FS **DAT** conduire-1S.PRES
 I'm leading her to her father.

But this confusion between allative, dative and benefactive functions is not unique to Somali dialects. It is related to the semantic and syntactic relation between these three functions. Indeed, allative function can cover the same area as benefactive and dative when the action described by the verb is directed towards something or someone. Besides, in a typological perspective, Schmidtke - Bode (2009: 1) demonstrates that benefactive markers “*share their territory with allative, recipient, and more general*

dative markers and are historically related to these other functions in intricate ways...". So it is not surprising that this marker can be used as an allative marker by the two dialects, and as a benefactive only by one dialect like CS as we can see below.

5.2.2 Benefactive function

CS and Karre adopt two different methods to mark the benefactive: CS uses the allative *u* with an object pronoun (when available), while Karre employs only object pronouns when they exist indeed. If the object pronoun does not exist, as it is the case for the third persons, the two dialects use *u* morpheme to express the benefactive function:

CS

20. **biyo** **ii** **qaad**
 biyo **i+u** qaad
 water **1S.Ob+ALL** take-2S.IMP
 Offer me some water.

CS

21. **biyo** **u** **qaad**
 biyo **ø-u** qaad
 water **3P.OBJ-ALL** take-2S.IMP
 Offer him/her/them some water.

Karre

22. **biyi** **i** **qaad**
 water **1S.Ob** take-2S.IMP
 Offer me some water.

23. **biyi** **u** **qaad**

biyi	ø-u	qaad
water	3P.OBJ-ALL	take-2S.IMP
<i>Offer him/her/them some water.</i>		

Here we see that there is an important difference between the two dialects since the construction (22) in Karre is not possible in CS, * *biyo i qaad*¹⁰; the cause being that the allative morpheme *u* should obligatorily be used in CS, in this case.

For the verb "to give", it is unnecessary to mark the idea of a beneficiary (since this verb implies a beneficiary whether it is explicit or not). It is why both CS and Karre use only the object pronouns (without the allative marker *u*) for the 1P and 2P, for which the object pronouns exist:

CS and Karre

24.	shaah	i	sii
	tea-IND	1S.OB	give-2S.IMP
	<i>Give me some tea.</i>		

With the object pronouns of the 3rd person, the allative morpheme *u* will not be employed in both dialects:

CS and Karre

25.	shaah	Ø sii
	tea-IND	3P give-2S.IMP
	<i>Give him/her/them some tea.</i>	

Even if in CS *u* is still used as an allative marker, and more precisely as a directional-goal marker, there is a slight difference between it and *ku*, the other directional-goal marker. But to understand this difference and the relationship between the different particles of Somali oblique system marking, we need to consider all the functions of *ku* and *ka* also.

5.3 Allative-Locative and Instrumental Marker: *ku*

The principal functions of this marker are allative-locative and instrumental. But it marks also the cause and the illative. The main difference is that in Karre the vowel of the marker assimilates with the verb first vowel as it is the case for the comitative marker, whereas it is not the case in CS:

5.3.1 Instrumental

CS

26. **qalinka** **baan** **ku** **qorayaa**
qalin+ka baa+aan **ku** qorayaa
pen+ART.M ThP+1S **INST** write-1S.PRES
I'm writing with the pen.

- 27 **fandhaal** **buu** **ku** **cunayaa** **bariiska**
fandhaal baa+uu **ku** cunayaa bariis+ka
spoon (wooden) ThP+3MS **INST** eat-3MS. rice+ART.M
PROG.PRES
He is eating the rice with a wooden spoon.

In Karre, this function is also expressed by a marker having the unvoiced occlusive velar *kv*. But the vowel of this marker, in contrast to CS, assimilates with the stem vowel of the verb. Compare constructions (28) and (29) with construction (30):

Karre

28. **dheregə** **ha** **ku** **uŋŋə**
dhere-gə ha **ku** uŋŋə
pot+ART.M JUSS **INST** eat-2S-NEG
Do not eat in the pot!

29. **kalaan** **ku** **us**

Spoon (wooden) **INST** take-2SIMP

Take it with a spoon!

30. **kalaan** **ka** **qaad**

Spoon (wooden) **INST** take-2S.MP

Take it with a spoon!

Unlike Karre, in CS, an assimilation of the vowel of the marker may change the meaning of the sentence: *qaaddada ku qaad*, “Take it with the spoon”, *qaaddada ka qaad*, “Take the spoon from him/her/it/them”. To express this opposition of action in Karre, we need to use verbs indicating contrary actions as *ki rid* (put in it) and *ki bihi* (put it out), whereas in CS we will use the same verb opposed by *ku* and *ka*: *ku rid* and *ka rid*.

5.3.2 Illative

CS

31. **biyo** **bay** **ku** **shubeen** **Joogga**
 biyo baa+ay **ILL** shubeen joog+ka
 water ThP+3Pl **ILL** pour.PAST.3Pl jug+ART.M

They have poured water into the jug.

Karre

32. **biyi** **iyaa** **ku** **shubeen** **haanə**
 water ThP **ILL** shubeen container+ART.F

They have poured water into the container.

33. **aqalə** **ki**¹¹ **rid** **sanduuqa**
 aqal+ta **ki** rid sanduuq+ka
 things+ART.F **ILL** put-2S.IMP box.ART.M

Put the things in the box!

From these examples, we see that Karre does not distinguish *ka*, *ki*, and *ku* syntactically. They are allomorphs expressing the same illative

function. The basic and unmarked morpheme seems to be *ka* (see table 6) the vowel harmonizing itself with that of the verb which follows it.

5.3.3 Allative

The allative function of *ku* in CS is unambiguous, even if it may seem complex. It indicates a centrifugal movement from the speaker toward another person or location. This function is often named as *goal*, to distinguish it from the marker *ka* which indicates the *source*:

34. **Jabuuti buu ku sii socdaa**
 Jabuuti baa+uu **ku** sii socdaa
 Djibouti ThP+3MS **ALL.DIR** AND go-3MS.PRES
 He is going to Djibouti.

35. **xafiiska bay ku ordaysaa**
 xafiiska baa+ay **ku** ordaysaa
 Office ThP+3FS **ALL.DIR** run-3FS.PRES
 She runs to the office.

In this directional-goal function, *ku* competes with *u* in CS. We note however a slight semantic difference between the two markers in this role. For instance *Axmed baan ku socdaa* has a purely directional-goal significance, meaning “I am going to Ahmed’s house” (or wherever he can be). With *u*, the sentence expresses an *intention*, with or without a movement: *Axmed baan u socdaa* means “I came for Ahmed” (a) or “I’m here for Ahmed” (b) as well as “I am in the way to Ahmed” (c), “I’m going to visit Ahmed” (d). The first two interpretations are linked with the dative-benefactive value of *u*.

It is noticed that the young generation of CS speakers uses less *u* as a directional, but almost exclusively as a benefactive. To express the meaning of a, b, c, and d, they would rather use correspond sentences

such as *Axmed baan doonayaa* (a) or *Axmed baan u yimid* (b) or *Axamed baan ku socdaa* (c, d). This shows that the two particles *u* and *ku* are about to differentiate themselves by specializing respectfully in benefactive and allative-directional-goal functions. To understand the whole process of this change, we need to consider all the functions of *ku* and *ka*.

The movement expressed by *ku* can be abstract in both dialects. It indicates not only an action or a physical movement, but also an intention or a psychological movement directed towards someone or something, as it can be noted from the following sentences:

CS

36. **Faarax** **baan** **ku** **qoslaynaa**
 Farah ThP+3MS ALL.N-DIR laugh-3PL.PRES
We are laughing at Farah.

37. **Cismaan** **ayuu** **ku** **xanaaqay**
 Osman ThP+3MS ALL.N-DIR get-angry-3MS.PAST
He has got angry against Osman.

Karre

38. **Usmaan** **iyaa** **ka** **qosolə**
 Osman ThP ALL.N-DIR laugh-1S/3MS.PAST
I am laughing at Osman/He is laughing at Osman.

39. **Usmaan** **iyaa** **ka** **dherefə**
 Usmaan iyaa **ka** dherefə
 Osman ThP ALL.N-DIR get-angry-3MS.PAST+CONJ
I am angry against Osman.

Here is a summary of *ku* functions in both dialects, Common Somali and Karre dialects:

Table 6: Functions of Marker “ku” in CS & Karre Dialects

	INSTRUMENTAL	CAUSAL ¹²		ILLATIVE	ALLATIVE ¹³	
		FM	VI		DIR- Phy.Mo v	DIR Abst.Mov
CS	ku	-	ku	ku	ku	ku
Karre	ka (with the possibility of a vocalic assimilation which give rise to allomorphs <i>ku, ki, kə</i>)	-	ku	ka (with the possibility of a vocalic assimilation which give rise to allomorphs <i>ku, ki, kə</i>)	-	ka (with the possibility of a vocalic assimilation which give rise to allomorphs <i>ku, ki, kə</i>)

Source: compiled by the author

5.4 The Marker of the Ablative: *ka* (CS) and *kv* (Karre)

The Somali linguistic literature describes this morpheme as an ablative marking the source of an action. But this general function can be subdivided into four different roles: 1) Separation, 2) Locative-Directional-Source, 3) Locative-Static, and 4) Comparison. These different values of the marker have in common the fact they all involve a movement from a specific location, explicit or not, concrete or abstract, to something or someone.

5.4.1 Separative Function

In this role, the marker *ka* does not change its form in CS, whereas in Karre, its vowel changes according to the first vowel of the verb, as we have seen for the other markers:

CS

40. **alaabtaada meesha ka qaad**
 things+POSS.2S place.ART.F **SEP** take-2S.IMP
Take your things from there!

Karre

41. **aqalə meesha ka qaad**
 things+POSS.2S place+ART.F **SEP** take-2S.IMP
Same meaning as (40).

42. **eleni ku fur**
 girl+ART.F **SEP** divorce-2S.IMP
Divorce the girl from him.

43. **ootə ki shiid**
 Brushwood-fence.ART.F **SEP** move-2S.IMP
Remove the brushwood fence (from there!)

5.4.2 Comparative Function

Here the marker has the same phonetic form in CS and Karre, namely *ka*:

CS

44. **Axmed wuu ka weyn yahay**
 Axmed wuu **Ø-ka** weyn yahay
 Ahmed PTo+3MS **3P-COMP** be.big-3MS.PRES
Ahmed is bigger than him/her/them.

Karre

45. **Ahmad waa ka wiinq yahə**
 Ahmad waa **Ø-ka** wiinq yahə
 Ahmed PTo **3P-COMP** big be-3MS.PRES
Ahmed is bigger than him (her/them).

