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Primary School Enrolment in Somalia: What are the Enabling or Hindering Factors?


Abdullahi Mohamoud Mohamed
John Momanyi Ongubo

Abstract

Somalia has one of the lowest primary school enrollment rates in Africa. This article analyzes the determinants of raising primary school enrollment in Somalia. The authors are focused on primary school enrollment of children aged between 6 and 14 years, and have engaged on pertinent aspects such as: child age, parental education, family size, wealth. Regional disparities also have a stake in enrollment of children to primary schools.

The authors are calling for policy interventions focusing on increasing adult literacy and income of households in rural and urban areas of Somalia to enhance the potential of primary school enrollment. It's also more prevalent the interventions to target improved educational resources allocation to the regions with low enrollments to support the overall wellbeing of the society.

Keywords: Primary School, School Enrollment, Somalia, Education.

1.0 Introduction

The 1990 World Conference on Education for All held in Jomtien, Thailand set the goal that every child in every country should have the chance to complete at least a primary education by 2000 (UNESCO, 2005). This was however not achieved leading to an extension during the World Education Forum in Dakar in 2000. In the same year universal primary completion in primary and secondary education were set as Millennium Development Goals, (UNESCO, 2005).

In Africa school enrolment has been low compared to other regions of the world. Gross enrolment rates in Africa range from 160% for Madagascar to 33% for Somalia, at the bottom. Enrollment rates for some other countries of the region are as follows: Eritrea 48%, Djibouti 54%, Sudan (with South Sudan) 74%, Ethiopia 102%, Kenya 113%, Uganda 122%. There is also a difference in enrolments by gender (boys and girls); the highest gross enrolment rates for girls was in Madagascar (158) and the lowest was in Somalia (23). (World Bank, 2012).

After independence in 1960, Somalia's education sector developed rapidly. Primary and secondary schools was opened in the regions of the country. Other efforts include training of teachers, adoption of official script for Somali language, and successful implementation of an intensive government-sponsored literacy campaign for youth and adults in both rural and urban areas. Due to these efforts and free and compulsory education for children, literacy levels increased from 5 percentage in 1970 to 65 percentage in 1990.

The collapse of the state in 1991 led to division of the country into three zones namely; Puntland (PL), Somaliland (SL) and South Central (SC) zone. The national net primary school enrolment was 32 percentage in 2007. The enrolment rates seem correlate with zonal political stability.

The enrolment rates are higher in Somaliland and Puntland than in South Central. Somaliland and Puntland are politically stable unlike South Central zone which was politically unstable for a longer duration of time.

Primary schooling enrolment rate is very low in Somalia compared to other African countries. Between 2007 and 2010 the average gross primary school enrollment was; 23 percentage for girls and 42 percentage for boys well below the average primary enrollment in the continent (World Bank, 2012). A variety of factors may explain this situation including poverty and opportunity cost of child's time.

However, few studies (Moyi, 2012a, 2012b) have investigated the determinants of raising primary school enrolment decision in Somalia and there are some gaps. They focus on conflict areas only (Moyi, 2012b) or the functional form estimated omit variables such as household size and time taken to fetch water that may determine school enrollments in Somalia. Also, they do not consider the nonlinear effect of a child's age on enrollment decisions, yet previous studies, (e.g. Glick & Sahn, 2000; Mariara & Mwabu, 2007; Al-Samarrai & Reilly, 2000), show that child's age can have important nonlinear effect related to late enrollment.

Low levels of education and training attainment are considered to be a major obstacle to economic growth and development (Glick & Sahn, 2000). The problem is a major concern in conflict and post conflict countries like Somalia aiming to revive their economies.

Human capital is considered as a means of increasing productivity and economic growth. One source of human capital is education which generates monetary and non-monetary benefits (Schultz, 2004). The new growth theory views human capital as knowledge and ideas which are non-rival and partly excludable, and a source of endogenous growth. Endogenous growth theory holds that investment in human capital

significantly contributes to long-run economic growth. Becker (1964) & Schultz (1961) argue that education is the major source of human capital. Investing in education generates monetary and non-monetary benefits to a country's economic development process. The monetary benefits include greater productivity, higher earnings to the educated and economic growth (Riddell, 2005). The non-monetary benefits on the other hand include improvements in health care, reduction in income inequality, poverty reduction as well as crime reduction (Glick & Sahn, 2000).

This paper focuses on primary education enrollment in Somalia. It aims to identify the factors influencing the raising or hindering of primary school enrollment in Somalia, examines differences in primary school enrollment and draws policy implications based on the findings of this study in order to raise the enrollment rate.

2.0 Education and Schooling Factors

After the collapse of Somali State and total dismissing of the national education service in Somalia, efforts were inaugurated by the local communities and scholars, and began to reopen schools, particularly in urban centers in the early 1993. The situation of education in Somalia varies depending on the region, and is somewhat better in Somaliland and Puntland. Most of the schools can function based on school fees paid by parents, donations from Somalis living abroad and development agencies.

Challenges to access education in Somalia are multifaceted; ranging from the affordability as Somalia falls among the low level income countries in the Sub Saharan Africa recording limited chances for a child to be enrolled early in primary school. Besides there is poor school environment, crowded classes and poor quality of school services which are among the challenges to access for education. Limited trained

teachers are also among the main challenges in education sector in Somali.

2.1 Factors Determine Raising Primary School Enrolment

A household decision to either enroll or not to enroll a child to formal schooling is usually a function of a number of factors. Factors identified by studies include; individual, household and community characteristics Glewwe & Jacoby (1994), Gertler & Glewwe, (1990). Khandker, Lavy & Filmer (1994) classify factors determining child schooling as either demand side factors or supply side factors. Individual, household and community variables fall under the demand side factors, while access to school, and quality of schools fall under supply factors.

2.1.1 Interactions with Household Characteristics

Individual characteristics include age of the child, and age rank among siblings. The household characteristics include household size, income of the household and other assets, education of the parents, household head and composition of the household while the community characteristics include schooling quality and location productive potential.

Household size is also another significant determinant of school enrollment. Al-Samarrai & Reilly (2000) found in Tanzania positive and significant effect on primary school enrollment to a number of children in the household. The other significant determinant of school enrollment is parental education. Gertler & Glewwe (1990), Mariara & Mwabu, (2007) found similar results in rural Peru and Kenya respectively; that father's education is more important determinant of primary school enrollment than mother's education.

Age of a child is critical in primary school enrolment decision as Mariara & Mwabu (2007) found that a child's age is statically significant and positively linked to a primary school enrollment. The probability of being enrolled increases at a decreasing rate with the child age. Similarly Al Samarrai & Peasgood (1998) found in Tanzania that the probability of enrollment in primary school to be significant and positively associated with age of a child, both girls and boys. This implies that younger children are less likely to be enrolled in primary school. Ngware, Oketch & Ezeh (2008) also found a positive relation between the age of a child and primary school enrolment. Their study found that when a child's age increases by one year, then there is a 50 percentage chance of that child being enrolled to primary school in Kenya.

Household characteristics also hold importance; Moyi (2012a & 2012b) found that the probability of children from wealthier households to be enrolled in school is high. Glick & Sahn (2000) also found that there is a positive relationship between household income and children schooling in Guinea. Similarly an empirical result found in Pakistan and Peru shows that low household income is major reason leading to withdrawal of many children from schools (Ray, 2000). Glick & Sahn (2000) also found that children from those households with easier access to credit were more likely to be enrolled and to stay in school longer.

The wealthier family can hire house help which gives chance their daughters to be sent to school instead of helping in house work; on the other hand girls get a chance from school for meeting friends enhancing their interaction to society. In Somalia boys (6-14) in rural areas are 12.76 percentage less likely than urban boys to be enrolled while girls in rural areas are 8.78percentage less likely than urban girls to be enrolled in primary schools.

2.1.2 Community Characteristics

Parental education determines the child enrollment decision of primary school. Boys and girls aged 6-14 whose fathers have no education are less likely to be enrolled than boys and girls aged 6-14 whose fathers have non curriculum education respectively. Boys whose fathers have primary and secondary education are more likely to be enrolled in primary school. On the other hand, girls whose fathers have primary and secondary education are less likely to be enrolled in primary school. The tertiary education for fathers is positively related to the chance of child being enrolled to primary school.

The mother's education level also has an effect though there is no effect for boys and girls aged 6-14 years. However, boys and girls whose mother has no education are 10 percentage and 21.7 percentage less likely to be enrolled than boys and girls whose mother has non curriculum education. Boys and girls whose mothers have primary, secondary and tertiary education are likely to be enrolled in primary school. Research has shown that mother's with primary, secondary and tertiary education has no effect for boys and girls to be enrolled. Other related research results agree that parent's education increasing the probability of enrolling a child to primary school, (Mariara & Mwabu (2007); Gertler & Glewe (1990)). In overall it can be see that Education attainment is very low among mothers compared to fathers in Somalia.

The economic situation of a household is another determinant of children primary school enrollment. Households that are wealthy have higher chances of enrolling their children to school. However, the wealth effect is larger for girls than boys. Studies have shown that girls from wealthy households have 22.46 percentage higher probability of being enrolled compared to 13.32 percentage for boys. Glick & Sahn, (2000) & Ray, (2000) also observed that there is a positive relationship between

enrollment to school and household income. However the difference in wealthier family for preference to girls can be explained in two ways when it comes to Somali community prospective first the wealthier family's boys may prefer to help family in their business instead of sending them to school or they drop the school because of seeing the education less opportunity to their future while they were offered everything from their parents.

Table: 2.1: Primary school aged children enrolled by gender.

Gender	Enrolled %	Never enrolled %
Male	58.27%	41.93%
Female	41.73%	58.07%
Total	**100%**	**100%**

Source: Mohamed, (2013)

Table: 2.2: Primary school aged children enrolment in rural and urban area

Area	Enrolled %	Never enrolled
Urban	49%	16%
Rural	50%	83.90%
Total	**100%**	**100%**

Source: Mohamed, (2013)

Table 2.1 above presents information regarding current enrollment of primary school aged children. 3750 School children aged between 6-14 years were attending school while 2528 were not. Almost half of the school aged girls were found to be out of primary school as compared to boys 33%. While 67% of school aged boys were attending school, only 52% of girls were attending school. Table 2.2 shows that 64% of the sample was drawn from the rural area. The urban area accounts for just

about 35% of the sample. Children in urban areas have higher probability of being enrolled to school as compared to their counterparts in the rural areas.

A study conducted by Mohamed, (2013) on determinants of school enrollment in Somalia revealed that out of the 6278 observations, 59 percent of the school aged children were enrolled to primary school. The percentage of boys enrolled stood at 67 percent while that of girls was 51 percent. About 52 percent of the sample is male children. About 15 percent of 16 percent of boys and girls respectively, are 6-7 years old. Similar proportions of the boys and girls were 14 years old. Most children in the sample were 8-9 years old.

Other studies have found that the region from where the child comes from is a key determinant of the probability of a child to be enrolled into primary school in Somalia. The marginal effect for boys from North East region is 0.1017 while that of girls is 0.1171. This implies that boys and girls from North East region are 10.17 and 11.71 percentage points that boys are more likely to be than boys than girls. Contrary girls in North West region are likely to be enrolled to primary schools than boys. The marginal effect for boys from South Central region is 0.0771 while that of girls is -0.01107. This implies that boys from South central are 7.71 percent more likely to be enrolled than boys from North West to North East. However girls from south central region are -1.107 percent a less likely enrollment than girls from North West to North East.

3.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

Low primary school enrolment in Somalia coupled with gender gaps has remained mentioned as very serious issues of policy concern. The determinant of a child (boy or girl) being enrolled to school count on the child's age, parent's education, wealth, regions of origin, and area of

residence in Somalia. In terms of gender boys are more likely to be enrolled than girls. Children from wealthier households have higher chances of being enrolled to school than the children from poorer households. Besides, the parent's education has high influence on enrolment status of their children. Boys and girls whose parents have no education are less likely to be enrolled relative to boys and girls whose parents are educated. It is evident that in Somalia the literacy of mother and father determines the chance of enrolling a child to primary school. The region from where the children originate or are currently situated is another determinant. Children in rural areas are less likely to be enrolled than the urban children. Children in regions which were fairly stable such as North West (Somaliland) and North East (Puntland) have higher chances of being enrolled to primary school. In contrast, children in Central South region who have been living in politically unstable environment for some time are less likely to be enrolled. In north east girls have greater chances to be enrolled in primary school compared to girls from North West regions. Girls from central south are less likely to be enrolled compared to girls from North West regions. This is a situation that attracts policy intervention in order to give equal education rights to all children regardless of age, gender, their parent's education status and the region where they come from.

3.1 Recommendations

Since the primary school enrollment is higher among children whose parents are literate, policies to raise literacy levels should be pursued in Somalia. This could be done by strengthening adult literacy programs in rural and urban areas of Somalia. Besides it is evident that children (6-14) from poorer households are less likely to be enrolled in primary school. Therefore, policies that improve the living conditions of households in Somalia would increase primary school enrolment for both boys and girls.

Further studies have revealed that boys of (6-14 years) have higher probability of being enrolled than girls. This requires education policies which target specifically girls have potential positive impact on their enrollment thereby decreasing the gender primary schooling gap. Due to the existence of regional disparities in primary school enrollment, it's important to target and channel education resources to regions with low enrollments taking into account the child's gender, owing to curb the gender differences in enrollments.

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Somalia: Historical Phases of the Islamic Movements

 Abdurahman M. Abdullahi (Baadiyow)

Abstract

There is very little scholarship on the history of the Islamic movements in Somalia. Available literature mainly addresses Islam from the margins of history through orientalist and secularist discourses, and security perspectives. This paper offers an overview of four phases of the development of the Islamic movements since 1800. The first phase is the Islamic revival (1800-1950) which focuses on the Sufi brotherhoods and their interaction with the colonial powers. The second phase is the rise of the Islamic consciousness (1950-1967) where Islam and nationalism were jointly used as anti-colonial ideology. The third phase is the Islamic awakening (1967-1978) and initiation of the early modern Islamic organizations. The fourth phase is the emergence of organizations of the Islamic movements (1978-..).

The narrative of this paper is extracted from the PhD thesis by the author on the Islamic Movement in Somalia. It provides empirically rich narrative of the development of the Islamic movements from insider's perspective.

Keywords: Somalia, Islamic Movements, Somali Modern History, Islamism.

Introduction

The historical evolution of the Islamic movements in Somalia have attracted less academic interest in the research communities and existing modest literature addresses Islam from the margins of history, through orientalist and secularist discourses, and security perspectives. Nonetheless, scholarship on Islam in Somalia has slightly improved since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 and increased role of the Islamic movements afterwards. In particular, in the post-9/11 security studies literature, analysis of the armed Islamic groups have grown; albeit lacks in-depth historical background. This essay offers a general road map of the modern historical developments of Islam within the context of general history of Somalia. It draws on the PhD thesis by the author which provides unique historical analysis of the evolution of the Islamic movements.[1] This paper divides this historical development into four phases: the Islamic revival (1800-1950), the rise of the Islamic consciousness (1950-1967), the beginning of the Islamic awakening (1967-1978), and the emergence of the Islamic movements (1978-..). These historical phases are not mutually exclusive and demonstrate continuity and change. They are dynamic, crosscurrent, and overlap each other. This essay summarizes these four phases and Islamic organizations that played major roles in each historical phase.

Literature Review

New literature on the rising Islamic movements sprang up as part of the security studies that grew exponentially after 9/11, which was an academic campaign to discover what is termed as the threat of "Islamic fundamentalism".[2] Indeed, Western scholarship on Islamic movement has increased in the two historical periods in which Somalia was engaged in a conflict with Western powers. The first period was the years of Jihad against British colonialism, waged primarily by Sayid Mohamed Abdulle

Hassan in the British protectorate of the northern Somalia (1900-1921). Colonial scholarship showed particular interest in the study of this anti-colonial movement and produced ample literature on this topic. Among these works, two colonial works have particular relevance to the study of this movement: Douglass Jardine's work *The Mad Mullah of Somaliland* and Italian author Francesco Caroselli's book *Ferro e Fuoco in Somalia*.[3] Moreover, nationalist historiography followed suit to immortalize national symbols and offered special attention to the armed resistance against colonialism represented by the Darawish Movement of Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan. In this venue, the works of Said Samatar and Abdi Sheikh-Abdi are paramount.[4] Comparatively, nonviolent Islamic works that majority of the Islamic scholars were engaged received less Western academic interest except few anthropological works.[5] Moreover, there are some historical chapters on individual Sufi scholars produced by B. G. Martin, Said Samatar, and Scott Reese.[6] Therefore, as a general trend and a common denominator among all this scholarship, history of Islam and its role are marginalized, unless recognized as posing a security threat to the Western powers.

Exceptions to the above-stated trend are works in the Arabic language, authored by Islamist scholars. Four works could be placed at the top of these literatures. Two of them were authored by Ali Sheikh Ahmed Abubakar, the third by Ahmed Jumale "Castro", and the fourth by Hassan Makki. Ali Sheikh's first work *Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyah al-Mu'asira fi Al-Qarni al-Ifriqi* is a good introduction to the Islamic call in the Horn of Africa. The work offers historical in-depth and overviews challenges to Islamism that include secularism, illiteracy, tribalism, and policies of the military regime in Somalia. The second book *Al-Somal: Judur al-Ma'asat al-Rahina* seems a complementary to the first book and focuses on the Islamic awakening and its encounter with the military regime. This book is unique in that it provides a detailed description of the execution of

Islamic scholars in 1975 because of the Family Law confrontation between the regime and Islamists. It also provides the reaction of the Muslim world to the execution of the scholars. In addition to that, it offers an Islamist critique of the above-mentioned secular Family Law. Moreover, Ahmed Jumale describes the history and development of Islamic scholars in the Banadir region where Mogadishu is located. His PhD thesis is a useful source on the history of Sufi orders.[7] On the other hand, Hassan Makki produced an indispensable work as a PhD thesis "*Al-Siyasat al-Thaqafiya fi al-Somal al-Kabir* (1887-1986)." This work is a very useful source of the cultural history of Somalia, in particular, it traces cultural competition between Arabic/Islamic and Western education, covering all Somali-inhabited territories of the Horn of Africa.

A similar academic interest with the emergence of Islamic Jihad by Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan in the first quarter of the twentieth century is noted after 9/11 and the declaration of Global War on Terrorism. In this period, many research centers have been producing occasional reports and briefings on Somalia as being a possible haven for terrorists. Somalia also appeared in the headlines of major newspapers, TV networks, radios, and electronic communications. The academic interest experienced an unprecedented growth and numerous papers and articles were published in many languages; of these, four works particularly stand out. These works were authored by an Ethiopian scholar Tadesse Madhene,[8] an Israeli Intelligence officer Shay Shaul,[9] an American scholar Andre le Sage,[10] and Norwegian scholar Stig Hansen.[11] These works are in the field of security studies and counter-terrorism measures and focus on Itihad and Shabab, even though some background studies were made on other organizations.

Shaul Shay's book *Somalia between Jihad and Restoration* focuses on Somalia as a possible haven for terrorist organizations. The book examines Islamic movements in Somalia with a special focus on Itihad

and its connections with Al-Qaida, Hassan al-Turabi of Sudan Islamic Movement, and Iran during the USA intervention in Somalia in 1992-1995. The last chapters are dedicated to the rise and the fall of the Islamic Courts, the Ethiopian intervention, and its aftermath. This analysis of the challenges of the Islamic Courts and potentiality of Al-Qaida terror in Somalia concludes with remarks on ways to prevent the emergence of a radical Islamic state that harbors terrorism in the Horn of Africa. This work is mainly descriptive and lacks academic depth and analysis.

On the other hand, Tadesse Medhene authored the book of *Al-Ittihad: Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia*, the first comprehensive academic analysis of its kind of this Islamist movement after 9/11. The author provides a brief background of Islamism in Somalia during Siyad Barre rule (1969-1991) and moves on to examine extensively the role of Itihad during the civil war and its interaction with the UN interventions in Somalia. It offers special attention to the issue of the ideological, political, and economic foundation of Itihad that weakened the warlords. The last chapters deal with the Djibouti Peace Process in 2000 and the role of the international and regional actors. The author also offers policy guidelines for future actions to thwart the takeover by Islamists in Somalia. However, the timing of this research, its author, sources, and the main thesis call for suspicion of this study's motives. Tadesse wrote from the Somali opposition's perspective supported by Ethiopia; this opposition conferred in Ethiopia to mobilize their agenda against the Transitional National Government (TNG). The major theme of the book is that Itihad is the umbrella terrorist organization shared by all Islamic organizations and that the TNG was built by Itihad. Therefore, the TNG, as a product of terrorists, should be opposed and replaced by other national institutions with the support of the international community. The recommendations of the author were implemented later in Kenya in 2004 by establishing the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) headed by

the former warlords who befriended Ethiopia. However, the consequence of this policy was disastrous and caused deteriorated security in the Horn of Africa.

Moreover, Andre le Sage's *Somalia and the War on Terrorism* undertook a field research on Islamism and counter-terrorism in Somalia. The author carried out his research in Mogadishu, where he met various local actors such as warlords, Islamic movement leaders, traditional elders, and members of traditional Sufi orders. In particular, he focused on Islah, Itihad, Islamic charities, Hawala-business, and the Islamic Courts. Providing an in-depth analysis of the Islamic movements, he concluded that political Islam is not monolithic, and doctrinal differences and competition exist between the various Islamist movements. Le Sage is credited with predicting the rise of Shabab, a new derivative of Itihad, and warning against it. Considering his dissertation as an initial study and admitting various limitations, he provided a number of recommendations such as continuing research and monitoring, opening dialogue with the moderate Islamists, and addressing social strains that push the population toward extremism. However, this moderate voice did not receive attention during the Bush administration which was entangled with the war on terrorism.

Furthermore, Hansen's work on Al-Shabab is the first comprehensive book on the militant Islamist group. The author examines the development of Al-Shabab chronologically in four stages. The first stage was initial formative period of 2005-06 as part of the Union of the Islamic Courts which had taken control of the capital Mogadishu after defeating the warlords in 2005. The second stage was the period of insurgency against Ethiopian occupation in 2007-2008. The third stage was the period 2009-2010 after the defeat of Somali government supported by Ethiopia and Al-Shabab took control of large territory in the southern Somalia. The fourth stage started in 2010 when Al-

Shabab lost vast territory to the African Union Forces (AMISOM) in collaboration of Somali National Army. This book's in-depth analysis and description of the Al-Shabab is valuable contribution to the subject matter.

