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About this Journal

Somali Studies: A peer-reviewed academic journal for Somali studies is a broad scope multidisciplinary academic journal devotes to Somali studies; published annually by the Institute for Somali Studies in print and online forms. *Somali Studies* aims to promote a scholarly understanding of Somalia, the Horn of Africa and the Somali diaspora communities around the globe.

Somali Studies provides a forum for publication of academic articles in broad scope of areas and disciplines in Somali studies, particularly focused on the humanities and social science. *Somali Studies* appreciates papers exploring the historical background or navigating the contemporary issues; special consideration will be given to issues which are critical to the recovery and rebuilding of Somalia, a country emerging from a devastating civil war.

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Note on Contributors

Paul Antonopoulos is a Research Fellow at the Center for Syncretic Studies. He has an MA in International Relations from Western Sydney University. His primary research interests are Great Power Rivalry and multipolarity as well as the International Relations and Political Economy of the Middle East and Latin America.

Idil Osman holds a PhD from Cardiff University's School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies. Her research interests include diaspora, media, migration, Sub-Saharan conflicts and transnationalism. She is the author of newly published book, '*Media, Diaspora and the Somali Conflict*'; the peer reviewed article *The Somali Media, Diaspora Communities and the Concept of Conflict Re-creation* and is the co-author of '*Somalia to Europe; Stories of the Somali Diaspora*'. She has worked for over a decade as a national and international journalist for the BBC, the Guardian and the Voice of America. Previously a Teaching Fellow in Media and Communications at University of Leicester, she is now a Research Associate and Senior Teaching Fellow in the Department of Development Studies at SOAS.

Monsuru Adegboyega Kasali is currently a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Crescent University, Abeokuta, Nigeria. He is also a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Fribourg, Switzerland. He is a recipient of several awards in his career.

Abdiqani Yusuf Farah is a doctoral student at Saint Mary's University of Minnesota. He is the author of '*Minority Outcry for a Dialogue in Education.*' His current research agenda focuses specifically on educational leadership, charter schools, minority leadership competencies, special education, culturally responsive teaching, and minority education performances. Farah is also a member of Minnesota Community

Education Association (MCEA), a policy advocacy association. He could be reached at axfara16@smumn.edu.

Helmi Ben Meriem holds a PhD in Somali literature from the University of Sousse, Tunisia. He is a fiction writer and a researcher of Somali Anglophone literature. He has published several academic papers.

Cabdullaahi Sh. Cabdi Aadan [Abdullahi Sheikh Abdi Aden], aka **Gacanka [Ga`anka]**, is a literary scholar and educator. He is an expert in Somali literature and a member of Intergovernmental Academy of Somali Language, a regional regulating body for the Somali language in the Horn of Africa region. His area of interest is literary criticism.

Siciid Maxamed Cali [Si`id Mohamed Ali], aka **Xarawo [Harawo]**, is a veteran and prominent Somali musician, composer and lyricist. He is member of 'Hobollada Waaberi', a Somali musical troupe. This poem *'Gurayare Dameerkaygow'* got an award from BBC in 1990.

Editorial Note

Dear Colleagues and Readers,

We are pleased to present Volume 3 of *Somali Studies: A Peer-Reviewed Academic Journal for Somali Studies*. This volume contains a number of articles on various topics written by authors from different locations with different disciplinary affiliations.

The power rivalry is a growing phenomenon after the end of the unipolar world dominated by the United States. Global powers contest to assure its presence in the geostrategic locations, and Horn of Africa is one of these areas. China, an emerging global power, is seeking to increase its share in the Horn of Africa through a model of economic partnerships along with military presence. The first article, by Paul Antonopoulos, is exploring 'China in the Horn of Africa'.

Somali diaspora has formed effective media outlets/stations where media has interacted with the issues in the homeland which a Somali conflict is one of them. Dr. Idil Osman is an expert, who has conducted a study on the involvement of Somali diasporic media in the Somali conflict, has found that 'much of the day-to-day involvement leads to the re-creation of the conflict among the diaspora communities.' In this second article, she probes "structural factors in conflict-centred diasporic media operations that could lead to conflict re-creation".

The difficult conditions in Somalia in the late 1980s triggered waves of Somali migrants to the overseas mostly in Western countries. Canada was one of the leading destinations. The third article explores the economic integration of Somali migrants in Canada, particularly the Toronto city.

The Somali diaspora is making an integral progress in different areas and a new leadership is developing for them in their host countries. This is

crucial point for integrating and playing a positive role in their new destination, and addressing the unique problems of the Somali community in that particular country. All these depend on the capacity of the emerging leadership. The fourth article, *the Leadership Practice Inventory*, explores how Somali American leaders could be rated in terms of best leadership practices and behaviors.

Along with political and immigration issues, there are also two other articles focusing on Somali literature particularly short stories.

The first is an essay about three short stories written in English language, by Saida Herzi, which delve into the intricacies of several burning issues, and have one theme in common: the desire for positive change.

The other is a book review on a short story written in Somali language by young author in 2016 but attracted more readers as it has been printed three times within eighteen months only. Mr. Abdullahi aka *Gacanka*, an expert in Somali literature has made a book review on this short story.

The last item is a poem with the name of 'My Donkey' by the Somali lyricist Si`id Mohamed, aka Harawo. It is intended to document this solely work in Somali poets.

I sincerely thank our respected authors, our reviewers & the Editorial and Advisory Boards for their valuable contribution to achieve this success.

Mustafa Feiruz
Editor-in-Chief

China in the Horn of Africa:
Neo-Colonialism or Strategic Manoeuvrers
in the Era of Great Power Rivalry?

✍ Paul Antonopoulos

Abstract

With the end of the unipolar world, China's rise has seen it challenge Washington's hegemony in not only Asia-Pacific, but also Latin America and Africa. Nowhere stronger in Africa is this Great Power Rivalry than in the Horn of Africa. With energy interests, shipping lanes, business ventures and security concerns, the Horn of Africa has become polarised on the global stage because of China's economic penetration. This penetration has called to question whether Beijing is engaged in neo-colonialism in the region or making partnerships and strategic manoeuvres to outpace Washington in winning favour with Horn of African states. It appears that Beijing has outmanoeuvred Washington as states in the Horn of Africa respond to partnership initiatives by China rather than establishing a culture of aid dependency like the US has created. This model of engaging with developing states has won favour in the Horn of Africa.

Keywords: Horn of Africa, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, China, USA, Power Rivalry, Neo-colonialism.

Introduction

The Horn of Africa, for its strategic location, has traditionally always been a major point of contention and importance. Trade routes linking China and India with Egypt and Europe pass through the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea and onto the Suez Canal before finally reaching the Mediterranean Sea. The Horn of Africa refers to the peninsula strutting out in Northeast Africa and containing Somalia which lays on the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, Djibouti on the strategic maritime chokepoint known as Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Eritrea on the Red Sea, and Ethiopia which is entirely landlocked and reliant on its neighbours for sea access.

Following the Berlin conference of 1884-1885, Colonial Powers (Britain, Italy and France) divided up the Horn of Africa among themselves; France occupying French Somaliland now known as Djibouti; Britain taking the big portion of Somali Peninsula; and Italy took possession of Eritrea as well as Italian Somaliland which is now part of the Somali Republic, with the Italians making strong efforts to also fully subjugate Ethiopia (Yared, 2012). The major colonial powers were content with this division of the Horn of Africa as they all had access to the strategic maritime location. With the so-called end of colonialism in the post-World War Two period and the changing global order dominated by two great Super Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States (US), the Horn of Africa was a contested region between those great Super Powers (Yordanov, 2017). This global rivalry between the Soviet Union and the US ultimately spilled over into local rivalries and conflicts, and in the case of the Horn of Africa, this was primarily between Ethiopia and Somalia, but also involving Eritrea, where Washington and Moscow supported one state over another depending on the current situation.

The implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991 signalled what was meant to be an era of the New World Order as George Bush Senior termed it, where the US would dominate intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations and neoliberal institutions like the International Monetary Fund, and be the sole military and economic power of the world. This however has been challenged in the last decade by the rise of China. Coupled with a resurgent Russia, Washington's complete domination over the globe has been challenged.

Although continuously affected by conflict, drought and poverty, the strategic location of the volatile region of the Horn of Africa and its far reaching economic potential has made it a major point of Great Power projection and rivalry between the United States and China.

Academic publications have focused on the challenges and rivalry between Washington and Moscow in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Syria, and between Washington and Beijing in Asia-Pacific, however little scholarly attention has been placed on the immense power projections being made in the Horn of Africa between the US and China. China's newfound economic engagement with Africa has meant it is now challenging the United States on a new front outside of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as challenging the United Kingdom and France, former colonial masters of much of Africa.

A Chinese penetration into resource-rich Africa only means that Western hegemony and exploitation will be challenged. The Chinese model of engaging with the continent has meant that Africa is beginning to prefer to conduct business and receive investment opportunities from China, and shunning the neo-colonial demands made by the West (Quartey, 2013). However, for China to continue conducting business and invest in the continent, it needs to secure a

nexus of transportation in the Horn of Africa, as well as exploit the resources of the region.

The congested military bases of Djibouti, Somalia's decades long instability and untapped oil potential, Eritrea's self-imposed isolation but self-reliance, Ethiopia's reliance on Djibouti for sea access, and never ending internal and external conflicts within or between these states has further polarised the Horn of Africa at a microlevel in addition to the macrolevel between the Great Powers.

Great Power Rivalry in the 21st Century: Beijing's Challenge on Washington

The end of unipolarity was evident in 2008 when Russia defied the threat of war with US-led NATO when it met Georgia's aggression against South Ossetia and engaged in a successful conflict to defend its citizens (Bruno, 2008). This signalled that the dominance of the US and the set of enforced international rules and order that it imposed was being directly challenged. In this context, we can assign that this was the beginning of 21st Century Great Power Rivalry. This signals that an age of great-power competition and a changing global system has arrived where Russia and China are actively challenging Washington's primacy across the world and advancing a vision for a multipolar order that has a more balanced global economic and security system. However, Great Power Rivalry is not just reduced to the trilateral relations between Washington-Moscow-Beijing but also includes aspiring middle powers such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, India, and Pakistan among others.

All these states are engaged in a significant drive to dominate regional and/or global influence and primacy. On July 11, 2017, China officially began the first steps to establish its first overseas military

base in Djibouti (Woody, 2017). This would prove to be a peculiar choice when considering the vast distances between the Horn of Africa and China, but must be understood in the context of Great Power rivalry in the region.

Although referred to as a "military" base by international commentators, Xinhua, China's state-owned news agency, described the new settlement as a "*support base*" which "*will ensure China's performance of missions, such as escorting, peace-keeping, and humanitarian aid in Africa and west Asia*" (Xinhua, 2017).

In the early morning of July 11, 2017, China held an official ceremony in the port of Zhanjiang, south China's Guangdong province. The commander of China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Shen Jinlong, "*read an order on constructing the base in Djibouti, and conferred military flag on the fleets*," according to Xinhua (Ibid).

At the 12th Annual National People's Congress held in 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi explained that:

> *"Like any growing powers, China's interests are constantly expanding overseas. At present, there are 30,000 Chinese enterprises all over the world... An urgent task for China's diplomacy is to maintain the growing overseas interests. How to maintain? I would like to tell you clearly that China will never go through the expansion path of the traditional powers, nor will China pursue hegemony. We want to explore a path with Chinese characteristics that both follows the trend of the times and is welcomed by all parties" (Gao, 2017).*

It is this pursuit of ideological conviction with Chinese characteristics that has driven Beijing's domestic and foreign policy since the

establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. The statement by Yi inexplicitly states that "*China will never go through the expansion path of the traditional powers, nor will China pursue hegemony.*" Effectively China is emphasising to its international partners that it will not pursue a policy of military and economic domination as seen by Washington's pursuit for global hegemony. Whereas the United States has militarily intervened and destroyed Haiti, Yugoslavia and Iraq to name but a very few, or economically dominate the globe because of the US Dollar hegemony, China has engaged in its Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road, or better known as the One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) that seeks to economically develop all states involved in the initiative (Hancock, 2017).

The One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) aims to improve the connectivity of states to establish a China-centred trading network, thus improving China's standing in the world. This is a significantly different model of international trade to Washington's approach that has seen the deposition of non-compliant leaders who commit gross human rights violations without criticism because of their obedience to US demands.

The OBOR initiative is divided by two routes; a land overpass called the Silk Road Economic Belt that connects China to Europe through Central Asia; and the Maritime Silk Road connecting China to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa and onwards to Europe.

(Cai, 2017)

China is using OBOR to assert its new-found confidence into global leadership through significant economic integration. Its aim is to encourage development in China through better integration with international economies; upgrading Chinese industry while exporting Chinese standards; and addressing the problem of excess capacity. It is because of this ambitious effort to streamline China's economy to the global community that the Horn of Africa has been identified as a key region towards Beijing's business ventures into Africa and Europe with its maritime route. This however directly challenges hegemony on the continent as it is almost completely dominated by Western influence, particularly from the former colonial masters, the United Kingdom and France, as well as the US. Whereas the US has directly intervened in Somalia with its military and indirectly involved itself in the Ethiopian Civil War, China has not embroiled itself in any civil or foreign strife in the Horn of Africa (Crossley, Lees and Servos, 2013: 384).

The One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) exerts Beijing's influence across the globe through trade deals, infrastructure developments and business ventures. This is in stark contrast to Washington who still behaves in a unipolar manner by exerting its influence through military pressure, as seen with its backing of militant groups in Syria in the attempt to depose President Bashar al-Assad, threats of war with North Korea, and threats of using a military option to resolve the domestic crisis in Venezuela. The continuous military aggression by Washington has meant that much of the developing world is gravitating towards China as Beijing has proven in not only rhetoric, but also with action, that it is not intervening in a state's domestic affairs (Kuo, 2016). It is for this reason that much of Africa is increasing its economic and diplomatic relations with China.

The states constituting the Horn of Africa are no exception to these increasing relations between the continent and China, and therefore polarising the Great Power rivalry in this region is inevitable. Whereas the US has intervened in the Horn of African countries, particularly Somalia through military means since at least 1992; China has been engaged or shown interesting in the Horn of African countries through economic means. It is in this manner that China will surpass the US for global influence at some point in the 21st Century. As seen in the above map, Djibouti is highlighted as a key tenet to China's OBOR initiative, and it is in Djibouti that the Great Power rivalry between Washington and Beijing in the Horn of Africa may be played out.

An October 2016 Quartz publication presented data from Afrobarometer which revealed that 63% of the 56,000-people surveyed across 36 African countries responded that China's influence was positive (Wike, Stokes, Poushter, Fetterolf, 2017). This was mostly credited because of the Chinese investments in infrastructure, development and business. Meanwhile, although most Africans viewed the US favourably, there has

been a decline with each new poll conducted (Ibid). No research has been conducted yet to find whether this is a result of China's increasing favourable outlook on the continent.

China Enters the Horn of Africa

Most pivotal to influencing the Horn of Africa is the most stable state in the region, Djibouti. Although China has begun to significantly invest in Ethiopia, the full potential cannot be realised except with the security of a Chinese operated port in the region. The tiny Somali-majority state of Djibouti straddles at a strategic juncture in the Horn of Africa. It is for this reason that the US hosts its largest African military base in Djibouti, along with its key allies, France and Japan, and Saudi Arabia also having plans to do so (Antonopoulos, Villar, Cottle and Ahmed, 2017: 10). It is therefore not peculiar that China has decided to establish its first overseas military base in the tiny and congested state.

Xinhua reported that "*the base will ensure China's performance of missions, such as escorting, peace-keeping and humanitarian aid in Africa and West Asia*" (Xinhua, 2017). Effectively it is a means for China to project its influence into Africa and across the Indian Ocean. However, although Beijing justifies its first overseas military to "*ensure China's performance of missions, such as escorting, peace-keeping and humanitarian aid in Africa and West Asia*," it does not acknowledge the direct economic impacts it will have for China's significant investments in the region. Although the claim for the base is to help logistically support China's peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts are valid, the true intentions for the establishment of such a base is to help project and protect China's investments and business ventures in the region.

This is especially crucial as it is projected that by 2050 over 25% of the world's anticipated nine billion people will be African and mostly under

the age of 30, meaning that there will be an abundance of human capital and exploitation available on the continent (United Nations, 2015). China has recognised this eventuality and has committed $60 billion in new investment in major capital projects that will drive the local economic capacity (Jadesimi, 2017). The growing exchange between China and Africa will see the rapid improvement of the continent's industrialisation, agricultural modernisation, infrastructure, trade and investment facilitation.

Chinese lend billions to African nations

The Chinese government, banks and contractors lent more than $94 billion to African governments and state-owned enterprises from 2000 through 2015.

2013: **$16.7 billion**

$15 billion

10

5 2000:
$121 million

0

'00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14 '15

Source: Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative   @latimesgraphics

The above infographic demonstrates China's $94 billion in a 15-year time period in Africa. Therefore, the recent $60 billion pledge is an important indicator of China's new resolve to become the dominant foreign economic force on the continent. Although China would often give easy repayable loans allowing African states to build bridges and stadiums in return for Chinese access to Africa's vast natural resources, Beijing has now become more ambitious with hordes of Chinese tourists, peacekeepers, soldiers and merchants making their way to the continent.

Mekonnen Getachew, a project manager at the Ethiopian Railways Corp., stated that "*China doesn't give simple aid, they do give loans.*

You work, and you return back. That is a good policy. Aid is just making slavery" (Kaiman, 2017). This was a direct statement against Western policies, including US policies, to simply just throw conditional aid money at the continent. Promises of aid money to poverty-stricken African states allow the US to keep them within their orbit of influence. In support, Reuben Brigety, dean at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs and a former U.S. ambassador to the African Union, stated that "*Americans still see Africa as a place where there are a lot of presidents for life, wars and famines. They don't understand what's happening on the continent economically and demographically*" (Ibid). This is in stark contrast to Chinese investment which is seen favourably.