When *ka* has a comparative value in Karre, the marker does not change according to the first vowel of the verb. Its form is always *ka* whatever of the vowel of the verb which follows it:

46. **nalah** **waa** **ka** **iftiig** **badan** **yahaa**
 torch.POSS.2S ToP **COMP** light much be-3MS.PREST
Your torch has much more light.

47. **waa** **ka** **suurle** **yahaa**
 ToP **COMP** goodness+have be-3MS.PREST
He is better than him.

If the form of the marker does not change, is it because these two functions – *comparative* and *directional-source* – are the original functions of the marker, while the others (separative, locative and static) would derive from a reinterpretation of a more recent development ? It is an assumption which would explain this oddity, but which needs to be confirmed through a theoretical or a typological comparison.

5.4.3 Directional-Source Function (DIR- S)

The marker appears with a verb of movement which describes a movement, a change from a location, a state:

CS

48. **Baariis** **bay** **ka** **yimaadeen**
 Paris ThP+3PL **DIR-S** 3PL-come-3PL.PAST
They have come from Paris.

Karre

49. **Hamaraa** **ka** **yibidə**
 Hamar+aa **ka** yibidə

Hamar + ThP **DIR-S** 3MS.come-3MS.PAST

I have come from Hamar/He has come from Hamar.

50. **waa** **ka** **ilbaha**

ToP **DIR-S** abandon (lifestyle))-3MS.PAST.

He has abandoned a particular lifestyle

(always considered as backward).

As for the comparison, the vowel marker does not change here too, according to the phonetic form of the verb that follows it.

5.4.4 Locative-Static

The marker appears here with stative verbs such *ahaw* (to be), *yaal* (to remain, to be installed), *jir* (to exist), etc.:

CS

51.	dhankee	bay	alaabtu	ka	taalaa
	dhan+kee	baa+ay	alaab+t+u	ø+LOC	taalaa
	Side+INT	ThP+3FS	things+ART.F+NOM	3PL.OBJ+LOC	3FS.remain- 3S..PREST

Which side from it/him/her/them are the things?

Karre

52.	buukə	birko	ka	yaalaa
	buuk+kə	bir+ko	ø+ka	Yaalaa
	book+ART.M	side+IND	3P.Ob+LOC	3MS.remain.PREST

The book is by its/his/he/their side.

We see here also that there is a difference between Karre and CS, since in the latter there is vowel assimilation of the marker, and not in the former:

53. **dhina'akanaa** **ki** **higaa**
 dhina'+a+kan+aa **ø+ki** higaa
 side+ART.M+DEM.M+ThP 3P.OBJ+LOC be-3MS.PREST
It is in this side from him/her/them.

Table 7: functions of the ablative marker “ka” in CS & Karre Dialects

	ABLATIVE			
	SEPARATION	COMPARISON	DIRECTIONAL-SOURCE	LOC-STATIVE
CS	ka	ka	ka	ka
Karre	ka (with the possibility of a vocalic assimilation)	ka	Ka	ka (with the possibility of a vocalic assimilation)

Source: compiled by the author

Except the phonological difference related to the possibility or not of a vocalic assimilation of the marker, there is a perfect correspondence between the two dialects ablative markers.

In the following table, we summarize the comparison of Karre and CS oblique system marking:

Table 8: Comparison of Oblique System Marking in CS & Karre Dialect

Function	Meaning	CS	Karre	Observation
COMITATIVE	Comitative/accompany	la	lv	Vowel assimilation of the marker in Karre.
ALLATIVE	Directional-Goal	u	u	Restrictive usage of u in this role by CS speakers.
	Benefactive	u	ø	Karre uses object pronouns to indicate the beneficiary, whereas CS uses u .
	Dative	u	u	Same usage in Karre and in CS.
	Cause-Consequence	u	u	Same usage in Karre and in CS.
LOCATIVE-INSTRUMENTAL	Instrumental	ku	kv	Vowel assimilation of the marker in Karre.
	Directional-Goal	ku	ø	Karre uses u for this function.
	Illative	ku	kv	Vowel assimilation

				of the marker in Karre.
	Locative-stative (?)	ku	kv	Vowel assimilation of the marker in Karre.
ABLATIVE	Directional-Source	ka	ka	Original function of <i>ka</i> .
	Separative	ka	kv	Vowel assimilation of the marker in Karre.
	Comparative	ka	ka	Original function of <i>ka</i> .
	Locative-stative	ka	kv	Vowel assimilation of the marker in Karre.

Source: compiled by the author

We have seen that Karre employs only *u* for directional-goal, while CS uses both *u* and *ku*, even if *u* usage in this role is weakening, because it has acquired also a benefactive role. We infer from our analysis that the primary function of *u* was directional-goal in both dialects. It marks a movement towards something or someone. We have pointed it out that in both dialects the benefactive function was marked by using object personal pronouns just as it is still the case in Karre for all persons. But

after the loss of 3rd object pronoun, *u* was used by the CS and Karre to mark the beneficiary as it is the case still in both dialects. The divergence begins when CS has generalized this last process to all personal pronouns and gave to *u* mainly a benefactive value. While Karre has continued to use the object pronouns to mark the beneficiary, for all persons, except for 3rd persons. From that, we see that CS has introduced an innovation which has forced it to adjust all its oblique marking system to this innovation.

In fact, after this first change, CS have created a new marker to replace *u* allative function, by reanalysing the ablative *kv* (directional-source) as a combination of *k+vowel*, *k* being interpreted as having a directional meaning. By associating this consonant with *u* which is interpreted as having its original meaning of *goal*, the directional-goal marker *ku* is created. In this way, CS has got two markers, *ka* and *ku*, both indicating a directional movement, but in an opposite way. This opposition is marked morphologically through the differentiation of the vowels, *a* and *u*, which will no longer assimilate with the verb vowels since they are significantly marked. The vowel *a*, for the ablative marker, has been chosen probably because it is the unmarked vowel in CS, in which we encounter in the articles (*ka*, *ta*), the demonstratives (*kaa*, *taa*), the discursive particles (*waa*, *baa*) whereas the other vowels, such as *-u* and *-i*, are usually marked, indicating *anaphoric* or *nominative* case.

6. Conclusion

This study has demonstrated concretely that Somali southern dialects can help to understand the evolution of the common Somali. Dialectological studies are still seen in many African and Arab countries as taboo, because they consider that these dialects may hinder national unity. However, if the dialectal phenomena is not recognized

as an outstanding heritage and is not taken advantage of it, especially in Somalia, there is a risk of losing what can help to understand better Somali language evolution and, beyond that, Somalis history itself. That is why this study has attempted to contribute to a greater awareness of the significance of studying Somali dialects. Besides, recognizing dialects is recognizing diversity, integrating differences, going beyond the compartmentalized identity claims, in one word, it is empowering citizenship.

Notes

¹ The speakers of this dialect pronounce their name and their tongue “*Karre*” with the unvoiced velar *k*, while the other Somali speakers call them “*Garre*” with the voiced velar, which is often used in linguistic literature.

² *Karre* clan mainly lives in *Qoryooley* and *Awdheegle* districts of Lower Shabeelle Region of Somalia. They are pastoralists, specially camel herders, and agropastoralists, a mixture of agriculture and livestock herding.

³ I would like to express my gratitude to my informant for this dialect, *Xuseen Cabdiraxman Maxamed*, who, with patience, helped me thorough this work. I also extend my thanks to Dr *Cabdishakuur Sheekh Xasan Faqi* for his consistent suggestions.

⁴ The standard or common Somali is based on *maxaatiri* dialect, particularly its variety of Northern Somali Dialect. *Maxaatiri* dialect is spoken in the major part of Somalis territories in the Horn of Africa, except between the two rivers of Shabeelle and Jubba in southern Somalia. Most of its speakers are nomadic pastoralists (usually camel herders). Even if there is some internal variation within this dialect, through all these regions, it is one of the most homogenous among Somali dialects.

⁵ *v* (= *vowel*) which varies according to the initial vowel of the verb.

⁶ For more details, please refer to Ismail (2011).

⁷ Vowel which assimilates with the first vowel of the verb.

⁸ The informant pronounces it sometimes as [li].

⁹ See Mohamed Ismail, 2011.

¹⁰ Naturally with a different accentual pattern, we will have a totally different meaning which is: *water*

¹¹ My Karre informant pronounces sometimes ki rid, and sometimes kə rid.

¹² This function can be found with details in Mohamed Ismail (2011; 2015).
FM = *cause related to Force Majeure* ; *VI* = *cause related to individual will*

¹³ *DIR-Phy.Mov* = *Physical movement*; *Abst. Mov* = *Abstract movement*.

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Abbreviations:

ABL : ablative	ABS : absolute
Adj : adjective	ALL : allative
ANAPH : anaphoric	AND : andative
ART : article	BEN : benefactive
CAUS : causative	COMP : comparative
COP : copule	DAT : dative
CS: Common Somali	DEM : demonstrative
DEF : definite	F(EM) : feminine
DIR : directional	GEN : genitive
FOC : focus	ILL : illative
HAB : habitual	IMPERS : impersonal
IMP : imperative	INSTR : instrumental
IND : indefinite	INTENS : Intensive

INT : interrogative	M : masculine,
LOC : locative	NOM : nominative
NEG : negative	NUM : numeral
CS : Common Somali	P : person (3P: 3 rd pers.)
OBJ : object	PL : plural
PAST : past (Indefinite, Progressive, Imperfect)	Pr : pronom
POSS : possessive	PREST : present (absolute, progressive, habitual)
PRES : presentative	REST : restrictive
REFL : reflexive	SUBJ : subjunctive
S : singular	ThP : Thematic Particle
SUJ : subject	VEN : venitive
ToP : Topicalisation Particle	

Toosinta iyo Casriyaynta Haybta Shakhsiga Soomaaliyeed



Cabdalla Cumar Mansuur

Mucda Qoraalka

Si loola jaanqaado dunida maanta horumartay waxaa loo baahan yahay in qofka Soomaaliyeedi uu lahaado waxyaabo lagu aqoonsado, oo afafka shisheeye lagu yiraahdo “ID”, annaguna qoraalkan aan u adeegsannay ereyga “hayb”, iyadoo la raacayo hab midaysan, oo casriyaysan, lana ilaalinayo nidaamka diinta iyo dhaqanka Soomaaliyeedba. Haddaba waxaan halkan ku qaadaadhigaynaa haybta qofka Soomaaliyeed oo u baahan in la turxaanbixiyo waxyaabaha lagu aqoonsado, sida: magaciisa gaarka ah, ‘magacaqoys’-kiisa, taariikhda dhalashadiisa iyo degaanka uu ku dhashay.