There are also many other valuable researches on this topic; for instance, relevant papers include Roland Marshal's study titled "Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War" that outlined the general developments of the ongoing Islamic revival in Somalia.[12] As one of the early studies, the paper carries some errors and misconceptions, which does not belittle its merit and academic value. Also, Adam Hussein's paper "Political Islam in Somali History" offers a brief historical survey of the development of the Islamic movement and the four possible options of its future development. The study recognizes the inevitable role of moderate Islamism and criticizes counter-terrorism policies.[13] Moreover, the International Crisis Group (ICG) produced a unique study of Islamist movements in Somalia, classifying them into three categories: Jihadist Islamism, political Islam, and missionary activism. This report also offered a brief background of the Islamic movements.[14] Furthermore, Hansen and Mosley authored a research paper "The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa."[15] The study explored the general question of whether the MB in the region could act as a partner in the quest for development and peace in the Horn of Africa. It includes a historical section on the Islah Movement and its developmental organizations. Finally, the work of Afyare Elmi "Understanding the Conflagration" produces an informative chapter on the role of Islam and Islamic awakening in the peace building in Somalia. Writing from insider's perspective, Elmi concludes with strong statement of inevitability of an Islamist movement's rule in Somalia.[16]

Phase One: The Islamic Revival (1800-1950)

The Islamic revival began in the 19th century and dealt with the emergence of the various Sufi brotherhoods. Sufi orders, with their symbolical activities and closeness to people's culture, contributed greatly to the revival of Islam in the masses, using innovative mobilization techniques. The most popular techniques are called Dikri in which religious poems (*Qasaaid)*are composed and chanted in a chorus and in an artistic manner, blessing people, reciting the Qur'an for the sick and diseased, annual remembrance of deceased parents (closer and distant), the commemoration of the birth of the Prophet (*Mawliid*), visiting the blessed sheikh's tombs (*Siyaaro*), etc. These techniques create collectiveness and a sense of belonging and mutual support for the adherents of the Sufi orders. They also create a web of trans-clan networks in society, diluting clan polarization and segmentation.

Although Sufism existed and practiced since early Islamic history, most of the organized brotherhoods emerged in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries AD. For instance, Qadiriyah was founded by Sheikh Abdulqadir al-Jeylani (1077-1166). In Somalia, the advent of Sufism has been recorded since the early fifteen century with the arrival of 44 Islamic scholars under the leadership of Sheikh Ibrahim Abu-Zarbai in 1430. Nevertheless, its renewal and reform as an organized movement was noted from the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century. Indeed, Said Samatar wrote, "These years between 1880 and 1920 can be described as the era of the Sheikhs in Somali history."[17] Revival is an important dimension of the historical experience of Muslims; Sufi reformation entailed shifting from individual Islamic activities to institutionalized orders.[18]

Traditional Sufi orders have mainly taken peaceful approaches to socio-religious reform through Islamic propagation and spiritual

revitalization.[19] As such, they dominated religious life, reaching out to populations in the urban and rural areas alike, most of whom had identified with one of the Sufi orders by the nineteenth century. Sufi sheikhs, besides their complementary role in running community affairs, established Islamic commonwealth centers (*Jamaacooyin*) whose dwellers gave their allegiance only to their Sufi masters/sheikhs. Moreover, in contradiction to conventional historiography that considers Sufi orders to be mainly apolitical, many leaders of the Sufi orders and their disciples became the supreme leaders of their communities. In this way, clan allegiances and loyalties were diluted and at times transformed into ideological loyalties. Occasionally, both religious and secular authorities are combined in one leader creating a strong Sufi master or sheikh. Moreover, most of the Islamic education centers were located in settlements on agricultural areas and around water wells, and many of these settlements were later transformed into villages, towns, and cities. In this way, Sufi orders transformed pastoral society to settled communities engaged in agriculture and/or trade.[20]

The two main Sufi orders in Somalia are Qadiriyah and Ahmadiyah and each of them has its local offshoots.[21] Qadiriyah was brought to western and northern Somalia in the early sixteenth century by Abubakar b. Abdallah al-Aidarusi (d. 1502) from Hadramout in Yemen and its two branches are Zayli'iyah and Uweysiyah.[22] Zayli'iyah was founded by Sheikh Abdirahman al-Zayli'i (1815-1882), who was based in Qulunquul near the town of Dhagahbur in the Somali State of Ethiopia. Uweysiyah was founded by the spiritual master Sheikh Aweys ibn Ahmad al-Barawe (1846-1907). The Ahmadiyah Brotherhood was founded by Ahmad Ibn Idris al-Fasi (1760-1837) and has three offshoots in Somalia: Rahmaniyah, Salihiyah, and Dandarawiyah. Rahmaniyah is founded by Sheikh Abdirahman ibn Mohamud (d. 1874) instead of Sheikh Ali Maye Durogba who is mistakenly considered the founder of the Order.

Salihiyah has two branches: southern branch introduced by Sheikh Mohamed Guled al-Rashidi (d.1918) and northern branch by Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan (1856-1920). Dandarawiyah was introduced by Sayid Adan Ahmed and has a limited following in northern Somalia.[23]

Scholars of Sufi brotherhood led the initial Somali reaction to the rule of the colonial powers. The historiographical speculation that the Salihiyah order was anti-colonial while the Qadiriyah order remained acquiescent and even collaborated with the colonizers has no historical basis. The well-known historical fact is that "Sheikh Aweys promoted resistance to the European colonizers in German-occupied Tanganyika and even Uganda and eastern Congo." [24] Evidences shows that Qadiriyah's encounter with colonialism was circumstantial and prudent, and the narrative that focuses on singular approach or prioritizes militancy over peaceful means of struggle is simply myopic. These approaches should be seen as complementing each other, depending on the situations on which available options are evaluated. Movements who encountered colonialism through armed resistance operated in different territories and include both Qadiriyah and Ahmadiyah. For instance, Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan who belonged to Salihiyah orderof Ahmadiyah offshoot led a Darawish Movement for roughly 21 years (1900-1921), against British, Italian, and Ethiopian forces. Moreover, Lafole massacre (1896), where disciples of Sheikh Ahmad Mahdi who belong to the Qadiriyah order, were accused for anti-colonial activities and retaliated by the Italians. The Biyamal revolt (1896-1908) led by Macalimiin (Islamic teachers) continued resisting colonization for 12 years and ultimately networked their resistance with the northern one of Darawish Movement, demonstrating the unity of purpose and nationhood. Moreover, revolts led by Sheikh Hassan Barsane (d.1926) and Sheikh Bashir (d.1945) demonstrate their uncompromising attitude towards colonial programs. Unfortunately, most of these movements had been suppressed by 1924,

and their leaders were marginalized, oppressed, eliminated and excluded after the colonial domination of Somalia. On the other hand, Somali Islamic scholars confronted colonialism both armed and non-violent means. Those scholars who opted for violent means have been recorded widely in the Somali history and immortalized, while peaceful and non-violent scholars and activists were neglected and marginalized in the historiography.

With the suppression of the Islamic scholars, new approaches were used to confront colonial influence. It included establishing initially civil society organizations and later political parties. The first civil society organization, the Somali Islamic Association, was founded in Aden in 1925 by the Somali activist Haji Farah Omar.[25] Other organizations that appeared in the Northern Somalia include Khayriyah, the Officials' Union and the Somali Old Boys Association (SOBA). The emergence of the civil society organizations in the Southern Somalia were delayed comparatively with the northern Somalia and appeared to the scene during the Second World War under the rule of the British Military Administration (BMA). Early organizations included *Jamiyat al-Kheyriyah al-Wadaniyah* (Patriotic Beneficiary Union), founded in 1942,[26] the Somali Youth Club (SYC), founded in 1943, and Native Betterment Committee (NBC), founded in 1942.[27] On the other hand, modern political developments of Somalia began in the early years of the Second World War after the 1941 defeat of Italian Fascism in the Horn of Africa and the establishment of the British Military Administration (BMA) in most parts of the Somali territories. The BMA, although completely destroyed existing small economic projects and infrastructures, brought an improved political environment by abolishing the "restrictions of the Italian regime on local political associations and clubs."[28] This new policy encouraged the development of the political consciousness of the Somalis after many of them had participated in the

two wars: the Italian–Ethiopian War of 1935 and the Second World War. As a result, the Somali Youth Club (SYC), a pan-Somali youth organization, was formed on 15 May 1943 in Mogadishu. From its founding members of 13 men, this club grew into political party in 1947 and was renamed as the Somali Youth League (SYL). A comparable rise in the political consciousness appeared in the British Somali Protectorate and similar nationalist party was established in the name of the Somali National League (SNL) in 1951.

Phase Two: The Rise of the Islamic Consciousness (1950-1967)

Islam and Somaliness were harmonious terms used to signify pan-clan and anti-colonial ideologies to resist Christian colonialism and growing westernization. With the total colonial domination by 1930s, Islamic scholars were marginalized from leadership role and the new elites created in the colonial system were steadily taking over national leadership. During this period, Islamic education and understanding of Islam's comprehensive scope was very limited. In particular, consciousness of the political aspect of Islam that aims at creating a state and society based on definitive references to the Islamic principles was not developed yet. The common vision and strategic priority of the Somali people before independence was centered on the liberation of the country from the colonial yoke. Indeed, Islamic consciousness was in high alert because of its role in championing Muslim cause in the Horn of Africa and due to Somalia’s geographical location at the Christian-Muslim converging lines. Moreover, as a strategic region connecting the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula with the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean attracting European colonialism and Cold War superpower rivalry, both Islamic and national consciousnesses were continuously provoked.

Thus, both national and Islamic identity and consciousness were intertwined in the historical development of Somalia, offering supra-clan

identity to the traditional society. What these two ideologies have in common is to inculcate people rejection of foreign domination and its uncompromising resistance. Thus, Islamic and nationalistic slogans were used to mobilize the masses for anti-colonial campaigns to liberate the nation. Modern nationalists and Islamic scholars worked collectively and national ideology was compounded from nationalism and Islam. National heroes were acknowledged to be Islamic scholars who national leaders such as Imam Ahmed Gurey, Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, Sheikh Hassan Barsane and Sheikh Bashir.[29] Other factor that prompted the development of the nationalistic and Islamic consciousness was religious antagonism between Somali Muslims and Christian colonizers during the struggle for the independence. Moreover, Christian missionary activities in the Muslim society had provoked resentment in the society. Furthermore, rising Islamic consciousness was specifically linked to the development of modern education in the Arabic language and connections with the Arab/Islamic world. Within local, regional, and international dynamics, Islamic consciousness began to emerge and grow.

The development of the Islamic consciousness should be seen as historical evolution and a range of responses to the challenges from specific tensions. It was concurrent with the growing nationalism in the second half of the twentieth century. They provided a supra-clan identity in a traditional society and shared in being indistinguishable from anti-colonial resistance ideologies. However, with the introduction of a modern education system and competition between Western education in the Italian and English languages and modern education in Arabic in the 1950s, the trends of westernization and Arabism began to emerge. The culture of westernization, carrying with it secularization of the state and society, and Arabism, delivering the Islamic consciousness, nationalism, and anti-colonialism, were fiercely competing with one another. In the

1950s, the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood were promoting Arab nationalism and Islamism, respectively. Egyptian cultural influence on Somalia took an added momentum in the 1950s and 1960s within the Cold War politics and mutual strategic cooperation between Somalia and Egypt.

Specifically, two broad sets of factors had contributed to the growth of Islamic consciousness in the 1950s and 1960s. The first set contributed to the increased capacity of the society and its resilience in withstanding the torrent ideas of westernization and western modernization. These factors included the introduction of the Egyptian system of schools, the formation of early Islamic organizations, the provision of scholarships to Somali students in the civil and military higher institutions in Egypt and other Arab countries, and other cultural means. These developments had created a new Arabic-speaking Somali elite, political leaders, and Islamic scholars who were against westernization and secularization and lobbied for Arabism and Islamism. Some of these scholars were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood ideology and the Salafism of Saudi Arabia and introduced them to Somalia. The second set of factors was involved in provoking the Islamic consciousness. They included the activities of Christian missionaries. The earliest missionaries were French Catholic Mission in British Somaliland (1891-1910), the Roman Catholic Church in Mogadishu (1904-1991) and the Swedish Overseas Lutheran Church in Kismayo (1896-1935). Furthermore, the Mennonite Mission and the Sudan Interior Mission joined the Christian venture in the 1950s, with the return of Italy as the UN trusteeship administrator.

After the independence in 1960, within the local, regional, and global context of the Cold War, regional competition, and transformation of the Somali society, the Islamic consciousness was gradually growing along with the growing westernization of the elites. The manifestations of this growth were the appearance of modern Islamist scholars educated in

Arab universities and marginalized in the job market and the proliferation of Arabic schools, books, newspapers, and libraries. Nevertheless, in the first nine years of the independence, there were no tangible conflicts between Islamic scholars and the new elites, with the priorities of the entire nation seemingly focused on consolidating the independence and pursuing the "Greater Somalia" project. Islamic scholars of these years became the pioneers of a new era of the Islamic awakening, in which Islamic activities took new dimensions.

Finally, the harmonious Somali society, where tradition and modernity coexisted, the state and Islam were not in direct conflict, and tolerance and dialogue were exercised, began to falter. The growth of the Islamist elites and their rejection of marginalization led to increased Islamic activities and eventual establishment of more robust organizations. At the same time, westernization and secularization were also growing. Thus, the gap between the two camps was gradually widening.

Phase Three: The Beginning of the Islamic Awakening (1967-1978)

The awakening of Islam started to take shape after Somalia's independence in 1960 and emerged strongly after 1967. It was as an outcome of the cultural divide promoted by multi-curriculum education programs, in Arabic, Italian, and English, and links with conflicting actors in the Cold War atmosphere. The split of the elites into non-Islamist and Islamist factions slowly began to emerge, challenging social cohesion and the unifying aspects based on race, religion, and national aspiration. The roots of this division can be found in the clash between the nature of the state and nature of the society. The post-colonial nation-state was nationalistic, hierarchical, centralized, and quasi-secular, while the society was clannish, egalitarian, decentralized, and Islamic. In these strained conditions, the society as a whole was torn apart by the elites who gravitated toward competing ideologies such as liberal Western

democracy, Socialism, and Islam. Although they possessed a strong cultural foundation, the weaker and less developed elites during this time were Islamists.

The bifurcation of the elites and their development, as illustrated in the figure (1), demonstrates the four types of elites in Somalia. The traditional elites consist of clan elders and Islamic scholars, who constitute traditional leaders. Modern elites consisting non-Islamist elites and Islamist elites, the two super-structural elites created mainly through modern education.[30] As the diagram indicates the dynamics of Islam (traditional and modern), clan (represented by elders) and the state (represented by secular elites) is the most challenging issue in Somalia.



Figure1. The diagram of development of the elites in Somalia

The relations between the traditional elites are cordial and collaborative in order to maintain community cohesion, however, non-Islamist elites and the Islamist elites are antagonistic because of their different position on the nature of the state. Non-Islamist elites, the inheritors of the post-colonial state, resolutely covet to retain the status-quo of the nature of the state whereas Islamists advocate zealously for its Islamization.[31] The free choice of the citizens through democratic process and peaceful resolution of the elite conflict is blocked by the non-Islamist elites who rely primarily on the support of the western powers. The consequence of this

policy is severe and breeds extremism in the name of Islam and curtails moderate Islamism in general.

Consequently, in 1967, the country was in search of a new ideology, having been embarrassed by malpractices in liberal democracy; thus, socialism and Islamism were luring. Socialism was promoted by the socialist countries, and thousands of the Somali students were offered scholarships and indoctrinated in those countries. These students became later the elites that challenged the workings of liberal democracy. On the other hand, Islamists were not happy with the entire secular tendency of the nation-state and opposed the growing leftist ideology, as well as the liberalist malpractices. They were also dissatisfied with the state policy on Islam that remained very similar to the inherited colonial approach based on the existence of two separate spaces; public and private. Islam which Islamists advocated for as comprehensive and applicable to all aspects of life was relegated to the private realm. They were not satisfied with Islamic window dressing such as establishment of a Ministry of Religious Affairs and occasional gesture of the politicians during Islamic festivities.

In 1967, after the pitiful political and social harvests of the first years of independence, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was elected President of Somalia, and he appointed Mohamed Ibrahim Igal as the Premier. The new regime adopted two new policies that enhanced the fragmentation and conflict in the Somali society. In the domestic front, the regime planned to curb budding democracy by sowing dictatorship through transforming the ruling SYL party, the only political party in the country. This new trend was supported by Western countries and conservative Arab regimes, in particular Saudi Arabia which offered considerable financial assistance.[32] The goal of this undertaking was to curb the Soviet influence in Somalia and to reverse previous policies geared toward the Eastern blocks initiated by Dr. Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke in 1963.

Therefore, the regime initiated policies intended to encourage the fragmentation of other parties. Consequently, more than 60 clan-based parties competed for 123 seats in the parliament during the 1969 election. As planned by the state, all Members of Parliament from the small, clan-based parties were absorbed within the SYL after the election.[33] In the process, the National Army was implicated in rigging the election to dent its nationalistic image and weaken its credibility. At the same time, the Somali masses became utterly dismayed with the government because of widespread corruption, economic stagnation, rampant unemployment, and clan fighting caused by the rigged election. This state of affairs was characterized by Cabdalla Mansuur as "democracy gone mad."[34]

The second step taken by the regime aimed at changing national policies on "Greater Somalia" that was the foundation of the Somali foreign policy. Since the independence, Somalia supported Somali liberation movements in the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya, Western Somalia in Ethiopia and French Somaliland (Djibouti) as missing three parts of "Great Somalia".[35] The new policy was to improve the relations with the Western countries and to curb Soviet influence in Somalia embodied, in their technical support for the Somali army. Prime Minister Igal undertook the soft foreign policy approach of détente which was aimed at alleviating Somalia's political, military, and economic ailments. He established congenial neighborly relations with Kenya and Ethiopia and restored the severed relationship with Britain in 1962. Somalia broke diplomatic relations with Britain "when the special British NFD Commission determined that, despite the fact that the majority of the Somalis in the region wished to join the Somali Republic, Britain should grant Kenya independence and announced that Kenya will decide on the matter."[36] The new Somali foreign policy was welcomed by Western powers and Somalia's neighboring countries but was perceived as a sell-out for the cause of Somali nationalism by domestic political opponents

such as leftists and Islamists.[37] Thus, the two policies of the regime were unpopular, and their ramifications lead to the subsequent political uncertainties. The political gambit that started with the assassination of President Sharmarke on October 15, 1969 and Prime Minister Igal's overt clannish maneuvering in the parliament to elect a new president were the preludes to the military coup on October 21, 1969.

Against this background, the year of 1967 was the culmination of the Arabic cultural influence and the maturation of Islamist elites. In this year, the first organization for Arabic educated elites was established under the name *Munadamat al-Nahdah al-Islāmiyah* "Nahdah" and soon other Islamic organizations followed such as Ahal and Wahdah.[38] The climate was ripe for change, and such organizations were responding to various internal and external tensions. The Somali Islamic awakening was not an isolated phenomenon; it was part of a worldwide Muslim upheaval after the defeat of the Arab forces during the war with Israel in 1967. This defeat set off a wave of soul-searching and the demand for a new ideology to replace the defeated secular Arab nationalism. The answer to the national cataclysm was to seek solace in Islamism, which was until then suppressed by the Arabic nationalist/socialist regimes. Therefore, Islamist movements inspired by Hassan al-Banna, Mawlana al-Maududi, and Sayid Qutub were gaining ground and amassing support. This awakening had been simmering since the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1954 and the execution of the famous Egyptian Islamic scholar Sayid Qutub along with two other members of the MB in 1966.[39] This event greatly shocked and inspired Muslims all over the world. Many Somali Islamic scholars changed their positive views on the Egyptian regime that they had held because of its earlier provision of educational opportunities for Somalia and its ardent support for the Somali nationalistic cause. As a result of this incident, the MB literature garnered immense interest and attracted huge readership. In particular,

two of Sayid Qutub's works became extremely popular: *Ma'alim fi al-Ṭariq* (Milestones) and *Fi Ḍilal al-Qur'an* (In the Shade of the Qur'an), the latter being a 30-volume commentary on the Qur'an with an innovative method of interpretation.

The Islamic awakening in Somalia acquired a new momentum with the military coup in 1969 and the adoption of Socialism as the national ideology. The military regime had adopted modernization policies in line with Socialism which went against the culture of the people and Islamic laws, thereby widening the fissure and ideological polarization in the society. By the end of 1960s, three "Proto-Muslim Brotherhood" organizations were established. These organizations are Nahdah,[40] *Ahl al-Islam* (the People of Islam) "Ahal"[41] and *Wahdat al-Shabab al-Islami* (the Union of Islamic Youth) "Wahdah".[42] Also, Salafia organization *Jamiyat Ihya al-Sunna* (Revivification of the Prophet's Tradition) appeared in the scene.[43] The watershed conflict between the Islamic awakening and the military regime was in the secularization of the Family Law in 1975 and the execution of 10 Islamic scholars and subsequent confrontation between Islamists and the military regime.[44]

Concluding this section, five factors played a pivotal role in strengthening Islamic awakening in Somalia in the 1970s. The first factor is the role of Islamic scholars in spreading modern Islamic-movement concepts and ideas through public education programs and lectures. The second factor is the activities of student organizations of Ahal and Wahdah, especially their enthusiasm and outreach programs. The third factor is the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood literature brought to Somalia by Nahdah. The fourth factor is the encouragement by conservative Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia. The fifth factor is the proclamation of the Socialist ideology and adoption of the secular Family law by the military regime, which ignited enormous Islamic sentiment.