In the case of Ethiopia, China's infrastructural developments are pivotal to lifting the country out of its reputation of being crippled by drought, poverty, famine and war. Most significant is the development of a railway line to connect the country that has been landlocked since Eritrea's breakaway in 1991. Because of its landlocked position, Ethiopia currently relies on Djibouti for 90% of its foreign trade with billions of dollars of imports and exports traversing the two countries by a three-to-four-day truck journey (Djibouti Embassy U.S., 2017).

However, Chinese firms have built Africa's first electrified cross-border rail system in Africa between Ethiopia and Djibouti. The 750-kilometre long railway line came at the price of $4 billion, however, as Getachew stated: "*The rail will make every economic activity easier. Our economy will boom.… This railway is making Ethiopia great again!*" (Kaiman, 2017). He then went onto express his hope and vision that "*by 2020, Ethiopia's economy will be among the world's mid-level economies*" (Ibid).

ETHIOPIA-DJIBOUTI RAILWAY

According to the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC), there have been 279 Chinese companies with more than $571 million worth of investment in the country (Xinhua, 2017). Such projects have stimulated Ethiopia's economy and have created more than 28,300 jobs in Ethiopia between January 2012 and January 2017 (Ibid). Trade between Ethiopia and China grew by 22.2% annually over the last several years with the Asian country becoming Ethiopia's largest trading partner (All Africa, 2017).

Chinese penetration into the Horn of Africa has not been limited to just its port development in Djibouti and railway construction in Ethiopia, but China has also shown interest in Somalia, where the pivotal and strategic state envisages that it can have a rapid post-war development with China playing a key role. Somali State Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Abdulkadir Ahmedkheyr Abdi said in an interview with Xinhua that China has historically assisted in the development of Benadir Hospital (1977), the National Theatre (1967) and the Mogadishu Stadium (1978), and highlighted that Somalia was the first country in East Africa to establish diplomatic ties with China

(Xinhua, 2017). In the same interview, Abdi praised China's past projects in Somalia and expressed his hope that ties can be further strengthened once the conditions in the war-ravaged state becomes further stabilised. On his part, Qin Jian, Chinese Ambassador to Somalia, stated that China was committed to helping Somalia reconstruct its economic and political pillars destroyed during the civil war (Ibid).

It is evident that the states in the Horn of Africa view China as being a necessary and productive partner for the development of the region. A strong corridor between Djibouti port and Addis Ababa will rapidly increase trade and development, as will China's post-war development of Somalia.

Although China is not as heavily involved in Eritrea as it is in Djibouti or Ethiopia, China has presented itself as a mediator in the ongoing border friction between Djibouti and Eritrea (Sputnik, 2017). With Qatar's withdrawal, as a peacekeeping force over the contentious Doumeira Mountain and Doumeira Island because of its diplomatic row with fellow Gulf States, China has offered itself to maintain peace in the contended areas (South China Morning Post, 2017).

Zhang Hongming, an African studies expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, believes that China's peacekeeping initiative in the contested region is only a means to protect its own interests, stating that "*Wherever Chinese interests go, means and tools to protect them should follow*" (Asia Maritime Review, 2017). This is however contradicted by a former Chinese ambassador to Eritrea, who claimed that China's intentions to mediate the border issue between Djibouti and Eritrea was in no way connected to its Djibouti military base. "*The disputes over Doumeira Mountain have been recurring, and China has been mediating in it for long time, mostly through the mechanism of the*

African Union. I don't see much difference this time." Shu Zhan, former ambassador to Eritrea, said (South China Morning Post, 2017).

Chinese Interests are a Case of Neo-Colonialism?

Western critics have questioned whether China's expansive investments, developments and peacekeeping initiatives in the Horn of Africa are a case of neo-Colonialism. Shu however stated that "*China would not do anything that is like a colonialist*" (Ibid). The entirety of Africa experienced decades of harsh imperialist and colonial rule by Western major powers that set the continent back in terms of development despite being an extremely resource rich continent. The Horn of Africa experienced brutal colonialism from the British, French and Italians for huge portions of the 19th and 20th centuries.

In this manner, China too has experienced the horrors of colonialism and imperialism in the same period that the Horn of Africa did. Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, and to a lesser extent the US, forced China into trade and territorial concessions that would have lasting impacts on the development of the country. Ingrained in the Chinese memory is the horrors of the Opium Wars that could not prevent Britain flooding China with the highly addictive drug, as well as Japanese atrocities in northeast China, known as the Rape of Nanking, where Imperial Japanese Army killed over 300,000 Chinese people and engaged in a program of mass rape and looting at the prelude of World War Two (Perkins, 1999: 339). The Chinese experience of colonialism and imperialism has influenced its foreign policy since the establishment of the People's Republic of China and has meant that China has always been wary not to become a coloniser or imperialist themselves as they begin to rise as a major world power in the era of multipolarity. To emphasise this point, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi, insisted in a 2015 tour of Kenya, that "*[China] absolutely will not*

take the old path of Western colonists, and we absolutely will not sacrifice Africa's ecological environment and long-term interests" (Manero, 2017).

Although Western powers claim to assist Africa in humanitarian and development efforts, which have totalled to over $300 billion since 1970, the assistance is often conditional and renders African states to become dependent on aid (Moyo, 2009). Therefore, China's "*no-strings attached*" policy in investment and development with African states has become highly desirable. Dirk Willem de Vilde, a Senior Research Fellow and head of International Economic Development at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), said that "*on all the infrastructure indicators, African countries are way behind compared to other countries. There is a huge infrastructure gap that is holding back development in many African countries at the moment*" (Harvard Political Review, 2017). Whereas Western powers have failed to develop the Horn of Africa, especially Somalia, China has been rapidly building ports, railway lines, schools and hospitals, shortening the gap that de Vilde highlights. He believes that China is not engaging in neo-colonialism and states that "*There is mutual interest… If there are good policies and institutions in place, [African countries] can use the investment well to grow their economies*" (Ibid).

Critics highlight that many of the infrastructure programs funded by China are usually done by Chinese labour, which limits opportunity for local companies and workers to gain experience and capital (China Africa Research, 2017). Although a fair criticism, it overlooks the brain drain that often occurs in the Horn of Africa as many of the brightest people leave to work in European, North American or the Arab Gulf countries, and therefore, to have the development projects completed in a timely manner, Chinese workers are needed to fill the gap in local knowledge (Raviv, 2014). This does not negate, however, that there are

local concerns of bringing low or unskilled Chinese workers to Africa instead of hiring local African workers.

Although China is undoubtedly reaping the benefits of investing in the Horn of Africa, unlike with Western investment, the relationship between Beijing and the region is a duality. Whereas Western ambitions are to protect capitalist corporate interests in extracting African resources and exploit cheap labour, China's interests are to implement the Chinese economic and development model that saw the country that was once as underdeveloped and poor as the Horn of Africa, to become a major world player that has reduced poverty. China in 1990 had an extreme poverty level of 40% that was reduced to 7% in 2012 (Phelps and Crabtree, 2013). Whereas the West exacerbated poverty in the Horn of Africa because of colonialism and the implementation of aid dependency, China has experienced the full effects of poverty and colonialism, but has in a short period of time lifted the majority of its people out of the cycle of poverty.

Beijing therefore has genuine interests in the Horn of Africa with developing the region out of poverty and to become partner states, rather than subordinate states, that could have aid money from the West dropped at any given moment. With Western aid money often going through bureaucratic hands and only trickles of the money reaching development and infrastructural projects, Chinese aid is often real with the evidence seen in the rapid construction of projects like schools, hospitals and stadiums. This is part of Beijing's foreign policy as it continues to grow in the age of multipolarity. In 2014, South Africa denied entry to the Dalai Lama knowing that it could enrage China, whilst in early 2016 Kenya deported 50 Taiwanese nationals to China (Oneko and Sandner, 2016). What these examples suggest is that with continued Chinese investment in the region, it will likely gain international allies in Addis Ababa, Djibouti City and Mogadishu.

Yong Deng, an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, stated that, "*China feels that it is entitled to a Great Power status, so maintaining that in a global world order is always a long-term foreign policy goal. In terms of great power rise… Africa carries an enormous amount of diplomatic weight in [shifting] China's diplomatic and political influence away from U.S., Western dominated world order*" (Harvard Political Review, 2017). With China demonstrating real and honest development, it is inevitable that states in the Horn of Africa will continue to gravitate towards China, looking at its success in poverty reduction and maintaining its *'no-strings attached'* policy.

Why is the Horn of Africa Strategically Pivotal?

The strategic maritime route connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the Indian Ocean comes to a chokehold at Bab el-Mandeb Strait, in-between Djibouti and Yemen. In 2012, over 20,000 ships accounting for 20% of global yearly exports passes through Bab el-Mandeb Strait, with this figure set to rapidly increase as China's rise means its further economic engagement with Africa and Europe (Antonopoulos, Villar, Cottle and Ahmed, 2017: 10). In 2012, China engaged with $1 billion worth of daily trade with the European Union, demonstrating the importance of this strait and offers a reason as to why China built its first overseas military base in Djibouti (Ibid). Although Yemen can offer a base on this strategic chokehold, it has been ravaged by a war since March 2015.

Meanwhile, for the US, its 4000-military personnel strong Camp Lemonnier base in Djibouti serves as Washington's main point of operations for its *'War on Terror'* in the Horn of Africa and Yemen (Wyscaver, 2017). Djibouti's stable conditions is in far contrast to conflict-prone Somalia where US concerns are mostly in stemming

terrorism in the region. Somalia as a hub for Al-Shabaab and ISIS is the primary focus for Washington's 'War on Terror' in the region. Whereas China is mostly motivated by economic opportunity in the region, the US is supposedly mostly motivated by so-called security concerns, which could then allow it to exploit natural resources in the region.

Therefore, the primary Great Power concerns in the region revolves around investment opportunity in the case of China, security concerns for the US, and natural resource exploitation for both. It is believed that Somalia has untapped reserves of oil and numerous natural resources, including uranium, iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper, salt and natural gas (The World Fact Book, 2017). Because of this vast amount of unexploited natural resources in Somalia, the Central Bank of Somalia believes that as the country undergoes reconstruction, not only will Somalia's economy reach pre-civil war levels, but accelerate and grow beyond those highs (Central Bank of Somalia, 2017). With China making a serious developmental effort in Somalia, it is only expected that they will be favoured for energy contracts over their US rivals. Whether tankers would leave from Djibouti city or China will develop a port in Somalia remains to be seen.

Ethiopia, dubbed as Africa's China, hosts the seat of the African Union and is the source of the Blue Nile, one of the two major tributaries of the Nile River that provides water to Egypt. Rather, what Ethiopia provides is a stringboard for China to continue projecting its influence across Africa. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa when completed, is one such example. The massive hydropower station at the headwaters of the Blue Nile River was difficult to get off the ground as the World Bank and other international financial organisations had no interest in funding the project because of Egyptian threats of using military action if any diversion of Nile water occurred. Chinese companies were more than

happy to take on the project that will ultimately be a source of energy in not only Ethiopia, but also neighbouring countries including Eritrea, Djibouti and South Sudan. Ultimately, by creating a source of energy for South Sudan, it is expected that Chinese firms will have priority to tap into the country's vast oil reserves. Such is the level of influence Beijing has in Ethiopia, that Girma Biru, Ethiopia's Minister of Trade, stated that "*China has become our most reliable partner and there is a lot we can learn from Beijing, not just in economics but politics as well*" (Zhu. 2010: 33).

However, with China's strong relations with Ethiopia, how does it affect its engagement with Eritrea? Eritrea achieved its independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and has never had healthy relations with its neighbour, especially since the independence of Eritrea marked Ethiopia's descent into becoming a landlocked state. Qiu Xuejun, China's Ambassador to Eritrea, revealed that "*China is Eritrea's largest trading partner and the two countries have fruitful cooperation in the areas of agriculture, mining, infrastructure construction, culture, education, health and people to people exchanges*" (Xuejun, 2015) This demonstrates that despite China's strong relations with Ethiopia, it has not hampered its engagement with Eritrea at all.

The Eritrea National Mining Corporation reported that the country is rich with gold, copper, potash, zinc, oil, natural gas, cement, gypsum, granite, marble, ceramics, limestone and iron ore, demonstrating why this state is pivotal to the Great Powers (Anderson, 2015). However, as China embarks on projects to exploit the vast natural resources of Eritrea, the US is lagging behind in comparison to Beijing's efforts and still has sanctions imposed on the country (Bureau of African Affairs, 2016).

US-Eritrean relations are not strong, especially since the UN imposed sanctions in 2009 and again in 2013 on the impoverished country (United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, 2013). Given that Washington's main priority in the Horn of Africa is to supposedly curb terrorism, it is peculiar that the US refuses to engage with Asmara on issues of security given Eritrea's strategic location bordering Sudan and opposite Yemen. Rather, the mostly isolationist policy by decisionmakers in Asmara has meant that the country does not fall into the orbit of the American Empire, making Eritrea a target of US-imposed sanctions. This explains Eritrea's gravitation towards China given that Beijing is willing to engage with any country in Africa without interfering in their domestic issues.

Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council's Africa Center, Bronwyn Bruton, wrote in a report that:

> "*the United States could find itself facing instability and perhaps a terror threat on both sides of the [Bab el-]Mandeb Strait, which is a critical chokepoint for the $700 billion … of trade passing annually between the European Union (EU) and Asia. Threats to this trade route have in recent years led the United States to pour millions of dollars into combating Somali piracy – an indication of the Strait's importance to U.S. interests*" (Birku, 2016).

He then also highlights the potential ally that Eritrea could be as the country has "*repelled jihadists and proven immune to radical ideologies*" (Ibid). The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia has identified the strategic location of Eritrea and has made it the centre to its operations in the Red Sea Basin (Fitzgerald, 2015). In addition, Australian, Canadian and Chinese firms have made inroads to exploit the natural resources of the country (Jamasmie, 2013). With the

imposition of US-led UN sanctions on Eritrea, any opening of the country will mean that Washington will have little to no access.

Kaplan, a lecturer in African Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, states that if Washington's "*primary goal in that part of the world is simply to reduce the threat from terrorism and to defang as much as possible terrorist groups and possibly, to the extent that it's possible, to end the conflict in Yemen, certainly we would want better relations with Eritrea*" (Lavinder, 2017).

However, policymakers in Washington are yet to fully accept that the era of unipolarity has ended, and that states who do not fall into the orbit of US influence can still have impressive economic development and fruitful relations with other Great Powers, such as China and Russia. Although US-imposed sanctions can affect an economy, it can no longer fully cripple a state if strong relations are had with Beijing and/or Moscow.

Kaplan goes onto question that: "*the fact that fighting terrorism, fighting Islamic terrorist groups, might turn out to be by far the most important goal for the new [US] administration, you would think that Eritrea would be not a highly prioritised but still important partner, given its geopolitical location…*" (Ibid). Effectively, China is proving victorious in the Great Power rivalry in Eritrea as it has substantive relations with Asmara while Washington is failing to subdue the country with sanctions.

Conclusion

The main advantage China has with its relationship with the Horn of Africa compared to the West is that the leadership in Beijing views

their relationship as a North-South prism while emphasising that developing states need to coordinate against the industrialised West. An excerpt from the New Republic said "*China is ready to coordinate its positions with African countries… with a view to safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries*", while Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said during a 2003 speech in Ethiopia that "*China is ready to coordinate its positions with African countries... with a view to safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries*" (Navarro, 2007: 96).

It is through this approach by China that it is outweighing the US in this region. As former US Ambassador to Ethiopia, David Shinn, noted in April 2015:

> "*Chinese influence in Ethiopia today is equal to or rivals that of any other country, including the United States. The leadership of the ruling EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) certainly gives the impression that it is more comfortable with the style and leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) than with the leadership and ruling parties of Western countries, including the US. […] Ethiopia has joined other African countries in stopping resolutions in the UN Human Rights Commission that censor China's human rights practices. Former prime minster [sic] Meles Zenawi stated emphatically that Tibet is internal affair and outsiders have no right to interfere*" (Draitser, 2016).

Rather, what this demonstrates is that elements in the US recognise that Beijing is making far greater inroads in the Horn of Africa. Whereas the US created a culture of aid dependency in the Horn of Africa, establishing a relationship of paternalism rather than partnership,

China's approach has been significantly different with Beijing preferring to develop states rather than trap them into submission.

This model implemented by China has seen it edge out the US in Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and with the same model being applied across the continent, in the medium term we will see economic and development change in Africa. The Chinese experience of colonialism and imperialism gives it an advantage over Western Powers who were the colonisers and imperialists in Africa. This Chinese approach will see its influence begin to penetrate other 'traditional' spheres for the West, such as Latin America, where it already is building strong relations with states such as Venezuela and Bolivia. However, in the Horn of Africa, we will see the restive region begin to rapidly develop and stabilise because of China's economic help.

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Diaspora Journalism and the Somali Conflict

Idil Osman

Abstract

Since its invention, journalism has been required to do at least three things at the same time as outlined by McNair (2005). These are the provision of information required for people to monitor their social environments, a resource for the participation in public life and political debate (what Habermas has called the 'public sphere') and a medium of education, enlightenment and entertainment. In conflict societies, however, these principles have been internalised and interpreted through a conflict lens creating a very complex web of media operations that produce contested representations. This article focuses on one such conflict that exemplifies this complexity; the Somali conflict. It concentrates on the Somali media produced by diaspora journalists and showcases the pressures that drive their selection processes and editing methods, processes and methods that transnationalise and re-create the conflict amongst Somali communities (Osman 2017). The findings analysed in this article are derived from interviews that have been conducted with diaspora-based Somali journalists and producers. The article illuminates the driving forces behind the darker roles that diasporic media can play in the continuation of an ongoing conflict.