I. Midaynta Hab dhigaalka Magaca Gaarka ah

Waa in la xasiliyaa jahawareerka innaga haysta xagga hab dhigaalka magacyada gaarka ah, oo siyaabo kala duwan loo qoro.¹

1. *Magacyo asalraac ah*: Marka la adeegsanayo farta Soomaaliga, magacyada asal ahaan ka soo jeeda af Carbeedka, saddex siyood ayay af Soomaaliga uga mid noqdeen, iyagoo loo qorayo sida loogu dhawaaqo:
 - a) Kuwo sida asalkoodu ahaa loogu dhawaaqo, sida: *Haaruun, Hinda, Khadiija, Cali, Yuusuf, Xasan* iwm.
 - b) Kuwo wax yar isbeddel codeed ku dhacay, sida: *Axmed* (af Carbeedka: *Axmad*), *Xuseen* (*Xuseyn*), *Aadan* (*Aadam*), *Maxamed* (*Muxammad*).
 - c) Kuwo isbeddel weyn ku dhacay, oo siyaabo kala duwan loogu dhawaaqo gobollada Soomaaliyeed, sida magaca Carbeed “*Abuu Bakar*” oo noqday: *Abokor, Abuukar, Abiikar, Eybakar, Bakar, Iikar*; magaca “*Cabdullaahi*” isna wuxuu noqday: *Cabdulle, Cabdille, Cabdalle, Cabdalla, Cabdullaahi, Cabdillaahi*.

Haddaba, nidaamkan aan kor ku soo xusnay, oo waafaqsan codaynta af Soomaaliga, oo horeyna u dhaqangalay, ilama habboona in la beddelo, laguna qoro hab Carbeedka asalka ah, sida dadka qaarkood ay bilaabeen in magacyadooda ay u qoraan, sida: magaca *Xuseen* oo ay u qoro *Xuseyn*; *Maxamed* oo ay u qoraan *Muxammad*; *Aadan*-na *Aadam* iwm. Haddii aan raacno aragtida asalraaca ah, maxaan ka yeelnaa magacyada, sida magacyada asalkooda ka soo jeeda “*Abuu Bakar*” (*Abokor, Abuukar, Abiikar, Eybakar, Bakar, Iikar*)? Giddigooda ma “*Abuubakar*” baan u qornaa? U malayn maayo in ay sax tahay.

2. *Magacyo jacbur ah*: Sidoo kale, waxaa soo badanaya dad magacyadooda ku qora far jacburan, farta af Soomaaliga iyo midda Ingiriisiga oo isku laran, sida: *Khaliif Abdullahi*; *Mohamed Xaashi*; *Abdinaciim iwm.* Arrintanna in laga fiirsado ayaa loo baahan yahay.
3. *Magacyo qoraalkoodu aanu iswaafaqsanayn*: Waxaa jira magac qof Soomaaliyeed, oo afar hab loo qoro, sida hogatus ahaan, aan halkan ugu muujinayno qof magaciisu yahay *Nuur Xuseen Cabdirashiid* iyo siyaabaha kala duwan ee loo qoro, oo ku xiran hadba dalka uu joogo qofkaas.

1. *Nuur Xuseen Cabdirashiid* (far Soomaali)
2. *Nur Hussen Abdirascid* (f. Talyaani)
3. *Noor Hussein Abdirashid* (f. Ingiriisi)
4. *Nour Houssein Abdirachid* (f. Faransiis)

Arrintani waxay qofka u keeni kartaa dhib weyn, gaar ahaan, xagga waraaqihiisa aqoonsi oo leh magacyo is khilaafsan, sidaasna lagu aqoonsan kari waayo. Qurbajoogta ayaana aad u garan karta dhibaatan iyo ciddii dibadda xiriir la leh.

Sidoo kale, ardayda wax ku barata gudaha dalka Soomaaliyeed, badiba waxaa dhacda in shahaadada dugsiga sare magaca qofku ku qoran yahay far Soomaali iyo far Carabi, shahaadada heerka jaamacadeedna isla sidaas loo qoro. Laakiin marka uu baasaboorto doonto, badiba waxaa magaciisa lagu qoraa far Ingiriisi. Marka uu dalka dibaddiisa u doonto waxbarasho heerka labaad ee jaamacadda ah, waa lagu soo celiyaa dukumentigiisa, waxaana loo sheegaa inuu qoraalka magacyadiisa isa soo waafajiyo.²

Bal haddana aan milicsanno adduunweynaha kale iyo dhigaalka magacyada. Waxaan ogsoonnahay in farta *Latin*-ka ay adeegsadaan reer Galbeedka badankooda iyo kuwo kaleba, sida: *Indonesia, Vietnam,*

Turkida iwm, iyagoo afafkoodu ay ku kala geddisan yihiin xagga ku dhawaaqidda xuruufaha qaarkood, haddana qola waliba waxay magaceeda ku qortaa habka fardhigaalkeeda u gaarka ah oo keliya.

Qaar ka mid ah afafkaas adeegsada farta Latin-ka, oo leh xurufo ay ku kala duwan yihiin xagga dhawaaqa, ayaan hogatus ahaan halkan ku soo bandhigaynaa:

- Polish-ka xarafka **c** dhawaaqiisu waa **z**; **ch** = **h**.
- Ingiriisiga: **c** = **s/k**; **ch** = **j**.
- Talyaaniga: **c** = **j/k**; **ch** = **k**.
- Turkish-ka: **ç** = **ch** (chair).
- Jarmalka: **ch** = **kh** (Munich).
- Faransiika: **ch** = **sh**.
- Indonesia: **sy** = **sh**.

Maadaama, farta af Soomaaligu ay la mid tahay midda reer Galbeedka, oo ay leedahay saddex xaraf (**c**, **x**, **q**)³ oo ku dhawaaqooda si kale ah, maxaa inoo diidaya, sida dadyowga kale ee dunidu ay ugu dheggen yihiin hab dhigaalkooda, in aan innaguna ugu dhegganaanno keenna, oo aan u qorno magacyadeenna habka farta Soomaaliga oo keliya?

Sida cid waliba ay farteeda ugu talaggasho dadkeeda, oo aan waxba ka khasayn u fududaynteeda dadka shisheeye, ayaa farta af Soomaaligana loogu talagalay Soomaalida. Sidaa darteed, qofka ajnabiga ah waa ku khasban yahay in uu raaco ama dhowro habka qorista afkeenna, sida aan giddigeenba u dhowrno hab qorista afafka shisheeye. Haddii innagu aynaan noqon dad shaqsiyad leh oo isku kalsoon, qiimana u yeela afkooda iyo fartooda gaarka ah, maxaa laga sugayaa qofka shisheeye? Qofka afkiisa hooyo liida shakhsiyaddiisii ayuu liiday. Tanina waxay ka mid tahay arrimaha keeni kara in qofku uu mudnaan dheeraad ah siiyo af

shisheeye. Arrintanna waxaa tusaale u ah, sida maanta ay Soomaalidu u adeegsato af Ingiriisiga, dalka gudahiisa iyo dibaddiisaba.

Weli mararka qaarkood waxaaba qurbaha lagu arkaa marka uu magac far Soomaali ku qoran yahay, dadka ajaanibka ahi sida la toosan ayay ugu dhawaaqaan, Soomaaliduna inay hagaajiyaan daaye, sida khaladka ah ayay isugu yeeraan, iyagoo isku dayaya in ay u fududeeyaan ajnabiga, liidayana habka Soomaaliga ee saxda ah. Tus.: magaca *Nimco* > *Nimko* ayay qaarkood ugu dhawaaqaan, *Axlaam* > *Akslaam*, *Maxamed* > *Maksamed* iwm. Weliba mararka qaarkood waxaa la maqlaa magaca *Maxamed* oo la soo gaabiyay, looguna dhawaaqayo qaab reer Galbeed, sida *Max* (oo loogu dhawaaqo Makis) iwm⁴.

Haddaba, si loo mideeyo hab dhigaalka magaca gaarka ee Soomaaliyeed waxaa loo baahan yahay in si midaysan aan u adeegsanno farta af Soomaaliga, mar walba iyo meel kasta oo aan dunida kaga sugannahay.

Sidaas darteed, magacii aan kor ku soo xusnay, waxay noqonaysaa in mar walba loo qoro “*Nuur Xuseen Cabdirashiid*” dukumentiga lagu qorayaa afka kasta oo uu ku qoran yahayba, sida af Ingiriisi, Talyaani, Swedish iwm.

II. Magaca Qoyska (*Magacqoys*)

Magac gaar, sidiisaba, waa astaan lagu aqoonsado qof, dal iwm oo looga soo sooco dadka iyo dalalka kale, sida magacyada gaarka ah ee juqraafiyeed: *Muqdisho*, *Hargeysa*, *Kenya*, *London* iwm. Sidaas ay tahay, way dhici kartaa in tiro kooban oo magacyo gaar ahi ay isku mid noqdaan ama isu dhowaadaan. Laakiin magacyada gaarka ee dadka Soomaaliyeed, intooda badani aad ayay isugu egyihiin. Tusaale ahaan, haddii aad cid weydiiso, “Yaa yaqaan *Maxamed Cabdullaahi*?” waxaa markiiba lagu weyddiinayaa: “*Maxamed Cabdullaahigee*?” oo la rabo in aad sheegto, si loo garto, naanaystiisa ama cidda uu ka dhashay.

Qoraal ahaanna, Soomaaliya kama jira nidaam midaysan ee qofka magaciisa loo qoro. Hay`adaha waxbarashadu xilliyada la gelayo imtixaannada shahaadada [sannadka 8aad iyo 12aad] waxay faraan in ardaygu qoro afar magac, sida: *Nuur Xuseen Cabdirashiid Faarax*; hay`adaha garsoorkuna qofka magaciisa saddexan waxay raaciyaan magaca hooyadiis, sida: *Nuur Xuseen Cabdirashiid*, ina *Faadumo Xasan*. hay`adda socdaalkuna waxay baasaboorrada ku qoraan qofka magaciisa oo seddaxan oo weliba ku qoran farta Ingiriisiga.

Arrintanina waa caqabad lagala kulmo dalka gudihiiisa iyo dibaddiisaba, taasoo la xiriirta magacyada Soomaaliyeed, oo badanaa aan lahayn wax lagu sii kala sooco, sida hab magac gaareedka aadka looga adeegsado adduunweynaha, oo af Ingiriisiga lagu yiraahdo “*surname*”, af Carbeedkana “*اسم العائلة*” (*magacqoyska*). Waxaana si gaar ah u dareemaya caqabadda *magacqoys* la’aanta Soomaalida qurbajoogta ah iyo ciddii xiriir la leh reer Galbeedka.