Finally, even though the proto-MB organizations of the Islamic awakening that include Scholar's organization of Nahdah and youth organizations of Ahal and Wahdah were short-lived, their Islamic call and impact were significant and lasting. They played different roles and complemented each other's efforts; for example Ahal and Waxdah focused on recruiting high school and university students in their respective geographical locations, in the southern and northern Somalia. Nahdah assumed the role of providing Islamic education and supplied Islamic literature. Nahdah operated for only three years, although its members remained prominent in the Islamic activism for a long period. Ahal ceased to exist in 1977 after about eight years of active work, and its members were divided into different new Islamic organizations. Wahdah members were divided and some of them joined Itihad in 1983 and others joined Islah in 1999.[45] All three organizations of the Islamic awakening were encountering common challenges of westernization, secularization, and Socialism by employing Islamic activism as their resistance ideology. Moreover, these organizations could be characterized as immature with great emotional attachment to the Islamic teachings and its comprehensive way of life, very low organizational capacity and resources, and idealistic approach to social and political realities in the country. The relationship between these organizations and the military regime gradually developed into an open confrontation which had a lasting impact on the political developments in Somalia.

Phase Four: The Emergence of the Islamic movements (1978-..)

With the crackdown on Islamists after the Family Law proclamation in 1975, most leading scholars were either imprisoned or fled the country. The Islamic awakening, hitherto united in its ideology and leadership, was fragmented and the ideology of extremism emerged strongly. This was provoked by the harshness of the regime in dealing with Islamic scholars, the encouragement and support by the conservative Arab

regimes of the Islamists, and their contact with the varieties of Islamic ideologies and activism that changed the Islamic landscape in Somalia. In August 1975, seven months after the Family Law fiasco, 60 prominent, high-ranking officers were sacked from their positions. Included in these were the leaders of the Islamic awakening: Sheikh Mohamed Garyare, Sheikh Mohamed Moalim, and Sheikh Abdulqani. Both Sheikh Mohamed Moalim and Sheikh Abdulqani were imprisoned, while Sheikh Mohamed Garyare fled the country. In addition to those imprisoned, some of the activists of the Islamic awakening fled to Saudi Arabia and Sudan, and began to regroup there. It is important to note that the fled of Somali Islamists to Saudi Arabia occurred during a time of booming economies and Islamic revivalism throughout the Arab/Muslim world. This economic well-being and education offered the emerging Islamic movement the impetus to reorganize themselves again. Also, students at Saudi universities who joined the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan and Saudi Arabia were working among Somalis in Saudi Arabia to recruit them into their underground organization (Islah movement). Also, among those who succeeded to flee was the leader of Ahal, Abdulqadir Sheikh Mohamud who regrouped members of Ahal in Saudi Arabia.

As a consequence of the migration of the Islamic activists mainly to Saudi Arabia, three Islamic organizations emerged from the ashes of the Islamic awakening organizations. The first organization that announced itself was the Islah Movement established officially on July 11, 1978. Its establishment was announced after four months of the retreat by the Somali army from the war with Ethiopia.[46] Islah proclaimed representing an ideological continuation of the Nahdah and elected Sheikh Mohamed Garyare as its first leader.[47] The second move towards the Islamist fragmentation was undertaken by Abdulqadir Haji Mohamud, the leader of Ahal who professed Takfir ideology and succeeded to convince prominent leaders of Ahal to adopt ideology of Takfir.[48] Other members

of Ahal who were hesitant to join Islah and the Takfir established a new organization called Jama'a Islamiyah. This organization combined former Ahal members who considered themselves belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood and many graduates from the Saudi universities who claimed adhering to Salafism. Gradually, Salafia tendency gained the upper hand and the organization took on the character of a Salafia movement. This organization evolved in 1983 to Itihad when Wahdah and Jama'a Islamiyah were unified.[49] Therefore, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, five organizations based on three different Islamic persuasions had appeared in Somalia: Muslim Brotherhood persuasion (Islah, Wahdah, Ikhwan "Aala-sheikh"), Salafia (Itihad) and Takfir. Takfir group were not popular and remain small underground organization while other organizations were growing.

By 1990, there were four Islamic organizations: Itihad, Islah, Wahdah and Ikhwan (Aala-sheikh).[50] Indeed, the Islamic awakening and its institutions were inclined to the Muslim Brotherhood methodology though lacked much of the organizational expertise until 1980. However, in the 1980s, Itihad became the strongest Islamic organization in Somalia, and the Salafia ideology took prominence;[51] while other three organizations adhering to the MB methodology were relatively weak and were competing each other because of many local and external factors. However, by 1990s, Islah emerged strongly with robust socio-political programs and has made an impact on other Islamist organizations in the socio-political sectors. Moreover, new organization under the name of *Jamā'at at-Tablīgh* (Society for spreading faith) have been taking strong roots in Somalia since 1991 targeting grass roots level and reaching out across social and economic spectra.[52]

Conclusion

Historical evolution of the Islamic movements went through four major stages: the Islamic revival, the Islamic consciousness, the Islamic awakening and the Islamic movements. In all these stages, the role of Islam in the state and society was growing and both moderation and militancy were evident in every historical juncture. Militancy was always related to the Salafia influence while moderation was linked to Muslim brotherhood persuasion. This paper had demonstrated that Islamic movements share common historical background and advocate for the application of Islamic principles and values in the state and society. Nonetheless, they are not monolithic in their approaches and could be classified generally into Muslim Brotherhood and Salafia persuasions. Besides these two major persuasions, traditional Sufi brotherhoods remain functional even though some of them have been politicized under the name of "*Ahl-al-Sunna wal-Jama'a*".[53]

In the final remarks, Islamic movements in Somalia were not immune from the social culture of fragmentation, internal competition, low organizational capacity and leadership crisis. Nevertheless, they are vital socio-political reality and their contribution in the provision of social services in the absence of the functioning state institutions is matchless. Moreover, the role of Islamist entrepreneurs in reviving economic sectors is incomparable. Furthermore, since 2000, Islamists became prominent in politics and Islamic compliant constitution was adopted. Since 2008, both national leaders and armed oppositions were belonging to the Islamic persuasions.[54]Finally, even though, Somalia lacks competing ideology with Islamic trends, it is also undeniable that Islamists lack necessary experience and expertise in the political sphere. Thus, current trend indicates growing role of inclusive policy based on equal rights of all citizens without discrimination and narrowing gap between Islamists and non-Islamists and their mutual cooperation in recovering Somali state.

Notes and References

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[16] Afyare Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peace building* (London: Pluto Press, 2010), 72.

[17] Said Samatar, *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The Case of Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 97.

[18] Scott Steven Rees, *Patricians of the Banadir: Islamic Learning, Commerce and Somali Urban Identity in the Nineteenth Century (*PhD thesis submitted to the University of Pennsylvania, 1996), 306.

[19] The nature of peacefulness of Sufi Orders may be interrupted because of external provocations, such as colonialism in the case of many scholars, exemplified by Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, and internal doctrinal conflicts, such as the conflict between Bardheere Jama'a and Geledi Sultanates and current fighting between Shabab and Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama'a.

[20] David Laitin, and Said Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987) 45.

[21] Most scholars fail to distinguish between the original Sufi order and their later derivatives. Sometimes these Sufi orders are said to be three, making Salihiyah a separate order from Ahmadiyah and also neglecting the existence of the Rufaiyah Order. See Laitin and Samatar, *Somalia: Nation*, 45.

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[28] I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History*, 121. The destroyed or removed projects include the railway line connecting Mogadishu, Afgoye, and Villagio Della Abruzi; Afgoye Bridge; salt production machinery in Hafun; and Maggiajan and Kandala mines. See Poalo Tripodi, *The Colonial Legacy in Somalia:*

Rome and Mogadishu: from Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 45.

[29] Two national heroes that were given special position in the Somali History were Imam Ahmed Gurey (Garan) and Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan. Imam Ahmed fought against Ethiopian and Portuguese intervention forces, representing Christian superpowers of that time, from 1531 until he was killed in 1543. Ahmad's war with Ethiopia is described in detail in the *Futuh al-habaša* ("The Conquest of Ethiopia"), written in Arabic by Ahmad's follower *Shihab al-Addin Ahmad ibn Abdulqadir*. Sayid Mohamed fought against Ethiopia and Britain in 1900-1921. References on Sayid Mohamed are many; however, two academic works stand out: Abdi Sheik Abdi, *Divine Madness: Mohammed Abdulle Hassan (1856-1920)* (Zed Books Ltd., London, 1993), and Said S. Samatar, *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The Case of Sayyid Mahammad Abdille Hasan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

[30]Islamist is an activist in realizing objectives of the Islamic movements which includes wide range of activities such as promoting Islamic beliefs, prescriptions, laws, or policies that are held to be Islamic in character. On the other hand, non-Islamists signify majority of the Muslims who are neither secular nor Islamic activists, some of whom are not even practicing Islam or even pretending to be secular nominally.

[31] For detailed description of the elite development and their relations refer to Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Tribalism, Nationalism and Islam: The crisis of the political Loyalties in Somalia (MA thesis, Islamic Institute, McGill University, 1992), 92-101.

[32] Saudi Arabia offered a loan of $50 million to Somalia designated to cover the election expenses in support of the SYL regime. See Mohamed Sharif Mohamud, "*Faslun fi al-Alaqat al-Somaliayah al-Saudiyah*", 2010 (Somali-Saudi relations), available from http://arabic.alshahid.net/columnists/8598 (accessed on February 6, 2010). This number seems exaggerated even though Mohamed Sharif insists that $50 million loan is true in my interview with him in Mogadishu on June 27, 2015.

[33] In 1969, all MPs joined the SYL except one person, the former Prime Minister Abdirisaq Haji Hussein.

[34] Abdalla Mansur, "Contrary to a Nation: The Cancer of Somali State'" in Ahmed, Ali Jimale (ed), *The Invention of Somalia* (Lawrenceville, NJ, Red Sea Press, 1995), 114

[35] NFD is the region in Kenya populated by the Somali people, while Western Somalia or Ogaden is a Somali territory annexed by Ethiopia. Both parts have Somali populations and are in the Horn of Africa. They had been divided by the colonial powers and then reclaimed by the Somali state as part of the "Greater Somalia."

[36] See Ibrahim Farah, "Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somalia, 1960-1990" (PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2009), 107.

[37] Ibid., 117.

[38] *Nahdah* was established in 1967 in Mogadishu, and had engaged in various Islamic activities, such as the establishment of libraries with contains MB literature and the *Da'wa* programs. The most popular program was the Qur'anic commentary of Sheikh Mohamed Moalim Hassan (1934-2000), which started in 1968 and continued until 1976.

[39] Sayid Qutub (1906-1966) was an Islamist scholar and the leading intellectual of the MB in the 1950s and 1960s. He was imprisoned (1954-64) and then hanged in 1966 by Jamal Abdi-Nasser. The other two members were Muhammad Yusuf Awash and Abd al-Fattah Ismail. See Zafar Bangash, "Remembering Sayyid Qutb, an Islamic intellectual and leader of rare insight and integrity", available from http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/milestones/remember.htm (accessed on January 28, 2010).

[40] The influence of the MB was clear in the bye-laws of Nahdah and its top leaders, the president, the vice president, and the secretary general were members of the MB. For more details refer to AbdurahmanAbdullahi, "The Islamic Movement in Somalia", 172- 176

[41] Ahal was established in 1969 and was transformed from Sufism to proto-MB in late 1960s as they are affected by the Qur'an commentary of Sheikh Mohamed Moalim Hassan and the Islamic library of Nahdah. For more details of Ahal, refer to AbdurahmanAbdullahi, "The Islamic Movement in Somalia", 182-190.

[42] Wahdah was formed in Hargeysa in 1969 and transformed from Sufism to proto-MB transpired in 1974. For more details of Wahdah refer to AbdurahmanAbdullahi, "The Islamic Movement in Somalia", 191-203.

[43] *Jamiyat Ihya al-Sunna* was founded in 1967 by Sheikh Nur Ali Olow (1918-1995) and its role was insignificant even though influenced some prominent personalities like General Mohamed Abshir and Yassin Nur Hassan, former Interior Minister.

[44] Abdurahman Abdullahi, ''Women, Islamists and the Military Regime in Somalia: The New Family Law and its Implications". In *Milk and Peace, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics. (Essays in Honour of I. M. Lewis)*, edited by M. V. Hoehne and V. Luling, 137 Á 160. London: Hurst, 2010.

[45] Wahdah and Jama'a Islamiyah formed Itihad al-Islami in 1983 in a precipitate merging that did not last long. At the end, most of the Wahdah members joined Itihad or Islah in 1990s. For more details refer to Abdurahman Abdullahi, "*The Islamic Movement in Somalia",* 202-203.

[46] The Somali government ordered its forces to retreat from Ethiopia on March 9, 1978, and the last significant Somali unit left Ethiopia on March 15, 1978, marking a disastrous end of the war.

[47] Many of the former members of Nahdah were in prison and others were made aware of the reorganizing of the organization under a new name.

[48] Hassan Haji Mohamud interviewed by the author, April 10, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.

[49]Itihad is the mother organization of Salafia in Somalia; it was renamed as *Al-Ictisam bil-Kitabi wa Sunnah* or Itisam in mid 1990s. Hence, Itihad and

Itisam became synonym. In the beginning of 1990s Itihad was drifting toward militancy and was entangled in armed conflicts from 1991 to 1997, after that it became fragmented and its activities were downgraded.

[50] Ikhwan, also known as *Aala-Sheikh*, was established after the release of Sheikh Mohamed Moalim from the prison in 1982. Sheikh Mohamed was designated to be their guide and mentor.

[51] Salafism had spread globally in as part of the rising influence of Saudi Arabia in global politics in 1960s. In Somalia, due to its being part of the Saudi geopolitical sphere, the influence of Salafism was noticeably augmented through students educated in the Saudi Islamic universities and through Somali migrant labour during the economic boom of the 1970s. For more details refer to AbdurahmanAbdullahi, "*The Islamic Movement in Somalia, 276-277.*

[52] *Jamā'at at-Tablīgh* or Tablighi Jama'a This movement was started in 1927 by Muhammad al-Kandhlawi in India to spread faith and spiritual reformation by working at the grass roots level. It became very active in Somalia after the civil war in 1991.

[53]Ahlu Sunna Wa al-Jama'a is a paramilitary Sufi group who became prominent in 2008, when it took up arms against al-Shabaab, the extremist group who began to destroy the tombs of the country's Sufi scholars.

[54] After the election of Sheikh Sharif (2008-2012) and Hassan Sheikh (2012-2016) as the Presidents of Somalia and the emergence of Al-Shabab as the armed opposition to the state, Islamists took unchallenged prominent political role in Somalia.

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Migration and Resettlement Patterns of Somalis in the Diaspora: A Case Study of Italy and Australia

 Vivian Gerrand

Abstract

Since 1991, large numbers of Somalis have migrated abroad. Many of them relocated to refugee camps in neighbouring countries, others reside further afield in western countries.

With the understanding that processes of settlement are varied, this article gives an overview of the social context in which Somali migration and settlement has occurred in two countries, Italy and Australia. In Italy, citizenship is seldom granted to Somalis. On the other hand, Australia offers official recognition to them in the form of citizenship within a multicultural model, however limited or "thin" this may be.

This article compares the resettlement trajectories of migrants and refugees from Somalia in the two countries. This comparative overview forms a basis for understanding the immigration policies and perceptions of immigrants in Italy and Australia and makes possible an informed engagement with the nuances of Somali experiences in the diaspora.

Keywords: Somali Diaspora, Immigration patterns, Resettlement Patterns, Italy, Australia,

Introduction

What migration and settlement options have existed for Somalis fleeing difficult conditions in Somalia? How have Somalis resettled in the diaspora? Since the outbreak of the Civil War in Somalia in 1991, large numbers of Somalis have migrated abroad. Many Somalis relocated to refugee camps in neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen.[1] A Significant Somali population resides further afield, in the United States. Italy and Australia have become home to significant numbers (approximately 8000 in Italy and 6000 in Australia) – although both sets of figures are problematic and discussed further below – and it is these specific cases that this article examines.

With the understanding that processes of settlement are multilayered,[2] this article gives an overview of the social context in which Somali migration and settlement has occurred in two diverse countries, Italy and Australia. In Italy, citizenship is seldom granted to Somalis, offering little stability. Australia offers official recognition to Somali refugees in the form of citizenship within a multicultural model, however limited or "thin" this may be.[3] The fact that this citizenship has not produced feelings of home in Somalis suggests the extent to which being at home is a complex and multi-scalar process, comprising civic and domestic domains, cultural and official belonging.[4] This article compares the resettlement trajectories of migrants and refugees from Somalia in the two countries, with particular attention to issues surrounding belonging and the importance of citizenship.

2.1 The Italian Context

While Australia is still an immigrant nation, in many western countries over the past few decades the balance between emigration and immigration has shifted. This is certainly the case for Italy, a country

which has since the 1980s become a centre of immigration after experiencing decades of emigration to countries such as America, Australia and Switzerland.[5]Since its unification in 1860, Italy was poor, economically and industrially backward, and had a high birth rate. The promise of better conditions abroad instigated emigration en masse at the end of the nineteenth and during most of the twentieth century. Since the mid 1970s, improved living standards have made Italy "the destination of hundreds of thousands of immigrants, many of them from African countries".[6]

Italy's current immigrant population is approximately 4 570 317 out of 60 626 442 million inhabitants, according to 2011 ISTAT (Istitutonazionale di statistica) Statistics, or approximately 7.5% of the population.[7] This estimation is likely to be conservative as a significant proportion of entries into Italy is irregular and thus remains unrecorded by authorities. In spite of the growing migration trends, Italy has a "piecemeal approach"[8] to immigration which has resulted in slow integration – and poor infrastructure – for new arrivals.[9] In contrast to the centre-left government's attempts to promote measures of integration from 1998 until 2001, the Berlusconi leadership emphasized a "purely economic understanding of migration" and restricted the avenues through which migrants could acquire legal status in Italian society.[10] Immigration policy has changed little under recent centre-left and centre-right Italian governments, in spite of changes in leadership. There is still no comprehensive settlement policy for immigrants in Italy.[11] Giovanna Zincone outlines five common attitudes towards immigration in Italian public discourse: solidarist, multiculturalist, functionalist, identitarian and repressive/legalitarian.[12] These attitudes have informed government responses to immigration in Italy, which are outlined below. Zincone identifies a discrepancy between government driven "regularisation" amnesties to allow immigrants to work under Italian law and negative public opinion on immigration.[13]

Yet, in spite of the prevailing antipathy with which many foreigners are regarded, Italy remains attractive for migrants due to its geography which has made the country more approachable than other European nations. Indeed, Italy's *mediterraneità*'– "its proximity to countries of different and contrasting cultures, of very different economic standards from its own", many of them experiencing great political upheaval – has had significant social implications.[14]The porosity of Italy's borders (its vast coastline) makes the country more approachable than other European nations; hence its reputation as a "launching pad" to other EU destinations. Attempts to impose restrictions on immigration have frequently led to larger clandestine migrant populations. In 1992, for example, excessive restrictions imposed by the Martelli law in the wake of pressure from potential Schengen partners to reduce immigration in Italy resulted in an increased number of unauthorized migrants entering the country.[15]

There are many contradictions in Italy's approach to immigration. While there have been attempts to assist with resettlement, conditions for immigrants in Italy have improved little over the past few decades. An unworkable situation of many responsibilities and few rights persists. Approximately 80 per cent of immigrant workers are not covered by the Italian social security system (INPS), for example.[16] Thus, loss of work frequently results in the Italian government's refusal to renew immigrants' official documents. As a consequence, most immigrants are forced to accept some of the poorest working conditions – the so-called three-d or five-p jobs[17] – and lowest wages in Italy for fear of returning to their countries of origin.[18] The majority of immigrants are unable to "vote in local elections even after twenty years of holding a regular residence and work permit and paying Italian taxes."[19]

In spite of a by now well-established migrant presence in Italy, there are still few acquisitions of citizenship. Citizenship is the formal instrument

with which an immigrant acquires equal rights and obligations with the local population. The fact that approximately 7 per cent of the population living in Italy are not Italian citizens confirms just how disorienting and complex acquiring citizenship is in Italy.[20]Zincone and Basili argue that "the present legislation is in need of reform because it produces an evident detachment of the Italian society from its political community",[21] with the consequence that a significant proportion of Italy's polity now lives without adequate representation.[22] Migrants in Italy thus bear many of the community's burdens without receiving its benefits.[23]

The principle of *jus soli*[24] whereby anyone born within the jurisdiction of the state is thereby a citizen of that state is not applicable in Italy where citizenship legislation is still based upon a familistic*jus sanguinis* model.[25] Citizenship is granted only in special circumstances. These include: when the child of migrant parents reaches adulthood and may request citizenship,[26] or in the case of a parent or an elder being or having been at some stage an Italian citizen.[27]

Zincone and Basili outline the requirements thus:

While according to the previous 1912 "Nationality Act" all foreign residents had to wait five years to apply for naturalisation, the current law requires: ten years for foreigners from non-EU countries; five years for exiles and stateless people; just three years for foreigners of Italian origin (two if minors); and four years for foreigners from EU countries. The discount applied to EU nationals is due to the fact that they were considered, at least until the recent enlargement, as members of a sort of extended family.[28]

Further restrictions have also been imposed. Until recently, marriage with an Italian-born citizen resulted in virtually automatic Italian citizenship.[29] In July 2009, however, the passing of a "Security Act" in response to concerns over "the lack of legality and security" restricted what was

perceived as a "too-easy route to citizenship". Act 94 discourages "marriages of convenience", and has seen the time of marriage for couples resident in Italy rise from six months to two years, with the granting of citizenship requiring evidence of "the persistence of the bond".[30]Italian citizenship has thus been increasingly denied to bodies that lie outside of a limited definition of "Italian" bloodlines.[31]

2.2 The Case of Somalis in Italy

Italian responses to the influx of Somali migrants and refugees following the outbreak of civil war in Somalia in 1991 have been shaped by such narrow definitions of what it is to be Italian. Akin to other African migrants, Somali refugees in Italy, for instance, are rarely granted Italian citizenship, in spite of the fact that their heritage was shaped significantly, as we have noted, by the Italian presence in Somalia over decades.This area of the continent became known as *l'Africa Orientale Italiana*, indicating how formative the Italian presence in the region was for these countries. In Somalia, for example, institutional education was conducted in Italian or in English or in Arabic until the Somali language became a written one in 1972[32]. Street signs in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, were in Italian. The special relationship of this region with Italy disappeared when Italy lost its influence in the area with the onset of civil war in Somalia, yet the historical legacy remains.