Keywords: Journalism, Somali diaspora, conflict,

Introduction

Diasporas have existed in one form or another since ancient times but there are reasons to believe that the political weight of diaspora communities has increased importantly throughout the late twentieth century (Demmers 2002). They play a crucial role in contemporary conflicts due to 'the rise of a new pattern of conflict, the rapid rise of war refugees, the increased speed of communication and mobility and the increased production of cultural and political boundaries' (Demmers 2002: 86).

In the context of conflicts of the 21st century, which are no longer fought or confined within the territorial borders they escalated from, conflicts are becoming dispersed and delocalised (Demmers 2002:85). Examples of the Tamil Tigers in London helping their counterparts in Sri Lanka, American Jewish groups supporting right-wing extremists in Israel, and German Croats supporting the collapse of Yugoslavia are representative of such conflicts and communication technologies have played a role in all these instances (Demmers 2002). The influence of these diaspora communities is often manifold and can take different political forms.

The Somali diaspora maintain links with family members back home primarily through economic support, but they are also active in the general reconstruction of the country. They make a major contribution to the Somali economy, sustaining livelihoods through remittances, humanitarian assistance and participation in recovery and reconstruction efforts (Menkhaus 2009). It is commonly acknowledged that the most successful migrant businesses arise in the crevices created by transnationalism - for example, shipping and cargo companies, import and export firms and labour contractors (Glick, Schiller et al. 1995. The Somali diaspora has utilised the improvements in

communication technology as the Internet in particular 'presented an opportunity for them to communicate, regroup, share views, help their groups at home and organise activities' (Issa-Salwe 2011: 54). But whilst these products of transnational media dissolve distance and suspend time, they create new and unpredictable forms of connection, identification and cultural affinity. The internet is also an opportunity to promote political identity and particular points of view through a new medium. The Somali websites that have sprung up in various parts of the world depict a deeply divided society, one that is at the same time both integrated and fragmented (Issa-Salwe 2011). As Lyons (2004) points out, conflict-generated diaspora groups are social networks that link past conflict, the contemporary challenges of living in a host state and an aspiration of return to a particular piece of territory that is the symbolically important homeland. He relates the advantages that cheap Internet communication and inexpensive telephone calls have for diaspora members.

Consequently, we witnessed a proliferation of Somali diasporic media (*hiiraan.com* in US, *somalitalk.com* in the US, *universalsomalitv.com* in UK and *oodweynenews.com* in Norway are some of the popular ones) particularly in the last decade, to meet the need of the Somali diaspora to obtain news from their homeland. Accompanying this phenomenon was a growth in the number of Somali journalists based in the diaspora, especially concentrated in the US, UK and Northern Europe. These journalists maintain close personal and professional relationships with Somalia and by extension with the Somali conflict, which is often of complex and multi-dimensional nature. This article is based on interviews conducted, as part of the author's PhD thesis which examined diasporic media involvement in the Somali conflict, between 2013-2014 with the journalists and producers to unpack and understand something of this complexity. The narratives of these interviews have

also been published as part of a book based on the author's PhD thesis titled 'Media, Diaspora and the Somali Conflict', published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2017.

There is a need for broader studies that examine the structures of operation, technological and ideological factors and a deeper look into the transnational milieu within which these journalists and producers work. What this article hopes to achieve, by identifying some of the issues concerning the role(s) diaspora-based Somali journalists play in the Somali conflict, is to spark interest and offset studies that can delve deeper into this under-researched yet topical subject.

Conflict and the mediated operations that re-create it

Diasporic media is often defined as the media produced by and for those of migrant backgrounds that live outside the borders of their homelands (Ogunyemi 2015). Their content focuses on matters that are of specific interest to diaspora communities. Current academic discourse regarding diasporic media often centres around its capabilities to help immigrants preserve their identities and maintain ties with their homeland. It is considered to be responding to the specific needs and conditions of immigrant communities as well as allowing a transnational bond to be created with countries of origin and therefore sustain ethnic, national and religious identities and cultures (Aksoy and Robins 2003: 93). While these notions hold much truth, diasporic media is doing more than that. They enact and perform conflict dynamics, actively shaping the constitutive nature of the conflict. It is these areas that require more academic attention to advance our understanding of the multifaceted role(s) diasporic media can play.

In the Somali case, this usually means news stories that deal with the on-going Somali conflict and the rebuilding of a collapsed nation. The Somali diaspora has established diasporic media to remain connected to their homeland as they still have meaningful ties there. They are particularly well positioned to engage with homeland activities. Since fleeing from civil war in the late 1980s and later on, the Somali diaspora has integrated into the West, used the opportunities of better infrastructure and technologies presented by the new environments and thereby attained resources vital to remaining connected to their homeland. In this, they have become part of what Appadurai refers to as the 'emerging new global cultural ecumene' (Appadurai 1990: 5). Somali diasporic media is often used and remediated by the domestic media in Somalia. This means that domestic Somali media can act as an echo chamber for views that originate from outside the country. It also warrants diasporic media a certain level of influence and allows them to occupy a hegemonic position within the Somali media landscape (Gaas, Hansen and Berry 2012: 6). To study their involvement in homelands in conflict is therefore an important part of understanding the multifaceted transnational roles that diasporic media can play.

The study that this article is informed by, which is an extensive examination of Somali diasporic media involvement in the Somali conflict (Osman 2015), has found that although there is a lot of mediated effort to provide platforms for developmental and humanitarian progress, much of the day-to-day involvement leads to the re-creation of the conflict among the diaspora communities.

Conflict re-creation becomes a possibility when the sentiments and dynamics forming the root causes of the conflict are reproduced through the media. The Somali conflict is, broadly speaking, rooted in poverty and unequal access to resources, clannism and external

interventions. When the media re-enacts the silencing of the poor and marginalised sections of society, it reinforces the injustices already established by the conflict. Equally, when media platforms reproduce existing clan tensions and alliances, they can encourage relationships of conflict-centred connections and disconnections leading to clannism practices that have been part of the Somali conflict's root causes. The mediated operationalisation of conflict root causes that encourage the enactment of existing conflict dynamics can also lead to the conflict being re-created through the media.

The collapse of the state fractured Somali society. In their place came factionalised entities and conflicts based on traditional clan alliances. The conflict perpetuated existing social inequalities and unequally shared resources. It also drew a foray of international actors, each with vested interests, engaging and intervening in multifaceted ways, including western-centric approaches that were often incompatible with existing local politics, social norms and cultures. These various groups have engaged diasporic media to further their political ambitions, clan interests and ideological causes. The diaspora communities are therefore not only receiving information on progress and happenings in their homeland; they are also invited to engage with the dynamics of the conflict. Between 1989 and 2004, 94% of worldwide violent conflicts revolved around inter-group or group-state disputes (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005). As identity groups are at the core of most contemporary conflicts (Demmers 2007), analysing how diaspora groups are invited to participate in conflicts through diasporic media is especially important in modern times.

Diaspora-based journalists are an important component of how diasporic media re-creates the conflict. They reap the advantages of living in a safe and secure environment without fear of being killed or

persecuted as well as benefiting from advanced technological infrastructures (Osman 2015). There appear to be (at least) four structural factors in conflict-centred diasporic media operations that could lead to conflict re-creation:

1. Ownership privilege
2. Poor levels of accountability
3. Conflict-embroiled elites as primary definers
4. Economic advantages of war reporting

Ownership privilege

Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (1988) illustrated the penetrative role of owners in their propaganda model and highlighted how corporate values and central aims of owners are imbedded within the professional decision-making processes. This can also be found in the Somali media. The Somali journalists interviewed for this study have raised concerns about owners' input on editorial content and story selection, especially as it relates to owners giving priority to clan-centred and political stories. One journalist, who works for a London-based Somali media outlet, explained the financial benefit behind the prioritising of these kinds of stories:

> *"The importance of news items is determined by the owner. News is important if he states it is important. This means news items that relate to the selection or crowning of a new clan elder, stories covering a clan event or a particular business and political events like a politician hosting a meeting or an event get selected. These stories generate financial income as those that are being covered are willing to pay so we don't bother with background checks and balance."* – London-based Somali journalist

The financial lure of these types of stories has also trickled down to the journalists based inside Somalia, which adds to the volume of news reports diaspora journalists receive, creating a daily newsreel that is often dominated by political stories.

The involvement of owners in story selection seems to be a professional burden for some of the journalists who wish to focus on covering stories that serve public interests. One of them, who works for a media outlet in Birmingham, related the difficulty that journalists face every working day with regards to balancing owners' priorities and their own sense of duty:

> *"The conflict between owners and us is an ongoing battle and this is intensified when the owner does not come from a media background or doesn't have an understanding of how journalism works. My sense of duty regularly clashes with the owner's demands because he wants to make editorial judgements that serve political elites rather than the interests of our listeners. He also employs whoever he wants without them being qualified to do the jobs they're being hired for, which creates clashes between colleagues as well."* – Birmingham-based Somali journalist.

Owners giving editorial salience to news stories paid for by political elites are problematic on many fronts but there are two that are particularly troubling in relation to our discussion on conflict re-creation:

1. The political elite in Somali affairs are those that are in some form involved in the current conflict
2. Prioritising their news ensures their power to shape the narrative and direction of the Somali conflict

News selection based on representing the political players that have paid the most produces a hierarchy of representative power, one based on the players with the most capital having the biggest voice. In the context of Somali affairs this often translates into the dominant clans being the most represented. This re-creates the existing marginalisation of less powerful clans and re-ignites antagonism between clans on media platforms (Osman 2015).

Poor levels of accountability

As the conflict coincided with improved communication technology, the appetite for war reporting has become insatiable. Lasswell noted in 1927 how one British observer commented after the First World War that 'war not only creates a supply of news but a demand for it' (Lasswell 1927: 192). Mass media affords the public a more widely accessible way of witnessing conflict. What has come forth in the interviews is that this mass access to the public is enjoyed with an almost non-existent sense of accountability on the part of the journalists. This is interesting, as many of them would take a critical approach with regards to how their owners operate but seems to be less inclined to take a similar approach towards themselves.

They see it as an opportunity that brings them deeper levels of freedom in comparison to pre-civil war media reporting. This kind of reporting seems to be exercised especially when feelings of non-representation at government level start to surface as one Birmingham-based producer explains:

> *"I don't like how my people aren't represented in the Somali government. I hardly see anyone that I can relate to. So I have no problems highlighting their problems. I feel pressure from my*

> *clansmen too to underline that we aren't represented which drives the way I do some of the reports."* – Birmingham-based producer

In addition to the lack of representation, poor levels of accountability seem to also be fed by financial uncertainty. Many journalists have related how they are not guaranteed sufficient salaries from their employers and often have to find ways to mitigate insufficient income, which may loosen their approach towards ethical reporting.

The issue of accountability in the context of diaspora-based Somali journalists, as can be seen, is a complex matter that shows the clan-based survival mechanisms journalists have developed to cover the news of a conflict-ridden homeland. But we also see the fragility of those mechanisms when one comes from clans that fall outside of the power bloc. We see how journalists and owners sometimes exercise the same logic to seek financial income. What these instances all have in common is how journalistic accountability can be pushed to the side to accommodate for working and surviving in a conflict-centred media environment.

Conflict-embroiled elites as primary definers

Hall et al (1978) highlighted the importance of how professional rules give rise to the practice of ensuring that the media is grounded in objective reporting and, where possible, authoritative statements are obtained from accredited sources. This culture sets a precedence of constantly turning to representatives of major social and political institutions because of the authority and institutional power their position grants them. The late Stuart Hall and his colleagues point out the irony of these very rules, which aim to preserve the impartiality of the media, and which grew out of desires for greater professional neutrality. In practice, these rules serve powerfully to orientate the

media in the 'definitions of social reality', which their 'accredited sources' – the institutional spokesmen – provide (Hall et al 1978: 57). The practical pressure of working against the clock and the professional demands of impartiality and objectivity combine to create a systematically structured over-accessing granted to those in power and elite positions, thereby reproducing symbolically the existing structure of power in society's institutional order. The result of this structured preference given in the media to the opinions of the powerful is that these 'spokesmen' become the primary definers of topics (Hall et al 1978: 58). Lance Bennet (1990) builds on this premise and illustrates how mass media news professionals tend to "index" the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic (Bennett 1990: 106).

This working hypothesis implies that "other" (i.e., non-official) voices filling out the potential universe of news sources are included in news stories and editorials when those voices express opinions already emerging in official circles. Thus, the media becomes what Bennett refers to as 'keepers of official records'. In the context of Somalia, although there is growing evidence of non-powerful groups and individuals finding alternative ways to get their voices heard, it is more common to find both Hall and Bennett's hypotheses unfolding in the form of prominent members of the international community, major clans and central and regional administrations being the primary sources that shape Somali news. Journalists interviewed for this study explained how events related to those primary sources are also headline news. Here is an account from one journalist/producer who works for a media outlet in London:

> *"Deaths, kidnappings and injuries of prominent members of the Somali government and the international community will take priority in our daily news coverage. We also give preference to international conferences that focus on Somalia such as the 2012 London conference. Headlining news would also include work that the UN and its agencies are carrying out. During the famine period for example, related events and issues would often be the headlining news, especially if international countries and donors pledged large sums of money or aid. We also gave the same prominence to meetings, events and conferences that addressed the famine and were organised by international community members."* – London-based journalist/producer

When asked who the most frequently featured newsmakers were, the journalists either stated international community members or Somali government officials or both. This hegemonic focus on elite figures creates a hierarchy of primary definers which side-lines the need for balance and plurality of voices. It reinstates the existing social inequality that the conflict produced where those who are silenced, continue to be silenced.

Economic advantage of war reporting

War reporting often produces the dilemma to appear nationalistic and reconciliatory but also to be critical and not necessarily fall in line with the official government rhetoric. There is also the added pressure to increase audience that can translate into profitable shows and programs. The Somali journalists explained that they particularly feel the pressure to generate audience, which often leads to them framing stories and producing programs to purposefully incite existing antagonism. A London-based journalist says:

"The stories that feature two opposing clans generate audiences because members of those two clans would want to hear what their representative has to say and what the opposing clan member is accusing them of. We have several programs at our station that work within this framework. These programmes are put on our website and YouTube as well to diversify and further increase audiences." - London-based journalist

Sometimes viewers complain about these programs but the journalist thought that these complaints were misplaced and journalists are not responsible for what the guests decide to say on air:

"The live discussions, especially the ones with in-house guests often cause complaints because the guests will praise their clan and progress that has been made in their towns and regions and speak ill of other clans that they have hostilities with. The viewers whose clan has been disrespected think of us as being responsible for that and log a complaint. We make a disclaimer at the beginning of the programs where we state we are not responsible for what people say but at the same time we warn participants to be respectful but we can't promise they will listen. This is mostly done for financial reasons as these types of reports generate large volumes of audiences and attract advertising."- London-based journalist

There seems to be a misunderstanding of what journalists are responsible for, which is rooted in most of them lacking professional training in journalism ethics and practice as well as a poor general educational background. Pitting two opposing groups against each other can, at the very least, re-create the 'us-vs-them' dimension of the conflict but this can also very easily erupt into violent outbreaks.

Conclusion

This article's key aim was to present how journalists in their reporting can re-create conflict but it has also highlighted how owners meddling with editorial decision making for financial purposes can contribute to the re-creation of conflict as well. This is chiefly done through giving importance to key conflict dynamics such as political disputes, marginalisation of minority groups and voices, clan antagonisms and events which when transported to their audiences, becomes manifested and re-created.

There is also a general sense of lack of accountability on the part of both the owners as well as the journalists. The journalists tend to see this as a type of freedom effectively giving them free reign to air their political and ideological standpoints and this in and of itself can fuel certain aspects of the conflict and recreate it. This is particularly dangerous when journalists do not feel politically represented which manifests in them feelings of powerlessness, marginalisation and a lack of recognition.

The third highlighted factor was that of elite sourcing and tendency to prioritise elite stories. Journalists expressed a unanimous sentiment of international community members and Somali government officials being seen as the primary news definers. It creates unequal accessibility and a hierarchical mindset amongst the Somali public. It also reinforces the existing social inequality which further marginalises the voices of the less powerful members of society and authorises the elite members as being more important than ordinary citizens.

The final factor that this article shed light on was the need to generate audiences. There is a tremendous appetite for conflict-driven topics, particularly when hostilities can become apparent. There seems to be a

misunderstanding of what journalists think they are responsible for as complaints have been raised by audiences about these topics but the journalists shrug it off and place the responsibility on the guests of the shows.

Some of these factors particularly that of accountability and responsibility can be traced to the journalists' lack of professional training with poor education. Furthermore, there is not a regulatory body that journalists and owners feel accountable to since there are not viable regulatory bodies established in Somalia. With regards to regulatory bodies in their host countries, this study has shown that whilst laws and regulatory frameworks exist, there is a need for implementation.

In sum, what this study has highlighted is that although diasporic media is helpful in providing platforms for development and reconstruction efforts, which is especially important for homelands in conflict, it is playing a bigger than what current scholarship has warranted. Diasporic media also preserves immigrant identities, cultures and tradition. They can play a performative role in enacting conflict-laden sentiments and reinforce war produced identities that then comes alive many thousands of miles from where the conflict is taking place.

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Migration Regime in Toronto and the Roles of Municipal Government in the Economic Integration of Somali Refugees (1991-2011)

✍ **Monsuru Adegboyega Kasali**

Abstract

In the early 1990s, the Somalis became one of the top refugee groups in Canada, when Canada was trying to throw away the yoke of economic recession bedeviling the country since the 1980s. Making the matter worse, the socio-economic attributes of those Somali refugees never reflected any possibility of quick access to labor market.

This study explored the migration history of Somali refugees to Canada and how they later became a collection among ethno-racial groups of African descent residents in Toronto. The study investigated the problem of economic integration that confronted the Somalis on arrival to the city.

The study therefore concluded that city governments have assumed more critical roles in immigrant integration and it has become needful to incorporate their views in intergovernmental diplomacy on matters relating to immigration and immigrant integration.

Keywords: Somali refugees, refugee resettlement, immigration policy, immigrant integration, and Canada.