Inkastoo aanay Soomaalidu dhaqan u lahayn adeegsiga *magacqoyska*, waxaa haddana lagu khasbaa, marka dibadda la joogo, in ay yeeshaan *magacqoysyo* uu dal kasta u dhigay hannaankiisa u gaarka ah. Waxaan halkaan ku muujinaynaa siyaabaha kala duwan ee dalalka qaarkood ay u siiyaan Soomaalida *magacqoysyo*, annagoo adeegsanayna qof magaciisu yahay: *Maxamed Cali Cabdullaahi* (sida ay Soomaalidu u adeegsato). Bal eeg, sida uu isu rogo qofkaas magaciisa haddii uu ku sugan yahay:

- Dalka Ingiriiska: *Maxamed Cabdullaahi* (*magacqoyskuna* waa midka **3d**, waxaana meesha ka baxaya magaca aabbaha)
- Dalka Talyaaniga: *Maxamed Cali Cabdullaahi* (*magacqoysku* waa midka **2d** & **3d**)
- Dalka Sweden: *Maxamed Cali* (*magacqoysku* waa midka **2d**, ama aabbaha)

Hababkan magacqoyseed ee kala geddisan siyaabo badan ayay uga soo horjeedaan habka, dhaqan ahaan, ay Soomaalidu u adeegsato magacyada gaarka ah, waxaana ka mid ah: ubad iyo aabbihis ayaa u muuqanaya laba walaalo ah, sida aabbaha magaciisu noqday *Maxamed Cabdullaahi*, inantiisuna waxay noqonaysaa *Caasho Cabdullaahi*. Midda kale, magacqosyada Talyaanigu waxay u badan yihiin in la hormariyo, qofka magaciisana gadaal la mariyo, isagoo gala kaalintii magaca awoowaha Soomaaliyeed, sida magaca *Maxamed Cali Cabdullaahi* waxaa loo qoraa *Cali Cabdullaahi Maxamed*. Bal ka warran, dhibaataada ka imaan karto, haddii magacyadaas aan la tagno geyiga Soomaaliyeed.

Dalka gudihiisana, hay`adaha waxbarashadu xilliyada la gelayo imtixaannada shahaadada [sannadka 8aad iyo 12aad] waxay faraan in ardaygu qoro afar magac, sida: *Nuur Xuseen Cabdirashiid Faarax*; hay`adaha garsoorkuna qofka magaciisa waxay ku raaciyaan magaca hooyadiis, sida: *Nuur Xuseen Cabdirashiid, ina Faadumo Xasan*.

Haddaba, si laysu waafajiyo labada hab, *magacqoysyada* jahawareerka leh ee ay ina siiyaan reer Galbeedku, oo iyaguba aan ku midaysnayn habka ay adeegsadaan, iyo casriyaynta hab magaceedka ay Soomaalidu isu taqaan, waxaan yeelan karnaa *magacqoysyo* maangal ah, oo dhaqankeennana waafaqsan.

Marka hore, aan wax yar dib u milicsanno taariikhda iyo sababaha keenay *magacqosyada* ay adeegsadaan dadyowga kala duwan ee dunida daafaheeda kala deggan. Adeegsiga *magacqoysyadu* waa nidaam soojireen ah, oo ay adeegsan jireen qoysaska gobta lagu sheego, ee boqorrada lahaa.

Qarnigii 11-12aad, ayay Yurub billawday in dadka caadiga ah loo yeelo *magacqoysyo* cusub, si ay u diiwaangeliyaan dadweynaha tarankoodu ku batay magaalooyinka, isla markaana ay adkaatay in magacyadooda la kala saaro, *magacqoys* la'aan awgeed. Xilligan casriga ah, dawlada bilaabay

adeegsiga *magacqoysyada* waxaa ka mid ah: *Netherlands (1811), Japan (1870), Thailand (1920), Turkey (1934) iyo Afganistaan (2014)*.⁵ Dadyowgaas iyo kuwa kale oo dunida daafaheeda kala deggan, oo aan isku dhaqan iyo isku af ahayn, ayaa wada qaatay in qofka magaciisa la raaciyo magac tilmaan gaar ah bixinaya, kaasoo ah *magacqoyska*. Tilmaamahaasina waxay u badan yihiin afar nooc, oo kala ah:

1. Degaanka uu ka soo jeedo: *Bush* (duur), *Yamamoto* (Japan, buur gunteed), *Bukhaari* (magaalada Bukhaaraa), *Kapoor* (Hindi, magacrugeed ab), *Jiang* (China, webi), *Moskva* (reer Mosco).
2. Xirfaddiisa: *Smith* (tumaal), *Al-Najaar* (najaar/faryaame).
3. Sifihiisa: *Brown* (USA, midab bunnii), *Tolstoy* (Russia, buurane), *Al-axmar* (Yaman, guduudow/casoowe), *Dogan* (Turkey, galleyr), *Gao* (China, dheer).
4. Qofka isirkiisa: oo ah habka ugu qaddiimsan, oo laba nooc ah:
 - a) Magaca beeshiisa: *Aala Nahyaan* (magac reer Carbeed), *O'Brien* (Irish, *O'*=reer, Brien = magac beel), *Wang* (China), *Kim* (Korea), *Oğlu* (Turkey).
 - b) Magaca abkiisa: Carabta & Yahuudda: ***Ibn Khalduum***, ***Bin Laadan***, ***Bin Goryan***, ***Abu Mazen***. Reer Galbeedkuna wax la ka mid ah ayay leeyihiin, sida: ***Powell*** (oo ka yimid: ***ap*** Hywel = ina Hywel), ***MacNeill*** (ina Neil), ***Ivanov*** (Russia, ina Ivan), ***Wilson*** (ina William), ***Fitzgerald*** (*Fitz* < filius (*Latin*), ina Gerald), ***Pálfi*** (Hungarian, ***fi*** (ina) Paul).

Haddaan sii baarno habkan dambe, waxaan arkaynaa in magacyadan ay ka joogaan abtirsi la soo gaabiyay, tus.: Carabta: magaca ***Ibnu Taymiyah*** asalkiisu waa *Axmad bin Cabdulxaliim bin Cabdisalaam bin Cabdalla bin Abiilqaasim bin Muxammad ibnu Taymiyah*. Reer Galbeedka, gaar ahaan Welsh⁶-ku, sida Carabta ayay u abtirsan jireen, iyagoo adeegsanaya qurubka ***ap*** (oo la micna ah *ina* ama *ibna*), tus., magaca *Llywelyn*

Gruffydds, asalkiisi hore, wuxuu ka soo jeedaa abtirsigan, oo marba isbeddel ku dhacaayay: *Llewelyn ap Dafydd ap Ieuan ap Griffith ap Meredith* > *Llywelyn ap Gruffydd* > *Llywelyn Gruffydds*, ugu dambayntiina qurubka *ap* wuxuu isu dhalanrogay dibkabaha “-s”⁷, haseyeeshee mararka qaarkood qurubka *ap* wuxuu noqonayaa horkabe kooban, sida *magacqoyska Powell* (oo asalkiisa ka yimid *ap+ Haywel*).

Raadka abtirsiga kama marna xitaa magacyada reer Galbeedka ee maanta la adeegsado, sida magacyada madaxweynayaasha ee soo socda, tusaale ahaan:

- *François Hollande* < *François Gérard Georges Nicolas Hollande*
- **George Bush** < George Herbert Walker **Bush**

Afarta hab magacqoyseed ee adeegsigooda ugu badan ee aan kor ku soo qaadaadhignay, markii laga reebo midka afaraad oo ah qofka isirkiisa, seddaxda kale waxay ka soo jeedaan *naanaysyo* la xiriira qofka degaankiisa, xirfaddiisa iyo sifadiisa. Haddaba, naanaysyada faraha badan ee ay Soomaalidu leedahay sow astaan uma aha baahida loo qabo *magacqoyska*? Waa tii horey loo yiri *Nin aan naanays lahayn waa ri’ aan geeso lahayn*⁸. Sida la wada ogyahay, naanaysta ayaa ka xoog badan qofka magaciisa oo seddaxan, maxaa yeelay ayada ayaa markiiba lagu aqoonsan karaa qofka. Tus. magacyadan soo socda oo aan la socon naanaysyo, waxaa laga yaabaa in aan durbadiiba la fahmi karin qofka loola jeedo, maxaa yeelay dad badan ayaa la wadaagi kara: *Maxamed Cabdullaahi Maxamed, Maxamed Ibraahim Warsame, Xuseen Sh. Axmed, Axmed Maxamed Maxamuud, Axmed Faarax Cali, Khadiija Cabdullaahi*. Haddiise magacyadan la raacsiiyo naanaysyada soo socda ama la sheego naanaysyada oo keliya, durbadii waa la garanayaa qofka loola jeedo: *Axmed Maxamed Siilaanyo, Maxamed Cabdullaahi Farmaajo, Maxamed Ibraahim Hadraawi, Xuseen Sh. Axmed Kaddare, Axmed Faarax Idaajaa, Khadiija Cabdullaahi Dalays*

Haddaba, maxaa inoo diiday in innaguna aan yeelanno *magacqoysyo* ku qaabaysan dhaqankeenna, si aan ula jaanqaadno caalamka intiisa kale, oo Muslin iyo dad aan Muslin ahaynba ka kooban, oo badankoodu ay wada adeegsadaan habka *magacqoyska*? Maadaama dhaqan ahaan aanu leenahay abtirsiimo, qabaa'il iyo naanaysyo aan qaarkood xumayn, waxaan tala ahaan soo jeedin lahaa sidan soo socota:

1. In aan adeegsanno '*magacqoys*' oo laga keeno: *magac reer* ama *magac ab* (oo aan adeegsigiisu badnayn)⁹, ama *naanays fiican*, ama *magac degaan*, ama *magac xirfad* iwm.
2. Si ubad iyo aabbiihiis aan walaalo u noqon, waxaa habboon in 3 magac la qaato, kuwaas oo kala ah: *qofka magaciisa + magaca aabbiihiis + magaca qoyskiisa*.
3. In magac sharafeedyada, sida: *macallin*, *shiikh*, *xaaji* iwm, qoraal ahaan aan la raacsiin magaca, gaar ahaan marka magaca lagu qorayo dukumentiyada (warqadda aqoonsiga, baasaboorka, warqadda dhalashada, shahaadooyinka waxbarashada iwm).
4. In magacyada lammaanan ee Soomaalida qaarkood ay leeyihin, sida: *Maxamed-Deeq*, *Caasha-Kiin* iwm, oo mid kastaa kelidiis magac noqon karo, in midkood rasmi laga dhigto, oo lagu kaaftoomo marka magaca lagu qorayo dukumentiyada, ama in labada magac loo dhexeysiiyo jiitin, si aan loogu khaldin magaca labaad in uu yahay magaca aabbaha, sida: *Maxamed-Nuur* .
5. In dawladda Soomaaliyeed ay si dhab ah ugu dhabbagasho sidii looga baaraandegi lahaa arrintan, loona hirgelin lahaa casriyaynta magacyada dadka Soomaaliyeed.