Italian colonial administration of Somalia from the partition of Africa in the 1880s until Somalia's independence in 1960 has been regarded as brief and benevolent in comparison with, for example, French and British colonialism[33]. Indeed, alongside the notion of a "weak colonialism", the *Italiani, bravagente* myth has been central to constructions of Italian identity.[34] Colonial studies were until recently limited to the work of historians such as Angelo Del Boca.[35]Fabrizio De Donno and Neelam Srivastava attribute this fact to "the impossibility of access to official colonial records for several decades" post 1945, and to "the general

refusal of the Italian governing class to engage in a sustained and public debate about colonialism, as had occurred in other European ex-colonial nations".[36]

Italian postcoloniality is an understudied area, according to De Donno and Srivastava.[37] Alessandro Triulzi is concerned with what he terms the "ambiguous displacements" of colonial memory within both Italian society and Italy's ex-colonies. Likening "colonial memory and its renewed positioning" to "back-up files which can be accessed according to convenience", he argues that the "the legend of Italian colonialism as different, more tolerant, and more humane than other colonialisms remains obstinately at large", in spite of the re-emergence of Italian colonialism "as a topic of heated debate".[38]

Consequently, Italy's colonial legacy has only recently begun to be integrated into "larger narratives of Italian national experience".[39]There is thus little to distinguish migrants from the ex-colonies from other immigrants. This absence of recognition means that Somali migrants – many of whom speak Italian – can lose their residency permits, resulting in discrimination, irregular work contracts – and thus hazardous occupations – or unemployment. The absence of social support for Somalis, Ethiopians and Eritreans in Italy suggests that Italy's legal and moral responsibilities, as a former colonial power, towards migrants and refugees from the region are unmet. In addition, Italy's aid projects – which were directed chiefly towards Somalia and other parts of sub-Saharan Africa following "a post-imperial pattern" – have been largely ineffectual.[40]

Unlike other European powers such as Britain or France, where citizenship has been available for most ex-colonial subjects,[41] and who Habermas argues "have had the chance *to take up a reflexive distance to themselves*",[42] Italy does not distinguish between migrants from the ex-colonies and elsewhere and thus does not grant citizenship to migrants

from Somalia any more readily than other third country nationals.Thus the cultural identification with Italy experienced by many Somalis, due to their heritage being influenced by the Italian presence in Somalia over decades, has little, if any, impact on the legal status of Somali refugees in Italy. Moreover, Somalis residing in Italy are no longer officially considered stateless in spite of ongoing conflict in Somalia, and the fact that Somalis are among the most represented refugee groups in receipt of publicly funded SPRAR (System of Protection for Asylum Seekers and Refugees) assistance.[43] As Somali writer Nuruddin Farah notes:

The majority of Somalis do not qualify for refugee status, according to the Italian authorities close reading of the 1951 Geneva Convention and Protocol, because they have no tangible evidence that, as individuals, they are fleeing persecution in their land. Hence their provisional admission into the country as "visitors"…[44]

Farah goes on to note how many in Italy see little need to alter the status of Somalis, now seen as part of a more general exodus from Africa.[45]Alessandro Triulzi considers the dilemma facing what he terms 'disenfranchised ex-colonial subjects':

In postcolonial Italy, the African "alterity" is dealt with, culturally and socially, through the ambiguous return of colonial clichés together with representations of modernity and citizenship which, while including sanitized narratives of the country's colonial past, exclude African migrants from full participation in cultural, social or political life.[46]

Perhaps as a consequence, Italy is viewed by many migrants as a "stopping-off point" and has ceased to be the host country of choice for Somali migrants and refugees. Due to the suspension of the 1992 Italian decree in recognition of Somalis' humanitarian status as refugees, the presence of Somalis drastically declined from 20,000 in the early 1990s to an estimated presence of between 5 and 6 thousand in 2006.[47]

According to a decree by the President of Cabinet, out of the 2008 annual quota of 150 000 for TCN workers in Italy, a mere 100 places were reserved for Somalis.[48]Other EU countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands or countries outside Europe such as Canada, Australia and the USA are now preferred for resettlement. Figure 2.1 provides a story of these changes in migration trends.

Figure 2.1: Comparison of Somalia born population in Italy and Australia

Country	1996	2002	2006	2011
Italy	5991	5305	5150	8112
Australia	2061	3714	4310	5686

Sources: Italy: Caritas, ISTAT; Australia: ABS, DIMA.

It should be noted that these figures do not capture the numbers of people with Somali ancestry residing in the two countries. Were the 2011 figures to include numbers of people with Somali-born parents, for example, they would likely be approximately three times the size of those above.

Matteo Guglielmo and Petra Mezzetti report that the Somali community in Italy "suffers from a certain degree of cleavage", between a "historical group" of Somalis who have been living in Italy since before the civil war and those who arrived later (and continue to arrive).[49]

3.1 The Australian Context

Before the European invasion in 1788, which marked the beginning of Australia as a nation of migrants, the land mass now known as Australia was inhabited by nations of indigenous peoples. Following European arrival however, the largest migrant group in Australia was British,[50] and for much of the next two centuries, this is how it remained, with "all immigration from outside the United Kingdom and other English-

speaking countries… discouraged".[51]The 1901 *Immigration Restriction Act*, quotas in the 1920s and "virtual prohibitions" in the 1930s on non-British immigration, the limitation of "citizenship rights to British subjects"[52] and the "White Australia" Policy ensured that in 1947, as immigration analyst James Jupp has outlined:

Australia could claim to be 99% white and 96% British… Anglicans were the largest single domination, suggesting that Australians of English origin were the largest element of the population.[53] Fifty years later, however, Catholics were the largest religious domination and people of non-European descent constituted six per cent of Australians. Almost a quarter of all Australians were born overseas and languages other than English increasingly spoken included Chinese, Arabic, Vietnamese, Macedonian, Croatian and Filipino.[54] In the most recent census statistics of 2011, the major birthplaces of Australians included China, Hong Kong, Fiji, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, Lebanon, Malaysia, Singapore and Sri Lanka.[55]

The significant cultural shift that took place over those fifty years can be attributed to changes in Australia's immigration policy, beginning in 1945 with the introduction of the Department of Immigration under the Chifley Labor Government.[56] Following the end of World War Two, defence, economic, foreign policy and population concerns propelled Australia to sign the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) agreement, allowing the resettlement of displaced Central and Eastern Europeans.[57] To meet the demands of the country's burgeoning industrialisation, Australia at this time was unable rely on what had hitherto been a predominantly British migrant intake and agreed to accept "an annual quota of displaced persons".[58] While Minister Arthur Calwell's administration of the Immigration Department sought initially to maintain White Australia (which included the deportation of "allied refugees of Asian origin, thousands of whom had fled to Australia from

the Japanese", while simultaneously attempting to attract Europeans who conformed to the racialist guidelines established under White Australia),[59] immigration policy slowly began to accommodate migrants from "non-traditional" sources.[60]

Australia became involved in further humanitarian migration programmes by signing the Geneva Convention and Protocol in 1973, which would have significant consequences for the "White Australia" policy, officially ended under the Whitlam Labor Government in 1972, with Al Grassby, Minister for Immigration, heralding the beginning of a new era of "multiculturalism".[61] Unlike the immigration and settlement policies that preceded it, multiculturalism proclaimed the value of many different cultures, rather than assuming that "other cultures were inferior to and incompatible with the 'mainstream' culture of White British Australia."[62]

For all its flaws, multiculturalism has significantly shaped Australian public life and has granted migrants access to significant benefits. Mark Lopez' political history of multiculturalism, *The Origins of Multiculturalism in Australian Politics 1945-1975* (1999), elucidates its ideology. Lopez locates four key strands – cultural pluralism, welfare multiculturalism, ethnic structural pluralism and ethnic rights multiculturalism – that have informed Australian multiculturalism as an ideal and as a policy.[63]

In February 2011, the latest version of Australian multiculturalism was released by the government in a statement that articulated multiculturalism as: "embracing and benefiting from the strength of our different cultural traditions" by "respond[ing] to our cultural diversity" with the aim of "strengthen[ing] social cohesion".[64] In addition, there is commitment "to an access and equity framework to ensure that the onus is on government to provide equitable services to Australians from all backgrounds."A shift away from active political struggle for migrants'

rights is evident in the contemporary emphasis on unity within "cultural diversity", which is celebrated annually on "Harmony Day", a key government initiative to promote cohesion.[65]

Australia's contemporary treatment of asylum seekers and refugees in many senses mirrors the developments outlined above insofar as both right and left wing governments have detained asylum seekers via regimes of incarceration and control. Due to its relative geographic isolation, Australia's capacity to exercise control over unauthorised arrivals has been much higher than many other nations. Such control represents a significant departure from the late 1970s, when Australia saw the arrival by boat of Vietnamese refugees, which coincided with the end of the White Australia Policy. In 1976, the Fraser Liberal Government began to welcome Vietnamese refugees fleeing communism who had arrived by boat. In spite of negative media representations of "boat people", the Fraser Government continued to welcome them, establishing a resettlement plan for Indo-Chinese asylum seekers.

Until the Fraser Government lost office to Hawke in the 1983 election, Australia's intake of migrants from Vietnam, Cambodia and China amounted to more than 15000 annually.[66] The election of the Hawke Labor Government brought with it significant modifications to refugee policy. The Hawke Government's objective was to control refugee and asylum seeker flows. This was achieved by way of introducing mandatory detention for unauthorised arrivals by boat and a new generation of detention centres that were instituted, in particular the Port Hedland detention centre, opened in 1992, in a remote part of Western Australia. It can be argued that the public perception of "boat people" altered at this time inasmuch as seeing asylum seekers incarcerated encouraged people to regard them as criminals.[67]

Temporary Protection Visas (TPV) were introduced for onshore refugee arrivals by the Howard Coalition Government in 1999. Unlike refugees

who entered the country as part of the offshore migration program on Permanent Protection Visas (PPV), and were eligible to apply for citizenship after two years of living in Australia, refugees on TPVs who were unable to renew their visas were returned to their "home countries" on their expiry.[68] Criticised by Human Rights groups, TPVs were abolished in 2008 by the Rudd Labor Government and replaced by Resolution of Status Visas (RoS), which enable access to the same benefits and entitlements as the PPV.[69] Since election of the Abbott government in 2013, TPVs have been reintroduced, alongside a new class of 'Safe Haven Enterprise' visas (SHEV) in December 2014, which allow asylum seekers to stay in Australia for up to five years, provided study or a work contract in a regional area of the country is in place.[70]

While the onshore program was created in accordance with Australia's obligation under the Refugees Convention, the offshore program was "designed and implemented over time by the Australian Government on its own initiative".[71] In this way, the government can monitor the categories and numbers of asylum seekers it chooses to accept, evading its legal responsibility to protect onshore asylum seekers.

While there are instances of humanitarianism, such as the welcoming of Indochinese refugees under Fraser and the granting of permanent residency to Chinese students under Hawke in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre, Australian immigration programmes have generally been selective and only welcoming of people that are in some direct way able to benefit the country.[72]

Likewise, skilled migration has been privileged by Australian governments for the purposes of building the nation's economy while arrivals of refugees have been viewed as a threat resulting in rejection via incarceration and, in some cases, deportation.[73] Australia's border protection practices have been emulated in other countries, including Italy. For example, the excising of a number of Australian islands in the

pacific from Australia's migration zone under the Howard government – what was referred to as the "Pacific solution" – was considered best practice by the Centre-Right Italian government policy makers.[74]This led to the construction of a number of CPT detention-like centres in the far south on the island of Lampedusa, a first point of contact with Italy for many Somali migrants.

3.2 Somalis in Australia

During the past decade, Somalia has often featured as one of the top ten countries of birth for humanitarian entrants to Australia, according to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship.[75] In spite of a history of Somali emigration "based on serving in British merchant ships", [76] Somalis were unable to settle in Australia until the end of the White Australia policy, which meant they were unable to settle in Australia for the next 70 years.[77] While the first Somalis began arriving in Australia in the 1980s,[78] it was not until the outbreak of civil war in Somalia in 1991 that a humanitarian migration programme was established. [79] From refugee camps in African countries that are Somalia's neighbours, many – particularly women under the "Women at Risk" humanitarian visa category – have arrived in Australia. Other Somalis have migrated via family connections when there has been the possibility of sponsorship via Family Reunion visas. While they may be regarded as an "emerging" community in Australia, Somalis as a cultural group are nevertheless a minority in Australian society.

In 1993, as part of the United Nations intervention in Somalia, Australia assigned 1000 peace-keeping troops to the country until the failure of the intervention in 1995. A year later, Somali born people in Australia amounted to 2061: most resided in Melbourne and almost all were Sunni Muslims. Somalis largely arrived in Australia as humanitarian entrants, or via reunion with family members. From 1994 until 1998, over 2000 Somalis settled permanently in Australia, many in Springvale and other

Melbourne suburbs.[80] Access to public housing in the inner suburbs of the North such as Moonee Valley and Moreland made these areas attractive for Somalis. Few Somalis in this group found employment due to incompatible language skills and levels of education.

A number of Somali organisations such as the Somali Relief Association, the West Somali Relief Association and Somali Community in Victoria were subsequently established to address issues of unemployment and welfare.[81]Social centres such as the Migrant Resource Centre North East, the Ecumenical Migration Centre and the Refugee Advice and Casework Service of Victoria have conducted extensive resettlement work among Somalis.[82]

Somalis in Australia, like other migrants, can become Australian citizens after four years of residence in the country. The most recent version of Australia's policy of multiculturalism, "The People of Australia" (2011), outlines the rights and responsibilities of all Australian residents. Somalis may access English lessons, schools and government health and welfare services such as Centrelink and Medicare; are protected by a national Anti-Racism and Discrimination Initiative, and are free to practice their cultural beliefs, provided these do not contravene Australian law.[83] This can become problematic for some Somalis as common practices in Somali culture, such as Female Genital Circumcision, are controversial and prohibited in Australia.[84] A number of community organisations such as Women's Health West exist to assist Somali women with similar cultural concerns. Further cultural issues associated with Somali settlement are discussed below.

The Ecumenical Migration Centre produces an independent *Migration Action* journal, to explore issues surrounding refugees, immigration and multiculturalism. Dedicated to Somali resettlement in Melbourne, the first edition of the journal for 2005 featured articles on youth education and includes suggestions by Somali poet, academic and refugee Yusuf

Sheikh Omar for future directions in resettlement of the community. In his article titled: "Young Somalis in Australia: an educational approach to challenges and recommended solutions", Omar canvasses the various challenges and difficulties encountered by Somali students in Melbourne. The author highlights language as the greatest challenge to academic progress. Somali students tend to struggle in developing writing skills while they excel verbally due to their cultural background in which oral adroitness is revered. Lack of English language ability combined with culture shock often leads to feelings of isolation at school. Omar describes such shock:

Generally speaking, Somali communities in western countries have maintained their specific cultural and religious characteristics. As a result, these communities, especially young people, often find themselves caught between two cultures creating tension and confusion.[85]

It is difficult for many young Somalis, furthermore, to integrate into "the Australian life style" without appearing disloyal and alienating the family and Somali community. At the same time, young Somalis conforming to the traditional cultural values of their parents risk isolation at school inasmuch as they may be restricted from participating in the activities on offer. Omar observed that at the time of writing, few young Somalis, moreover, intended to resettle permanently in Australia: "Many of them hope to go back to Somalia, Africa or the Muslim world".[86]

Omar identifies a third way for Somali students to resettle in the host society, arguing that it is possible for refugee students to be "proud of their culture and social identity" while maintaining openness towards "the new culture." Such a balance, he maintains, would enable students to adapt to the new environment while simultaneously contributing "to their own culture in their new country".[87]Omar considers some of the ways in which the school system could be improved to aid the resettlement process. These include teaching English as a second language in smaller

groups and teaching the mother tongue as "the basic skill of reading transfers readily and dynamically" from the first to the second language.[88] In addition, Omar recommends that Australian schools cultivate understanding of Somali culture by adopting an interfaith model, which would "mark the major celebrations of all cultural groups, including the Somali community, and invite community members to participate in the preparation".[89] Identifying the need for cultural maintenance and development among Somalis in Australia,[90] Omar outlines how special support, including the welcoming of parent participation in special programmes organised by schools,[91] should be available to Somali students whose schooling has been interrupted by civil war and displacement.

Based in Heidelberg, the Australian Somali Youth Association (ASYA), of which Omar was president at the time of its inception in 2003, addresses some of the resettlement concerns highlighted above.[92] ASYA seeks to bridge the cultural gap between Somali youth and the mainstream by motivating and inspiring Somalis to build an academic future in Australia. Reduced dropout rates and increased numbers of secondary school and university graduates are some of the association's aims.

Women's Health West in Footscray is another example of an organisation facilitating Somali resettlement insofar as it has established a Somali Women's group that holds weekly meetings. During these times, "Family and Reproductive Rights Education Program" (FARREP) service providers present health and wellbeing related information to Somali women with the assistance of a Somali interpreter.[93] The organisation also provides assistance and information on the delicate and controversial issue of female genital mutilation (FGM), which is increasingly problematic in the Western countries in which Somalis

resettle.[94] The kind of assistance offered in Australia is rare in Italy, where infibulated women tend to be viewed as laboratory guinea pigs.[95]

4 Conclusion: Comparing Settlement Contexts and Trajectories

In summary, Australia offers official recognition to Somali refugees in the form of citizenship within a multicultural model, however limited or "thin" this may be. Italy, in contrast, seldom grants citizenship to Somalis and thus offers this group of migrants little stability. In the absence of comprehensive settlement policies, most Somalis have preferred to resettle elsewhere due to poor living conditions. Yet while the civic infrastructure for migrants in Italy is poor, a number of second generation Somalis have had palpable artistic success there in cultural endeavours that are only just beginning to emerge in Australia. The cultural comparison of Somali resettlement in Italy and Australia becomes more complex when cultural opportunities are considered. Different models of "cultural citizenship" may be at work, suggesting the potential for both societies to learn from the resettlement experiences of the other.[96]

Notes and References

[1] Over the last three decades since the collapse of the state and eruption of civil war, a large number of people fled Somalia and dispersed across the globe. The number of people that have fled the country is estimated at one million or above. A majority of this diaspora population resides in the Horn of Africa and Yemen, the Gulf States, Europe, North America and Australia. There are also significant communities in Malaysia and South Africa.

[2] Alison Blunt and Robyn Dowling, *Home* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 2.

[3] For an insight into "thick" and "thin" conceptions of citizenship, see Bauböck (1999).

[4] Blunt and Dowling, *Home*, 6.

[5] Immigrants in Italy began to outnumber emigrants in 1973. Enrico Pugliese, *L'Italia tra migrazioni internazionali e migrazioni interne* (Bologna: Il Mulino 2002), cited in Giovanna Zincone and Marzia Basili, EUDO Citizenship Observatory 1. *Country Report: Italy*. www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ [Accessed 20 Nov 2009], 15.

[6] Some scholars estimate that "over the last two decades of the twentieth century, up to a million or more African immigrants entered Italy, whose southern islands are only a few miles from the northern coast of Africa." Sante Matteo (ed.) *ItaliAfrica: Bridging Continents and Cultures* (Stony Brook, NY: Forum Italicum, 2001), 3.

[7] Statistics on immigration trends in Italy can be located at: http://dati.istat.it/

[8] AnkicaKosic and Anna Triandafyllidou, A. *European Immigration: A Sourcebook* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), 185.

[9] Considering the recent nature of the immigration experiences in Italy and Spain, Colin Crouch argues that these countries "lack institutions for coping with ethnic and cultural pluralism". Colin Crouch, *Social Change in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 406.

[10] Anna Triandafillydou, "Religious diversity and multiculturalism in Southern Europe," In Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafillydou and Ricard Zapata-Barrero, *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship* (London: Routledge, 2006), 119.

[11] Zincone, Giovanna, "The Making of Policies: Immigration and Immigrants in Italy," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 32, no. 3 (2006): 347.

[12] Zincone, "The Making of Policies: Immigration and Immigrants in Italy,"351-52.

[13] Zincone, "The Making of Policies: Immigration and Immigrants in Italy,"348.

[14] Paul Ginsborg, *Italy and its Discontents: 1980-2001*. (London: Penguin, 2004), 235.

[15] John Foot, "The logic of contradiction: migration control in Italy and France, 1980-93." In *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (London: Pinter, 1995), 137.

[16]The Italian job market relies on a cycle of irregular work contracts. Rome: Caritas Statistical Dossier, 2001, 269.

[17] Demanding, dangerous and dirty or *pesanti*, *precari*, *pericolosi*, *poco pagati*, *penalizzati socialmente*. Ambrosini and Berti cited in Kosic and Triandafyllidou, *European Immigration*, 190.

[18] Kosic and Triandafyllidou, *European Immigration*,190.

[19] Matteo, *ItaliAfrica*, 86.

[20] Zincone and Basili write that: "In July 2009, there were nearly four million foreign people legally resident in Italy, representing 6.5 per cent of the total population. 8.9 per cent of the employees and 4.5 per cent of the self-employed are immigrants in Italy. According to the 2009 Report of the Bank of Italy, immigrants contribute 4 per cent of fiscal and contributory receipts and consume only 2 per cent of the welfare spending." Zincone and Basili, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 19.

[21] Zincone and Basili, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 19.

[22] Rainer Bauböck argues that the subjection of "resident foreign citizens" to territorial sovereignty without representation in the making of laws is a deviation from the basic norms of democratic legitimation of political authority.' Rainer Bauböck, "Recombinant Citizenship," In: Alison Woodward and Martin Kohli (eds.) *Inclusions and Exclusions in European Societies* (London: Routledge, 2001), 46.

[23] Bauböck defines the polity as "an intergenerational community whose members share in benefits and burdens which derive from living under a common political authority." Rainer Bauböck, *National Community, Citizenship and Cultural Diversity*. Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna. Political Science Series No. 5. (2009).

[24] Ayelet Shachar describes the *jus soli* principle as having its origins in "the common law tradition" wherein there is an implicit "territorial understanding of birthright citizenship", and a recognition of "the right of each person born within a physical jurisdiction of a given state to acquire full and equal membership in

that polity." "Redefining citizenship as property" In Behabib et al. (eds.) *Identities, Affiliations and Allegiances* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 260.