Introduction

As one of the signatories to the United Nations Convention on Refugees, Canada has continued to demonstrate strong commitment to protection of those encountering horrific humanitarian situations often occasioned by the outbreak of civil war as evidenced in Somalia. From the Cold War period, the country has become one of the leading destinations for refugee resettlement. In its resettlement program, though, Canada has admission benchmark which all prospective refugees must meet before being considered for resettlement. One of the conditions is that applicants must be recognized as refugees in line with guidelines of the UN Convention on Refugees. Prior to the enactment of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) in 2002, it was also expected that prospective refugees must demonstrate 'ability to establish' (to easily facilitate their ways to labor market integration). Resulting from the enactment of IRPA, there was a shift in Canada's humanitarian admission priorities. The country began to admit refugees based on compassion rather than (their) economic viability, as previously was the case. Certainly, Canada's Refugee and Humanitarian Resettlement Program offers protection and assistance for refugees settled outside its territory. Generally, there are three classes of refugees. These include Government Assisted Refugees (GARs), Privately-Sponsored Refugees (PSRs), and Landed in Canada Refugees (LCRs). Thus, the first two classes of refugees make up resettled refugees and enjoy full access to refugee and mainstream settlement and integration services while the LCRs often lack such privileges. Sometimes, through Joint Assistance Sponsorship (JAS) agreements both the government and citizen groups, religious bodies or any other organizations can jointly support the resettlement of refugees. In this case, settlement and integration support funding from government can be extended for 24 months while social support can be provided for 36 months by the private sponsors (Orr, 2004 cited in Hyndman, 2011).

Hence, the major concern of Canadian government was to provide resettlement opportunities to refugees based on the urgency of their needs for humanitarian protection (Yu et al., 2007). The compassionate consideration for refugee resettlement in Canada has been laudable but it also has come with a price. It did not take long for some of the challenges associated with the new immigration law to become noticeable. The arrival of the first post-IRPA government assisted refugees (GARs) in 2003 shown the refugee resettlement that was more of:

> *"multi-barriered individuals, including those with low literacy levels in their original languages, and significant physical and mental health issues, as well as increased numbers of single headed households, large households, and a much higher number of children and youth who were born and raised in refugee camps with limited exposure to formal education"* (Hiebert and Sherrell, 2010: 25-26).

Indeed, Somali refugees constitute one of the immigrant groups who have been eluded by labour market inclusion. Unlike the success story that accompanied the admission of Vietnamese 'Boat People' who received tremendous support from Federal government and other stakeholders including religious and voluntary organizations in 1979 and 1980, the resettlement of Somali refugees from 1991 was fraught with far less positive outcomes (Naji, 2012). Perhaps, Canadians were less receptive to the Somalis and inadequate settlement services offered to the first generation Somalis contributed greatly to their poor integration experiences (Danso, 2002; Mohammed, 2001; Murdie, 1996; Naji, 2012 and Opoku-Dapaah, 1995).

In addressing an array of challenges confronting the labor market inclusion of Somalis and other ethno-cultural minorities, various levels of government in Canada have become cooperative in their

intergovernmental relations. However, immigration falls under the concurrent control of federal and provincial governments in Canada but more power is enjoyed by the federal government is this field of governance. Federal government has full control over all aspects of admission of immigrants ranging from economic, humanitarian, family reunification, caregiver immigrants and non-immigrants including visitors and students. Except Quebec that enjoys control over selection of economic and humanitarian immigrants, the rest of provincial and territorial governments in Canada can only admit economic migrants (Banting, 2012).

With the ascendancy of technological and economic dynamics instigated by globalization and international trade competitions coupled with budget constraints experienced in Canada which made it imperative for municipal governments to demand for more control in immigrant integration policy coordination (Tolley, 2011). The economic recessions and the budget deficits that accompanied it raised public resentment against any government policy that would encourage reliance of refugees and other immigrants on social welfare (Mulholland and Biles, 2004). The economic situation of refugees became more precarious as federal government transferred some of its functions (i.e. post-secondary education, health care, social support etc) to the provincial governments without adequate fiscal backing and most of which provinces in turn downloaded to the municipal governments, complicating already distressed fiscal condition that municipal jurisdictions were grappling with.

More interestingly, most newcomers usually choose large urban centres like city of Toronto as their destination. Perhaps, it is not out of place that most immigrants usually regard economic opportunity as the significant magnet that frames their decision on where to reside (Torjman, 2002). This instructs why most immigrants prefer to settle in big cities like

Toronto considered abound with economic opportunities. There was growing population of Somali refugees settling in the City of Toronto, most of whom were eluded of the anticipated opportunities due to certain barriers like inability to communicate effectively in Canada's official languages (English and French languages), non-recognition of their educational certificates, among others (Bashir-Ali, 2006; Brown, 2008 and Galabuzi, 2001).

The rising poverty prevalent among the Somali refugees in Toronto City created a lot of apprehension and criticism among the public in the city (Ornstein, 2000). The city being the closest to the public began to play more active role in immigrant integration and social assistance despite the fact these policy areas were under exclusive control of federal and provincial governments (Birrel and McIsaac, 2006; Good, 2008 & 2009; Israelite et. al., 1999; McIsaac, 2003 and Poirier, 2003 & 2006).

This study investigates the problem of economic integration that experienced by most Somalis on arrival to the City of Toronto and explains various factors responsible for their economic exclusion. The study also examines what informed the involvement of the City government in immigration matters despite the fact that it falls outside the functional responsibilities of the city government and the effect of the intervention on its already overstretched local fiscal resources. The study shall also elucidate various initiatives taken by the city administration towards labor market inclusion of the Somalis and a number of positive outcomes achieved through the integration strategies of the local authorities in the City of Toronto.

Theoretical Framework

It is federal and provincial governments that jointly deliberate on immigrant admission, settlement and integration. According to Section 95

of the Constitution Act 1867, immigration falls under concurrent jurisdiction of the Federal and Provincial governments but immigration law of any province "shall have an effect in and for the Province as long as and as far as it is not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of Canada."

While the bulk of integration processes takes place at the municipal level, the municipal governments have also found it compelling to agitate for their inclusion in intergovernmental deliberations on immigration matters. This new development has created a new political agenda setting, which according Kingdon (1995) is motivated by three factors which include problems, policy and politics. Kingdon's Policy Window thesis largely explains the intervention of municipal jurisdiction especially the city authorities in the economic integration of refugee immigrants despite the fact that such function falls under the jurisdiction of Ottawa (Federal government) and provincial authorities. The municipal governments being the nearest to the people in various localities are being confronted with a mirage of agitations from various socio-cultural groups concerning the welfare and labour matters relating to the refugees (Leo, 2009).

Again, due to the downloading nature of intergovernmental relations in Canada where federal government often transfers certain responsibilities including immigrant integration to the provincial and territorial governments who in turn transfer same to the municipal jurisdictions. Perhaps, more critical roles played by municipal governments in immigration have continued to impact adversely on their finances while financial transfers from federal and provincial governments have been grossly inadequate. Evidently, these transfers of responsibilities are not backed with adequate fiscal support from the higher level jurisdictions. As a result, the fiscal capacity of municipal government was overstretched with resultant inefficient outcomes from the local provision of public goods and services. In addition, lack of local knowledge used to

affect higher level government coordination of immigrant settlement and integration services and programs in Canada which necessitated the Canada's engagement with provincial government on the need to consult the municipal governments and other local stakeholders on issues relating to settlement and integration of refugees and other immigrants (Piorier, 2003, 2006).

It was against the foregoing that, on 29th September 2006, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Immigration and Settlement was entered into by Canada, Ontario and Toronto. The tripartite agreement was facilitated as "*a framework for the federal, provincial and municipal governments to discuss matters related to immigration and settlement in the City of Toronto*" (Canada-Ontario-Toronto Memorandum of Understanding on Immigration and Settlement, 2006). The MOU was the product of the acknowledgement from the federal and provincial governments of the crucial roles played by the City of Toronto in complementing the immigrant settlement and integration coordination efforts of the two higher levels of government. It was, however agreed that almost 50 percent of newcomers settled in Toronto. The rationale behind the tripartite summit federalism was to achieve more positive outcomes from Canada's immigration policy as the City of Toronto was required to contribute its experience, expertise and capacity for community infrastructure and service delivery methods…to enhance the existing federal and provincial strengths of well established policies, programs and network (Canada-Ontario-Toronto Memorandum of Understanding on Immigration and Settlement, 2006: 2-3).

Acting beyond their statutory functions, municipal governments have opted for overlapping intergovernmental approach by playing more active roles in the settlement and integration of immigrants to avoid social problems that may accompany economic exclusion of any immigrants. Third factor has to do with the commitment of the political elites across

municipal jurisdictions to optimize public gains in the economic integration of refugees to reduce the number of refugees relying on public support. Usually, the local political elites partner with other levels of government as well as other stakeholders in providing economic integration needs of the refugees (Good, 2008).

Somali Refugees in the City of Toronto: Arrival and Economic Integration Issues

Ontario remained the leading destination for majority of the landed Somali refugees and other immigrants. More than fifty percent of the landed Somali refugees settled in Ontario. For instance in 1991, out of 3221 refugees who landed in Canada as newcomers, over 2000 of them chose Ontario as their intended destination while City of Toronto has remained the leading destination for immigrant settlement not only in Ontario but also the entire Canada (Employment and Immigration Canada, 1992). Between 1991 and 1995, the number of Somali newcomers that settled at the Metropolitan Area of Toronto was five thousand, four hundred and eighty-five (5485). The City of Toronto is significantly larger than all the municipalities in Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA). Between 1996 and 2001, two thousand, seven hundred and seventy (2770) Somali newcomers had arrived Toronto (Statistics Canada, 2001). At arrival, Somali refugees possessed different attributes in terms of language skills, education and capacity to excel in Canada's labor market. Within the ten years, different integration outcomes were recorded among the Somalis in Toronto and elsewhere based on their year of admission and skills.

On arrival, Somali refugees encountered a lot of challenges. One of the problems was non-recognition of credentials or lack of formal education which reduced their chances of participating in Toronto's labour market. Those who were working as professionals in their home country found

themselves excluded from applying for professional jobs due to non-recognition of their credentials by various provincial governments including Ontario (Bashir-Ali, 2006; Israelite et. al., 1999; Opoku-Dapaah, 1995 and Zine, 2001). Hence, the only choice left to them was to attain Canadian education which was at high cost. In many provinces, the refugees were expected to pay high tuition like foreign students.

However, the federal law guarantees free access to primary and secondary education to all residents including refugees but the policy of each province determines the cost of accessing tertiary education. For Ontario, refugees' fate to access tertiary education was nebulous because those of them who desired to have tertiary education were mandated to pay high fees like foreign students. They also had no access to student loans and scholarship (Israelite, et. al, 1999). Certainly, immigrants who obtained Canadian certificates would have comparative advantage over those who studied in their country of origin. The advantage was not only in terms of language skills but also in terms of income (Bonikowska et.al., 2008). The prevailing dilemma that accompanied non-recognition of their pre-arrival credentials and absence of financial means to attain tertiary education in Canada reduced their situations as ones that were very precarious.

Another major problem evidenced among the Somali refugees between 1991 and 2011 was that many Somali parents lacked the language skills to support their children in their school work. At arrival, the children were confronted with a number of impediments in Toronto schools due to inadequate schooling in their home country as a result of civil war and they were placed in class according to their ages. The problem of language made their experience more pitiable as their parents also lacked language skills to support them in their school work. The frustration was expressed by a Somali mother:

> *"Even if the child has a good educational background, with a strong base in math and other subjects, still he wouldn't be able to follow along in class because of the language. Language is the key factor, and it is only when the child has a strong language base that he can catch up to his classmates. It is of no help for him to throw him in a class without giving him any support"* (Israelite et. al, 2009: 12).

In addition, the culture shock evidenced in Canada further deepened the frustration of majority of Somali refugees as they were losing sense of belonging to their new home due to cultural differences. For instance, many parents would complement their girl children's school dresses with hijab (scarf used by Muslim females to cover their hair), which were found unacceptable in most Canadian schools. They were ignorant of the secular character of majority of Canadian schools. In addition, racial and religious discrimination created deep sense of exclusion among the Somalis particularly the first generation in Toronto. Somali refugees predominantly Muslim can be said to be victims of prejudice and stereotypes. The religious resentment has been confirmed by many studies to generate intergroup threats especially negative stereotypes and intergroup anxiety, often leading to discrimination (Stephan & Stephan, 1996; Stephan et al., 1999; Bizman & Yinon, 2001; Croucher, 2013).

The experience of discrimination and its negative impact on the integration of Somali Canadians have attracted a handful of studies (Israelite, 1999; Kusow, 1998; Ighodaro, 1997; Buchanan, 1996; Grover, 1995; Opoku-Dapaah, 1995). The discrimination experienced by the Somalis was driven by three factors: being newcomers, Muslim and Black (Reitsma, 2001). The September 11 terrorist attacks in the United State further put the Somalis like many other Muslim groups in the Western world in shackles of bigotry with growing Islamophobia. One pointer to these studies was the sense of despair and exclusion prevalent among the

Somali refugees. Perhaps, the racial and religious discrimination compelled majority of them to be phlegmatic in relating with other cultures which may have had a huge impact on their labor market integration. In addition, the difference between the host culture and the Somali culture also put them more at disadvantage within Canada's educational system, slowing down or impeding their success in the academic pursuits (Brown, 2008, Bashir-Ali, 2006; Zine, 2001). As if that was not enough, the structural constraints imposed by the immigration policy of Canadian government of excluding Somalis without landing status from employment until the decisions were made on their landing applications, many of whom waited for more than 5 years before government decisions on their applications (Israelite et. al., 1999 and Opooku-Dapaah, 1995).

The hefty tuition same as foreign students, the refugees were made to pay in Toronto also limited their shot at career progression. Canada's tertiary education certificate would be enhanced their labor market participation (Israelite et. al., 1999; Mohammed, 2001). The high cost of the university education indeed worked against the efforts of Somali residents in the City of Toronto (and the rest of Canada) to secure their inclusion in the socio-economic life of the urban centre as unemployment was high among them (Mohammed, 2001).

Without doubts, most of the first generation Somali refugees relied on welfare support in spite of their eagerness to work as captioned by a Somali:

> *"If I had the proper documents and a loan to open my own business, I could be an independent person. They [Immigration officials] told me to stay at home and wait for the $500 [welfare] cheque. That is not what I came here for"* (Israelite, 1999: 10).

The resentment of many Canadians toward providing jobs to refugees was another stumbling block to the labor market integration of Somali refugees (Opoku-Dapaah, 1995 and Zine, 2001). The second generation Somalis have had their own share of poor performance like their parents in the labor market participation. Apart from the inability of most Somali parents to provide all the needed support to their children's schooling, the negative images of muslims and homogenization of African groups propagated by the media in Canada, propelled discrimination against them. Studies have shown that negative stereotypes reinforce discrimination against any minority groups as individuals from any outgroup are often erroneously expected to behave in certain ways (Stephan & Stephan, 1993).

Local Strategies to Enhance Economic Integration of Refugees

The City offered support to a lot of immigrant settlement and integration service providers through provision of grants. The grant awards were accessed by immigrant service agencies and non-governmental organizations through different windows including Access and Equity Grant Programme for certain important initiatives including anti-hate advocacy, fear and threat management, employment counseling for the vulnerable groups etc (Good, 2009; Gunn, 2012). Since December 1998, the City of Toronto provided in its annual budget the Access and Equity Grant Program to foster harmonious relations among various ethno-racial communities residents in the City.

In its award of grants, the City did not only focus on mainstream immigrant service organizations but also ethno-racial organizations for successful integration of refugees and other immigrants. The City has been very proactive in building sense of belonging among various ethnic-racial organizations and supporting programmes that would assist the refugees and other immigrants and ensure their timely labour market

integration. The City government prioritized the need to partner with ethno-racial communities to build confidence among them and address the problem of discrimination which may have adverse impact on immigrant integration processes. In this respect, the City authority partnered with many Somali groups including Dejinta Beesha Somali Multi-Service Centre (City of Toronto, 2003).

The City of Toronto has appeared to be very committed to issues bothering on immigrant settlement and integration as amplified in its motto - "Diversity Our Strength." One of the ways to foster social inclusion among its diverse racial-ethnic communities was to address the problem of economic inequalities that dominated discourse about the experiences of immigrants in Canada.

The rapidly increasing social and economic inequalities in Toronto, and elsewhere in Canada, became a source of worry to the government of the Toronto City and elsewhere. The sense of exclusion among the vulnerable groups including the refugees and the newcomers required mobilization of wide-ranging policies to foster equity, multiculturalism and socio-economic inclusion. In 1998, the City inaugurated a Task Force on Community Access and Equity to recommend ways to develop policies that would foster inclusiveness of all the diverse cultures in the City in realizing the goals underlying its motto-"Diversity Our Strength." In the follow-up to the Task Force, the City facilitated a Roundtable on Access, Equity and Human Rights (Altilia, 2003; Isrealite et. al., 1999).

On January 29, 1999, the draft report was submitted to Strategic Policies and Priorities Committee while requesting for Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) who would put up a report concerning the administrative choice for the implementation of the Action Plan proposed. The report (Diversity Our Strength, Access and Equity) was finally approved in December 1999 by the City Council. The thrust of the Action Plan was to

develop a framework and roadmap that would guide the processes of decision-making across all departments of the City Council. One of the ninety-seven final recommendations from the Task Force was the setting up of Race and Ethnic Relation Advisory Committee "to advise City Council on issues of access, equity and human rights" and four other groups including Aboriginal Affairs; Disability Issues; Status of Women; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered Issues. Out of all the five groups, Race and Ethnic Relations was essentially the one that largely aimed at economic integration of refugees and other vulnerable groups include other classes of immigrants and "racialized groups".