Waxaan tusaale ahaan halkan ku soo bandhigaynaa magacyo niman Soomaaliyeed oo caan ah, oo giddigoodba leh naanayso aan xumayn oo si fudud lagu aqoonsado nimankaas. Maadaama naanaysyadaasi ay

waafaqsan yihiin afarta hab *magacqoyseed* ee aan kor ku soo xusnay, waxay tusaale muuqda u noqon karaan sida loo samayn karo *magacqoysyo* Soomaaliyeed.

1) Magaca isirka:

a. Magaca abka:

- *Yaasiin Cismaan Keenadiid*¹⁰ (Keenadiid waa awoowgiis)

b. Magaca reerka:

- (Sh.) *Cabdulaahi Yuusuf Qudubi* (*Qudubi* magac beeled)
- (Sh.) *Cabdiraxmaan Cumar Celi* (*Celi* waa magac beeled)
- (Dr.) *Saalax Caydaruus Alcamuudi* (*Al-Camuudi* waa magac beeled)

2) Magaca degaanka:

- *Maxamed Cusmaan Jawaari* (Jawaarey waa magac degaan)
- *Faarax Maxamed Gololey* (Gololey waa magac degaan)

3) Magaca sifada/naanaysta qofka:¹¹

- *Aadan Cabdulle Cadde*
- *Axmed Maxamed Siilaanyo*
- *Maxamed Ibraahin Hadraawi*

4) Magaca xirfadda:

- (Sh) *Xasan Axmed Faqi*¹²
- *Cabduraxmaan Nuur Garaash*¹³

Haddii habkan iyo wax u eg la qaato waxay arrintu noqon lahayd *hal dhagax afar shimbir ku dil*, yacnii afar mushkiladood ayaa sidaas lagu xallin kari lahaa ama lagu yarayn lahaa, kuwaas oo kala ah:

1. Waxaa yaraanaya magacyadii isu ekaa.
2. *Magacqoysyadii* qallafsanaa ee ay reer Galbeedku qurbajoogta ku khasbeen ayaa meesha ka baxaya.
3. Waxaa caadi noqonaya adeegsiga magacyada isirka ama qabiilka. Taasina ceeb iyo wax laal yaabo midna maaha, waayo, qabiilku waa wax la isku aqoonsado, sida ku xusan Quraanka Kariimka ah, suratul Xujuraat, aayadda 13aad:

﴿...وَجَعَلْنَاكُمْ شُعُوبًا وَقَبَائِلَ لِتَعَارَفُوا...﴾ الحجرات: ١٣

(...Oo waxaan idin ka dhignay ummado iyo qabaa'il si aad isu aqoonsataan...) Al-Xujuraat: 13

Sidaa darteed, *magacqoys* waxaa Carabta u ah magaca qabiilka ay ka dhasheen, sida: *Baa-sarca, Al-Camuudi, Aal-Nahyaan, Aal-Sacuud, Baa Cumar*, iwm.

4. Waxaa sidaas ku haraya ama yaraanaya naanaysyadii xumaa, oo diinta Islaamku aan oggolayn, sida ku cad Quraanka Kariimka ah, suratul Xujuraat aayadda 11aad:

﴿...وَلَا تَنَابَزُوا بِالْأَلْقَابِ بِئْسَ الْأَسْمُ الْفُسُوقُ بَعْدَ الْإِيمَانِ...﴾ الحجرات: ١١

(... Hana isugu yeerina naanayso xunxun, waxaa xun magaca faasiqnimada iimaan kaddib...) Al-Xujuraat: 11

III. Taariikhda iyo Degaanka uu Qofku ku Dhashay

Soomaalidu dhaqan uma lahayn in ay meel ku qoroto taariikhda dhalashada, gaar ahaan lama tixgeliyo maalinta iyo bisha uu qofku dhashay, sida ku cad baasaboorrada iyo waraaqaha aqoonsiga ee laga sameeyey geyiga Soomaaliyeed. Markii dibadda loo qaxay waa tii Soomaalida badankeedu ay ka dhigatay taariikhda dhalashadeeda kowda Jannaayo (01/01...). Xitaa sannadku wuxuu u badan yahay mala'awaal ama mid aan sugnayn, qofku da'diisa marna wuu yareeyaa marna wuu weyneeyaa, waxayna ku xiran tahay hadba xaajada uu markaas doonayo in uu ku fushado. Haddaba, si loola jaanqaado dunida casriga ah ee maanta waa lagama maarmaan in qof waliba uu lahaado taariikh dhalasho oo dhan (maalinta, bisha iyo sannadka).

Sidoo kale, degaanka uu qofku ku dhashay, isna waxaan aragnaa in Soomaalidu aan sidaas u danaynayn, oo waxaa la arkaa in dadka badankoodu ay qortaan in ay ku dhasheen Muqdisho ama meel kale oo aan dhab ahayn. Haddaba, waxaan ku talin lahaa:

1. Ciddii aan lahayn taariikh dhalasho ee sugan, waxaa habboon in lagu dadaalo sidii loo samaysan lahaa, taariikh dhalasho oo maangal ah, lagana gudbo habka la caadaystay, oo ah in laga wada dhigto kowda Jannaayo (01/01/....);
2. In lagu dadaalo in jiilka cusub taariikhdooda dhabta ah la qoro, lana xifdiyo; iyo
3. In degaannada Soomaaliyeed loo yeelo xeer adag, oo ah in warqad dhalasho la siiyo hooyadii ku umusha degaan, sida adduunweynaha kale ay sameeyaan, kaddibna warqaddaas laga diiwaangeliyo dowladda hoose, si loo ogaado taariikhda (maalinta, bisha iyo sannadka) iyo goobta uu ilmuhu ku dhashay.

Gabaggabo

Sida sawirka wejigu uu u yahay wax isla markiiba qofka ka soo soocaya dadka kale, ayaa sidoo kale qoraal ahaan waxaa qofka Soomaaliyeed haybtiisa saxda ah lagu aqoonsan karaa marka uu leeyahay saddexdan tilmaamood:

- 1) Qofka magaciisa iyo ka aabbiihiis oo saxan;
- 2) *magacqoys* u gaar ah, oo ku salysan dhaqanka Soomaaliyeed; iyo
- 3) taariikhda (maalinta, bisha iyo sannadka) iyo degaanka uu qofku ku dhashay oo sugan.

Saddexdan tilmaamood, siiba labada hore, waxaa suurtagelin kara, hadday noqoto iskuxirnaantooda iyo xaqiijintoodaba, marka qofka Soomaaliga ahi haybtiisa shaqsiyadeed uu ku qoro far Soomaali, mar walba iyo meel kasta oo uu dunida kaga sugan yahay. Markaasna waxaa suurtaggalaysa in laga gudbo: magacyada dhigaalkoodu is khilaafsan yahay, ee la caadaystay in lagu qoro faro aan islahayn; qaabka saddexda magac ee keenay in dad aad u badan ay isku magac noqdaan; *magacqoysyada* hababkooda kala duwan ee nalagu khasbay. Sidoo kale, naanaysyadii foosha xumaa ayaa haraya ama yaraanaya, waxaana kaalintooda gelaya '*magacqoys*'-yada noocyadooda kala duwan.

Tilmaamo

¹ Waxaa mahad gaar ah iga mudan aqoonyahannada gacanta igu siiyay diyaarinta maqaalkan, oo kala ah: *Idiris M. Cali (USA)*, *Saynab A. Sharci (UK)*, *Giorgio Banti (Italia)*, *Cabdirashiid Maxamed Ismaaciil (Jabuuti)*, *Maxamed Xasan Nuur (Muqdisho)*, *Mustafa Cabdullaahi Fayruus (Muqdisho)*.

² Arintan waxaa nooga waramay Dr. Maxamed Xasan Nuur oo ah Diiwaanhayaha Guud ee Jaamacadda Muqdisho.

- ³ Xarfaha “dh”& “kh” halkan kuma darin, maxaa yeelay lama mid aha saddexdaas xaraf ee matalaya codad aad uga geddisan sida caadi ahaan loo adeegsado.
- ⁴ Warkan dambe waxaan si toos ah uga helay macallimad Saynab A. Sharci oo ku nool dalka UK.
- ⁵ Sannadka 2014 ayay bilaabeen reer Afganistaan in ay yeeshaan, magacqoys iyo taariikh dhalasho, sida uu qoray Kapul Journal: *Obstacles Beyond Number for the Afghan Census*, December 10, 2014, oo uu qoray Joseph Goldstein.
- ⁶ Welsh waa dad ku nool dalal badan oo ay ka mid yihiin: UK, USA, Canada, Australia iwm.
- ⁷ Waxaa sidoo kale la mid ah dibkabayaashan oo la micna ah “-ina”: **-s** (Dutch, Irish) **-son** (English, Swedish, German, Norwegian), **-sen/-zen** (Danish, , Dutch), **-ic** (Czech, Sorbian, Belarusian), **-oğlu** (Turkish). Iyagoo horkabayaal ahna, oo isla micnihii hore leh, waxaa ka mid ah: **Bin-/Ibn-/Ben-** (Arabic, Hebrew), **Ap-/Ab-** (Welsh), **Fitz-/Mac-** (Irish), **Pour-** (Persian), **Di-** (Italian, Spanish). Horkabayaal iyo dibkabayaal tilmaama halka uu qofku ka soo jeedo, waxaa ka mid ah: **-i** (Arabic, Persian, Hungarian); **De-** (Italian, French).
- ⁸ Naanaysyada Soomaaliyeed badanaa waxay tilmaamayaan iin jireed ama dabeecadeed oo uu qofka leeyahay, sida: *ilay, gacamay, afqallooc, madaxay, laangare, jinnoole, -waal, shiino* iwm.
- ⁹ Dadka qaarkood waxay caan ku noqdaan magaca aabbaha ama awoowga, oo ah magac aan aad loola bixin, magacaas ayaana aad loogu gartaa, sida: *Maxamed Siyaad Barre (Siyaad), Maxamed Xaaji Ibraahin Cigaal (Cigaal), Cabdalla Cumar Mansuur (Mansuur), Maxamed Xaaji Xuseen Raabi (Raabi)*.
- ¹⁰ Waa magaca qoraa caan ah, Alle ha u naxriistee, isagoo dhammaystiran waa: Yaasiin Cismaan Yuusuf Keenadiid. Qoraagu, sida qoraalladiisa ku cad, magaca awoowgiis, Yuusuf, waa ka booday, arrintaasoo u muuqato in ay tusaale fiican u noqon karto habka aan talo ahaan kor ku soo jeediyay.
- ¹¹ Magacyada *Cadde, Siilaanyo, Hadraawi* iyo naanaysyada kale ee aan xumayn, waxay tusaale wacan u noqon karaan naanaysyada laga dhigan karo magacqoys.
- ¹² Magacu waa *Sh Xasan Axmed Maxamed Cismaan*, *Maxamed* ayaa la oran jiray *Faqi Maxamed Cismaan*, aqoontiisa fiqhiga iyo axkaamta darteed ayaana *Faqi* loogu magacaabay, ka dibna *magacqoyseed* ayuu u noqday tarankiisii.