[25] According to Zincone and Basili, Italy's *jus sanguinis*, familistic model derives from "its late achievement of national unity" and the country's legacy of emigration which led to the introduction of "legislation that made the public community of citizens coincide with the ethnic community of nationals", with the aim of fortifying connections "between Italian expatriates and their descendants." Zincone and Basili, EUDO Citizenship Observatory. 1. *Country Report: Italy*. www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ [Accessed 20 Nov 2009].

[26] Legislation 91 passed in 1992 specifies that children born in Italy to foreign parents are not eligible to become Italian citizens until they turn 18, at which time they must prove that they have resided in Italy without interruption, and have a year in which to claim citizenship. Corrado Giustiniani, *Fratellastri d'Italia: Vite di stanieri tra noi*. (Bari: Laterza, 2003), 152.

[27] Caritas Statistical Dossier 2002, 161-62.

[28] Zincone and Basili, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 1.

[29] As long as the couple are living in Italy. Should the couple be outside of Italy, citizenship would be granted after 3 years of marriage. Caritas Statistical Dossier 2002, 162.

[30] Zincone and Basili, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 2.

[31] Luca Einaudi, *Le politiche dell'immigrazione in Italia dall'Unità a oggi* (Bari: Laterza, 2007), 186.

[32] The Somali Language became the medium of instruction of primary and secondary education in Somalia in mid 1970s. English and Arabic languages were still the medium of instruction in some subjects or schools but there was no role at all for Italian in this level. However, in tertiary education, Italian was the primary language of instruction from its inception in 1954 until the collapse of Somali central government in 1991. Over the past two decades, the languages of instruction in primary and secondary schools were Arabic,

English and Somali; while English and Arabic became the teaching languages in tertiary education in Somalia.

[33] Towards the mid-nineteenth century the Somali Peninsula became a sphere of competition between the three European colonies: Great Britain, Italy, and France; they divided it into five territories. Two territories gained their independence in 1960; a British protectorate from Great Britain, and Italian Somaliland from Italy; these joined together to form the Somali Republic. After independence Italy was the most influential country in Somalia.

[34] For an investigation of some of the brutalities that occurred during Italy's administration of *L'AfricaOrientale Italiana*, see Angelo Del Boca's history of Italian colonialism, Angelo Del Boca, *Italiani, brava gente?*(Milano: NeriPozza, 2005).

[35] For an introduction to Italian colonial cultures, see Patrizia Palumbo, (ed.) *A Place in the Sun: Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present* (California: University of California Press, 2003).

[36] Fabrizio De Donno and Neelam Srivastava, "Colonial and Postcolonial Italy," *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 8, no. 3 (2006): 371.

[37] Fabrizio De Donno and Neelam Srivastava, "Colonial and Postcolonial Italy," 371.

[38] Alessandro Triulzi, "Displacing the Colonial Event," *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 8, no. 3 (2006): 430.

[39] Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Mia Fuller, *Italian Colonialism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1.

[40]In Somalia, for instance, Italy's funds did not address civil rights concerns, failed to control the deployment of military aid, and tended to end up in the hands of élites rather than contributing to the needs of the poor: '[F]rom 1988 onwards, the first scandals about Italian aid began to break, first with a fertilizer factory which had cost 100 billion lire to build but never began production, and then with the construction of 3,000 useless silos in fibreglass throughout the villages of Somalia…When an independent monitoring of 121 aid projects took place in 1993, 40 per cent of them were found to have failed

completely, and of the remaining 60 per cent half functioned poorly.' Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 238-39.

[41] See EUDO citizenship observatory.www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/

[42] Jurgen Habermas, *Der Gespaltener Westen*. (2004),51. Cited in William Outhwaite, *European Society*. (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 34.

[43] Somalis were the fifth most represented refugee group that received assistance from SPRAR in 2006. (2007 Caritas Statistical Dossier) 504. In 2010, they were the group that received most assistance. (SPRAR Central Service data bank).

[44] Nuruddin Farah, *Yesterday, Tomorrow: Voices from the Somali Diaspora* (London; New York: Cassell, 2000), 63.

[45] Farah, *Yesterday, Tomorrow: Voices from the Somali Diaspora*, 63.

[46] Alessandro Triulzi, "Displacing the Colonial Event", 430.

[47] The 2007 Caritas Statistical Dossier records the Somali presence in Italy as 5,150, 0.1 per cent of the migrant population, in 2006. Caritas Dossier 2007, 485.

[48] Annual quota for TCN workers in Italy (1998-2008). Source: Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri concentrate la programmazione transitory dei flussi d'ingresso dei lavoratori extracomunitari non stainable nel territorio dello stato (DPCM).

[49] Matteo Guglielmo and Petra Mezzetti, "Somali Diaspora Associations in Italy: Between Integration and Transnational Engagement," CESPI, *Diaspeace* Working Paper 62, (2009), 24.

[50] James Jupp, *Immigration* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1998), 132.

[51] Jupp, *Immigration*, 100.

[52] Jupp, *Immigration*, 47.

[53] Jupp, *Immigration*, 132.

[54] Jupp. *Immigration*, 149-50.

[55] Jupp. *Immigration*, 150.

[56] Jupp, *Immigration*, 103.

[57] Australia was to "populate or perish", as the country was considered "too thinly populated and too reliant on primary industry to resist attack or invasion from Asia." Jupp, *Immigration*, 102.

[58] The DP program was concluded by 1953. Jupp, *the Australian People*, 831.

[59] Jupp, *Immigration*, 104.

[60] See Gwenda Tavan, *The Long Slow Death of White Australia* (Carlton North, Vic: Scribe, 2005).

[61] Designed in Canada in 1968, multiculturalism aimed "to cater for the large number of Canadians whose origins were neither British nor French." In contrast with Australia, multiculturalism in Canada has "never been officially managed by agencies concerned with immigration." Jupp, *Arrivals and Departures*, 7.

[62] Jupp, *Arrivals and Departures*, 6.

[63] Mark Lopez, *The Origins of Multiculturalism in Australian Politics 1945-1975* (Melbourne University Press, 1999), 5-6.

[64] Australian Government, *The People of Australia: Australia's Multicultural Policy*. Released 16 February 2011, www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/multicultural/pdf_doc/people-of-australia-multicultural-policy-booklet.pdf [Accessed 12 October 2012], 2.

[65] Australian Government, *The People of Australia*, 7. For a discussion of government anxieties underpinning the increased emphasis on cohesion, see James Jupp, "The Quest for Harmony," In James Jupp and John Nieuwenhuysen (eds.) *Social Cohesion in Australia* (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[66] MacCallum, "Girt By Sea: Australia, Refugees and the Politics of Fear", 21.

[67] MacCallum contends that "Previously the boat people had been treated as guests, albeit uninvited ones who did not yet enjoy all the privileges of residents. Now they were isolated and locked up. Clearly they must be

guilty of something to be treated so like criminals." MacCallum, "Girt By Sea: Australia, Refugees and the Politics of Fear", 23.

[68] DIMA, "Refugee and Humanitarian Issues: Australia's Response." www.immi.gov.au.

[69] Entitlements include welfare allowances and English classes. www.immi.gov.au.

[70] DIMA, "Safe Haven Enterprise visas." www.immi.gov.au

[71] O'Kane, *Refugee and Asylum Seeker Issues in Australia*, 28

[72]The imminent introduction of the "Significant Investor Visa" in 2012, which enables billionaires to become Australian citizens provided they invest and reside in the country for an equivalent period of forty days every year for four years, is a further example of this attitude. www.immi.gov.au.

[73] Including the deportation of Australian citizens who were mistaken for "illegal" immigrants.

[74] Spruce, Damian and IllariaVanni, "Laboratorio Australia: setting the benchmark for the world's worst practice." 10 March 2005. www.meltingpot.org/articolo4950.html. [Accessed 2 March 2006]

[75] Source: Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Fact Sheet 60. Australia's Refugee and Humanitarian Program, March 2011, last viewed August 2011.

[76] Jupp, *The Australian People*, 688.

[77] Jupp, *The Australian People*, 688.

[78] From 1983 until 1988, 39 Somali citizens were given humanitarian visas. James Jupp, *Exile or Refuge?: The Settlement of Refugee, Humanitarian and Displaced Immigrants* (Canberra: AGPS, 1994), 19.

[79] According to Jupp: "By 1989 there were already 388 000 Somali refugees in neighbouring countries, most of them in Ethiopia. Australia processed refugees mainly through its immigration post in Nairobi, Kenya, having no diplomatic presence in Somalia or Ethiopia." Jupp, *The Australian People*, 688.

[80] This is a consequence of the fact that "Many Somalis passed through the Enterprise hostel at Springvale, which was closed in 1993." Jupp, *The Australian People*, 688.

[81] Jupp, *The Australian People*, 688.

[82] Somali community groups that have been formed include the Somali Community of New South Wales in Sydney, "which received a substantial grant from the Department of Immigration in 1993" and a number of small organizations… in Brisbane, Canberra and Adelaide." Jupp, *The Australian People*, 688.

[83] Australian Government, "The People of Australia. Australia's Multicultural Policy", 16 February 2011. www.immi.gov.au [Accessed 12 October 2012]

[84] For an analysis of issues surrounding FGC in Australia, see Ben Matthews, "Female Genital Mutilation: Australian Law, Policy and Practical Challenges for Doctors," *The Medical Journal of Australia* 194, no. 3 (2011): 139-141.

[85] Yusuf Sheikh Omar, "The Educational and Employment Aspirations of Somali High-School Students in Melbourne." Ecumenical Migration Centre. November 2005, 8.

[86] Omar, "The Educational and Employment Aspirations of Somali High-School Students…", 15.

[87] Omar, "The Educational and Employment Aspirations of Somali High-School Students…", 8-9.

[88] Omar, "The Educational and Employment Aspirations of Somali High-School Students…", 9.

[89] Omar, "The Educational and Employment Aspirations of Somali High-School Students…", 15

[90] When "immigrant students feel pride in their ethnic culture and heritage, their self-esteem and sense of identity is enhanced." Links with their communities are reinforced and an increase in confidence makes possible a positive contribution to "the new culture". Omar, "The Educational and Employment Aspirations of Somali High-School Students…", 16.

[91]Omar advises schools "to recruit, train and employ some refugee/immigrant professionals who have the same language and cultural background of the refugee/immigrant students" for the purposes of teaching "community languages, cultures and religions" and providing "cultural interpretations to parents, children and school staff." Such figures also present positive role models for the students. Omar, "The Educational and Employment Aspirations of Somali High-School Students…", 17.

[92]Somalis living in Heidelberg have a penchant for calling the area "Somaliberg" due to the large numbers of Somalis inhabiting the suburb.

[93]The organisation has created a brochure titled "Healthy African Women" in Somali, Arabic, Amharic and Tigrigna which lists local community health centres, hospitals, key women's health screenings and information about childbirth and female genital mutilation. See (Women's Health West, 2005).

[94]Matthews, "Female Genital Mutilation: Australian Law, Policy and Practical Challenges for Doctors," 140.

[95] Amina, an infibulated Somali woman interviewed by Italian Somali writer Igiaba Scego, recalls her first gynaecological examination in Italy: "I have never felt so humiliated and sad. They were queuing to see my mutilation! Fortunately I met a talented Italian doctor who had spent some time in Uganda and Djibouti, so he knew all about FGM practices. He helped me enormously, giving me a hand with getting my life together as a woman and mother. There is a need [in Italy] for better health education and awareness and for appropriate psychological support." My translation from an interview conducted by Igiaba Scego, "La donna violata," In *MigranteMente: Il popolo invisibile prende la parola,* ed. Sabatino Annecchiarico (Bologna: Editrice Missionaria Italiana, 2005), 100.

[96] For an interdisciplinary perspective on questions of citizenship and their relation to culture, see Nick Stevenson, (ed.) *Culture and Citizenship* (London: Sage, 2001), and Nick Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions* (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2003).

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Intergenerational Conflict in the Somali Diaspora: The Perspectives of Young Somali Men in Australia and USA

 Yusuf Sheikh Omar

Abstract

This is a qualitative study investigating young Somali men's experiences and views toward the intergenerational conflict between young people and their parents in Australia and US context. The study explores young men's experiences and perspectives about the intergenerational misunderstanding during their social integration into the receiving countries: Australia and USA. The paper focuses on the areas of cultural, language, lifestyle and attitude differences between youth and their parents. Young men's sense of empowerment in the new environment in contrast to their parents who feel being disempowered will be explored. The paper also sheds light on young men's connectedness with their mothers than with their fathers concluding with young men's strategies of seeking advice and consultation.

Keywords: Somali Diaspora, Young Somali men, intergeneration, culture conflict, immigrants, Australia, USA.

1. Introduction

People have been on the move since the beginning of human existence (Berry e al., 2006). However, the movement of ethnically, racially and religiously diverse migrants across continents is a relatively new phenomenon, and has been on the increase since the beginning of the twentieth century due to well advanced technologies and transportation systems (Binder &Tosic, 2002). This new phenomenon of migration presents "both opportunities and challenges for migrants, and receiving societies alike" (Berry et al., 2006: 1). It also poses challenges between young and old generations of migrant background. Some of these people migrate voluntarily, hoping for a better life, but many are forced to migrate because they face persecution due to their beliefs, political opinions, or membership in a particular social group (Binder &Tosic, 2002).

Beside the nomadic way of life that still remains in the Somali mainstream culture, people are afflicted with prolonged civil war which creates hardships and requires moving constantly. As a result of war and violence happening in Somalia, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled from their homeland seeking a refuge and shelter in countries such as Australia and the USA. Due to ongoing fighting and conflict:

> *Somalia remains one of the countries generating the highest number of displaced people and refugees in the world. There are more than 1.4 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Somalia while over 560,000 Somalis live as refugees in neighbouring and nearby countries* (UNHCR, 2010, online).

Similarly, there are hundreds of thousands of Somalis who sought refuge and shelter across continents mostly in North America, Western Europe, Australia and so on. (UNDP, 2009, online).

Cultures, languages, and general lifestyles of these receiving countries – within which young generation grew up – are greatly different to the culture, language, and general lifestyle which Somali parents brought from their country of origin, Somalia. These differences in terms of culture, language, and general lifestyle created enormous misunderstandings between Somali parents and their children not only in Australia and the USA but also in other countries where Somalis sought protection and shelter (Omar, 2011).

This paper will attempt to identify the underlying factors of this intergenerational misunderstanding, particularly in Australia and the USA context. It presents a story of the experiences of young Somali men who have fled Somalia and are now living in Australia and the USA, explaining Somali youth-parents conflict in the receiving countries. The overall aim of this paper is to investigate and compare the perspectives and experiences of young Somali men living in Australia and the USA in relation to the intergenerational conflict during their social integration process. The specific objectives are to:

1. Identify young Somali men's experiences and perceptions of the differences between them and their parents in the area of culture, language, and general lifestyle.
2. Identify young men's experiences and views on quality of their relationship with their parents together with the best strategies of seeking their parent's advice in matters concerning young men's lives.

This paper draws on the findings from my 2011 PhD thesis and, in doing so, it commences with a brief literature review which provides a context for this study.[1] Next, the methodologies used in the study are explained. Somali community profiles in Melbourne and Minneapolis are also described briefly. The qualitative findings are discussed focusing on young men's experiences and perceptions of intergenerational differences

including differences in thinking, cultural norms, negotiation strategies, language communication, lifestyle, and general outlook on life.

2. Intergenerational Differences in the New Milieu

Each generation has its unique integration experiences as it faces distinctive challenges in its relationship with the larger new society and its own ethnic group (Nee and Alba, 1997). It has been found that first generation[2] migrants retain strong links to the culture in their country of origin, whilst the 1.5 generation or second generation struggles to maintain a balance, selecting from both: its background culture and the new culture (Melia, 2004, p. 127). Thus, the 1.5 or second generation is bicultural and by nature a cultural broker. This is because it breaks through cultural barriers between the country of origin and the hosting country (Vasta, 1994). However, this finding is at odds with studies conducted by Nee and Alba (1997) and Padilla and Perez (2003), who found that the 1.5 and second generation are primarily oriented towards the background culture because its life is profoundly influenced by the first generation, their parents and their migrant community at large. The second generation is also nurtured in traditional ways of thinking and exposed to the behavioural characteristics of its parents and of its community. As a result, it shows strong loyalty to its cultural background and a strong connection to its ethnic community at least theoretically (Nee and Alba, 1997).

Studies conducted in Australia identify that refugee adolescents and older generation including parents face special risks during integration processes. These can be attributed to the lower general adaptability of integrating older people as their involuntary migration aggravates the problem of cultural adaptation, while the "double transition of adolescence and acculturation reinforce each other, creating enhanced risk for youth" (Sam and Berry, 1997, p. 311). Similarly, Vasta (1994)

finds that many migrant adolescents are vulnerable because neither their home nor mainstream culture is entirely their own (Melia, 2004). Moreover, there is evidence that as time passes, and as individual's age, they explore various strategies of integration, choosing the one that is most useful and satisfying (Sam and Berry, 1997). Hamm and Coleman (2001) remark that migrant adolescents seldom adopt a single strategy for acculturation; instead, they develop various strategies to manage in different contexts. Sometimes they use assimilationist strategies, acting like mainstream youth in an attempt to fit into the wider society's culture. Within their communities and at home, however, they may prefer cultural maintenance strategies (Sam and Berry, 1997).

In a liberal western environment, teenagers may feel that their parents are authoritarian. However, (Vasta, 1994) such feelings often reflect their parents' reactions to the unfamiliar environment, lack of confidence in the new culture and concern for their children's integration into the wider society. When migrant children who perceive their parents as authoritarian mature and return to their country of origin, they realize that their parents' authoritarian attitudes were caused by the new environment rather than by their cultural background (Vasta, 1994, Melia, 2004). Sometimes, migrant teenagers may identify themselves neither with mainstream society nor with their ethnic group, instead identifying with another migrant ethnicity. For instance, some Somali teenagers in Australia may identify themselves with Lebanese youth in Australia. This perpetuates the identifier's sense of foreignness; the identifier may be marginalized by his/her own ethnic group, and eventually may develop chronic self-doubt "which can lead to delinquency" (Melia, 2004, p. 127).

3. Research Methodologies

3.1 Ethnographic Research

This is a qualitative study investigating the experiences and perspectives of young Somali men regarding the intergenerational gap and differences. The study was carried out in two field sites, the northwest suburbs of Melbourne, Australia, and the Cedar Riverside neighbourhood of Minneapolis, USA. The total number of formal interviews conducted as part of the study was 80 representing 30 young participants aged 16-25, and 50 other interviewees, including parents and key community members. Thus, the study is informed ethnographically. This type of research is particularly well suited for studying "hard-to-access groups", such as refugees and immigrants, or groups resistant to survey methods (Hudelson, 1996).

At the beginning, the research plan aimed at keeping the balance between female and male participants but during the pilot project in stage one, it was evident that girls were not comfortable discussing some matters related to gender relationships with me while boys did not mind. Islam teaches that interactions between men and women, who are not related, should be instructed and guided carefully particularly in the private spheres. Culturally, it is often taboo (especially by elders) for a woman to have a relationship with an unrelated man, although there is more flexibility for an interviewer's interactions with Somali men. These gender divisions made it difficult for the researcher to discuss a range of issues with young women. For that reason, the researcher decided to drop young women as participants.

3.2 Methods of Data Collection and Sampling

Primary data was mostly gathered through oral/narrative methods, which are best suited to Somali culture as well as to the participant parents'

levels of literacy. Data sources included audio recorded unstructured and semi-structured interviews, focus groups and field participant observations. The sampling strategy of this study was purposive, using a range of specific strategies including snowball sampling, and key informant sampling through community networks.

3.3 Young Participants' Socio-demographic Characteristics

Among those living in Melbourne, all but two of the young people were born in Somalia. One was born in Australia and the other in Saudi Arabia. Their ages range from 16 to 25. Eight young participants out of the 15 young people lived with both parents, and four young participants lived with their mothers only. One young man lived alone, one was married, one lived with his siblings and one lived with his mother and his uncle, who was also his stepfather. Most young people were from large families.

Melbourne participants had lived in Australia for an average of 11 years. Eight out of 15 participants were studying at the time of the interview; one was studying at university, one at TAFE[3], one at ESL[4]and the rest at high school. Two of these students had part-time jobs at the time of the interview. Seven out of 15 were not studying at the time of the interview and five of these seven who were not studying had full time jobs and two had part-time jobs. Again, ten out of 15guardians of the young people had jobs, four did not and one young man did not state his guardian's employment situation.

In the Minneapolis study, all but one participant was born in Somalia (one young participant was born in Kenya). Their ages range from 17 to 25. Only three out of the 15 young people lived with both their parents, six young participants lived with their single mothers, a young man with his father who was married to another woman, two young participants

with their older siblings, two with their uncles, one with his aunt and one lived alone. Most of these young people were from large families ranging from seven to 12 members.

In terms of lengths of residence in the USA, all of them except three young participants had lived in the USA for between seven to 16 years. One young man lived there three years, another young participant lived there almost three years and one young man for four years. In terms of education, all of them were studying either at high school, colleges or university. Five did not work, three worked during summertime and school holidays, three worked fulltime, one worked part-time and one worked as a volunteer. Regarding their guardian employment, 10 out of 15 participants' parents/guardians had jobs; for one, his mum was sick, and another one, his aunt did not work. Two participants, who lived with their old siblings, and one who, lived alone, did not mention if their siblings had jobs.

3.4 Methods of Data Analysis

I began my analysis early in the research process during the formal and informal interviews, which gave me time to reflect on and discuss the topic of the research with participants. Ongoing observations, field notes, interactions with the community members, particularly young people, and attendance at community gatherings and congregations were also important to my analysis, and to understanding the topic deeply. Moreover, I transcribed the interviews myself, which gave me the opportunity to analyse interviews individually and then to analyse cross-case data, comparing their similarities and differences. I then coded and categorised interviews under identified themes.

Data analyses are presented here both directly and indirectly. Sometimes I present direct quotations from participants; sometimes I conceptualise

participants' data in my own words; and sometimes I compare the qualitative data with views expressed in the literature. The main comparison is, however, between the qualitative data itself, for example, comparing data from Melbourne with Minneapolis data. The findings cannot be generalised to the wholly researched population or to the targeted community (Patton, 2002).