On October 12, 2001, the Acting Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) tabled the Status Report before the Administration Committee with central focus on the performance of immigrants in labor market in the City of Toronto. In the report, it was found that a number of ethno-racial community groups were experiencing high level of labor market exclusion, and the situation was worrisome. It was also reported that one of the most vulnerable and least integrated ethno-racial groups was Somali community. It was revealed that at least 24 percent of Somali residents were unemployed, which higher than national average. In addition, the number of Somalis living below poverty line in the City stood at 62 percent (City of Toronto Clerk, 2001). It was therefore clarified that:

> *"the City has previously noted that many of the inequalities identified by the study requires action by all sectors and orders of government. As a result City has called upon other orders of government to address these issues, and in particular requested the Government of Canada to establish a national urban policy that results in social inclusion and the elimination of racism and for intergovernmental initiatives to respond to these issues."* (City of

Toronto, 2001; Administration Committee Report, No.18, Clause No. 25).

On the 16th of October 2001, many community associations reacted and expressed their concerns on the issues of inequalities and socio-economic exclusion against minority cultural groups including the Somali as captured by the Study commissioned by the City of Toronto. The problem of endemic poverty and economic uncertainties among the Somalis and other vulnerable community organizations provoked urgent government in the City of Toronto actions to militate against the prevalent ethno-racial inequality in the City. Without doubts, the Status Report from CAO was released at the right time because the time of the release coincided with the United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. Councilor Pam McConnell of the City of Toronto was part of the Canadian delegation to the Conference. On November 19, 2001, Councilor McConnell presented a report articulating the need for the City authorities to develop a Plan of Action in line with the United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, to address to the growing ethno-racial inequality in the City of Toronto.

In December 2001, the City of Toronto Community Advisory Committees on Access, Equity and Human Rights were mandated to consider the United Nations anti-racial discrimination declaration and pass their comments to the City of Toronto Diversity Advocate and Chief Administrative Officer (City of Toronto Clerk, 2001). With the diversity narratives being amplified by the municipal government as a major force for the strength of the city, Toronto city government expressed commitment to further assure the collateral market expansion of the city while equality program was considered as key to addressing the labor market exclusion being experienced by Somalis (Jacobs, 1998; Kipfer and Keil, 2002 and Ornstein, 2000).

On 16 January, 2002, a meeting that included all the five advocacy groups held and a number of issues were identified that required adequate attention of the City Council, and these included poverty reduction, housing, public transit and transportation, youth leadership and elimination of youth violence, employment, policing, education , public awareness as well community outreach. The issues of pay disparity particularly between the Canadian born and immigrants including refugees, accreditation of foreign credentials and diversity training also received attention.

Since 2001, the City of Toronto demonstrated stronger commitment to labor market integration of refugees and other immigrants. One of the strategies undertaken by the City to fastrack the inclusion of immigrants into labor market was to engage its Social Service Division to initiate service agreements with several community organizations specialized in the provision of labor skills training, occupational planning, career counseling and mentoring programs. In addition, the Social Service Division of the City also motivates financially relevant employers to offer job placement to Ontario Works clients including those without Canadian work experience. The City also provides financial support to immigrants to get their credentials assessed. The City had very unique job posting system in which the major consideration for employed was not based on certificate recognition or Canadian work experience. Though, immigrants' credentials were still assessed to determine the positions of the applicants. Another strategy used by the City of Toronto was forging partnership with various ethno-racial communities and always informed them about job placement and process of job hiring into the City government workforce.

Positive Outcomes of Local Initiatives to Labour Market Participation of Somali Refugees

Between 1991 and 2000, 1020 Somalis out 17,380 Somali residents in Toronto lacked knowledge of both the English and French languages, which are the two official languages in Canada. The lack of requisite skills in the two official languages may be said to be one of the major causes of high unemployment rate among Somalis in Toronto during that period. Without doubts, various integration services especially the language training and adult education programs coordinated by the federal and provincial governments with support from the City government to complement their efforts through provision of support grants to the local immigrant service agencies. From 2001 to 2011, the population of Somalis increased but rather than having an increase in the number of Somalis without skills in any of the two official languages, the number of that category of Somalis in Toronto reduced by half. It was only 620 out of 21,450 Somalis could communicate neither in English nor in French. The number of Somalis having skills only in French was 50, which was a slight reduction compared to 55 Somalis who could only communicate in French between 1991 and 2000. The number of Somalis that had skills both in English and French languages also increased from 780 to 1105 by (Statistics Canada, 2011).

The growing number of multilingual Somalis will increase their chances of achieving better integration into the labor force. With the growing interest by all levels of government, requesting the services of interpreters and translators for their multilingual communication system, more Somalis with multilingual skills including English and French will find much easier to secure (better) jobs. The renewed interest among immigrant service agencies to provide access programs to newcomer, many multilingual Somalis may secure employment in that sector. There are many corporate organization where having skills in English and French may be added advantage.

The number of Somalis with knowledge in English language only also increased from 15,525 recorded between 1991 and 2000 to 19,675 by the end of 2011 (Statistics Canada, 2001 & 2011). With an increase of less than two thousand Somali residents in Toronto within the two periods, and an increase of over four thousand in the population of Somalis who could communicate in English indicates that the language services and programs attracted great positive outcomes among the Somali refugees in Toronto.

Education

Table 1

Education characteristics of Somali Immigrants

in Toronto (1991-2000)

Total population of 15 years and above by highest level of schooling	**9325**
Less than high school graduation certificate	3930
High school certificate	1780
Some postsecondary education	1330
Apprenticeship or trade certificate or diploma	475
College certificate or diploma	790
University certificate below bachelor's degree	210
Bachelor's degree	585
University certificate above bachelor's degree	40
Master's degree	145
Earned doctorate	40

Source: *Statistics Canada, 2001 Census of Population, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 97F0010XCB2001041.*

Table 2

Education characteristics of Somali Immigrants (2001-2011)

Total population aged 25 years to 64 years by highest certificate, diploma or degree	**8010**
No certificate, diploma or degree	1875
High school diploma or equivalent.	2645
Apprenticeship or trade certificate or diploma	345
College, CEGEP or other non-university certificate or diploma.	1555
University certificate or diploma below bachelor level.	335
Bachelor's degree.	880
University certificate, diploma or degree above bachelor level	375

Source: *Statistics Canada, 2011 National Household Survey, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 99-010-X2011036.*

It was not only in the knowledge of official languages that an improvement was recorded among the Somalis residents in Toronto. From 1991 to 2000, only nine from every one hundred Somalis had bachelor's degree and above including earned doctorates while by 2011, 16 Somalis out of 100 had bachelor's degree and above . The increase in the number of Somalis was another positive outcome from the pattern of settlement regime in Toronto. In addition, by the end of 2000, for every three Somalis, one possessed certificate less than high school which suggests that majority of the Somalis never had up to secondary education.

In 2011, the number of Somalis without certificate reduced to one-quarter of the Somali population. However, the educational situation improved compared to the first ten years that followed 1991 but still very poor. Perhaps, many of them could not complete their studies in their country of

origin due to outbreak of war. Notwithstanding, some of them may have long dropped out. This explains the high incidence of low income among the Somalis in Toronto at 51.7% compared to 12.4% reported among the Canada born residents of Toronto (Statistics Canada, 2011).

Labor Market Outcomes

Table 3

Employment Portraits and Selected Occupations of Somalis (1991-2000)

The total number of Somalis from 15 and above by labor force activity		9330
The total number of Somalis in labor force in Toronto		4520
Employed Somalis was	3260	
Unemployed Somalis was	1260	
Employment rate	34.9%	
Unemployment rate	27.9%	
175 in management occupations		3.9%
710 in business, finance and administration occupations		15.7%
215 in natural & applied sciences & related occupations		4.8%
85 in health occupations		1.9%
1265 in sales and service occupations		28.1%
680 in trades, transport and equipment operators and related occupations		15.0%
404 in occupations unique to processing, manufacturing and utilities		8.9%)

Source: *Statistics Canada, 2001 Census of Population, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 97F0010XCB2001042.*

Table 4

Employment Portraits and Selected Occupations

of Somalis (2001-2011)

Total number of Somalis aged 15 and above in labor force status	**13420**
Total in the labor force from age 15 and above was	**6170**
Employed Somalis	4455
Unemployed Somalis	1715
Employment rate	33.2%
Unemployment rate	27.8%
265 in management occupations	4.3%
725 in Business, finance & administration	11.8%
320 in health occupations including medical doctors and nurses	5.2%
275 in natural and applied sciences and related occupations	4.5%
1580 in sales and service occupations	25.6%
880 in trades, transport and equipment operators and related occupations	14.3%
175 in occupations unique to processing, manufacturing and utilities	2.8%

Source: *Statistics Canada, 2011 National Household Survey, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 99-010-X2011036.*

Employment

From 1991 to 2001, the number of Somalis in Toronto aged 15 and above in labor force was four thousand, five hundred and twenty (4520) was labor force but there was rapid increase in the number of Somalis in the labor force as the number increased to six thousand, one hundred and seventy (6170). Occupations that immigrants belong will determine their income level and the portraits of occupational career of Somalis in Toronto labor force shown that the number of Somalis in management occupations rapidly increased from 175 (1991-2000) to 265 (2001-2011). This suggests that more Somalis had achieved more income level by 2011. In the similar vein, a marginal increase was recorded in the population of Somalis in business, administration occupations from 710 (1991-2000) to 725 (2001-2011). Certainly, more Somalis had also achieved greater income level by 2011. Between 1991 and 2000, there were only 85 Somalis in health occupations, and by 2011, the number had increased to 320, which was a welcome development. The gradual increase of Somalis in high income occupations, suggests that pattern of integration services in Toronto yielded moderate outcomes.

Income

From 1991 to 2000, the average income of Somalis in Toronto was fifteen thousand, five hundred and nineteen Canadian dollars ($15,519) (Statistics Canada, 2001). By 2011, the average income for Somalis had reached twenty-one thousand, four hundred and eight Canadian dollars ($21,480) (Statistics Canada, 2011). There was a little reduction in the unemployment rates among Somalis between the two periods. From 1991 to 2000, the rate of unemployment was 27.9% while in the period of 2001-2011, unemployment rate fell to 27.8%. Meanwhile, the employment fell in the later period to 33.2% from previous 34.9%. The

issue of fall in the rate of among employment also affected the Canada born, even more than the Somali residents.

From 1991 to 2000, the employment rate among the Canada born was 70.0% but within of period of 2001 and 2011, the employment rate fell to 65.3% (Statistics Canada, 2001 & 2011). The reduction was far above that of the Somalis. During the period of 2001 and 2011, while the unemployment of the Somalis reduced from previous 27.9% to 27.8% by 2011, the Canada born experienced more unemployment which increased from the previous 5.5% to 8.6% (Statistics Canada, 2001 & 2011). Irrespective of the slight reduction in the rate of unemployment among the Somalis, their average income was still less than half of what was earned by the Canada born. Again, the incidence of low income was very prevalent due to less educational qualification.

Conclusion

The difficult conditions in Somalia in the late 1980s provoked exodus of Somalis from their fatherland. Canada was one of the leading destinations for the resettlement of Somali refugees. The admission of Somali refugees, among other ethnocultural immigrants, was accompanied with mixed feelings considering the litany of forces that worked against their integration. Lack of language skills and Canadian work experience and non-recognition of certificates possessed by many of them with post-secondary education militated against their labor market inclusion. Above all, the discrimination that Somali refugees had to contend with due to their religion (Islam) and race (Black) also slowed down their inclusion into the urban labor market in the City of Toronto and elsewhere in Canada.

The government of Canada, at all levels, developed different policies and programs to support the refugees; each level of government has adopted

different programs to support immigrant settlement. However, the two lower level jurisdictions (municipal and provincial authorities) play more active role in the integration of immigrants but federal government has continued to provide an enabling environment and intergovernmental cooperation with provincial governments and certain city authorities including Toronto as well as providing long-term settlement programs for the new immigrants in the first three years of their arrival.

A number of proactive policies were developed by the city government that helped in facilitating greater language skills, education and labor market participation among the Somalis. The Access and Equity Grant program initiated by the city government assisted in facilitating better performances of ethnocultural minorities including Somali group in the local labor market participation. The Access and Equity grants provided by the municipal government to mainstream settlement organizations enabled Somalis and other vulnerable groups to undertake training in fear and threat management, job skills, mentoring and employment counseling without being put in any financial burden. Extending the grants to ethnocultural associations including many Somali groups to provide essential settlement services to newcomers was also a welcome development.

Further, the financial incentives provided by the city government to motivate employers to offer jobs to Somali residents as well as members of other ethnocultural minority groups assisted greatly in integrating them economically. The continued interface between community organizations and the city government through its Social Service Development is very commendable. The interface makes the government to be aware of the peculiar and general needs of various community associations including the Somali group resident in the City of Toronto. The policy helped in guiding municipal policy formulation and implementation especially in the areas of employment skills training, mentoring and career counseling. Suffice, for the city government not to lay any strong emphasis on

certificate recognition and Canadian work experience made access to local public jobs more open to vulnerable groups like Somali community and it indeed helped to improve the labor market experience of Somalis in the City. The regular provision of information on job vacancies to ethno-cultural associations designed to create adequate awareness among cultural groups regarding vacancies within the city workforce was also a welcome development in the economic integration of the Somalis and other ethno-cultural minority groups in the city.

Indeed, in recognition of the immigrant settlement services provided by the City of Toronto to the teeming immigrant population including the refugees, the federal and Ontario governments were compelled to facilitate a tripartite intergovernmental agreement that involved the City of Toronto in 2006. The agreement made Toronto City the first municipal jurisdiction in Canada to be fully involved in matters relating to immigration and immigrant integration. It is however recommended that federal and provincial governments should provide more grants to municipal governments to allow the tier level of government be in good financial footing with the aim of enabling them to perform better in the provision of essential settlement services that quicken the integration of immigrants. It is also recommended that priority be given to both the vertical (three levels of government) and horizontal (municipalities) exchange of ideas and information in the coordination of immigrant integration policies to optimize the quality of settlement services across jurisdictions.

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Leadership Capability of Emerging Somali-American Leaders: Surveying by Leadership Practice Inventory

✍ Abdiqani Yusuf Farah

Abstract

This study is a replicate of the Leadership Practice Inventory (LPI-Observer), a half-a-century-old research instrument. Having every component of the instrument intact, the aim of this study was to evaluate the leadership capability of Somali-American leaders. The study looked into the actions and/or behaviors of 21 emerging, Somali-American leaders in different disciplines in Minnesota, USA. The participants were presented with thirty descriptive statements measuring the following five leadership practices and behaviors: (a) Challenging the Process, (b) Inspiring a Shared Vision, (c) Enabling Others to Act, (d) Modeling the Way, (e) and Encouraging the Heart. The findings show a higher-than-average ranking of between 100th and 70th percentile. Compared to the semi-universal, overall score of 89, the result shows an overall score of 114 for the Somali-American leaders.

Keywords: Somali-Americans, Somali community, leadership practice inventory, leadership competence, Somali diaspora, Somali Minnesotans

1. Introduction

Though there is no one single way to predict leadership success, literature has been defining and refining leadership since the dawn of the last century. A consistent definition, therefore, is that leadership is the exercise of influence over groups or their activity in a structured or unstructured context to accomplish goals and meet objectives (Huber et al., 2000; Johnson, 2015).

This is a study on leadership which is based on a predetermined guidepost, a well-known leadership research instrument. This study wanted to contextualize leadership for cultural compatibility and to see whether this guidepost could be true of Somali community leaders in Minnesota.

The 2010 U.S. Census put the Somali population in the country at 80,000. While that number has met challenges over the past couple of years, one thing is crystal clear: The Somali community is making an integral progress in different areas, namely business and politics. But like any other immigrant community new to the sociopolitical landscape of America, this progress has not only been slow but also fragile and with hope. However, the leadership effectiveness of the Somali community leaders is unknown. For example, how could Somali American leaders be rated in terms of best leadership practices and behaviors? This study was determined to answer that question scientifically by employing the LPI-Observer, the finest leadership research instrument.

The LPI-Observer uses thirty carefully worded statements representing universally accepted domain of leadership practices and behaviors (Kouzes & Posner, 1998). Focusing on affective domain, the LPI-Observer measures leaders' attitudes, feelings, and perceptions.

The LPI-Observer focuses on five leadership practices: (a) Challenging the Process, the leader's "willingness to challenge the status quo"; (b) Inspiring a Shared Vision, leader's ability to look beyond the position; (c) Enabling Others to Act, leader's ability to enlist the cooperation of others; (d) Modeling the Way, setting an example for others; (e) and Encouraging the Heart, leader's skillfulness to promote team spirit across the organization (Kouzes & Posner, 1998). These leadership practices are believed to be an excellent predictor of leadership success, or failure. They are the building blocks of LPI-Observer Instrument.

The LPI-Observer Instrument generated an average score of 89 percent from different cultures varying from North American to European to Asian (Kouzes & Posner, 1998; Posner, 2016). This study wanted to see whether the LPI-Observer could hold the same average score for Somali American leaders.

There are serious implications for both academia and practice in the context of the Somalis in the diaspora. Academic institutions and professional development programs about Somalis in the diaspora will be able to tailor their focus to the evolving nature of the leadership practices in Somali culture. Similarly, organization development practitioners in their respective fields will be able to ground their understanding on action research. The significance of this study, therefore, reflects the contributions to the knowledge repertoire in relation to Somali-based leadership theories and practices.

2. Method

2.1 Validity

Validity refers to the degree to which a test measures what it is supposed to measure and yield accurate inferences about the test results (Carless,

2001; Newton, 2012; Popham, 2000). The LPI Instrument uses several ways to determine the validity of the instrument. Face validity, empirical measures (studies), and predictive or concurrent validity are the backbone of LPI tests.

The LPI was first born out of a pilot test consisting of a 30-item survey in which 19 graduate students (seven men and twelve women) participated. "Of the thirty test items, twenty-five (83 percent) were unanimously determined to be clear and understandable and to consist of terminology and concepts that were within students' and student leaders' experiences" (Kouzes & Posner, 1998, pp. 7-8). With a validity rate of 83 percent, this instrument can yield valid results. Then, over the years, the credibility of this instrument has been confirmed with "over 2,500 managers about their personal-best experiences as leaders" (Kouzes & Posner, 1998, p. 5).