- ¹³ Naanaysta xirfadda ku tusaysa, qofkuna bulshada dhexdeeda caan ku noqdo, waxaa ka mid ah: *Nuur Biyoole, Xasan Roodhiile, Cali Barafle, Cismaan Cusboole, Cumar Rooti, Cabdiqaadir Tuubiiste, Cabdi Fuundi.*

Raadraac

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Awaaltiris



Maxamed Ibraahim Warsame “Hadraawi”

Tixdan

Tixdan ‘awaaltiris’ waxaa tiriyay abwaan Maxamed Ibraahim Warsame “Hadraawi”, waxay soo baxday 13/9/2009; waxayna ku saabsan tahay dayacaadda iyo dhibaataada ka dhalatay ragga balwadda qaadku dilootay ee ‘ka indhabeelay’ xilkii saarnaa.

Sheekada ‘Ugaaso’ waa fadeexad naxdin leh. Waa aabbo ku jira ‘iilka qaadka’, dayacay masuuliyaddiisii, hooyadii qoyska ay dantu badday inay masruufkii dusha u ridato; waxayna ka badin wayday inay bacadka iyo qorraxda ‘qaad’ ku iibiso! Odaygii oo dhowr maalmood reerka ka maqnaa ayaa soo galay aqalkii oo la buuxo. Maba waraysan waxa dhacaye, qaad uu sitay ayuu doonay inuu u fadhiisto! Wuxuu u yeedhay inantiisii si ay ugu adeegto ‘Ugaasooy... Ugaasooy’!!! Waa inan dhowr maalmood ka hor geeriyootay, tacsideediina loo fadhiyo!!! Yaab, amakaag!!!

Abwaanku, waxaa kale oo uu tilmaamayaa dhibaataada ku habsata bulshada, marka waayeelkeedu ‘la ambado xilkiisa’ ama si gurracan uu u fahmo ‘siyaasadda iyo maaraynta danta guud’.

Abwaan Hadraawi, wuxuu caan ku yahay inuu sheekooyinka ka curiyo maansooyin xambaarsan duluc qotodheer iyo farshaxannimo huwan.

Tixdani waxay ka kooban tahay (255) meeris, oo dhowr qaybood ah.

1. Uub baad ku jirtaa qarsoone¹
2. Ka soo baxa iilka qaadka
3. Adduunka ragoow mar kaalay
4. Abuurtiyo heegga daawo
5. Awoodaha saaran daawo
6. Falaadkiyo alabbadeeda
7. Ilaah samihiisa daawo
8. Udbaha iyo teedka daawo
9. Aloomka ku jeeran daawo
10. Hagoogta aslaysa daawo
11. Cadceedda ifaysa daawo
12. Ilwaadkiyo nuurka daawo
13. Abaabul-caddaanta daawo
14. Ummuuraha toosay daawo.
15. Dayaxa ishin-buuxsankiisa
16. Aashaa socodkiisa daawo
17. Cirjiidhiyo ololka daawo
18. Rugaa Afagaalladeeda
19. Laxaa iyo Ururka daawo
20. Aleelaha guudka daawo
21. Habeenka amuuman daawo
22. Shareerkiyo aqalladiisa
23. Haddana ashqaraarradiisa
24. Ardaayada gogosha taalla
25. Ummuuraha seexday daawo.
26. Haddaanu arbeebigeedu
27. Ku barin abtirsiimadeeda
28. Inbiig ku dhex joogi maysid.

29. Ugaas bokhran baad ahayde²
30. Irdaha noloshaad ahayde

31. Ilayska dhulkaad ahayde
32. Ragoow indhobeelistaada
33. Asaayo maxaa ka beermay!
34. Halkaad ku lahayd astaanta
35. Maxaa umal soo fadhiistay
36. Maxaa gudcur soo af yeeshay
37. Naftaada markaad illowday
38. Bal soo tiri aafadaada
39. Wixii lumay aynabkaaga
40. Bal daawo inkaarahaaga!
41. Unuunka dhirtaad ka goysay
42. Aahdeeda bal soo dhegayso
43. Hashii iyo awrka geela
44. Abaaludda loo dareershay
45. Ureenkiyo tiinka daawo
46. Rasaasta alwaysa daawo
47. Oomaarkiyo dhiigga daawo
48. Areerinka meydka daawo
49. Islaan curadkeeda weyday
50. Asayda la saaray daawo;
51. Habliyo ubixii dalkeenna
52. Markay Ingiriis u xiistay
53. Markii Iglan looga yeedhay
54. Wedkay ku aroortay daawo;
55. Uneexada gabanka xoortay
56. Abaydinka dooxa yaalla
57. Abkiisa la sheegi waayay
58. Aboodiga boobay daawo;
59. Addoonka addoonka maagay
60. Ku yidhi isku Aadan miihin

61. Gabooye agtiisa yaalla
62. Walaalnimadii ka ootay
63. Aayaadkiyo diinta qeexan
64. Sidaa kaga aayo beelay
65. Halkuu illin mooday daawo;
66. Cirkiyo onkodkiyo hillaaca
67. Daruuraha alabaskooda
68. Cuslayn jiray alalagtiisa
69. Bal daawada uumigiisa;
70. Dhulkii ubixiyo caleenta
71. Ugbaadkiyo doogga laaca
72. Ilwaadkiyo nuurka sheegtay
73. Awaaraha jiifa daawo;
74. Basaastiyo oonka daawo
75. Geyiga umaltoobankiisa
76. Ayaayurantiisa daawo
77. Bal dhawr laba-eefiddaadu
78. Waxay af-dhabaandhab keentay!
79. Garaadka abloobay daawo
80. Adduunyadu baadi maaha
81. Mudkeediyo bulad ammaanka
82. Afkii cunay quusan waaye
83. Hadduu laba-aabudh saaray
84. Hadduu ugubkeeda leefay
85. Muxuu ka dhex joogi uuska?!

86. Ugaasadu meeday heedhe?!³
87. Dorraato miyaan la aasin?
88. Miyaan kafan loo amaahan?
89. Miyaan axan loo yaboohin?
90. Markii araggaa la waayay?

91. Miyaan jinku qaylo oogsan?
92. Miyaan insigii gadoodin?
93. Miyaan ollogeenu yaabin?!

94. Ishaaro san kaama hayno
95. Shidaad naga oolin maysid
96. Ogaal nagu caymin maysid
97. Itaal nagu xoojin maysid
98. Qudhaanjo afuufi maysid
99. Dalool naga awdi maysid
100. Xashiish nala ururin maysid
101. Aqool nala seesi maysid
102. Aqoon nagu biirin maysid
103. Xilkaagana oofin maysid
104. Afkaagana dhawri maysid
105. Sidii gabadhii Ayaan
106. Ayaan-Hooday dhahaane⁴
107. Abwaannimo sheegan maysid
108. Aroor qudha toosi maysid
109. Dhiggaagiyo aynigaaga
110. Adduunka la qaybsan maysid
111. Iskaaba xusuusan maysid
112. Wixii Rabbi kuu abuuray!

113. Intaydu ku deeqi mayso
114. Intaada ku biirin maysid
115. Hantida arladoo dhan taalla
116. Haddaad irbad nooga keento
117. Ducaa ku asqayn lahayde
118. Inkaar naga waayi maysid.

- 119. Ufiyo bacad baan fadhiistay
- 120. Anfaaciga aad cunayso
- 121. Ilaaqda raggaan ku keenay
- 122. Waxaan u adkaystay maagis
- 123. Amaah iyo qaylo joogta
- 124. Uurkayga waxaan ku haysto
- 125. Afkayga ka sheegi maayo
- 126. Asluubtana qoomi maayo
- 127. Awaashiyo waayahayga
- 128. Ka daalaco oogadayda!

- 129. Haddaad na ilaalin weydo
- 130. Axsaanta ku laaban weydo
- 131. Abaal nagu yeelan maysid
- 132. Ammaan naga dhowri maysid
- 133. Anigu kugu faani maayo
- 134. Dharaar kugu aarsan maayo
- 135. Adiga kuu uunsan maayo
- 136. Agtaydana jiifi maysid
- 137. Haddaan beri kuu ilduufay
- 138. Haddeer ku abaysan maayo.

- 139. Markay ajashaada gaadho
- 140. Cidina kuu ooyi mayso
- 141. Ilaahay ka dhuuman maysid
- 142. Jannada ku aroori maysid
- 143. Cadaabta ka ooli maysid
- 144. Godkaaguna waa aboor
- 145. Abeesiyo waa ciqaab.

146. Ragoow amarkaaga weyni⁵
147. Haweenka uleeya maaha
148. Dhibtooda ku iida maaha
149. Ufaan-uf qadhiidha maaha
150. Albaabbada kheyru seegay
151. Caqaar ku aroosta maaha
152. Asaasaq ku gaadha maaha
153. Ku aakhiro seega maaha.

154. Ragoow irdho qaadan maysid
155. Ugaadhsi ka seexan maysid
156. Abeerka badbaadin maysid
157. Ugaybkana dhaafi maysid
158. Haddaad cunto aayahaaga
159. Xulkooda haddaad abbaarto
160. Unuunka haddaad ka goyso
161. Areebo sidaad ka yeeli?
162. Sabeen inanteennu maaha
163. Adeeri ka sii mug weyne
164. Asoolka hablaha ka daaya!

165. Abaartiyo roobka dhoofay
166. In waalan, intiinna dhooohan
167. In qaawan, intii sawaaban
168. Dhammaan ifafaalayaasha
169. Ka muuqda adduunyadeenna
170. Ragoow ubadkaaga leexday
171. Islaamnimadii ka baydhay
172. Agoonnimadooda buuxda

- 173. Dhashiinna ku aabbo weyday
- 174. Asmay ku calool galeene
- 175. Ammaanada boodhka taalla
- 176. Ragoow ololaynta jaadka
- 177. Haddaad kaga ood fogaatay
- 178. Maxaa arrin kuu dambeeya!