4. Somali Communities in Australia and the USA

4.1 Somali Community in Australia

A significant number of Somalis arrived in Australia, especially Victoria, under the Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program and the Family Reunion program, particularly during the period of 1991-2001 (Jupp, 2001; Clyne, and Kipp, 2005). As the 2011 Census shows, the Somali population in Australia numbered around 14000 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011). The largest concentration was in Victoria, particularly in Melbourne (61 percent). The majority of Somalis have settled in Melbourne's northwest although there are communities in the inner city suburbs, in the northeast, in the west and in the south. The northwest suburbs of Melbourne are culturally diverse and the specific areas where Somalis have settled can be characterised as low income areas with a high proportion of public housing. The Somali community in Australia is highly urbanised – 98.7 percent live in capital cities (Victorian Multicultural Commission, 2007).

4.2 Somali Community in the USA

As a result of the civil war, the Somali community has become the largest group of African refugees in the USA. It is

> *One of the unique sets of newcomers to ever enter this nation … the uniqueness of these newcomers and the fact that relatively*

> *little is known about them makes it imperative to study and understand their situation* (Goza, 2007: 255).

The most recent estimates of the total population of Somalis living in the USA ranges from 150,000 (Shio, 2006) to 300,000 (Sonsalla, 2003).Probably this number has increased constantly in the last decade.

Since 1991, the number of Somalis has increased rapidly, concentrated in the mid-western states, particularly Minnesota (Goza, 2007, Kusow, 2007). The largest Somali community in the USA lives in the Twin Cities, Minneapolis and St Paul, with a combined population of more than 50,000; the Twin Cities are regarded as the *de facto* capital of the Somali community in the USA (Schaid & Grossman, 2004). Many Somalis, especially new arrivals live "in the Cedar-Riverside areas between downtown Minneapolis and the University of Minnesota where you can easily see women wearing the hijab or a group of Somali men lingering outside a coffee shop" (Roble and Rutledge, 2008: 135). Somalis have also been drawn to almost all cities of Minnesota including small ones. Thus, they can also be found in Rochester, St. Cloud, Owatonna, Waseca, Marshall, Faribault and Mankato (Shio, 2006, Minneapolis Foundation, 2009). Pull factors for Somali resettlement to these cities include good services, education and employment opportunities, a good social welfare system, a well-established Somali community, and word-of-mouth among the Somali diaspora about the benefits of living there (Horst, 2006).

5. Research Findings

The following is the main finding of the study. It explains intergenerational gaps such as: attitude and cultural conflict, language and communication challenges, youth connection and relationships with their mothers in comparison with their fathers, and finally youth strategies of seeking advice and consultation.

5.1 Attitude and Cultural Conflict in the New Setting

> *You take what she [mother] tells you, and you take what you have to do here and you end up somewhere in the middle* (a young man from Melbourne).

According to the data of this study, misunderstandings between Somali boys and their parents are common. Cornelius, and Faire, (2006, 57-58) argue that when two people or two groups are very different in terms of language, culture, way of life, interests and values, it is easy for small incidents to escalate into misunderstandings, tension and crisis. This is because everything they do and say seem alien and wrong to the other side.

Issues of language, culture and intergenerational gaps all contribute to these misunderstandings. Intergenerational gaps have been described "as psychological discontinuities … or absences in shared cultural knowledge, meaning and practices" (Kapteijns and Arman, 2004, p.23).

Cultural misunderstanding can be caused by discrepancies between parents and youth lifestyles, attitudes and general outlook on life, which are influenced by growing up in different contexts and environments. According to a young man participant from Melbourne "*They [parents] don't discuss with their children you know. They have to talk with them about what they do today…to know their problems*". Some young men complain that their parents are reluctant to discuss with them their situations and the challenges they encounter in their daily lives. Instead of conversation and persuasion, parents tend to resort to dictatorial methods and one way process of communication such as "Dos and Don'ts (do and don't strategies)". According to young men in both Melbourne and Minneapolis, most parents expect their children to behave the way they (parents) used to behave in Somalia when they were

children, while Somali children here in Australia and the USA expect their parents to treat them according to Australian/American norms and cultural context.

> *Somali [youth] have one problem. They have no communications with their parents. Parents talk like 1970s, old days are still in their memories, but the young ones are gaining new culture, new things* (a young man from Minneapolis).

> *Somalian parents tend to want you to be like them [and] how they live…your mother has totally different experience in view to you, because she lived in Somalia…there is that difference I mentioned before, culture clashes, like if you are born here, your parents are not born here, you are definitely not going to see eye to eye in every situation, so there is a definitely barrier of your parents expectation in what you see fit* (a young man from Melbourne)

Ramadan (2004) explains that adult Muslims who emigrate to the west bring with them packages of their Islamic cultural habits as they are practiced in Muslim countries. To prove that they are good Muslims, they strive to perpetuate these old customs and expect their offspring to behave similarly. But Ramadan argues that it is a mistake for migrant adults to push their children to follow customs imported from another country, which do not fit the new surroundings. "Today everything is proving that the formalistic imitation of models in an age other than one's own is, in fact, the betrayal of principles" (Ramadan, 2004, p. 133).

Some young men interviewed in this study suggest that Somali parents should be more compassionate and understanding with their children. These young men believe that if Somali parents engage with their children through a more friendly style of interaction, as other parents

(Australian and US parents) do, they would win their children's trust; otherwise, the children will look for alternative friends.

5.2 Intergenerational Power shift

Alongside cultural conflict between youth and their parents, the other issue that requires to be underlined is intergenerational power shift created by the new environment. Young respondents in both countries observed that, compared to life in Somalia, in the new environment children enjoy more power than their parents. These cultural differences create power struggles and challenges between young and old. On the other hand, parents try to impose their views on the youth, but young people are aware of the advantage they have in the new environments and therefore, they may challenge their parents by expressing their views and expecting their ideas and opinions to be considered. A study of Somali parents' involvement in education in Minneapolis-St. Paul (Nderu, 2005), found that Somali parents note that their children are aware of their power over them in the US context. Parents are afraid of being deported, imprisoned or punished by the authorities, or having their children taken away from them, if their children report negative stories about them to the authorities. As a result, some parents allow their children to become unruly. Similarly, Ramsden (2005, p. 203) emphasises that some Somali parents in Melbourne feel a loss of control as parents because of their children's increased freedom in Australia.

> *Whereas Australians promote kids, the kids [are] kinds of run things whereas in Somalia… parents [are the ones who] run stuff. So, definitely that affects that cultural difference whereas as Somalian parents they won't be able control their kids, whereas kids feel here [in Australia] they have sense of control and they should have a say…they [kids] definitely want more power…they wanna have that kind of negotiating and Somalian parents tend not*

> *to allow negotiating…kids want their views to be considered where[as] parents view kids should not have say, they [kids] like they should have say* (a young man from Melbourne)

Youth–parent power struggles and misunderstandings can result in mistrust, tension, precarious relationships and mutual disrespect. This can lead children to manage their affairs independently, without informing their parents of what they are doing because they perceive them as irrelevant in the new context.

> *Parents don't know what is going on. They do know nothing about their children. They do know nothing about what youth are doing. Youth just do what they want to do and they don't tell their parents…They [youth and parents] need more involvement with each other, have discussions, and go together in different places* (a young man from Minneapolis).

Instead of considering their children' views, showing mutual respect of different lifestyles and avoiding judgemental attitudes, disappointed parents criticise their children and their ways of life, which widens the already existing gap between them. Parents' criticism can extend to the ways young people dress, walk, and talk to their parents and elders in general; they emphasise that they (the parents) did not behave like that in Somalia when they were young. Then children perceive their parents' points of view as old-fashioned and irrelevant.

> *There is a sort of misunderstanding like they think differently because most Somali kids grew up in Australia and they straight away pick up Australian culture…and sometimes because of different culture your parents frown when they see you doing something because they didn't use it in Somalia* (a young man from Melbourne).

These misunderstandings and parents' attempts to keep children under control can lead to rebellion and ultimately the children may leave their families to live with their peers. Some young people in Minneapolis or Melbourne apply for government housing. However, when these young men face unexpected financial challenges, they may return home and conform to their parents' demands. It is indeed a clash of cultures, in which parents strive to keep their children away from mainstream influences and remain religious, Muslim Somalis, while youngsters want to behave like their Australian/American counterparts.

> *If you say this is haram, that is haram and you don't explain that is very dangerous attitude…some of them (boys) leave home… They apply house and stay their own ways, some join their friends too. Then when they face tough life, because the income they receive is not enough for rent, food and other expenses…or when disagree with their housemates, they [youths] return back to their families, then say sorry to their mothers. Because at beginning, they think they can stand their own way, but they face different realities* (a young man from Melbourne)

> *It is hard communication [both laugh]…they don't discuss…they [parents] dictate them [youth]… They yell a lot. They say do this and this, and don't do this, I don't know. [Then] They [youth] leave the house or go somewhere, or talk back to them* (a young man from Minneapolis)

Ramadan (2004) explains that the adult Muslim migrants' perspective is that less western culture equals more Islamic culture. Therefore, in order to remain good Muslims, many parents and religious teachers advise and inform young people that:

They should distance themselves from society and be not only vigilant but even radical with regard to the prohibitions …they [adult migrants] feel better in their isolation, in the end, this is easiest and safest. Confrontation with the other [culture] is dangerous…we [Muslim migrants] enjoy talk that affirms us in these feelings in the mosques and at conferences and seminars, speakers who vigorously refer to the prohibition, insist on 'our essential difference' 'our distinctiveness' because of the excellence of our religion 'our necessary distance' find an audience that is emotionally receptive and supportive …this world outside… is a fiction….daily life is not as clear as our speeches… we may well be satisfied with clear speeches that make us no concessions, but around the mosques, after conferences, young people have school friends, listen to music, go to the cinema…cultural environment, television and their younger cotemporaries inevitably touch the hearts and minds of those who live in Europe or the United States and the answer lies more in learning to manage this impact than in denying or rejecting it (Ramadan, 2004, pp. 217-19).

5.3 Language Difficulties

Big, big issue…some of them [parents] don't speak English language but the son or girl, ma'sha'allah (Allah is great) knows English language well. Sometimes it is possible for children to understand parents' Somali language but get them back into English…So, they just have very simple understanding with their parents…she [mother] says this is my mistake…If I spoke with him in Somali language during his childhood, he could speak today good Somali language…I pushed him to speak English to improve his language so he forgot Somali language (a young man from Melbourne).

As the quote above implies, some young participants and their parents have significant misunderstandings because of language difficulties, and this is confirmed by the literature. Language barriers compound the lack of meaningful communication between first and second generations of Somalis (Clyne, and Kipp, 2005, p. 21).

There were discrepancies between participants' perceptions of the language barrier between them and their parents. The majority of young interviewees in both countries said that they communicate with their parents in a mixture of Somali and English. The determining factor is the generational difference – most young men who grew up in Australia or in the US cannot speak good Somali, whereas most Somali parents cannot speak good English. In this environment, young people and parents blend English and Somali in order to communicate. This phenomenon is described by researchers "as code-switching and/or language blending that are strategic in nature" (Shepard, 2005, p. 164). Parents' mixture of Somali and broken English is an indicator of their relative cultural adaptation to the new environment, whereas children's use of mixed languages is a sign of a continuation of Somali culture. Young male participants in this study revealed that siblings and Somali peer groups communicate in English, indicating that younger people's communication occurs along generational lines. Other studies have also found that most Somali children communicate in English (Clyne and Kipp, 2005; Oikonomidoy, 2005).

> *maybe Somali[language] plus English, mixture you know, we learnt how to mix both languages together, we create our own language you know, instead of saying chair we say 'Chair-ka' we make it Somali, then moms can easily understand it*(a young man from Melbourne).

> *The child understands his mum…because she is around him 24/7, he sleeps in the home, stays in the home, so, somehow, some ways they gonna understand each other, you know, in different ways. If she likes she speaks some broken English language and he may speak some broken Somali language. Most children speak broken Somali. You can see 18 years old born here who speaks like baby language, broken Somali language* (a young man from Minneapolis).

A number of young men in both Melbourne and Minneapolis believe that the motivation for parents to communicate with their children in English is to help the children to grasp English and study well. However, as the response below indicates, some youth believe that good parents are the ones who speak with their children in Somali. The second response below also suggests that, as young people grow up and their Somali remains poor, they feel embarrassed and guilty that they cannot speak in their mother tongue.

> *You can see now a Somali mum of 40 years old who tries to speak with her child in poor English…I swear by Allah, I am surprised!!! Because they think the child will get good job, parents believe that strengthens their children's English from childhood, but good parents talk with their children in Somali language, and children look like they want back to Somalia because of their good Somali language*(a young man from Minneapolis).

> *Some parents speak to their children in English rather than Somali language…if parents speak with them in Somali language, children couldn't lose it…sometimes it is mixed. They talk in Somali, they talk in English but children among them speak English….the more you get old the more you feel ashamed that you don't speak your own language* (a young man from Melbourne).

From a different perspective, one young man in Melbourne suggested that instead of speaking with children in Somali, parents should learn English and speak with their children in English, not in Somali. He sees this as practical because the language that children use at school and in public is English. According to him, speaking with children in English will help the children to improve their English, which will lead them to better educational performance.

> *They live in this country, so, by saying don't speak English at home, tend to cut off the practice they need it at the young age. I remember when I was in primary school, I was told not to speak English at home* (a young man from Melbourne).

As this statement indicates, a few young interviewees' parents encourage them to speak Somali. This is, however, at odds with Clyne's and Kipp's (2005, p. 21) conclusion that Somali parents tend to speak with their children in Somali and that most children reply to them in Somali.

A number of formal and informal interviewees in Melbourne and Minneapolis revealed that many parents prefer to speak to their children in English in order to learn English from them:

> *I swear by Allah, parents sometimes learn from you. They learn from their kids. There are some parents who before they judge their children, listen to them…they know that children can not be beaten in this country…* (A young man from Melbourne).

5.4 More Connection with Mothers than Fathers

During interviews, the majority of young participants in both cities talked more frequently about their *hooyo*/mother than about their *aabbo*/father, which may indicate that they feel more closely connected to their mothers than their fathers. Such attitudes could be

attributed to gendered parenting styles, where Somali fathers' relationships with their sons are generally authoritarian and distant. Somali mothers' softer, more caring styles, developed through their daily interactions and connections with their children, may be more effective in the new environment in which the child–parent relationship is generally based on negotiation, friendship and consideration (Kapteijns and Arman, 2004). Some children live with both parents, but the father's role is greatly diminished in the new environment, to the extent that children can perceive their fathers and other adult males as uncaring. In contrast, the mother's role is growing in the new environment because she takes on more responsibilities; in some cases, they extend into what are traditionally fathers' responsibilities. Many children live with single mothers and have no male figure in their families. Many families are "broken"; separation and divorce rates are very high in the Somali community. Many families came to the west only with mothers because the fathers had been killed in the civil war. Some of these views are summarised by a young man in Minneapolis.

> *The dad is more careless. People I saw them, all kids I have grown up with them; have mums, their dad probably they don't know where he is, or maybe he is at home but really he don't care… The mom is the one who every day runs after her son and asks [people] "have you seen my son, have you seen my son… they [mothers] care about their kids… When they [boys] see other kids [from the mainstream] are helped by their dads, then they reminisce that they miss something [good]. But the most important person is the mom. Moms are mostly taking both jobs mom's job and dad's job.*

Reflection: I observed that when young men talked about their relationships with parents, family matters and homework, they used the word 'mother' over and over again, but did not say 'father' very much. This is because the mother is the fulcrum of family life in Somali communities in the diaspora. Secondly, around half of Somali households are assumed to be run by single mothers. Moreover, mothers' roles in family and community affairs are increasing in economic, educational and social matters. Fathers' roles and influences are waning. Most fathers are also poorly connected with their children, particularly their sons, for whom, it is assumed, they are mentors and role models.

5.5 Seeking Advice and Consultation

When participants were asked about sources of advice and consultation when dealing with important issues, their responses included – parents, teachers, siblings, friends, and open minded people, but the most common answer was that they seek advice from a person qualified to deal with that particular issue rather than their parents. This is because parents are often perceived by young participants not to have enough understanding of young men's present situation in the new environment. They are also seen as lacking the skills and knowledge to help their children to solve the problems created by the new situation. The phrase "it depends on" what kind of advice you are looking for, was used by most young interviewees. "For *education, I probably go to my teachers, or my…library helper…for other stuff, I don't really seek help for it*" (a young man from Minneapolis).

> *It will depend on the situation the consultation is about, because I tend to go an experienced person in the field to give me that you*

> *know, someone who knows what they talking about, because there is no point to going someone who knows nothing about the topic, and asking advice for those is very useless, but just in general talking about normal problem I face day to day I tend to go that person in the family that I can make connected to speak the language and we can understand where we come from*(a young man from Melbourne).

While some young men, who do not live with their fathers, do not consult with either their fathers or mothers, a few interviewees in both countries who live with their fathers stated that if the issue is serious and private, then they go to their fathers and perhaps their mothers. Shepard (2005, p. 187) also found that most Somali boys and young men who live with both parents seek advice from their fathers rather than from their mothers. They perceive fathers as more educated, knowledgeable and understanding of what goes on beyond family boundaries.

> *It depends on the kind of advice. If it is personal advice, I go to my dad, and if it is job advice, I go to the agency, different advice for different resources…it is always different* (a young man from Melbourne).

> *I like my mum more but I am close to my dad. My dad, he is my best friend. When I have a problem, I talk to him. I am close more with my dad. Because he is a man and I am man… It depends on what it [the problem] is, but I most likely go to my dad. I may also go to my friends. I actually go to my dad, mum and friends basically and teachers…like if it is a serious issue, you go to your family. If it is something like is okay, you go to your friends. If it is something to do with school, you go to your teachers…it is different cases* (a young man from Minneapolis).

One young interviewee in Melbourne who was very religious noted that if he faces some challenges, he simply prays to Allah and does not seek help from Somalis. His view is that Somalis' appearance and their inward life are different and they cannot be trusted because they are spoilt by the new environment.

6. Conclusion

This was a qualitative study focused on the intergenerational conflict between young Somali men and their parents in Australia and US context. It suffices to say that each generation has its challenges and own unique strategies during a social integration process in culturally and linguistically diverse society like Australia and the USA. While the first generation of migrants attempts to hold their culture of origin in the new setting, young generation struggles to keep a balance between their cultural background and the culture of the new hosting country. For that reason, the young generation is defined as a cultural broker.

Language, attitude and cultural conflicts between Somali youth and their parents are huge. This is because of the absence of shared cultural knowledge, meaningful communication, mutual understanding and practices. Young men have been influenced greatly by the new environment compared to their parents who are stuck with their cultural packages they brought from Africa.

Instead of building up good relationships with their children that is based on compassion, consultation, understanding, more friendly style and consideration of their children' views, many Somali parents tend to employ authoritarian strategies similar to the way they had been ~~were~~ treated in Somalia when they were children. However, Somali children are aware of the advantages they have in the new system, and therefore, many of them do not value or pay attention to their parents' orders. For that reason, many Somali parents feel a loss of control over their children whilst children perceive their parents as irrelevant in the new

environment. This intergenerational misunderstanding and cultural conflict entailed mistrust, misconception, tension, and unhealthy relationship between young Somalis and their parents in Australia and the USA and in the West in general.

The difference in itself is not the problem; judgement, assumptions, and miscommunication, however, are the problem. If relationships, approaches and communications are health and appropriate, meaningful understanding and mutual respect are the expected to be the outcome. Therefore, it is crucial that non-judgemental attitudes, respectful approaches, health relationships, and appropriate communication methods should be adopted as principles and put into practices even if we disagree greatly with the opposing person or group (Cornelius, and Faire, 2006, pp. 57-58). Thus, Somali parents and their children in the West should develop mutual respect during their interaction in their everyday life.

In regard to the issues concerning relations with their parents, most young men felt more engaged with and connected to their mothers than their fathers. This is because Somali fathers' parenting style and relationships with their sons are generally perceived to be more authoritarian and remote whereas Somali mother`s parenting style and relationship with their children are softer, interactive, and more a caring style, and that would be more effective in the new environment in which the child–parent relationship is generally based on negotiation, friendship and consideration.

Finally, most young men participated in this study showed that that they seek advice from people qualified to deal with that particular issue rather than their mothers or fathers. This is because young men perceived that their parents have no enough skills and understanding of young men's needs in the new environment, however, young men seek their parents' advice particularly from their fathers when dealing with matters concerning family issues.

Notes

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[2] There is no universal consensus of the definition of the first generation or second generation. Therefore 'first generation' in this context refers to those immigrants or refugees who were born in another country and then migrated or were relocated to another country while they were older than 5 years and then have become citizens and residents in the new country. 1.5 generation refers to those young people who came to the new country younger than 5 years old. They are midway between the first generation and the second generation.Second-generation refers to individuals who were naturally born in the relocated country to one or more parents who were born outside of the new country. [More details for definitions of immigrant generations, please see: Moffett, D (Date unknown), How Is First-Generation Immigrant Defined? (Available online):http://immigration.about.com/od/glossary/f/How-Is-First-generation-Immigrant-Defined.htm]

[3]Technical and Further Education (TAFE) is Australia's largest provider of vocational education and training.In many instances TAFE study can be used as partial credit towards Bachelor degree-level university programs.

[4] ESL stands for English as a Second Language.

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Somalia Security Shaping Factors: Colonial Legacy, Global Conflicts and State Making Process

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Abstract

This study aims to address the incessant security threats that Somalia has been facing for the last five decades. Exclusively, the article attempts to explore and stretch a substantial understanding of the literature and the notion of security in Somalia by trying to puzzle out the link between state building and the security in Somalia. The article utilizes Mohammed Ayoob's concept of Third World security understanding, and argues that the history of state formation and the short experiences of the state building period in Somalia has shaped the internal security vulnerabilities and the social disintegration. The feeble experience of governance and state making process, have contributed significantly to the fragility and state failure, which in turn resulted in and led to -at the same time- the internal security susceptibilities and fragmentation of the society. The study also argues that the colonial legacy and the super power competition in Somalia have shaped the politics as well as its security environment.