2.2 Reliability

Reliability refers to the ability of an instrument to give the same result consistently, when repeated under the same conditions (Carless, 2001; Newton, 2012; Popham, 2000). The LPI-Observer uses a test-retest reliability, split-half reliability, and alternate-form of reliability, generating a reliability coefficient of up to .95 (Kouzes & Posner, 1998; Posner, 2016). Over the years, the LPI Instrument's repetitive tests achieved consistent results across contemporary Western cultures.

Replicating the same LPI test procedures, this study was to see whether results drawn from leaders with East African cultures could produce the same result. Simply put, taking the same procedure, step-by-step, the mission of this study was to see whether or not the same result could be achieved for Somali-American leaders.

2.3 Data Collection

The data were collected between July and August of 2017 from 21 community leaders (17 men and 4 women), all of whom had emigrated from Somalia and now live across the State of Minnesota. All subjects agreed to participate in the study voluntarily.

These participants were presented with a 30-item survey measuring their behaviors and actions as leaders. In this survey, and consistent with the LPI format, participants were asked to rate themselves on a scale of 1-10 (1 being almost never and 10 being almost always).

3. Results

Coding raw data is an indispensable step, no matter how boring the data might get (Kane, 2013). After the data were collected and the coding carried out, scores were tallied and grouped for analysis. Using a five-point Likert scale system ranging from "rarely" to "very frequently," the final scores were then turned into the following scale.

1	2	3	4	5
Rarely	Once a while	Sometimes	Fairly often	Very frequently

Consistent with the LPI-Observer Instrument guide, the data were scored in grids and in self-rating models representing each of the five leadership practices. For example, the first grid (Challenging the Process) corresponds to items 1, 6, 11, 16, 21, and 26 on the questionnaire. The next grid starts with item 2 and ends with 27—jumping five places between items from the first digit. The same procedure is repeated for other three grids. (Look at Appendix B for details regarding how each item corresponds to the five leadership practices.) Below is a table that shows the percentile score of each respondent, based on these grids.

Table 1

Individual rater score by each leadership practice

Raters	Percentile	Challenging the Process	Inspiring a Vision	Enabling Other to Act	Modeling the Way	Encouraging the Heart
1	100%	30	28	29	30	29
2		30	28	29	30	30
3		30	30	30	30	30
4		30	30	18	30	30
5		30	30	29	30	30
6		26	29	29	30	26
7		30	30	29	30	30
8		30	30	30	30	30
9		29	29	30	30	30
10		29	28	26	30	30
11		26	29	28	28	30
12		27	29	28	29	29
13		27	28	27	29	29
14		27	27	27	29	29
15		28	29	30	30	29
16	90%	30	25	23	27	29
17	80%	28	23	29	26	17
18	70%	26	26	24	25	26
19	60%	23	22	27	27	26
20	50%	22	25	25	22	23
21	40%	12	9	13	12	10

4. Discussion and Analysis

The next table shows another snapshot displaying how the percentile has been distributed from high to low.

Table 2

**Individual percentile ranking by leadership practice**

Leadership Practice	Participants	Percentile	Rating
Challenging the Process	16	100-90%	H
Inspiring a Shared Vision	2	80-70%	H
Enabling Others to Act	3	60-50%	M
Modeling the Way	0	40-30%	L
Encouraging the Heart	0	20-10%	L

As is apparent from Table 2, the majority of the respondents (about 86%) scored a higher percentile, between 100th and 70th percentile. Only 14 percent scored at or around the middle percentile. According to Kouzes and Posner (1998), a higher score is at or above the 70th percentile, a lower score is at or below 40, and anything that falls between these figures is considered to be moderate (Kouzes & Posner, 1998).

The philosophy behind this type of test is that the higher the score, the greater the leadership potential in test takers, and similarly, lower scores mean the lack of potential leadership in them (Posner, 2016). In other words, those who score low on the LPI-Observer tests are deemed to have less leadership capacity, and vice versa.

Although there is no universal rule of rating leadership, the LPI Instrument assumes that those who score higher share the same qualities. These qualities are (a) "personal credibility, (b) "effective in running meetings" (c) successfully representing your organization or group to nonmembers" (d) "generating a sense of enthusiasm and cooperation" and (e) "having a higher-performing team" (Kouzes & Posner, 1998).

While an average of 87 percent is normal for LPI studies on leaders from various cultures (Kouzes & Posner, 1998), the average score for Somali-American leaders turned out to be extremely higher than the average score. The chart below shows the average score for each leadership practice (114, 112.8, 112, 116.8, 114.4—from left to right), yielding an average of 114. That is completely above than the average score for any

LPI studies (114 > 89).

In comparison, a study of 1440 international (outside the U.S.) respondents has shown a little bit lower result. In this study, for example, an average score of 92 was achieved for Challenging the Process, 90 for

Inspiring a Shared Vision, 81 for Enabling Others to Act, 94 for Modeling the Way, and 76 for Encouraging the Heart, yielding an overall average score of 86.6 (Carless, 2001). Yet, when the average score for this international study is compared to the score achieved for the Somali-American leadership, a huge difference still exists (86.6 < 114). A difference of 27.4 points is incredibly worth noting.

Some may wonder whether languages play a role in LPI tests. However, a quick look at a longitudinal study reveals otherwise. Posner (2016) was able to secure a similar overall score of 87.46 percent, 86.36 percent, and 90.6 percent for Arabic, Brazilian Portuguese, and Mongolian speakers respectively. That means that the test taker's language plays no significant role.

While what accounted for such a level of discrepancy is hard to pinpoint, several assumptions may help explain why such a high score exists for Somali leaders. The following factors might have played a role. Consider their implications on test takers.

False Pride

The first of these is what could be termed as a false pride factor, wherein a respondent may intentionally choose to score higher in the hope of not looking bad in the face of today's competitive world. False pride is assumed to be at play when respondents have self-imposed insecurities but do not want researchers, or their collaborators, to know about these insecurities. When study participants harbor a sense of false pride, they are determined to hide this self-doubt behind false impressions.

This competition could also be internal, toward Somali-Americans. Because the primary audience for the study outcome is the Somali communities and other concerning parties across the globe, respondents

may have been driven by an inward competition. Here is where the data collectors for this study also come in. The data collection process had been done through a collaborative process where the researcher and an assistant (both Somalis) collected the data from respondents in separate engagements.

Another corollary point relates to the research assistant. An educated, female assistant involved in the data collection, and because most participants were male leaders, they might have felt threatened and therefore chose to inflate the scores. This could be highly relevant because the Somali culture views males as authoritative and commanding; therefore, a female data collector in this male-dominated community work could instill unfounded insecurity in men.

Cultural Susceptibility

Another possible issue is cultural. According to Popham (2000), cultural misunderstanding, or lack of interest in diverse cultural values and beliefs, costs leaders opportunities to set their mentalities as flexible as possible. Similarly, Banks (2012) also believed that cultural susceptibility overshadows both practical and scientific application of leadership theories, as well as how leaders behave. While the increasing interconnectedness of the world eliminated the walls between cultures and customs, cultural challenges still impact both academic and real-world practices of leadership.

In other words, the difference between the score of the Somali-American respondents and that of the global respondents could be due to cultural challenges, rather than practical, on the part of the Somali culture. For example, even though the LPI Instrument uses a highly thought-out language (Kouzes & Posner, 1998), the average Somali leader may have interpreted culturally differently the items on the LPI-

Observer questionnaire. For instance, here is a statement on the LPI Instrument that may not culturally sensitive. "I am upbeat and positive when talking about what our organization is doing." Does the term "upbeat" mean the same thing in the Somali culture? How about "positive?" How positive is positive in different cultures?

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

The applicability of the LPI-Observer to the Somali culture seems to be prone to potential biases, yet bear the same implications for the practice of leadership. And despite the viability of the instrument used for this study, the result turned out to be highly above the average score for other test takers, more than 27 percent higher than the semi-universal score. Because test takers of the same socioeconomic group or race may show cultural dissimilarities (Banks, 2012), cross insensitivity and cultural bias could be the cause of the discrepancy shown by the study.

Researchers and practitioners alike may benefit from investing in a full-fletched and longitudinal study, with a larger sample size. A future research should particularly consider the cultural aspects that are likely to cloud the understanding of Somali leaders. Two likely factors researchers should take into consideration are socioeconomic status and cultural background of the test takers. Non-Somali researchers might be able to work around the impact of the false pride and generate a different result.

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Appendix A: LPI Instrument

To what extend does this leader engage in the following behaviors? Please read statements carefully and choose an answer that best applies to each statement by circling the number associated with the particular statement. He/she:

1-Almost Never to 10-Almost Always

1. Sets a personal example of what he/she expects of others	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
2. Talks about future trends that will influence how our work gets done	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
3. Seeks out challenging opportunities that test his/her own skills and abilities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
4. Develops cooperative relationships among the people he/she works with	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
5. Praises people for a job well done	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
6. Spends time and energy making certain that the people he/she works with adhere to the principles and standards that we have agreed on	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
7. Describes a compelling image of what our future could be like	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

8. Challenges people to try out new and innovative ways to do their work	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
9. Actively listens to diverse points of view	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
10. Makes it a point to let people know about his/her confidence in their abilities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11. Follows through on promises and commitments he/she makes	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
12. Appeals to others to share an exciting dream of the future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
13. Searches outside the formal boundaries of his/her organization for innovative ways to improve what we do	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
14. Treats others with dignity and respect	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
15. Makes sure that people are creatively rewarded for their contributions to the success of projects	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
16. Asks for feedback on how his/her actions affect other people's performance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
17. Shows others how their long-term interests can be realized by enlisting in a common vision	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
18. Asks "What can we learn?" when things don't go as expected	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
19. Supports the decisions that people make on their own	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
20. Publicly recognizes people who exemplify commitment to shared values	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
21. Builds consensus around a common set of values for running our organization	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
22. Paints the "big picture" of what we aspire to accomplish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
23. Makes certain that we set achievable goals, make concrete plans, and establish measurable milestones for the projects and programs that we work on	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
24. Gives people a great deal of freedom and choice in deciding how to do their work	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
25. Finds ways to celebrate accomplishments	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

26. Is clear about his/her philosophy of leadership	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
27. Speaks with genuine conviction about the higher meaning and purpose of our work	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
28. Experiments and takes risks, even when there is a chance of failure	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
29. Ensures that people grow in their jobs by learning new skills and developing themselves	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
30. Gives the members of the team lots of appreciation and support for their contributions	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Appendix B: Five Leadership Practices

Encouraging the Heart

5. Encourages other people

10. Recognizes people's contributions

15. Praises people for job well done

20. Gives support and appreciation

25. Finds ways to publicly celebrate

30. Tells others about group's good work

Modeling the Way

4. Shares beliefs about leading

9. Breaks projects into steps

14. Sets personal example

19. Talks about guiding values

24. Follows through on promises

29. Sets clear goals and plans

Enabling Others to Act

3. Includes other in planning

8. Treats others with respect

13. Supports decisions of others

18. Fosters cooperative relationships

23. Provides freedom and choice

28. Lets others lead

Inspiring a Shared Vision

2. Describes ideal capabilities

7. Looks ahead and communicates future

12. Upbeat and positive communicator

17. Finds common ground

22. Communicates purpose and meaning

27. Enthusiastic about possibilities

Challenging the Process

1. Seeks challenge

6. Keeps current

11. Initiates experiment

16. Looks way to improve

21. Asks "what can we learn?"

26. Lets others take risks

Female Genital Mutilation, Political Corruption, and Women's Rights in Saida Hagi Dirie Herzi's "Against the Pleasure Principle,", "Government by Magic Spell", and "The Barren Stick"

✍ **Helmi Ben Meriem**

Abstract

This paper is a study of Somali fiction writer Saida Hagi Dirie Herzi's three short stories: "Against The Pleasure Principle" (1990), which is about female genital mutilation; "Government By Magic Spell" (1992), which is a criticism of the political corruption; and "The Barren Stick" (2002), which is the story of the strife of a woman in her two marriages.

Saida Hagi Dirie Herzi's stories delve into the intricacies of several burning issues. It can be described as a treatise advocating for deserting the old ways as the only way to move forward and bring peace and harmony to both the individual and to the Somali society as a whole. Her short stories have one theme in common: the desire for positive change aimed at transforming Somalia into a country characterized by basic human rights and an emphasize on political institutions based on rule of law.

Keywords: Somali, women issue, political corruption, Saida Hagi Dirie Herzi, female circumcision.

> *"Suugaanta ama fannaaniintu, waqti kasta oo la joogo, sida jaraa'idka oo kale hadba wixii dalkooda ka dhaca ayay wax ka tiriyaan."*
>
> *Abwaan Cabdi Muxumud Amiin 31*

I-Introduction

Saida Hagi Dirie Herzi[1] writes fiction imprinted with a commitment to the betterment of her Somali society, especially the condition of women; her stories speak against traditional cultures but also articulate a different better Somalia. The three short stories revolve around women's rights, female genital mutilation and politics of corruption. The common theme of these three stories is the desire for positive change.

The following thematic study examines the inscriptions of these burning issues in the fictional texts at the time of their composition. It is worth mentioning /It has not escaped our notice that Somalia continues to suffer from politics of corruption severely while there are ameliorations in varying degrees in the other issues.

From the confines of traditional homes to the open space of Mogadishu and then to a metropolitan city in the West, the desire for change keeps the characters moving on their separate but interlinked paths towards a world-view that accepts and sustains differences; change is knitted from the private space upwards and outwards to the public space where small individual desires for change meet consolidating each other's yearning for an alternative reality. The women-protagonists of the three stories present the reader with Somalis bringing to the foreground a change that extends beyond the limits of the nuclear family.

Saida Hagi Dirie Herzi, born in Mogadishu in the 1950s, is one of the first Somali woman writers to use English as a medium of creative expression. She holds a B.A. in English literature from King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah and a MA from the American University in Cairo, and taught at King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah. She has two sons and two daughters and lives between the UK, the USA, Kenya, and Somalia (Achebe 198; Langer 320).

Saida Herzi is the author of three short stories: "Against The Pleasure Principle" (1990), which is about female genital mutilation; "Government by Magic Spell" (1992), which is about politics of corruption which exploits the negative primordial cultures or deviances in the society; and "The Barren Stick" (2002), which is the story of the strife of a woman in her two marriages.

II- Female Genital Mutilation in "Against the Pleasure Principle"

 "Against the Pleasure Principle"[2] is described by French scholar Marie-Louise Mallet as a "nouvelle autobiographique [où] Rahma [est] l'alter ego de Hagi-Dirie Herzi" (343), which suggests that Saida Herzi herself might have being influenced by her own life in writing this short story.

 "Against The Pleasure Principle" is the story of Rahma, a pregnant Somali newly-wed of twenty-three who is thrilled at the news that "her husband had been awarded a scholarship to one of the Ivy-league universities in the United States" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 244); to move from Somalia to the USA carries with it many benefits including better education, better housing, and superior health care to that available in Somalia. Rahma is not only "all excitement" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 244) because of her husband's scholarship but also because "she was going to have her baby—the first—in the US" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 244); from this, one gathers that Rahma believes that she and her yet-to-be-born child will

be offered the "best medical care in the world" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 244), which, in the case of Rahma, is something worth having—indeed highly required, as will be stressed subsequently.

Nonetheless, Rahma's mother objects to her daughter's travelling to the USA; initially, the reader is led to believe that the opposition of Rahma's mother stems from a fear of losing her companionship (Herzi, "Pleasure" 244). Then the reader is given more speculation about the refusal that include the fear that Rahma will not "come back at all" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 244), that she will "throw overboard the ways of [her] people and adopt the ways of the outside world" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 244), and that Rahma will act as though she was "superior to all those who stayed behind" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 244); thus Rahma's mother is presented as someone who desires to enshrine the Somali culture and beliefs in her offspring.

Eventually, the reader is confronted with another reason behind Rahma's mother's resistance to her daughter's journey to the USA; in fact, Rahma's "mother also seemed worried about Rahma having her baby in the US" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 244). Here, one is left to wonder why anyone would object to having better medical care, since "problems, if any, would be more likely to arise at home than there [USA]" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 244); but subsequently, the reader discovers that "like all women in her native setting, Rahma was circumcised" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 244). Thus, American doctors are perceived in two different manners: by Rahma as a potential help for her in delivering safely and by Rahma's mother as an impending calamity, since Rahma's circumcision, which was done at the age of four, will be discovered and might not be properly dealt with by American doctors who are unfamiliar with such condition.

What is interesting in the case of Rahma is that she was the one who 'wanted' to be circumcised and who rushed her family into circumcising her due to the "feast of circumcision" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 245). In other

words, when nine-year old Rahma's sister was about to be circumcised, the 'ritual' was surrounded by an appealing aura: "relatives were bringing gifts—sweets, cakes, various kinds of delicious drinks, trinkets; and her sister was the center of attention" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 245). Witnessing the 'feast' and the 'glamour,' Rahma feels "jealous [and] left out" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 245) and urges her mother to circumcise her. This shows how Somali families and culture lure their daughters into perceiving female genital circumcision as a celebratory event; indeed, Fadumo Korn writes in her *Born in the Big Rains* that "the girls can't wait for this day. But they don't know what they're waiting for" (41). Circumcision is given the imprint of a sacred rite of passage from childhood to adulthood, one that girls awaiting to go through it ought to want and to demand.

In fact, the act of self-sacrifice turns into a traumatic event in which the pain inflicted by the women is so immense that Rahma "passed out" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 245). The pain, which Rahma was made to suffer, is emphasized by the presence of "several women [who] were playing tin drums . . . the intent of the drums was to drown the screams that would be coming from her [Rahma's] throat in a moment" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 245); when she wakes up, Rahma realizes that "all the outer parts of her small genitals were cut off, lips, clitoris and all, and [that] the mutilated opening stitched up with a thorn" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 245).