- 179. Ragoow ka adkoow xilkaaga
- 180. La saayira ooryihiinna
- 181. Irmaanta xaqeeda siiya
- 182. Ragoow ubadkaaga toosi
- 183. Wixii arrin kaa daboolan
- 184. Iimaanka ku baadi doona
- 185. Afeefna ka yeesha xaajo
- 186. Ilaashada baylahdiinna;

- 187. Alhuumadu way fiddaaye⁶
- 188. Haddaad ummad liil ka weydo
- 189. Hadday ahab yeelan weydo
- 190. Waayeelku hadduu abguuro
- 191. Hadduu odaygeedu waasho
- 192. Hadduu la anbado xilkiisa
- 193. Hadduu runta aamusiiyo
- 194. Hadduu kolba eed xanbaarto
- 195. Asuulkiyo xeerka soohan
- 196. Hadduu marba oof daloosho
- 197. Hadduu laba-eef caddaysto
- 198. Iimaanka hadduu xaraasho
- 199. Hadduu wacadkiisa iibsho
- 200. Araadi ku baadi doono

201. Ilaahay ka yaabi waayo
202. Hadduu kolba iin caddaysto
203. Hadduu umal saaqa yeesho
204. Sidii abris qooqan guuxo
205. Hadduu sida awr xunbeeyo
206. Hadduu abur xoor leh saydho
207. Hadduu ilko jiira yeesho
208. Hadduu noqdo aadun huursan
209. Abeesada meel la daaqo
210. Aqoonta qofkii ku dhaama
211. Hadduu asaraar ku beensho
212. Dhirtuba kala ayni weeye
213. Hadduu garanwaa abuuro
214. Hadduu kala geeyo uunka
215. Hadduu marba qayb la ooyo
216. Hadduu marba iil banneeyo
217. Hadduu yahay uur-ka-gaal
218. Wanaagga ku aabi badan;

219. Aleelo hadduu ku waasho
220. Islaan iyo foom karaarsan
221. Agtooda hadduu fadhiisto
222. Ijaabo ka baadi-doono
223. Iblayska hadduu la showro
224. Hadduu marba ood ka boodo
225. Ishaaro xun baa qarsoon.

226. Haddaanay astaan lahayn⁷
227. Abbaar iyo nuxur lahayn
228. Aroor iyo raad lahayn

229. Ammaan iyo qawl lahayn
230. Asluub iyo dhaqan lahayn
231. Islaamnimo sheeganayn
232. Hadday wada eexo tahay
233. Hadday asaroorin tahay
234. Asaasiran lagu bursado
235. Hadday dabin aasan tahay
236. Hadday wada eeso tahay
237. Shil iyo wada aano tahay
238. Hadday agaraadam tahay
239. Addoonsigu diin u yahay
240. Hadday orgobaysan tahay
241. Iimaanku ka qooman yahay
242. Hadday Arraweelo tahay
243. Hadday Abnawaase tahay
244. Afduub iyo beeno tahay
245. Axsaantu ka maydhan tahay
246. Hadday orgi iyo ri' tahay
247. Or iyo wada qaylo tahay
248. Hadday adhiyaysi tahay
249. Hadday adhaxtuujin tahay
250. Ilduuf iyo jeeble tahay
251. Hadday wada '*aniga*' tahay
252. Siyaasadi aabbe ma leh.
253. Ku daalka abaabulkeeda
254. Alooskiyo baanaheeda
255. Ujeeddo ka keeni maysid!!!⁸

Tilmaamo

- ¹ Qaybtan, meerisyada 1-28, abwaanku wuxuu ragga qaadku dilooday kula talinayaa inay ka soo baxaan ‘iilka qaadka’ oo bal adduunyada quruxdeeda iyo falsamida Ilaahay –sw- u sameeyay daawadaan, waxna ku qaataan.
- ² Qaybtan, meerisyada 29-85, wuxuu abwaanku ku sheegayaa dhibaataada iyo burburka ku habsaday nolosha iyo bulshada markii ay raggu kaalintoodii gabeen, halkay wax ka tari lahaayeen ay waxyeellada ka qayb qaateen.
- ³ Qaybtan, meerisyada 86-145, waa ‘fadeexaddii Ugaaso’; oo iyadoo dhowr maalmood ka hor geeriyootay, maradii kafankana amaah loogu soo qaaday. Aabbeheed, oo magaalada dhinac ka joogay, kana war la` yahay geerideeda; ayaa u yeedhayaa si ay ugu adeegto. Hooyadii reerka oo intii hore iska adkaysan jirtay ayaa afka furatay! Iyadoon xishoodka qoomin ayay inala wadaagaysaa dareenka iyo waayo-aragnimada uu ku reebay aabbahan kaalintiisu bannaanaatay.
- ⁴ Waa Hoodo Suldaan Aadan Faarax (Hoodo-Ayaan), waa halabuur da` yar, una firfircoon arrimaha bulshada. Waxay tirisay maanso ay kaga hadlayso qiimaha ‘hooyada’. Abaalmarin darteed ayuu Hadraawi ugu xusay maansadan, magaceediina ugu lammaaneeyay ‘Ayaan’. Laga bilaabo 2009, waxay caan ku noqotay Hoodo-Ayaan.
- ⁵ Qaybtan, meerisyada 146-186, abwaanku wuxuu ragga ku waaninayaa inay gartaan xilka qoyska ka saaran, waajibkoodana ka soo dhalaalaan.
- ⁶ Qaybtan, meerisyada 187-255, waxay ka hadlayaan masuuliyadda guud ee bulshadu ragga ka sugayso; hadduu xilkaa la ambadana wixii la sugaaba waa waxyeello iyo wax aan lagu farxin.
- ⁷ Siyaasaddu waa in danta guud laga shaqeeyo; waxaase abuurmay faham guracan oo loo qaatay in ‘siyaasaddu’ tahay khiyaamo, hagar daamo, shirqool, danaysi gaar ah... iyo wax kasta oo ka madhan wanaagga iyo qiyamka fiican. Meerisyadan ugu dambeeya 226-255, abwaanku wuxuu hoosta ka xariiqayaa in ‘siyaasaddaas guracan’ aan cidina meel ku gaadhayn.
- ⁸ Raggaa kaalintoodii dayacay, falaadxumo kalena ku darsaday, waxaa kale oo uu Hadraawi ku falanqeeyay maansooyin dhowr ah, waxaana ka mid ah maansada ‘Rag Siyaasi wada Noqoy’ ee uu tiriyay 14/3/1998.

Guur an ka La'aado



Xalwo Bulxan Cali

Tixdan

Tixdan 'guur an ka la'aado' waxaa tiriyay abwaanad Xalwo Bulxan Cali, Febraayo 2000; wuxuuna ku saabsan yahay sifooyinka xunxun ee ay tahay in ragga leh ay gabdhuhu ka digtoonaadaan guurkooda. Sifooyinkani waa kuwo dhantaalaya xilka iyo kaalinta aabbaha ama sayga laga sugayo.

Tixdani waxa uu daba socdaa laba gabay oo ay kala tiriyeen abwaan Aw Yuusuf-Barre, abaaro sannadkii 1922, iyo abwaan Cabdiqaadir Yamyam, sannadkii 1976. Labadan abwaan wiilasha guurdoonka ah ayay kala taliyeen gabdhaha ay tahay inay guursadaan. Abwaanad Xalwo, waxa ay dhamaystirtay dardaarankii, oo gabdhihii ayay, iyaduna, kala talisay wiilasha ay tahay inay guursadaan!

Maadaama aan la koobi karin, tilmaamaha wanaagsan, ee rag iyo dumarba; saddexda abwaan waxay doorbideen inay taxaan tilmaamaha xunxun ee ay tahay in laga digtoonaado. Dhinaca kale, saddexda gabayba waa waano ku socota guurdoonka, wiilal iyo gabdhaba, oo looga digayo dhaliilaha guurka seejin kara.

Tixdani waa 116 meeris, waxayna abwaanaddu baraarujinaysaa 24 sifo, oo ay tahay in ragga leh ay gabdhuhu guurkooda ka fiirsadaan!

1. Indhoweyd murtidii geyfanayd, waanigaan geline¹
2. Waa tii an gees maray naxwihii, Guulle ii qoraye
3. Maantana rag baa igu gujaye, ma anan goobeene
4. Ruuxna gaar umay laha murtidu, waa qofkii garane
5. Gabdhihii la caayee xumaha, gurada loo saaray
6. Haddii an gar eexaad la naqin, waa gef hadalkaase
7. Idinkuba wax baad galalaftaan, kala guraysaane
8. Maxaa libin ku-geeraarka iyo, guusha idin siiyay?
9. Guyaal iyo guyaal badan haddii, nalagu soo guuray
10. Goor iyo ayaamaba haddaan, ciil la galawlaynay
11. Caro gaamurtaan wada qabnaa, gebi ahaanteene
12. Gacan bidix ayaad nagu waddeen, tan iyo goortaase
13. Haddii ay gadoodaan habluhu, lama guhaadsheene
14. Gabayaa inay noo kaceen, geliya laabtiinna.
15. Aqoonyahanno gaamuroo murtida, kala gorfaynaaya
16. Inay maanta wada geyfanyiin, geliya laabtiinna.
17. Markiise an garaadsaday iyo haddooy, garashaday buuxdo
18. Raggu waxay abiid guranayeen, godob xumaataahe
19. Garaadli'i ma haysee gabdhaha, jaaniskaa gabaye
20. Guriga iyo intaan ubadka iyo, fool galgalanaynay
21. Nagu gaadde gabayada xunoo, gubaya jirkeenna
22. Gefkaad naga gasheen inuu ciqaab, idin geyaysiiyo
23. Rabbina idin gargaarinoo nabsigu, idinku soo guuro
24. Guyaal baan sugaynoo waqtigi, waa la soo galaye
25. Guryihiyo haddaad naga jafteen, ubad gardaadiinta
26. An googaalaysannee inan ragow, goobta noo fidiya
27. Guushuna kuway raacdo aan, wada guddoonsiinno!!
28. Afartaa gorfeeyaye mid kale, aan giraangiriyo
29. Geyriyo ufada soo dhacdiyo, yaare aan geliyo
30. Gucummaale aar iyo sidii, goosha an u riimo

31. An guulguulo afarrey-guntaha, guushu waa aniye
32. Goshana aan la baxo kaan naxwaha, garan ujeedkiisa
33. Xaajadana aan soo gudbiyo, waa gun weyn tahaye.
34. Aw Yuusuf gabayguu tirshiyo, gedihi uu sheegay²
35. Yamyamna uu ka gaaftee u yiri, guur an ka la'aado.³
36. Aniguba geddaas oo kalaan, qayb ka gaabsadaye
37. Nama wada geyaan nimanku oo, qaar ayaa gudhane
38. Kuwa gogosha aan loo dhigayn, goyn an ka higaadsho.⁴
39. Dabaguraha gooraha xun jecel, gabar ardaa jiifta
40. Gaatamaha tuugada u guda, goor dhexiyo leylka
41. Gaajoonahaas aan dhergayn, guur an ka la'aado.
42. Midka giniga haystee ku xira, jeebka gudihiiisa
43. Een garanin reerkaaga geli, Guulle wuxu siiyay
44. Intii aan galuubnaan lahaa, guur an ka la'aado.
45. Marti geyre dhaxanliyo ku timid, guure iyo dheelmad
46. Gogol kaan u soo qaadinoon, sooryo gelinaynin
47. Intii gacalku soo hiifi laa, guur an ka la'aado.
48. Midkaan geedka laga naadin oo, goobta laga sheegin
49. Oon tirada la soo gelin kolley, saami waa gabaye
50. Intuu aniga ii guuxi laa, guur an ka la'aado.
51. Midkaan ehelka garan oon wanaag, gacan u qaadaynin
52. Ilmadowda gaajoon midkaan, gelin qadaa siinnin
53. Intay guriga ii ooyi layd, guur an ka la'aado.
54. Midka gada dharkiisoo rahmada, waa gu' baaqsadaye
55. Intuu qaad ku soo gadan lahaa, go'a sariirtayda
56. Ima geyo nin qaawane midkaa, guur an ka la'aado.