Keywords: State making, Security, Colonial Legacy, Somalia

1. Introduction

Located in the horn of Africa, Somalia is the most homogenous country of the African continent ethnically, lingually and religiously. However, the country has been in a devastated civil war for about three decades, and all state institutions have almost collapsed. As a result, Somalia, lacked a functioning and effective government, and these conflicts left the country to be less secure and unstable for a long period. This article aims at contributing to bring a deep understanding to the security studies of the Horn of Africa to elucidate the security threats that Somalia has been facing since its independence in 1960. Exclusively, the paper explores the interaction of state formation, the colonial legacy and the super power's competition on the region, and how their impacts have led to the security vulnerabilities of Somalia. The paper employs Mohammed Ayoob's theory of Third World security understanding and argues that Somalia's security threats, mainly stem from the struggle of state building, and the foreign power's legacy to shape the politics and security environment of Somalia.

Although the Somali security issue is still unfolding, many scholars have already used much ink to analyze and enlighten the causes and consequences of the Somali civil war and more specifically the suffering of the Somali people following the state collapse. Most of these writings centered on either the implication of the war or the causes based on weak leadership or clan-based political culture. This paper acknowledges the merits of all of these arguments, but further argues that a very little attention has been paid to the role of the history of state building and foreign legacy on the instability and vulnerability of the Somalia security. With regard to Mohammed Ayoob's theory, the paper will mainly focus on security in relation to vulnerabilities that significantly threaten, or weaken state structures, both potential and institutional. 1 From that perspective the study attempts to describe the security vulnerabilities to

include the colonial legacy, the state making process in Somalia and the super power competition in the region of Horn of Africa.

The paper is structured into two main sections; first it gives an overall understanding about Mohammed Ayoob's understanding of Third world security, and second, it will discuss and analyze Somali security based on state making and the foreign power's legacy.

2. Mohammed Ayoob's Third World Security Understanding

Security, in traditional international relations literature, is based on two assumptions, which are 1) Security threats from outside of state's border; and 2) These threats are primarily military in nature, which will require a corresponding military response. According to Walter Lippmann:

> *"A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war."*[2]

According to this perspective, the security of a state is external or outwardly directed, to be safe from outside threats. "Citizens of developed Western states routinely take their security for granted until it is challenged by some extraordinary outside threats". [3] However, Mohammed Ayoob argues, that the application of this concept of externally directed security to the Third World context, has created a major conceptual problem. This is so because the major characteristics of the security concept as developed in the Western literature on international relations are at least thoroughly diluted in the Third World. The first fundamental attribute of the traditional understanding of security is external directedness; however, "the sense of insecurity of the Third World, emanates to a substantial degree, from within their boundaries

rather than from outside".[4] The Third world states suffer primarily from internal threats to the security of their state structures and to the regimes themselves.

Since the application of these traditional understandings of international relations security to the Third World context is not enough to understand the scene, Ayoob, argues that the security of these states needs to be looked at from a different perspective. To explain this, Ayoob suggested a number of factors that inherit and contribute to the insecurity of the Third World states.[5]

First: State making and the security of the third world. According to Ayoob, it is unlikely to compare the Third World states to the developed ones, especially in the crucial variable of state making, where the commonality of both is simply having a formal possession of juridical statehood. However, the Third World states have not had adequate time to complete the prerequisite processes of state making and nation building, compared to the ideal type of the modern industrialized states. This drastic shortening of the time frame combined with the initially low level of state power, provide the primary explanation for the sharp internal challenges and the security vulnerabilities that the Third World states are facing today.[6]

Second: colonial legacy and its impact on the third world politics and security. In addition to the internal security vulnerabilities, the world powers have an impact - whether military, political or economic - on the state formation process and the security problematic of the Third World states. For instance, the colonial experience of the most Third World states, have had a predominant influence in shaping their polities and their security environments. One of these security problems created by the colonial experience, for example, is the decisions taken by the colonial powers to divide the ethnic groups into more than one state,

which have been responsible for creating many postcolonial interstate conflicts and many other problems. Somali people are one of the affected victims in this case.

Third: transfer of modern of weapons to the third world. For Ayoob, Sophisticated weapons acquired from developed world to provide security can often, increase prospects of conflict and, therefore, add to the insecurity of Third World states. These weapons from the industrialized countries to the Third World states had exacerbated the intensity and duration of regional and national conflict in Third World states. As a result of the combination of various factors (including, the superpowers' strategy to use arms transfers as political instruments to buy the loyalties of Third World leaders, the leading arms exporters' interest in using arms sales as a major booster for their economies), the Third World's dependence upon arms and military equipment imports from the developed countries has become "the defining characteristic of post-colonial North-South military relations". [7]

3. Somalia security understanding

Similar to other Third World states, Somalia's security threats are mainly caused by its internal environment, and unlike the western concept of externally or outward directed security, these internal security vulnerabilities have led to the fragility and state failure of Somalia, and generally to the regional conflict in the Horn of Africa. While the external security threats incessantly persist, Somalia's internal vulnerabilities shape mainly its security and political environment. The fundamental factors that had destructive repercussions and caused insecurity and political instability are the history of state building process, the of colonial legacy and Cold War policies.

3.1 State making and Somali security

Somalia embodies, according to Seth Kaplan, one of the postcolonial Africa's worst mismatches between conventional state structures and the indigenous customs and institutions. While the Somalis share a common ethnicity, culture, language, and religion, which might seem to be an excellent basis for a cohesive state, yet in reality the Somali people are divided by clan affiliations, which is the most important component of their identity.[8] While this has significant influences to the extent of Somalia's statehood, nevertheless the process and the history of statehood have far more weight to the capacity of the country to handle its internal security pressures, Somalia's state building, like most other Third World countries, has characterized a drastic shortening of the time frame of the various phases during the state making process. The country has experienced merely three decades of governance and statehood, with two of the three, had experienced authoritarian system of governance, political violence and instability.

Somalia's modern statehood started with the country's independence in 1960 and throughout the period from 1960-69 after independence, Somalia was touted in the West as the model of a democracy in Africa, as successful elections had been held in the country,[9] and the anchors of the governmental institutions of Somalia had been set up. However, in 1969, a military coup overthrew the civilian government, banned all political parties, dissolved the parliament and the Supreme Court, suspended the constitution and advocated the scientific socialism of Marxist China and the Soviet Union.[10]

Following 21 years of military rule and dictatorship, Siyaad Barre's regime was eventually forced from power in the early 1991 by armed opposition groups. Hence, the country disintegrated into autonomous or semi-autonomous regional states in the northern part of

the country, or fragmented into feuding militia groups in the south. During this period, Somalia experienced violent conflict and instability in which almost all state institutions have either been damaged or destroyed. Many attempts to restore stability and rebuild the state institutions were made, in which weak transitional governments [11] and then federal government [12] were established as a result of top-down approaches. During this period these governments were faced by armed resistance groups, and yet the country is subject to violence and insecurity.

According to Ayoob, building effective and strong institutions, as well as good infrastructural power of states, require a long enough period of challenges, transformation and growth, that are similar to modern western states which had already undergone through a long and painful process. Somalia, however, lacks that accumulated experience of governance and leadership in its journey of state building process. For instance, as soon as the independence came, new elite started to govern the freshly independent state, comprised of all its inherited institutions, by mimicking structures and forms of the previous era of the colony. These new elite accessed the power to promote their interests and engaged with clannism.[13] The subsequent authoritarian regime was characterized as a low level of institutionalization of political processes, concentration of power in the hands of the ruler, and private appropriation of state resources through corruption.[14]

Likewise, the opposition parties, which are important institutions to guide the government, were almost very weak in the civil rule era in 1960-1969, and lacked the competence to influence the country's politics and government's actions towards a positive trend. Following the military coup in October 1969, all political parties were dissolved and banned any political activities parallel to the revolution. Hence, the opponents fled outside the country and established armed militias based in Ethiopia. These armed rebels based on clan affiliation, thereby limited their appeal

to run a central government.[15] Thus, the infirm and ineffective institutions have resulted to arise security vulnerabilities, and led to the collapse of the Somali state.

To sum up, the security predicament of Somalia is conditioned by the lateness with which the country has arrived at the state-making process. This short period of state making convulsed the security vulnerability, and therefore shaped the internal conflicts of the country.

3.2 Colonial Legacy and Somalia Security

The Geostrategic importance of Somalia, which is directly at the southern end of the Red Sea, across the Arabian Peninsula, and thus located close to major oil-lines, placed Somalia to a foreign struggle for a long period of time.[16]

The scramble for Africa in the last quarter of nineteenth century, Somali people were divided between different colonies with dissimilar systems, managed to create the rudimentary structures of colonial administration, with different schemes of colonialism before and after WWII. This different colonial rule lasted until 1960.[17]

One of the negative results that have shaped Somalia's security till today is the decisions made by the colonies to divide the ethnic Somalis into different territories, which have created a lasting regional tensions and disputes, like the wars in 1964 and in 1977 between Somalia and Ethiopia.

3.3 Cold War and Somalia Security

With the start of the Cold War, the global military rivalry between the U.S. and USSR led to a period of escalating tensions between the superpowers, and divert their conflict to the Third World as proxy

war.[18] The superpowers were mainly concerned about their security by contesting each other outside their borders. Somalia, for its geopolitical importance, was one of the Third World grounds victimized to test the balance of power of NATO and WARSAW's competition on global power politics. The influence of these international forces, as either military, or political made a substantial difference to the fortunes of Somalia's state making enterprise and to the larger security problems of the state. Due to huge amounts of military hardware from the Soviet Union and US, Somalia "became the most militarized state per capita in the Horn of Africa". [19] Consequently, the importance of this influence in the Cold War and the impact of the colonial powers' decisions to divide the Somali territories had caused the permanent tension between Somalia and Ethiopia, and full armed war at some times, in which the worst was in 1977.[20]

As a result of the colonial experience, and the cold war, external factors had predominantly influenced in shaping the Somali politics and its security environment. This had major consequences on the internal security of the country, with one flash point, the war of 1977 against Ethiopia disregarded Somalia's potential internal insecurity vulnerabilities. Certainly, those huge amounts of military hardware from Somalia's former sponsors during the Cold War created a regional tension and ensured a long-term destabilization of the country. [21]

Generally, because of these super power competitions in the region, the Cold War had a negative impact on the Somalia security environment, as the country considered its external security as more momentous than its internal security vulnerabilities.

3.4 Global Counterterrorism and Somali Security

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and emerging of the New World Order, the United States considered Somalia as no longer significant for its foreign policy strategy as the Soviet Union' threat ended. The attempt to save Somalia in 1993 with the UN's authorized mission didn't succeed and ended with unhappy withdrawal in early 1995.

After 9/11, Somalia appeared on the scene, and attracted the eyes of the world in a security measure under the global war against so-called terrorism.[22] Somalia, thus, became an arena for a global war, which, in turn, shaped the internal agenda in political and security dimensions. In this regard, Somalia has witnessed some efforts with gradually intensifying operations. And some "ill-conceived foreign interventions" worsened the situation. In 2005, the signs of confrontation became clear in Mogadishu streets, and at the beginning of 2006, the confrontation was polarized into two groups: ICU and ARPCT. Mogadishu based factional leaders declared "The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT)" on February 2006 and declared a war allegedly supported by the US, against Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a group of Islamic courts that united themselves to form a rival administration to the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia.[23] This war became a prolonged war and still is continuing.

Another time, security concern became the propelling force of the West's interest in Somalia.

Global Counterterrorism war became the preceded agenda and dominated the operations and the projects sponsored by the international community in Somalia. However, the security predicament is merely a part, not the whole of Somalia's problem. In

addition, the security problem in Somalia has resulted from the state building failure, and therefore, re-building the state institutions, social re-integration and resolving the grievances resulted from the civil war with a true reconciliation, would have been the biggest challenge for Somalia's state building and security environment.

Generally, starting from the colonial legacy, the Cold war and the global war on terror, Somalia has undergone various influences of the international forces which have shaped its internal and external security environment fallaciously.

4. Conclusion

This article discussed the security threats that Somalia has faced in the post-independence era, and attempted to give a comprehensive understanding on the effect of colonial legacy and super power competition on state building and the security vulnerabilities, as well as state collapse in Somalia. The study argues that Somalia's security threats mainly stem from its internal environment, which can be referred to the inadequate experience and the maturity of state building and governance to overcome and resolve the internal security vulnerabilities and respond to people's needs.

The study also showed that the colonial legacy and foreign power's rivalry in Somalia, has immensely shaped and influenced the security environment of Somalia, and this has been real on the ground since the Cold War and until this era.

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Marketing of Somali Livestock: A Strategic Approach

 Adam Ahmed Hussein

Abstract

Livestock is a leading sector in Somali economy which contributes to the GDP and export earning in hard currency. There have been various challenges facing production, processing and marketing of this sector.

This paper aims to develop and analyze market driven value chain management strategies with holistic marketing approach, by identifying major constraints and opportunities of the livestock value chain. Stages of livestock production and marketing development are also discussed with recommendations of reorganizing livestock value chain system and quality control to improve the overall performance of the cluster.

The proposed marketing strategies focus on livestock infrastructure development access to markets & marketing system, cost effectiveness of inputs and processing, empowerment policy framework, improvement of post-harvest handling facilities, satisfying quality standards and enhancing competitiveness of livestock trading system.

Keywords: Somali Livestock, Marketing, Livestock Marketing, Marketing Strategy, Somalia

1. Introduction

The pastoralist Communities have always had to continuously rely on livestock as their most important source of livelihood. Besides utilizing as a direct and stable food in form of meat and milk, they are also able to trade to meet cash needs for their daily basic needs such as healthcare and education fees.[1]

Pastoralist and rural community have been largely depending on livestock in securing consumption needs and provision of basic services for a long period of time. The entrepreneurship of livestock trading and the private-sector-led export industry have helped the Somali community to economically sustain, particularly, during the prolonged period of civil war. Livestock from pastoral production systems accounts for almost 90% of Somalis' consumption and meets the demand for red meat.[2]

Somalia has a traditional livestock sector based on nomadic pastoralism. The growing private sector has led export industry, and the livestock sub-sector to dominate the economic clusters, generating approximately 40% of National GDP and providing 60% of job opportunities (about 75% of the agricultural workforce) and earnings about 80% of foreign currency. Approximately 90% rural households' income is derived from this sub-sector.[3]

Many of Somalia's productive sectors, already weak before the civil war, have been damaged by decades of armed conflict and state collapse. The livestock sector - historically the most productive part of the Somali economy - has survived relatively well, due in part to its relative autonomy from government services.[4] Somalia exported around five million heads of livestock in 2014 to the Gulf countries, and this indicates the highest number of live animals exported by Somalia for 20 years.[5]

Exported livestock is used to exchange for imports of different basic and production goods required for running the country's economy which is working in unregulated environment, unconventional system and without the leading role of formal state institutions. Thus, the livestock export has a major impact on the country's overall food security and promotion of different sectors of the Somali economy.[6]

However, the collapse of relevant public institutions and the lack of nationwide - government controlled livestock marketing policies and strategies led to inefficiencies in livestock value chain leading to high transaction costs, unstable markets, prices and weak competitive position in foreign markets.

A number of Livestock development studies conducted in Somalia identified constraints and opportunities in the major segments of the livestock value chain, for example, production, processing and marketing activities.

This paper attempts to analyze the current condition of Somali livestock, and recommends fundamental and competitive strategies for Somalia's livestock marketing. The main objectives of the study are:

- To analyze the current condition of the livestock cluster, by indicating the obstacles and the opportunities of livestock marketing in local and international markets.
- To provide marketing strategies through value chain management processes.
- To provide recommendations in an improvement of competitiveness of livestock marketing strategies.

2. Livestock Production & Population

The situation analysis of Somali livestock cluster revealed that livestock production and productivity of agro-pastoral and pastoral systems are constrained by several factors including environmental change and climate variability emerging from frequent droughts, floods and heavily on pasturing and water tensions as well as pests and diseases that compromise livestock production.

Other constraints of livestock production are inability to extension services, limited access to financial services, traditional institutions, ineffective mechanisms in livestock production and loss of common property resources. Post-harvesting in the livestock sector limited investment by the private sector in livestock sector due to limited financial facilities economic trends inflation and exchange rate, less capital and lack of effective production policies, and social trend like urbanization, Ineffectiveness care of consultant institutions to livestock developers, and lack of incentives from governments are also major concerns.

Somali livestock sector is dominated by small producers. Therefore, stakeholders particularly private investors should interfere to develop, support, and enable the cluster development strategies in complementary with national agricultural policies.[7]

There has not been an official census on Somali livestock since 1989. At that time a detailed field study was done by UNDP in partnership with FAO and USAID which presented in human development report of Somalia 2001. The report indicated that the total wealth of livestock in Somalia was estimated with 42 million head.[89]

In 1999 data gathered by the Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU) estimated a total of 38.9 million heads in Somalia.[10] The data revealed that livestock are distributed in considerable numbers over five geographical zones in Somalia with the possibility of interchangeable because of multiple factors.[11] The study also disclosed that camels are the most important domestic animal in terms of biomass and are well represented in every zone; most cattle are in the two southern zones; In contrast, sheep are far more numerous in the north and to a lesser extent in the centre than they are in the south; There are large numbers of goats in the north with substantial numbers in the south, but very few in the centre.

3. Livestock Marketing

Marketing means more than selling, in general, marketing is part of the holistic process of producing, promoting and pricing a commodity.[12] Marketing is a societal process by which individuals and groups obtain what they need and want through creating, offering, and exchanging products and services of value freely with others.[13]

Livelihood diversification is a key means for sustaining pastoral livelihoods; access to markets is a key role in supporting diversification.[14] Considerable evidence shows the degree to which diversified livelihoods and investments can assist pastoralists to sustain their livestock-based economies, especially during droughts and other shocks.[15]

3.1 Supply Chain Value of Marketing Process:

The processing from production to marketing, the policy makers, and producer communities should make strategic intervention to the following challenges:

1. The shortage of health care and transporting livestock technology.

2. The inadequate of enabling infrastructures like roads, quarantine centers, promotional systems and techniques.
3. The poor value addition of trade services on boards of neighboring like health checking food and water for waiting period of departure or sell.
4. The local market facilities needs such as slaughter houses, meat and milk storage facilities,
5. Inadequate drainage and waste disposal facilities and reducing unhygienic practices especially in handling livestock products and impropriate containers.

All above factors, among others, require the attention and collaboration of local communities and the administrations, both at a regional and national level. The local relevant actors should develop livestock policies, ensure quality standards and inject the necessary capacity in the current institutions engaged in handling the whole livestock value chain process. These steps are necessary because ineffective processing of livestock supply chain value have caused -in recent years- a decrease in smartness and weight of the life animal in international markets. Furthermore, the quality of meat is affected by the long distance from the markets and the inadequate and obsolete equipment used in transporting livestock to international markets like Gulf States Yemen and Egypt.

3.2 Livestock Marketing

3.2.1 Livestock Local Marketing

In addition to small-scale seasonal crops and fruits production, Somalia depends on livestock products such as meat, milk, skins, and wools in furniture, luggage, clothing and food.

The livestock marketing system, as Bailey et al., (1999: 6) write consists of "pastoralists who raise animals, traders who buy animals in and around permanent or periodic markets throughout the rangelands". They hope to sell the livestock "at a profit elsewhere. [16]

Livestock local markets has taken different forms[17] but share common characteristics, as they are small size markets, with diverse kinds of animals, mostly they are seasonal markets near to the big towns. Local markets use the commercial system of distribution and services because all parties should have full information about the market; the intermediates (*gedislay*) serve both batchers (slaughter) and exporters.

In analyzing livestock markets, there are some dimensions that should be taken in to account: pastoralist willingness, where pastoralists appear generally unwilling to liquidate animals to the point that their herd size may prove insufficient to ensure household food security.

3.2.2. Foreign Marketing

Since the independence in 1960, Somali governments supported livestock marketing efforts, and the first five year (1963-1967) strategic-plan for economic development gave priority to agricultural sector. The plan was developed on the assumption that livestock exports earnings and plantation of crops would increase if there are better roads, transportation, ports, and irrigation works. Livestock Development Agency was formed in 1965. Veterinary services, provision of water, and of holding grounds, inoculation, and transportation means were improved. Pastoralists embraced with enthusiasm to the prospects for wealth maximization through entering the international markets of livestock. **"**In the early 1960 the exported livestock value approximately doubled; livestock soon surpassed bananas as Somalia's leading export**"**.[18]

The Livestock Development Agency had taken the responsibility of getting competitive prices for Somali livestock and its products in international markets. The agency emphasized veterinary services, provision of water and pasture in holding grounds for the livestock when they undergoing inoculation and transportation. The agency helped the pastoralist's community in providing animal health care system and protecting grassing areas. The newly born Somali state paid greater attention to raise local awareness about the domestic production, self-reliance and economic sufficiency to achieve political, economic and cultural full liberalization.[19]

As a result, the livestock trade grew, domestic production increased as well as international level. Local markets were promoted by the government support and Somali currency (shilling). The government gave high priority to livestock development, for its being the largest economic resource of Somali economy. The main challenges were the weakness of the government and the persistent effects of droughts from 1963 to 1967.

After the military coup in 1969, the Somali government maintained the support of livestock segments by activating livestock agency, and development strategies. In addition to the ministry of livestock, livestock marketing agency, agency of hides and skin, agency of national grassing, agency of rural development were established. Although most of the economic sectors had been nationalized, the livestock sector remained yet in the hands of the private sector.

The primary importers of Somalia's livestock were Arab states**,** particularly Yemen, Gulf States and Egypt. In June 1983, the government of Saudi Arabia put an embargo on Somalia's livestock claiming that rinderpest had been detected in Somali livestock which made them unsafe. Alternatively, Saudi businessmen invested in

Australian ranches; while the kingdom was, at the same time, seeking market for their new oil product. Whatever the cause, the ban created a large deficit in the Somalia's national budget and negative impact on the livelihood of livestock producers and a great loss to the export trade of Somalia as 70 percent of export revenue of the government was from livestock.[20]

The major challenges of marketing livestock are the severe drought in 1974, the war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977 and 1978, and the escalating armed conflicts in the northern regions, knowing that 80 percent of livestock exports go through Berbera Port. Other major obstacles to livestock export were the lack of adequate communications infrastructure, good roads, transport means, banking and financial services.