Rahma finds that they left "a passage the size of a grain of sorghum" for passing water (Herzi, "Pleasure" 245). The society had their own standards for the size of the opening, "an opening the size of a grain of rice is considered ideal; one as big as a grain of sorghum is acceptable. However, should it turn out as big as a grain of maize, the poor girl would have to go through the ordeal a second time" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 246). In this respect, Raqiya Haji Dualeh Abdalla indicates that "the main purpose of the operation is to achieve a small opening, just big enough to permit urine and menstrual blood to flow out" (20).

Female genital mutilation is perceived by Somali society as a "measure of hygiene" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 246), but actually female genital mutilation is "if anything, anti-hygienic" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 246) because it does not allow for urine and menstrual blood to pass in a sanitary and effortless manner. Raqiya Haji Dualeh Abdalla writes that such a procedure has short-term and long-term complications including hygiene-related ones such as infection leading to *vaginitis* and retention of urine that can spread more infections throughout the genitalia (21-2).Then, what is the real reason?

The title of the short story unmistakably points to the answer: it is essentially a question of pleasure… Female circumcision is a tool for the control of women's sexuality. Mohamud Siad Togane writes in his poem "Zara," describing female circumcision: "Murdering the seat of her pleasure// . . . //to insure her virginity, her chastity, her humility//to insure our family honour and dignity" (47).

 In the case of Rahma's mother, one is confronted by two opposing views: first, she supports female genital mutilation and, second, she is afraid for the life of her daughter's unborn child if she chooses to deliver the baby outside of Somalia; "Rahma's mother . . . did not think a US doctor could be trusted to make the right cut . . . He might cut upward *and* downward [which] could mean trouble for all future deliveries" (Herzi, "Pleasure"246). The question here is: Why then would a mother, who knows the possible side effects of such an act, still support it? In fact, Rahma's mother believes in female circumcision because it is part of the culture, and the mother, been circumcised herself, would want her daughter to be like her (Herzi, "Pleasure" 248-9); ………… she even invited two circumcised Somali mothers, who lived in the USA, to warn Rahma of how they were humiliated "feeling like [like they were] freak[s]" (Herzi, "Pleasure" 248) in the land where female circumcision is not practiced.

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Nevertheless, none of the advice of her mother or the women change Rahma's thinking on female circumcision: "How much longer, she [Rahma] wondered, would the women of her culture have to endure such senseless mutilation?" (Herzi, "Pleasure"249); Rahma reasons that "though her people made believe circumcision was a religious obligation, it was really just an ugly custom that had been borrowed from ancient Egyptians" (Herzi, "Pleasure"249).

As the story reaches the end, one learns that Rahma has made up her mind that "no daughter of hers would be ever circumcised" (Herzi, "Pleasure"249); Rahma has witnessed both the pain of undergoing *'female genital mutilation'* and its effects on her life. In brief, given that this short story is written by a woman, who herself most probably underwent female circumcision; the story clearly warns against such a practice and argues for its end. Herzi's story is stitched together as a manifesto against stitching and mutilating female genitalia.

III- Politics of Corruption in "Government by Magic Spell"

Saida Hagi Dirie Herzi's second short story "Government by Magic Spell"[3] which is an exploration of Political Corruption which intertwines superstitions with clannish politics in Somalia, revolves around the figure of Halima, a Somali woman who is "possessed by a jinni" (Herzi, "Spell"94). A jinni is Arabic for a spirit, who is capable of taking over the body, mind, and at times the voice of humans; as it is the case of Halima, "possessed by the spirit of an infant, which she had stepped on by accident, one night in front of the bathroom" (Herzi, "Spell"94).

In Arabic mythology, jinnis can have some magical powers such as granting people their desires; a good example of this is the story of Aladdin and the Magic Lamp in *The Arabian Nights* where Aladin uses the jinni to acquire wealth and marry Princess Badroulbadour (116).[4]

Indeed, Saida Herzi's story follows the same trajectory where Halima's relatives use the jinni to gain power in Mogadishu; the wadaad, Somali for a religious healer, says that "the spirit was of the benevolent sort, one that was more likely to help" (Herzi, "Spell"94). In the case of Halima, her jinni is her "servant" (Herzi, "Spell" 95), who made her "experience a feeling of power, as though she could do things beyond the reach of ordinary human beings" (Herzi, "Spell" 96). Halima's jinni "came to be regarded as a blessing for her family, an asset to the whole clan" (Herzi, "Spell" 96), in which the clan manages to keep power through the jinni; another example of the use of jinni to acquire things or privileges can be found in Somali writer Yousuf Duhul's short story "The Last Morning of Buttonnose" where the protagonist Ahmed "wished he had the lamp [Aladin's lamp]. The first order he would give to the jinnee would be to teach him to read" (18).

British scholar Catherine Lynette Innes describes Herzi's story as an example of narratives which are "thinly veiled allegories or documentaries" (6); in fact, one can argue that Saida Herzi's story is a criticism of dictatorship. In her story, Saida Herzi points to the fact that ruling politicians resorted to anything to keep power by any means; Halima's jinni was to be used to "protect the clan and to ensure its continued domination" (Herzi, "Spell" 97). This was done in two forms: "tahleel" and "annual sacrifices" (Herzi, "Spell" 97).

On the one hand, tahleel consists of "a special type of water, over which certain rituals were performed" (Herzi, "Spell" 97).[5] In the case of Halima's tahleel, its function is "to cure people of curiosity" (Herzi, "Spell" 98); upon drinking it, people "stopped wondering about the actions of the clan's leading men. They became model subjects doing without questions . . . what they were told" (Herzi, "Spell" 98). Thus, Halima's tahleel made people "docile" (136), using Michel Foucault's

notion; they were "subjected, used, transformed and improved" (136) in accordance with the interest of the ruling politicians.

Eventually, thanks to Halima's tahleel and sacrifices, "the men of the clan continue to govern with the help of Halima's magic spell" (Herzi, "Spell"99); were one to summarize Herzi's story, it can be described as a call for Somali society to free itself of superstitions and to reshape Somali politics outside of corruption and tribal paradigm.

IV- Women's Mistreatment in "The Barren Stick"

"The Barren Stick,"[6] a first person narrative, is Herzi's latest short story to be published; it chronicles the life of Sharifa, her two marriages, and her struggle to bear a child. The story foregrounds the issues of women's rights and subjection in a patriarchal environment. The story starts with Sharifa's declaration that "… one is lucky to be born male. Girls are thought of as lost labour" (Herzi, "Barren" 217).

This subjection of Somali girls and women takes on an economic aspect, one that perceives sin women a lost economic potential. Traditional Somali families perceive girls as being only "expensive to raise" (Herzi, "Barren" 217) without a possible repayment.

Moreover, the mistreatment against Somali girls is also based on a fear of premarital sex: "They [girls] are trouble because they may bring shame to their family, if God forbid they may bring an illegitimate child into the house" (Herzi, "Barren" 217).

In a traditional society where "women's rights under [the patriarchal] customary law are limited" (Musse Ahmed 57), a woman does not choose her partner; this environment is what Ladan Affi calls "the master gender narrative" (92). It is no surprise then that Sharifa states that "the value of

a girl, like that of a cow, is based on her ability to work and to produce offspring. Preferably male offspring" (Herzi, "Barren" 218).

In her family, Sharifa is mistreated, in which her family "was determined to get as much as possible out of [her]" in terms of work (Herzi, "Barren" 217). "Long before [her] bones had grown strong, [she] was made to carry water over long distances, bring firewood and pound grain" (Herzi, "Barren" 217). At this younger age and given that her body is not fully grown, the other activities assigned to Sharifa, which also include "planting," "harvesting," and "work[ing] in the fields from dawn to dusk" (Herzi, "Barren" 217).

For Sharifa, the only escape from the tyranny of the family is to enter the institution of marriage, because she is well aware that her current situation within the family house is not going to change for the better. This quasi-escape can only be sanctioned by Sharifa's male relatives who:

> Often [were] talking about what they would get as my dowry. Father would say, "If we are lucky we will get ten cows," and one of my brothers would interrupt, "No way, this can't be, we only have one and we should try to get as many as twenty." (Herzi, "Barren" 218)

It is significant here that Sharifa has no say in the decision making about her marriage. Not only is she written out of the history of her society, as Affi describes the situation of Somali women in traditional settings (91), but Sharifa is also written out of the construction of her own future and is denied the right to decide on any of the decisions related to her marriage. The issue of dowry is essentially about Sharifa's family acquiring as much wealth as they can to compensate for Sharifa as "lost labor" (Herzi, "Barren" 217). It is, indeed, because of the bride-price that Sharifa's family do not mind marrying her at the age of thirteen to "a widower [her]

father's age [who] had just lost his wife and needed someone to take care of him and his children" (Herzi, "Barren" 218). The "greed" of Sharifa's family (Herzi, "Barren" 218) makes of her as a maid in her husband's house not his partner.

During her preparations for her marriage, Sharifa is asked "to gather the sticks with which [her] husband would beat" her (Herzi, "Barren" 218); Sharifa explains that since most girls "marry young, [they] have to be beaten to become good and obedient" (Herzi, "Barren" 218), making her an accomplice in the very violence she will have to endure. As a matter of fact, in a Somali buraanbur, a mother tells her daughter of the same practice that Sharifa describes:

> hangool ku yadhiyoo hawsha kugu dilaa
>
> misana adigoon wax dhimin, aabi kugu dilaa
>
> A hooked stick he may ask you to fetch
>
> To beat you with for mistakes minor you make or for no cause at all. (qtd. in Hanghe 34)[7]

Since "women [like Sharifa] wish to free themselves from the burden of such degrading work [in their families' households] by making a good marriage" (Dualeh Abdalla 58), they also have to accept to be physically mistreated by their husbands; it is a matter of exchanging authorities, replacing the father and other male relatives by the husband. The mother in the buraanbur attempts at "preparing [her daughter] for the severity of life" as a wife (Affi 95).

Sharifa's situation in her husband's home is not much different from that in her family's home: "Nothing ever pleased my husband" (Herzi, "Barren" 218). Her husband's attitudes towards her are driven by his "fond[ness] of saying: 'Women were created from the crooked rib of Adam, and they should be straightened out'" (Herzi, "Barren" 218-9). By

insisting on Sharifa being "trained another way by [her] husband," as different to her training by her family (Herzi, "Barren" 219), Sharifa's husband is, in fact, going against the wisdom of the Somali proverb which indicate that "anyone who tries to straighten it, breaks it" (qtd. in Farah, *Crooked Rib* 1; qtd. in AlSayed 120). His desire to shape Sharifa into what he perceives to be the perfect image of being a woman is solely his to govern and construct.

In the midst of this repressive environment, the sticks, which Sharifa has collected prior to her marriage, are used by her husband to inflict pain on her: "Beating me seemed the only thing that gave him any pleasure . . . scars on my face and the limp on my hip" (Herzi, "Barren" 219); whatever Sharifa does or does not, she gets beaten, attesting to the observation by the narrator in Yasmeen Maxamuud's Nomad Diaries (2009): "Any abuse from husband to wife was abuse the wife invited in some way or another" (27). Sharifa's marriage, marred by physical violence, is to Sharifa's shock perceived by other Somali women as the sign of a man's love: "They [other Somali women] believe that the more you are loved, the more you are beaten [. . .] refer[ring] to it with pride" (Herzi, "Barren" 219).Sharifa's rejection of such perception of physical violence makes her an oddity within her community; she would ask other women: "Do you call these scars signs of love? Any more signs like these and we will all be dead" (Herzi, "Barren" 219). In the case of Sharifa, domestic violence is socially sanctioned since she was in advance asked to collect sticks, the very tool used in inflicting violence.

Sharifa's situation worsens when, as she describes it, "I could not bear children. That made my husband hates me. He felt cheated. There was no return for all that he invested in me" (Herzi, "Barren" 219). Since Sharifa is located in a traditionalist environment where the "position of the woman is entirely dependent [on the man]" (Dualeh Abdalla 58), her position within her husband's house witnesses a shift that is centered on

her inability to procreate, resulting in her husband marrying again. The power dialectics in this relationship favor Sharifa's husband who eventually marries two other women and begets children; once he has definitely established that it is Sharifa who cannot bear children, he divorces her by saying "You are divorced [. . .] three times" (Herzi, "Barren" 219-20).

After divorce, Sharifa was forced to return to her family's house where her "brothers did not want" her and where her "parents had died" (Herzi, "Barren" 220). Upon her divorce, Sharifa thought that she "would be glad to be free, but being home with [her] family was hardly any better" (Herzi, "Barren" 220). At the center of her brothers' discontent with her is that "they had to give back half of the dowry [. . .] and were afraid that Sharifa "might claim [her] share of what they had inherited of livestock and land" (Herzi, "Barren" 220); her brothers are clearly motivated by financial considerations in their unhappiness with Sharifa's return to the family. Sharifa's return is considered a financial burden to her brothers because it means that there is one more person to support and also due to the dowry reimbursement. Sharifa's brothers unanimously perceive Sharifa as a loss on all levels: "The waste of it! Anything given to a woman would be wasted, just as she herself is a waste," Sharifa's brothers used to tell her (Herzi, "Barren" 220).

Sharifa's brothers married her to "the first man that passed through [the] village" (Herzi, "Barren" 220), ending the two-month period of squandering their savings on Sharifa. Within this new marriage, Sharifa states that "the routine of work [in her second husband's house] from dawn to dusk [was] punctuated by the occasional beating. This man was gentler" (Herzi, "Barren" 220). Odd as it may be, Sharifa sets a comparison between the beating from her former and her current husband; being a woman in traditional society explains such peculiar

comment by Sharifa in that she knows that the beating is inevitable, thus she might as well appreciate the gentler beating.

When her new husband, the witch-doctor of the village, discovers that she cannot bear him children, he makes her "drink countless cups of ostrich oil [,] vile-tasting concoctions made of herbs, roots and all sorts of other things I could not name" (Herzi, "Barren" 220-1). Eventually, Sharifa becomes pregnant and her husband "prophesie[s] that [she] would give birth to a boy who would inherit his profession" (Herzi, "Barren" 221). Unfortunately, the prophesy turns to be erroneous as Sharifa gives birth to a stillborn baby who was immediately buried indicating the end of any hope for Sharifa ever being a mother (Herzi, "Barren" 221). The reader is left to speculate on Sharifa's fate: Will she be divorced? Indeed, given that Sharifa indicates earlier in the story that has she not got pregnant, "people would lose faith in his [her husband] curing skills, and his credibility as well as his income would suffer" (Herzi, "Barren" 220), it is most likely that she would be divorced as the death of her baby equals the failure of her husband, the witch-doctor.

V-Conclusion

Saida Hagi Dirie Herzi's three stories delve into the intricacies of three burning issues affecting either one segment of the population or the whole population; deserting the old ways of denying women their rights, of female genital mutilation, and of superstitions and clannish politics is the only way to move forward and bring peace and harmony to both the individual and to the Somali society as a whole. Herzi's commitment is evident in her call to address, criticize, and move beyond the plagues annoying Somali society.

Notes.

[1] Through a careful evaluation of limited biographical material, the author of this article believes that Saida Hagi Dirie Herzi is the daughter of Hagi Dirie Hirsi (1905-1976), a prominent Somali businessman, nationalist and member of the Somali Youth League (SYL) (1943-1969). In 1935, Hagi Dirie Hirsi married Hawa Hirsi Nur who gave birth to Saida, Ahmed, Shamsa, Asha, Habib, Amina, Kamar and Abdisalam. Hirsi's daughter, Saida, went to Cairo and Jeddah to study English literature, which corresponds to Saida Hagi-Dirie Herzi's own life (Lange n.p.). Herzi and Hirsi are two spellings of the same name. Saida Hagi Dirie Herzi born in Mogadishu in the 1950s.

[2] "Against the Pleasure Principle" was first published in Index on Censorship in October 1990. The story was subsequently republished in 'Daughters of Africa: An International Anthology of Words and Writings by Women of African Descent from the Ancient Egyptian to the Present' (1992, pages 777-81); 'A Map of Hope: Women's Writing on Human Rights: An International Literary Anthology' (1999, pages 244-9); 'Crossing the Border: Voices of Refugee and Exiled Women' (2002, pages 162-9); and 'Half a Day and Other Stories: An Anthology of Short Stories from North Eastern and Eastern Africa' (2004, pages 70-7). All editions of the story are the same. This essay uses the one in 'A Map of Hope: Women's Writing on Human Rights: An International Literary Anthology'.

[3] "Government by Magic Spell" was first published in The Heinemann Book of Contemporary African Short Stories (1992, pages 94-9). The story was subsequently republished in The Torn Veil: And Other Womens' Short Stories from the Continent of Africa (1998, pages 52-6); and Half a Day and Other Stories: An Anthology of Short Stories from North Eastern and Eastern Africa (2004, pages 78-84). All editions of the story are the same. This essay uses the one in The Heinemann Book of Contemporary African Short Stories.

[4] As told in Adam Gottlob Oehlenschläger's Aladdin, or, the Wonderful Lamp: A Dramatic Poem in Two Parts (1863).

[5] For other depictions of tahleel in Somali fiction, please refer first to Abdi-Noor Haji Mohamed's A Cargo of Guilt, in which Hooyo Magaado brings back a tahliil (100) in order to save her daughter Safi from a mysterious sickness (the

tahleel, its rationale and its effects are closely described from page 100 to page 104.Tahleel and tahliil are two different spellings of the same procedure).

[6] "The Barren Stick" was first and only published in 'Crossing the Border: Voices of Refugee and Exiled Women' (2002, pages 217-21).

[7] The song is entitled "The duties of a young wife", it is song #23 of Folk Songs from Somalia). In the introduction of this song, Xaange said "In this buraanbur work song the mother is describing the difficult domestic work which her daughter has to carry out in her own household when she is married, emphasizing that the young wife would have to stand on her own in the management of her domestic affairs without relying on other women, not even on her own mother" (Hanghe 34).