57. Kaan garan salaaddiyo waqtiga, Guulle faral yeelay
58. Googoyska cibaadada gefaye, geesta uga leexday
59. Oon masaajid soo gelin waqiis, guur an ka la'aado.
60. Midka guurka diidoo macsida, abidki goobaaya
61. Een garan samaantee xumaha, daba guclaynaaya
62. Saaniga Ilaahay ka go'ay, guur an ka la'aado.
63. Midka Diinta garanaaya ee, gooyay dhaqankeeda
64. Shareecada midkaa garab maree, gaalo dabaraacay
65. Garaadxumaa u geysaye dulliga, guur an ka la'aado.
66. Caasi ganaya hooyadi intuu, gumuc u soo qaato
67. Ama cay ku gaacina hayoo, nabar ku guulaaya
68. Gayaan kuma habboonee midkaa, guur an ka la'aado.
69. Garruun xaasidnimo loo tabcoon, garasho hoos oollin
70. Gafuurjabin midkaa ila rabeen, gacalo ii haynin
71. Intuu ii la gaatami laa bud weyn, guur an ka la'aado.
72. Xilagube gasiin iyo an bixin, maro is gaarsiisan
73. Guudkana Islaam uga egoo, gogosha ii jiifa
74. Intii goor xun aan ooyi laa, guur an ka la'aado.
75. Guullihii abuurtiyo Nebiga, caydood kan u geyfan
76. Gaboodfalaha Diintii gudbaye, dhaar an kala goynin
77. Gaalkaas Ilaahay ka go'ay, guur an ka la'aado.
78. Gaarida wanaagga leh midkaan, garan abaalkeeda
79. Gafuur-buure aan ruuxna garan, wuxuu gollaynaayo
80. Gujeeyaha gunuusee guryama, guur an ka la'aado.
81. Kaan jikada gelaynoo ilmaha, gelinna haynaynin
82. Oo aan garawshiyo lahayn, saacidee gabadha

83. gacan kaan i siinayn bugtada, guur an ka la'aado.
84. Waalidkay midkaan gobonnimiyo, sharaf ka goobaynin
85. Guuleed walaalkay ninkaan, gaar u magacaabin
86. Ee xididka gooyee an rabin, guur an ka la'aado.
87. Gabagabo dagaal iyo markii, cadaw la guulaayo
88. Gantaalaha markii laysku ridee, geesi diriraayay
89. Giiryaalaha gadaashayda maray, guur an ka la'aado.
90. Midka Gaawadii oo dhashiyo, Goodir daba jooga
91. Galaxdeeda caanaha midkaan, goommanaha siinnin
92. Bakhayl gurigi looma soo hoydee, guur an ka la'aado.
93. Mooryaanka gaajoon oo waddada, tuugadaw gelaya
94. Googaradda dumarkiyo midkaan, garanna dhaafeynin
95. Jidgooyaha Islaamkii gambiyay, guur an ka la'aado.
96. Qabqablaha gumaadee shacbiga, dhiiggood gadanaaya
97. Dawlad gaamurtiyo kaan jeclayn, calan shangeesooda
98. Oo gaar keligi nolol u raba, guur an ka la'aado.
99. Balwad kay gagabisee fadhiya, cooshka laga guuray
100. Qaadkiyo garaabada midkaa, guranayee jiifa
101. Oo qiimihii nolosha gabay, guur an ka la'aado.
102. Hinaasaha guryama oo shakigu, gebigi buux dhaafshay
103. Gurigayga kii soo hormara, guullan ka-horgeyska
104. Guufanayska waardiyaha gala, guur an ka la'aado.
105. Guur badane gabadhuu arkaba, meher la gaadaaya
106. Xannaanada gurboodkana dayaca, gurina aan joogin
107. Gododlaha cidlada iiga guday, guur an ka la'aado.

108. Midka deriska guulguula ee, gawnaxyada buura
109. Intuu guriga joogana Cambaro, gaabsatee cararto
110. Xaawaleyda kaa gabawarana, guur an ka la'aado.

111. Allow deeqsi geesiya halyey, diinta garanaaya
112. Garaad badane gobannimiyo sharaf, looga gogol yeelay
113. Adaan gacanta kuu hoorsadee, calafku ii geeyo

114. Gabay kuma idlayn karo raggaan, gacalo loo hayne
115. Damiirkiisa-gade baa jiriyo, ceebta gurigeede
116. Dumarooow garwaaqsada raggii, laga gol roonaaye.

Tilmaamo

¹ Qaybtan, meerisyada 1-27, waa arar ah gabaykufaan iyo goodin uu weheliyo garnaqsi.

² Waa Yuusuf Maxamed Xirsi (Aw Yuusuf-Barre). Qiyaastii sannadkii 1922^{kii} ayuu tiriyay gabaygiisa 'guur an ka la'aado', oo abwaanku ku sheegay sifooyinka xunxun ee gabadhii leh ay tahay in guurkeeda laga fiirsado.

³ Waa abwaan Cabdiqaadir Xirsi Siyaad (Yamyam) (1945-2005), wuxuu isna tiriyay gabay la yiraahdo 'guur an ka la'aado' sannadkii 1976. Gabaygani wuxuu kaabayaa gabaygii Aw Yuusuf-Barre, isagoo ka duulaya waayaha cusub ee soo kordhay.

⁴ Meerisyada 39-110 abwaanaddu waxay ku tilmaantay 24 sifo xun oo ragga leh ay tahay gabdhuhu inayna u xiisin guurkooda. Dhinaca kalena, tani waxay baraarujin u tahay ragga, oo ay tahay inay iska ilaaliyaan sifooyinkan ay haweenku neceb yihiin!

Darajiyo Xil Yaa Mudan?



Cabdi Yuusuf Xasan “Cabdi-Dhuux”

Tixdan

Tixdan waxaa curiyay Cabdi Yuusuf Xasan, oo ku magac dheer “Cabdi-Dhuux”, Sannadkii 1997.

Tixdan waxay tilmaamaysaa hoggaanka ku habboon ummad ka soo kabanaysa colaado sokeeye; ha noqoto sifooyinka qofka hoggaamiyaha noqonaya looga baahan yahay ama waajibaadka iyo hawlaha hor yaal.

Abwaanku si farshaxannimo leh ayuu u taxay hawlaha hor yaalla cidda rabta inay daadihiso dabaadiga ka soo haray colaado sokeeye, oo ‘dulli iyo dhib’ ka saari kara. Sidaas darteedna, mudan darajo iyo xil.

Tixdani waa 60 meeris.oo jiipto ah, waxay ahayd hees ka mid riwaaad la oran jiray “darajiyo xil yaa mudan” oo Muqdisho lagu dhigay. Heestani waxay caan baxday sannadkii 2000, xilligii uu socday ‘Shirwaynaha Nabadaynta Soomaaliya’, magaalada Carta, Jabuuti.

1. Dal burburay dadkiisii
2. Debaadigii ka soo haray
3. Dulli iyo dhib kama baxo
4. Illaa dawlad caadila
5. Iyo qaran dib loo helo.
6. Doodi waxay ka joogtaa
7. Dadweynuhu isweydiin
- 8. Darajiyo xil yaa mudan?**
9. Bulsho daadahayn kara?
10. Dadka Soomaaliyeedow
11. Farriimaha durdura iyo
12. Su'aalaha is daba yaal
13. Dulucdiyo ujeeddada
14. Waa dood innoo furan!
15. Yaa colaadda damin kara?
16. Dabka yaa bakhtiin kara?
17. Yaa dooni kara nabad?
18. Dalka dibudhiskiisiyo
19. Dadka yaa wax tari kara?
20. Yaa qaranki shalay dumay
21. Darbiga u adkayn kara?
22. Ummadda yaysku duwi kara
23. Kala durugtay waayadan?
24. Dariiqyada agoontaa
25. Gaajadu ku dubatiyo
26. Curyaamiinta daawiyo
27. Yaa daryeel u fidin kara?
28. Waa dacar qabiilkuye
29. Yaa “diiday” oran kara?
30. Dadka yaa hor iman kara?
31. Hadal deeqa oran kara?

32. Kasban kara rag iyo dumar?
33. Oo xumo ka daahira?
34. Cadceed baa dul joogtoo
35. Dhidid baa ka da'ayoo
36. Diif baa ku raagtoo
37. Bulsho daalan weeyee
38. Durdurrada xareediyo
39. Yaa damalka gayn kara?
40. Dareenkii waddanigiyo
41. Yaan ka dhiman damiirkoo
42. Dhibaatadu damqaysaa?
43. Kuwaa daydaygaa iyo
44. Qaaddicu dariiqyada
45. Duruus yaa u dhigi kara?
46. Dawga toosan marin kara?
47. Hubka daadsha oran kara?
48. Dawladaha jaarkiyo
49. Lays kama durduriyee
50. Sumcad dunida yaa ku leh?
51. Dhan yaa ku leh dulqaad badan
52. Dhanna ku leh dadaal wacan
53. Dhanna daacadnimo sugan
54. Oo na daadahayn kara?
55. Waxaa duubka xiran kara
56. Oo doonta wada kari
57. Nin la doortay oo mudan!
58. Annaguna darajadaasaan
59. Duco iyo kalsooniba
60. Ugu sii daraynaa!!

— O —

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4. The manuscript must be written with Microsoft Word, font Times New Roman, 1.5 line-spacing, size 12 for Roman manuscripts, and size 14 for Arabic manuscripts. All manuscripts must be submitted electronically.
5. The manuscript should be in length of 10-20 pages, of A4 size, with an abstract of 150 to 250 words, and around 5 keywords.
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