Somalia's five-year plan for the period 1987-1991 largely reflected that international pressures and doctoring policies led by International Monetary Fund (IMF) US Agency for International Development (USAID) allowed private banks to operate. However, USAID advised payment rising for those useful clusters in public sector, farming and livestock projects. As a result of the civil war in many areas, the economy deteriorated rapidly in 1989 and 1990. Previously, livestock exports from northern Somalia represented nearly 80 percent of foreign currency earned, but these exports came to a virtual halt in 1989. Shortages of most commodities, including food, fuel, medicines, and water, occurred virtually countrywide, followed the fall of the regime in late January 1991.[21]

Somali livestock is preferred in both domestic and international markets; the traditional foreign markets are Arab Peninsula**,** particularly Gulf States, and Saudi Arabia is the most important market for Somalia livestock products.

The price of livestock in these markets has doubled in last ten years because of improvement in health conditions and trusts of importers in the quarantine centres in both Berbera and Bossaso (the most active ports for livestock export) and Mogadishu.

Table (1): Somali Livestock End Market Price

Prices in End Markets	US$ Per Head			
	Sheep	**Goat**	**Camel**	**Cattle**
Bahrain	180	180	N/A	N/A
KSA	130	130	700	N/A
Kuwait	150	150	N/A	N/A
Qatar	140	140	N/A	505
Oman	110	110	N/A	600-650
UAE	104	104	N/A	700-750
Egypt	500	500	2000	N/A
Yemen	140	140	N/A	500-800

Source: USAID, Somali livestock End Market Study, 2013

3.3 Livestock Marketing Support Projects

There were some projects funded by mostly international agencies but unfortunately the projects did not have baseline data to enable impact to be quantified. There is no accurate, appropriate and complete data on activities being undertaken and their associated costs. It is therefore difficult to carry out cost/benefit analyses of each project completed to enable and know the true impact of each.

For instance, in 2000 the laboratories that could have been used to confirm the presence of disease and effectiveness of the functional case came out with tangible result that is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia allowed to take Somali livestock after the declaration of the official bans

in 1999 and 2000, and before any credible animal health inspection and certification was put in place, the United Arab Emirates Also allowed the export of Somali meat into its market before the export slaughter facilities met international operating standards or established credible quality assurance systems.[22]

The Somali livestock sector has also been aided by the construction of four modern slaughterhouses, four meat markets and three livestock markets while FAO has also developed a livestock certification system to help ensure quality.[23]

The importing countries have appreciated the support given to date by EC funded projects as shown by the positive comments by the UAE, Yemen, Oman and KSA veterinary officials in formal functions. The acceptance in February 2009 by large Somali livestock traders to use the Berbera and Bossaso quarantine stations to access the KSA markets supports this line of argument.

Capacity building efforts that focused on the public sector supporting the development policy and legal framework helped in the creation of an enabling environment for the private sector.

The livestock marketing and export chain over the last few years have been to improve compliance and acceptability of Somali livestock products. Between 2004 and 2008 EC spearheaded improvement and diversification of Somalia's livestock trade and marketing project. The project facilitated the development of capacity (physical and human) within public (ministries and municipalities) and private sector organizations to promote trade transactions. The grading system in export quality livestock and developing functional livestock marketing information system have been addressed.

Further efforts are needed to address outstanding constraints and to consolidate improvements bound to grow livestock in most of Somalia and to extend marketing efforts to cover meat and hides and skins.[24] These efforts and activities are essential to:

a. The protection of Somali livestock assets and market access should be continued, especially as the facilities for livestock marketing are still at rudimentary.
b. It is possible to commercialize livestock and meat production, but all interventions should not discount that livestock production in Somalia is about livelihoods not only marketing.
c. Development projects of the community should inject marketing projects into sustainability.
d. Improvement of market infrastructure must be in line with community aspirations and needs.

4. Livestock Marketing Strategies:

The holistic marketing approach used in modern stage of marketing devotion uses a bundle of strategies to comprehensive marketing management by choosing target markets, getting, keeping, and growing customers, through creating, delivering, and communicating superior customer value from the goods and services.[25]

Drawing from the constraints and opportunities identified along the value chains, strategic plan should address the constraints identified and facilitate exploiting opportunities.

This gives a direction of the strategic plan which is market oriented with a mission of enhancing the productivity and competitiveness of the livestock sector in agro-pastoral and pastoral systems of Somali livestock sector. The strategies suggest to improve organize areas of livestock

value chain development i.e. production, processing and marketing to improve the overall performance of the component.

Private sector gives more consideration to the risks associated with the livestock business by focusing on marketing strategies. Any effective change happens in the business environment will ~~make~~ have an impact on the production and marketing process.

4.1 Production and Productivity Strategies

Considering the major constraints to increasing livestock productivity, two priority areas should be focused on:

The first: the consequences of environmental harshness and climate effects like drought and floods that cause fast depletion of grazing and water resources and high livestock death and body deterioration that effect negatively the market price of livestock. The floods have positive effects on forage availability but cause epidemic diseases, causes of high mortality rate of the various livestock species**".** [26]

The second: The strategies of improving production and productivity of the sector should be included in strengthening resilience of the pastoral systems by minimizing livestock losses and developing mechanisms for a quick recovery of the sector after crises situation. In order to improve the capacity of pastoralists, anticipate crises situation.

In order Somali livestock to have effective marketing strategies which will provide a good ground but not a good enough, this paper proposes the following strategies about livestock infrastructure development strategies and market access strategies

Further, these strategies should be based on conducting scientific research on field development, livestock marketing and animal export

policy made by both at regional and national levels.[27] Livestock marketing strategy formulation is the responsibility of the public authorities and the leading livestock export companies from private sector.

Livestock marketing strategy evaluation -like every other product- should consider standards of quality, cost, time, and price as well as customer satisfaction. The livestock is unique product because of having the following features:

1. Livestock needs for food, water, breathing air and relaxation.
2. It may moves by itself to the market place.
3. It cannot be carried with every means like crop product for instance.

Therefore, more variables should be considered in order to set a prioritized strategic plan of marketing for this valuable unique product- the livestock.

Numerous of independent factors influencing livestock marketing should be identified: External environments such as political, legal, economic, cultural, social trends which provide opportunities and threats. Internal factors like human forces, capital, finance, leadership, skills, systems, quality, and reputation of the organization are factors determine the level of competitiveness or vulnerability of the livestock marketing organizations, for example competition in foreign markets, customer satisfaction and price leading.

Major infrastructural facilities such as roads, safe water and telecommunication systems and holding grounds require heavy investments, that only private sector can not initiate. While the domestic livestock trade has increased in volume in the past two decades, there has

not been a corresponding improvement in infrastructure in livestock-producing areas to benefit this crucial activity. This requires a meaningful investment in infrastructure to facilitate safer, faster and affordable delivery of livestock and livestock products to domestic and export markets. Berbera port in Somaliland and Bossaso port in Puntland have been active spots for livestock export, but the roads linking livestock-producing areas with major markets and the two ports are in a poor condition. The authorities of Somaliland and Puntland should prioritize infrastructure development to facilitate people and livestock movements.

African Development Bank proposed livestock infrastructure projects comprising the following projects, among many others that considered being an opportunity for development in Somalia.

a. **Livestock infrastructure development:** Livestock infrastructure development includes two sub-components Firstly, construction or rehabilitation of marketing physical infrastructure like the roads, transportation means, livestock marketing centers etc. Secondly, development of livestock service like health service, milk manufacturing, and livestock slaughter facilities, quarantine stations & veterinary laboratories, and veterinary check points.

b. **Capacity building for pastoralist community:** focuses on community mobilization, farmer organizations, field demonstration, staff and farmer training, promotion of women participation, environmental protection and social management activities.

c. **Life services and fattening:** Fattening livestock and nutrition are more important initiatives; fattening ranches may be situated on private lands and managed privately with minimal investment. Primary focus should direct to develop policy, regulatory and institutional framework, organizing water and pasture, dipping facilities, and veterinary services.

d. **Conflict resolution over resource usage management:** People have various ways to use for such resources like forests, water, pastures and

land; and want to manage them in different ways. Such resources can be successful if properly used them, but can lead them to conflict when there is competition over material goods, economic benefits, property or power in land controlling, and when some perceive that their values, needs or interests are under threat. Community-based natural resource conflicts may occur at the local level, but often involve regional and national level.[28] The intensity of conflict varies greatly - from confusion and frustration among members of a community about poorly communicated development policies, to violent clashes among groups over resource ownership, rights and responsibilities.[29]

4.2 Marketing and Market Access Strategies

There are numerous constraints to access the market and exploit the opportunities in agro-pastoral and pastoral systems like poor political and economic infrastructures example security factors, foreign relations national economic policies and physical structures such as roads, holding grounds, water, dipping facilities, and veterinary services.

4.2.1 Access and Benefit from Markets:

There are many factors limited to benefit from market access like shortage in market information, high cost of production inputs, multiple taxes, lack of public motivation, poor quality product. So, the marketing strategy should be set on the national vision that regards to achieve significant income growth of livestock export. The theme of the strategy should recognizes regional markets as the main markets for livestock and livestock products, and that regional trade can greatly be improved through initiatives for regional economic communities(associations).

4.2.2 Promotion of Marketing System

To promote marketing system requires developing educational direct institutions which involve capacity building of livestock marketing institutions and agencies as well as institutes and faculties that offer diplomas and degrees in livestock specializations, these provide the accurate information about the livestock markets, competition, demand, and price, market accessibility, distribution ways and shipment systems, substitute products and their price and services management through conducting marketing research and livestock studies. Higher education institutions can contribute marketing system promotion by producing skilled marketing forces that can promote livestock commerce and export, they aware about the competition and marketing strategies.

4.2.3 Cost of Inputs and Processing

Functional marketing require options that enhance sector abilities to successfully participate in an effective marketing training on price quality relationships or collective action of establishing the market facilities - a task that ranges from investing in basic infrastructure to creating grading systems that reward investors for producing quality products, high cost of inputs, multiple taxes, inappropriate incentives, inefficient institutions to enforce action to create successful public private partnerships.

4.2.4 Handling Post Harvest Facilities

Post-harvest handling is the stage of production immediately following harvest, including cooling, cleaning, sorting and packing. For example, the instant a livestock product like milk or meat is removed from the animal, or the animal is slaughtered, the product begins to deteriorate. So, post-harvest treatment largely determines the final quality

of the product, whether it is sold for fresh consumption, or used as an ingredient in a processed food product.

4.2.5 Satisfying Quality Standards

In the developing countries, including Somalia, dietary changes are driving a massive increase in demand for livestock products and consideration of the quality. The increased demands for livestock products can be satisfied from domestic resources in Somalia with affordable cost which has impacts, and the pressures for change within marketing systems. A supply-side response has been the continued development of large-scale, urban-based industrial livestock production systems that in many cases give rise to environmental concerns.

4.2.6 Enhancing Competitiveness of Livestock Trading System

To enhance the key trading system weaknesses requires to developing appropriate pasture land facilitating livestock movement, setting competitive price, increasing investment in livestock services emphasizing quality of outputs, getting solution for resource use conflict. Competitive advantage is being different from others in terms of product features, application of skills and knowledge, price, quality, delivery-schedules and after sale service. There are several trends which should be taken into the account that emerged from technological innovations and development like product/service innovations, partnerships, agencies, franchises, economies of scale of the product, accessibility of targeted market segments and niche markets.

5. Recommendations on Promotional Strategies

The writer presented a bundle of recommendations different stake holder like government, business sector and livestock owners and the community.

1. The government

- Central government should tirelessly work with regional and states authorities on political and security stabilisation especially in pasture areas, and establish legal and policy framework for livestock production and trade.
- Somalia has a relative advantage in the livestock sector in regional trade, to retain this advantage, a long term plan is critical to maintain livestock production and protect them from the negative effects of environmental and climate changes like draughts, natural diseases and manmade disasters. This kind of risk can be managed if the authorities provide pasturing reservation areas, introduction of new and improved cross breeds, promotion of zero grazing/quality fodder production, and forestry management system.
- Government should provide human development strategies aimed to upgrading working forces skills through training programs and continuing education; it should support the institutes and the faculties that provide livestock relative specializations educating work forces involved livestock marketing.
- It should take affirmative action in strengthening of mutual relationship with importers and other neighbouring and regional states may have effects on our livestock trade strategies through diplomatic efforts affecting policies of importing countries to foster and raise their positive attitudes towards Somali livestock products, by enhancing the role of Somali embassies foreign countries to which Somalia export its livestock.
- to standardize slaughter systems and sale venues of livestock products and develop animal slaughtering policies and procedures and enhance purchasing capacity of the consumers through offering social justice and opportunities of labour, resource mobilization, education and

trainings for sustainable development of the local communities and national economic growth.

2. Business sector and livestock trades

- should develop marketing strategies to overcome both internal and external marketing obstacles, by improving distribution channels and facilitating appropriate means in both land and sea transportation.
- Should establish reliable health institutions that able to expand veterinary service and grassing management.
- Should encourage small entrepreneurs to join in corporations to gain a capacity for the competition in the international markets to minimize risks and maximize profits, having optimum capital structure on livestock.
- Field survey and deep studies are required to find out which kind of changes and development should be done in livestock cluster and to analyse critical constraints and opportunities by conducting marketing research, establishing livestock research centre, consultation and training centres in coordination with field experts should be designed with high priority for private investments.

3. Livestock owners

- Should create attractive environment for local and foreign investment, taking into consideration all national, regional and international policies.
- Should work in mutual integration manner to prevent from resource based conflict and cooperate to over through environmental hardship and resource scarcity and maintain ethics and social culture of *takaful*.
- To extend ground facilities and improve veterinary services and inspection in both production fields and export doors to maintain livestock quality through effective service in feeding, watering and other services.

4. Community institutions

- Financial sector should enhance banking services provided to livestock producers and traders for example to enter *mudaraba* or *musharakah* or *murabaha* financing with them, to issue guarantee certificate and also being aware to international competitors' strategies.
- Developmental projects and foreign aids should be channelled to the agriculture or livestock development. It and mutual interests of different stakeholders involved to the livestock marketing environment.
- Raising awareness programs should promote using technology to improve livestock business profitability, and networking to share R&D with the industry and other forms of livestock development projects.

However, differentiation is an important solution to revive the industry that will improve margins and develop a more sophisticated trade. This provides opportunities for quality products, which ultimately increase demand and secure market share but not always improve price.[30]

6. Conclusion

From the above description, priority consideration has to be given to infrastructure development, capacity building programs, conflict resolution on resource uses, marketing system, cost effectiveness of inputs and processing marketing strategies, by engaging all participants. It should also be given priority to creating an environment conducive for legal and policy framework, as well as coordinating developmental assistant projects which address satisfying quality standards and competitiveness of trading system. Strategy evaluation should complete quality standards of the product in cost, time, price and customer satisfaction.

Finally, Somalia should develop techniques to overcome both internal and external marketing obstacles, improve distribution channels and transportation means, enhance forestry management system, provide training and continuing education programs and enhance diplomatic relationship with imported countries and regional states that may affect livestock trade strategies for sustainable development of Somali economy.

Notes

[1] For more details see: Peter D. Little (2004) "Pastoralism in a Stateless Environment: The Case of the Southern Somalia Borderlands" University of Kentucky.

[2] For more detail, see FAO/World Bank/EU. (2004). Somalia: Towards a Livestock Sector Strategy. Report No.: 04/001 Ic-Som Date: 29 April 2004

[3] Central Bank of Somalia – Economy and Finance. Somalbanca.org. http://www.somalbanca.org/ economy-and-finance.html. Retrieved 30 December 2010.

[4].UNDP (1998). Human Development Report: Somalia". Nairobi: p.3

[5] The revelation was made by (FAO) May 1, 2015. This figure included 4.6 million goats and sheep, 340,000 cattle and 77,000 camels, estimating their total worth at US$360 millions.

[6] African Development Bank, (2010). "Regional Study on the Sustainable Livestock Development in the Greater Horn of Africa", January, 2010.

[7] Since the independent of Somalia the need for development projects in the livestock sector has been considerable in scale and type. After the Somalia failed as state the demand for aid became double (emergency aid and developmental assistance). Different relief organizations attempted to support the rural and agricultural people but the circumstances of instability and high risk in the regions constrains this willingness. The target groups and beneficiaries were either localized as is the case with milk, fodder and local

slaughter facility development or wide spread throughout the country as is the case with Render-pest eradication, support to livestock marketing, slaughter infrastructure and animal health services delivery and other inputs.

[8] Guide to African Markets. British Chambers of Commerce. 2007. http://viewer.zmags.com/getMag Pdf.php? mid=dqrpw. Retrieved 20 August 2010

[9] There is no updated reliable statistics on the population of Somali livestock, but there are different estimations. In 1988 Somali ministry of planning presented 44.3 million of heads as–Ahmed A Elmi (1991) illustrated in his book "**livestock Production in Somalia with especial emphasize on camels**".In 1999 FSAU which is managed by FAO, presented "**Map of five ecological zones of livestock distribution"** with total number of 42.1 million. On *April 2004* FAO presented in "**Somalia:Towards a Livestock Sector Strategy**" with total number of 38.9 million of heads.The draft report of Istanbul conference on Somalia 32-23 May 2010 presented that Somali has more than 50% of livestock in Africa with total number of 34.3 million heads. Therefore, if this numerical evidence is accurate then that means there is decreasing in livestock population in Somalia.

[10] FAO/World Bank/ EU (2004). Somalia, Towards a Livestock Sector Strategy. p. 27

[11] The factors affecting the distribution of the livestock are: 1) Drought which causes movement in internal regions and cross border; 2) Rainy season and the dry season; 3) Unrest security situations because of tension or armed conflict; 4) Fluctuation for the sake of the export; 5) In addition to that sometimes personal factors affect the study and qualitative analysis. Therefore, Density of animal and their scope will be different by region within two sequence period of time.

[12] The initial steps of livestock marketing include: To identify the demand level and select the market place, To estimate production costs and cash flow needs, To recognize or determine quality level of animals being produced to satisfy the market demand, To contact to the buyers who will interested in

that type of animal, The final step in the marketing chain is to evaluate the pricing and delivery alternatives, and decide which alternative to be used.

[13] Philip Kotler (2002), "Marketing Management", Millennium Edition. Custom Edition for University of Phoenix. p. 7

[14] Diversification means to support livestock production by allowing herders to better manage risk through diversifying activities and investments. For example, herders depend on selling animals to finance initial investments in trade and education, while ensuing revenues from non-livestock activities can support pastoralists. Cash earned from livestock trade, farming and other non-herding activities not only facilitates livelihood diversification, it also finances purchases of veterinary medicines, school fees and, increasingly, feed and fodder to sustain pastoralist production.

[15] Little PD. (2009). Income diversification among pastoralists: lessons for policy makers. Policy Brief 3.COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) and Pastoral Areas Coordination, Analysis and Policy Support (PACAPS) Program, Tufts University, Medford, MA.

[16] .Bailey, D., C.B. Barrett, P.D. Little and F. Chabari. 1999. Livestock markets and risk management among East African pastoralists: a review and research agenda. GL-CRSP Pastoral Risk Management Project Technical Report No. 03/99. Utah State University, Logan. P. 46.

[17] Some of the forms of livestock local markets are as following: 1) Co-existed livestock market: The earliest form of livestock market often co-existed with specific locations where people came together to buy and sell the essentials of everyday life. Livestock would usually be brought to the market area of such venues, corralled in temporary pens and exchanged through 'private treaty' haggling between buyers and sellers. 2) Purposed-built market: structured market usually in the towns and cities across the country were the price formation and exchange conditions are well known, with permanent penning and sales. 3) Commercialized Market: The largest market structure in the trade of livestock as multiple transactions that characterize the *saylad* system, whereby company agents purchase livestock directly from pastoralists outside

of the major traditional livestock markets. The larger exporters have found it more profitable to send agents directly to pastoralists in the render places.

[18] Nelson, Harold D. (ed). (1981) Somalia: A Country Study, American University Foreign Area Studies, Washington p 136

[19] Nelson, Harold D. (Ed). (1981) Somalia: A Country Study, American University Foreign Area Studies, Washington p. 87

[20] Metz, Helen Chapin, (Ed). (1992) Somalia: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, p. 165.

[21]Chapin Metz, H. (Ed). (1993) Somalia: a country study. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

[22] Any increase in live animal exports may not be solely due to improved disease surveillance, control efforts, and the associated support to the private or public sectors, but due to other considerations.

[23] FAO (2014) "Somalia registers record exports of 5 million livestock in 2014" http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/283777/icode/

[24] EC (2009) Review and Identification of a Livestock Sector Strategy and Programme toAddress Food Insecurity and Economic Development in Somalia" Final Report – May, 2009.

[25] Philip Kotler (2002), "Marketing Management", Millennium Edition. Custom Edition for University of Phoenix.

[26] EAFF,(2012)"Eat Africa livestock Strategy". P. 22.

[27] Some common strategies mostly used in marketing are focus strategy, diversification strategy, Integration strategy (vertical and horizontal integration) in combination with pricing strategies and competition strategies.

[28] The conflicts range from disputing among local pastures men over the use of land, to conflicts among clans on controlling over woodland. Community-level conflict might involve government agencies, domestic and multinational businesses, politicians, international development agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

[29] Daniel Buckles and Gerett Rusnak, (1999). Conflict and Collaboration in Natural Resource Management; International Development Research Centre; pp. 2-45

[30] Yacob Aklilu, Peter D. Little, Hussein Mahmoud and John McPeak (2013) "Market access and trade issues affecting the drylands in the Horn of Africa"

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LOG Associates (2010) Regional Study on the Sustainable Livestock Development in the Greater Horn of Africa, African Development Bank Group, Nairobi.

Bailey, D., C.B. Barrett, P.D. Little and F. Chabari. (1999). Livestock markets and risk management among East African pastoralists: a review and research agenda. GL-CRSP Pastoral Risk Management Project Technical Report No. 03/99. Utah State University, Logan.

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Guide to African Markets. British Chambers of Commerce.2007. http://viewer.zmags.com/getMag Pdf. Retreived 20 August 2010

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4. The manuscript must be written with Microsoft Word, font Times New Roman, 1.5 line-spacing, size 12 for Roman manuscripts, and size 14 for Arabic manuscripts. All manuscripts must be submitted electronically.
5. The manuscript should be in length of 10-20 pages, of A4 size, with an abstract of 150 to 250 words, and around 5 keywords.
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