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Lafaguridda Sheekada Habeen-Eersi

✎ Cabdullaahi Sh. Cabdi "Gacanka"

Gundhig

*Kani waa qoraal aan ku lafagurayno sheekada 'Habeen-Eersi', oo ah
sheeko gaaban oo ay qortay Dayax Axmed Maxamed. Dayax waa gabar
dhallinyaro ah, buugga 'Habeen-Eersi'-na waa buuggeedii ugu
horreeyay ee ay daabacdo.*

*Sheekadan 'Habeen-Eersi' waxay ku socotaa gabar qoyskoodu jeclaa,
aadna loogu hanweynaa, hase yeeshee, haasaawe dhallinyarannimo uu
jiitay! Ugu dambayntiina eersatay habeen, himiladeedii ka dhigay hal
bacaad lagu lisay, nolosheediina u rogay silic iyo saxariir ay aakhirkii u
god gashay. Sheekadani waxay xambaarsan tahay dhambaal iyo
farshaxannimo mudan in la gorfeeyo.*

I- Hordhac

Lafaguridda buuggu waa ereybixin loo xushay in loo adeegsado gorfaynta buugga iyo shansho-dhuuxidda tayadiisa dhigaaleed. Lafaguridda sheekooyinku waxay kaalin weyn ka geysan kartaa kor u qaadidda tayada qoraalka iyo hibada dhigaaleed ee qalinleyda. Lafagurka sheekooyinku waa arrin ku yar amaba ugub ku ah suugaanta Soomaalida, aadse loogu baahan yahay.

Muddadan dambe waxaa geyiga Soomaaliyeed isa soo tarayay dhiganeyaasha Af Soomaaliga ku qoran, oo sida muuqata, sannadba sannadka ka dambeeya tiradoodu sare u kacayso. Badiba dhiganeyaashani waa qalinkii hal`abuur dhallinyaro ah. Arrintan waxaa dhiirrigelinteeda kaalin muuqata ka geystay bandhigyada buugaagta sannadlaha ah ee ku soo badanaya magaalooyinka Soomaalida, sida: Hargeysa, Muqdisho, Garoowe iyo Kismaayo.

Buugaagtan tiro ahaan soo kordhaya, waxaa lagama maarmaan ah in lagu kaabo arrimo tayayntooda gacan ka gaysta. Lafaguridda buuggu waxay qayblibaax ka qaadataa kobcinta iyo tayaynta hal`abuurka qoran, iyo weliba dhiirrigelinta akhrintiisa.

Lafaguriddan buugga 'Habeen-Eersi', waa taas ta ay daaran tahay.

Buugga 'Habeen-Eersi' waa buug sheeko gaaban ah, wuxuuna ka kooban yahay 80 bog, waxaa qoray Dayax Axmed Maxamed.[1] Buugga 'Habeen-Eersi' waa buuggeedii koowaad, daabacaaddiisii 1aad waxay soo baxday Sebtembar 2016, halka daabacaaddiisii 3aadna soo baxday Maarso 2018; muddo sannad iyo bar gudaheed ah ayaa saddex jeer la daabacay. Halkaas waxaa ka cad sida akhristayaashu u xiiseeyeen sheekadan.[2]

Lafaguriddan buugga 'Habeen-Eersi', ugu horeyn waxaan ku soo bandhigay barnaamijka 'Madasha AGA' oo ay qabanqaabisay

Akadeemiya-Goboleedka AfSoomaaligu [AGA[, oo Muqdisho lagu qabtay 28/3/2018. [3] Buugga aan lafaguriddan tixraacnay waa kan daabacaadda 3aad.

II- Milicsi Guud

Sheekadani waxay ku socotaa gabar qoyskoodu wada jecel yahay, oo ay ula baxeen Ubax. Ubax waa gabar da'dii hanaqaadka ku jirta, qoyskeedu aad ugu hanweyn yahay, iyaduna hiigsanaysa nolol heer sare ah oo ay ku naallooto. Dhanka kale, haasaawe dhalinyarannimo ayaa Ubax hareeyay… *"Markii aan kacaamay waxaan u laabkacay shukaansi iyo jaceyl, oo waxaan aad ugu milmay dhallinta aan isku da`da nahay"* *(bogga 9).*

Laakiin, sida hal bacaad lagu lisay ayay himiladii Ubax hawada u kala raacday, una beenowday. Ubax waxay eersatay haasaawihii dhallinyarannimada iyo habeen ay sinbiriirixatay. Habeen uu hoday beerlaxawsiga inan rag oo u falay dhabbadii guuldarradeeda. Ubax markii ay is ogaatay in talo faraheeda ka baxday ayay miciinbidday oohin iyo shalaytiyo aan u soo celinaynin wixii kaga ba'ay dabinka ay ku dhacday habeenkaa madow, kuna weyday sharafteedii gabarnimo.

Eelkii ka dhashay habeenkaasi wuxuu Ubax baday in ay ku hungowdo nolosha. Waxay mudatay ciriiri, silic iyo saxariir adduun. In lagu wiirsado mooyee turaal way ka weyday bulshada ay la noolayd, walaal iyo waalid, xigto iyo xigaalo kii ay tahayba. Nabarradii ka soo gaaray mashaqadaas ayay aakhirkiina u geeriyootay.

III- Dhambaal Mug leh

Gabar waliba waa inay iska hubsato tallaabada ay qaadayso iyo halka ay dhigayso; ka fiirsato mustaqbalkeeda, kana digtoonaato simbiriirixasho ay sahal ugu dhacdo. Waa inayna ku hodmin haasaawe dhallinyarannimo

beerlaxawsi huwan. Waa kaas dhambaalka mugga leh ee ay sheekadani si farshaxannimo iyo saamayn leh u tebinayso.

'Habeen-Eersi' waxay hogatusaalaynaysaa in gabdhuhu ay ka feejignaadaan jaceylka beenta ah ee ay dhallinta qaarkood ku hodaan si ay ceydhiinka ugu loogtaan. Gabdhuhu waa inay maanka ku hayaan *'Lax waliba shillalka ay is dhigto ayaa lagu gowracaa'*. Hadhow, shallaay iyo baroor waxba tari maayaan. Dhinaca kalena, haddii gabari ay sinbiriirixooto, waxaa la gudboon in aanay quusan oo ay ku dadaasho sidii ay mar kale dib ugu dhisi lahayd sharafteedii cadhowday, isuguna dhiibin niyadjab iyo rajobeel nolosheeda burburiya.

IV- Farshaxannimada qoraalka

Sheekadan 'Habeen-Eersi' waxay huwan tahay farshaxannimo ay ku ammaanan tahay. Haddaanse mid iyo laba ka soo qaato, waxaan si gaar ah ugu ammaani lahaa qodobbadan:

Magac ilqabad leh: Habeen-Eersi, magaca sheekada la siiyay, waa mid kooban oo ilqabad leh, huwan macne gun dheer oo saamayn leh, ka tarjumaya dulucda iyo dhambaalka ay sheekadu tebinayso. Xulashada magacan waa lala helay!

Bilow iyo ebyid tayo leh: Waxay sheekadu ku bilaabantay *"Han iyo himilo wanaagsan oo ay ii qabto awgeed ayay hooyaday iigu heestay Ubax, aabbahayna iigu wanqalay!! Waxaan ahay gabar ay aad u jecel yihiin xubnaha kala duwan ee qoyskoodu."*(bogga 9); Waa hab-bilow toos ah, soo-jiidasho leh, markiibana la jaanqaadaya dhambaalka ay sheekadu tebinayso.

Qoraagu wuxuu sheekada ku soo ebyay *"Noloshaas dhan ee qadhaadhka badan ee Ubax iyo Nashaad soo mareen halkee bay ka bilaabantay? Raaxo aan lagu waarayn oo habeen ah miyaa? Habeenkaasi imisa*

habeen oo qadhaadh ayuu dhab ahaan dhalay? Imisa waji ayuu farxad ka kexeeyay? Imisa qoys oo kale ayuu saameeyay? Imisa xasuusood oo xun buu reebay?"(bogagga 76-77). Waa ebyid uu akhristuhu buugga isku laabayo isagoo dhadhansanaya farshaxannimada qoraalka, saamaynna uu ku reebay dhambaalka ay sheekadu tebinayso.

Dareen-curin joogto ah: Sheekadani maanka akhristaha waxay ku beeraysaa saamayn iyo xiise marba marka ka dambeeya aad sii jecleysanayso akhriskeeda, ilaa aad ka dhammaysana aadan joojin karaynin. Lama murginin dhacdooyinka sheekada, haddana xiisaheedu ma dhammaanayo. Xiisaha iyo dhadhansiga aan gurayn ee uu kugu jiidanayo akhriskeedu, waa mid uu ku ammaanan yahay buuggani.

Heerka luqadda: Heerka luqadeed ee ay sheekadu ku qoran tahay waa mid ku habboon mawduuca iyo akhristaha la filayo intaba. Qoraagu wuxuu xushay erayo tayo leh, si farshaxannimo lehna wuu isagu falkiyay; isla markaana waa luqad aan ku cuslayn dhallinyarada magaalada. Tanna waa dhibic kale oo uu ku ammaanan yahay buuggani.

Maansooyin ku dhafan dhacdooyinka: Sifaynta dhacdooyinka waxaa lagu dhafay maansooyin ku habboon, sida:
"Ruuxaad taqaan baa habloow, lala hadlaa uune
Hummaag beena lama haybsadiyo, hayjad oomane e" (21).

Tixahan dhacdooyinka ku dhafani waxay tayeeyeen sheekada, aadna way u bileen hogatusaha farriinta ay gudbineyso.

V- Maxaan saluugay?

Waa hawl Aadane iyo caadadeede, sheekadan wax lagu saluugaa wuu jirayaa. Sheekadan 'Habeen-eersi' haddii aan ka fiirinno dhinacyada hab-qoraaleedka sheekada iyo suurtagalnimada dhacdooyinkeeda, waxaa

innoo muuqan kara dhaliilo kooban oo ay sheekadu leedahay. Bal aan yara taabto.

Habka werinta: Dhacdooyinka sheekadu, badiba, waxay ku socdaan werin uu qoraagu kaga sheekeynayo Ubax, gabadha ay sheekadu ku socoto. Qaab-dhigaalkan werinta ku dhisani wuxuu meesha ka saaray, kala saafidda hadallada dhexmaraya shaqsiyaadka qaybta ka ah sheekada. Habkan werintu waxa uu hoos u dhigayaa dhadhanka iyo toolmoonida sheekadu ay u yeelan lahayd akhristaha.

Suurtagalnimada Sheekada: Dhacdooyinka ay sheekadu werineyso waa kuwo dhab ahaan u jiri kara, oo ka dhex dhaca bulshada. Balse, dhacdooyinka qaarkood ayaa ka baxaya tilmaantaas guud, oo mugdi fuulayaa suurtagelnimadooda.

Aniga, waxaa iga soo booday laba dhacdo, oo maskaxdaydu diiday inay sidaa u dhici karaan. Tan hore waa 'foosha Ubax'; oo inta ay qol isku soo xirtay deedna saddex maalmood ka dib keligeed umushay, *"Waxaa soo baxday ukuntii bilaa arxanka ahayd ee ii jiiftay uurka, oo aan dhalayba."* *(31).* Xusuusnow, Ubax waxay ahayd inan ugub ah! Su`aal ayaa fuulaysa suurtagelnimada arrinkan. Tan kale, waa 'diidmada Ubax', ay diiday inay sheegto ninka uureeyay! *"Balse qidhim ka dhigay oo waan diiday, in aan sheego ninka iga dhalay ilmaha yar"* (33). Xaaladda ay Ubax ku jirtay, diidmadani maaha mid maangal ah, sidaas darteed, waxay mugdi gelinaysaa suurtagalnimada dhacdadan.

VI- Gunaanad

Sheekadan Habeen-Eersi waa sheeko gaaban oo dhaxalgal ah. sheeko qoraal ahaan kooban, si buuxda oo farshannimo lehna u soo tebinaysa fikrad cuddoon iyo dhambaal togane ah; ku dhisan mushkilad bulshada ka dhex dhacda una baahan wacyigelin; akhristaha u kordhinaysa waayo-

aragnimo, bulshada Soomaaliyeedna u adkaynaysa *'qiyamka'* iyo akhlaaqda ay ku dhisan tahay.

Sheekadani waxay ku ammaanan tahay qotadheerida fikradeed iyo quruxda falsafadeed ee lagu dhisay, iyo sida farshaxannimada leh ee laysugu sargooyay hufnaanta xabkada sheekada iyo dhacda werinteeda.

Sheekadan Habeen-Eersi, waxaa ka muuqda goldaloollo kooban, waase goldaloollo aan hoos u dhigayn farshaxannimada iyo quruxdeeda faneed, waxna aan u dhimayn dulucda iyo dhambaalka ay tebinayso midna!

Tilmaamo

1. Dayax Axmed Maxamed, waa qoraa da` yar, ku dhalatay Muqdisho. Waxbarashadeeda waxay ku qaadatay magaalooyinka Boosaaso iyo Hargeysa; waxayna shahaadada heerka koowaad 'Bachelor' ka qaadatay Jaamacadda Hargeysa, kulliyadda Daraasaadka Islaamka 2013. Habeen-eersi ka sokow, Dayax waxay qortay maqaallo iyo dhawr buug oo aan weli la daabicin.

2. Muddadan kooban ee buuggani qornaa, laga soo bilaabo Sebtembar 2016, waxaa lagu soo bandhigay sagaal magaalo oo kala ah: Hargeysa, Boosaaso, Muqdisho, Gaalkacyo, Qardho, Garoowe, Laascaanood, Buuhoodle iyo Kismaayo. Waxaa ka mid ahaa afar xarumo jaamacadeed. Sidoo kale, saddex sanno oo is xigta, buuggan waxaa lagu soo bandhigay saddex bandhig buugeed: Bandhigga Buugaagta Garoowe 2016; Bandhigga Buugaagta Muqdisho 2017; iyo Bandhigga Buugaagta Kismaayo 2018.

3. Madashan lagu lafagurayay buugga 'Habeen-Eersi' waxaa lagu soo bandhigay saddex daraaso lafagurid ah oo ay sameeyeen saddex aqoonyahan. Qoraalkan ka sokow, waxaa kale oo lagu soo bandhigay laba daraaso lafagurid ah oo ay soo kala gudbiyeen Mustafa Fayruus iyo Saynab Xaaji Axmed. Sidoo kale waxaa goobta ku faalleeyay buuggan aqoonyahanno, masuuliin, abwaanno, qalinlay iyo akhristayaal kala duwan, oo madasha ka soo qaybgalay.

Gurayare Dameerkaygow!

✒ Siciid Maxamed Cali "Xarawo"

Tixdan

Dameerku inkasta oo uu ka mid yahay gaadiidka iyo gammaanka Soomaalidu ku manaafacaadsato, haddana, maansooyin u dhigma faa`iidadaa lagama curin.

Tixdan "Gurayare Dameerkaygow", ee uu tiriyay abwaan Saciid Maxamed "Xarawo", wuxuu tilmaamayaa, kuna ammaanayaa, waxtarka dameerku leeyahay iyo dheefta lagu qabo. Tixdan kama muuqato buunbuunin iyo faan dheeraad ah, abwaanku wuxuu ku kaaftoomay inuu dameerka ku ammaano dheeftiisa iyo waxa uu yahay keliya.

Waxa uu ku ammaanay inuu yahay gaadiid 'baladi' ah oo aan dibadda laga soo dhoofin, kuna shaqaynin shidaal dibadda laga keeno, ee uu quuto cawska dalka ka baxa. Waxa uu sheegay in dameerku qabto hawlo kala duwan, sida inuu yahay gaadiid la fuulo, la rarto, biyo lagu dhaamiyo. Waa gaadiid la adeegsado isagoo sidiisa 'cadaysimo' u ah ama lagu xiriiriyo karreeto (gaari-dameer) iwm.

Abwaanku wuxuu dameerkiisa ku ammaanay in uu carruurta la koriyo, oo uu yahay isha dhaqaalaha reerka. Sidaas darteedna, uu ugu abaalgudayo ammaan faafta oo diiwaanka gasha.

Saciid Xarawo waxa uu heestan kaga qaybgalay tartan suugaaneed ay qabatay Idaacadda BBC sannadkii 1990, waxayna gashay kaalinteeda.

1. Gurayare dameerkaygow
2. Gaadiidkii dhaqankaygow
3. Geyi kale kamaad iman
4. Gacal ila shaqeeyoo
5. Ii gargaara baad tahay,
6. Misna guuto aan dhalay
7. Gurmadkoodii baad tahaye!!

Heey jac … jac …. Jac!!!

8. Gurayare dameerkaygow
9. Marka aan gadhkaaga iyo
10. Gawsaha bir kuu sudho oo
11. Xakamaha ku giijiyoo
12. Gaadhi kugu xidhiidhiyo
13. Guudkaagu waa dahabe!!

Heey jac … jac …. Jac!!!

14. Gurayare dameerkaygow
15. Geenyo faras ka roonoow
16. Markaad waajib gudataa baa
17. intii calafku ii galo
18. Guulle loogu mahadiyaa!!

Heey jac … jac …. Jac!!!

19. Gurayare dameerkaygow
20. Giddi maalin iyo leyleey
21. Alaabada intaad guri
22. marna biyaha guryaha geynee
23. Marna beer galley aad fali

24. Shidaal kuuma an gadee
25. Gasiinkaagu waa cawsee!!

Heey jac … jac …. Jac!!!

26. Gurayare dameerkaygow
27. Gaajada xanuunka leh
28. Gaashaanka caabbiyaa
29. Garbahaaga weeyoo
30. Waxaad gasho, waxaad guddo
31. Ammaan gaar ahaaneed baan
32. Diiwaanka kuu gelin
33. Adduunyada ha gaartee!

Heey jac … jac …. Jac!!!

— O —